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CROSSED WIRES: OUTDATED PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE NLRB’S PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS DECISION

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or the Board) has recently emphasized the need to adjust to the rapid pace of change in modern society.\(^1\) The recognition of employees’ right to use employer-owned email systems for protected activities in its December 2014 Purple Communications decision purported to establish a central pillar of this effort.\(^2\) Purple Communications reversed the NLRB’s 2007 Register Guard holding that employees do not have the right to use employer-owned electronic resources for protected activities.\(^3\) However, the Board’s rationale in Purple Communications reflected an understanding of electronic resources that was more suited to 2007 than to the lives of workers in late 2014. Consequently, an attempt to demonstrate adaptability resulted in a failure to respond to changed circumstances.

Part I of this Note describes the NLRB’s role in protecting collective action in the workplace, as well as its responsibility to adapt its standards to changing social, economic, and technological circumstances. Part II explains that the tension between employees’ collective action rights and employers’ property rights represents one of the fundamental balancing acts the Board must perform as circumstances change. Next, Part III examines how the Board has performed that balancing act in the context of email, including its 2007 Register Guard and 2014 Purple Communications decisions. Part IV demonstrates that workers’ utilizations of diverse electronic communications platforms grew significantly between 2007 and 2014. Part V argues that those changes should have factored into the Board’s analysis in Purple Communications.

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1. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. (BFI Newby Island Recyclery), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 11 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“[T]he primary function and responsibility of the Board . . . is that ‘of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.’ If the Board’s standards fail to adjust to changing circumstances[,] the Board is failing in what the Supreme Court has described as the Board’s ‘responsibility to adapt the Act to the changing patterns of industrial life.’” (first citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979); and then citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)) (internal citations omitted).


3. The Guard Publ’g Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in relevant part and remanded sub nom. Guard Publ’g v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
I. THE ROLE OF THE NLRB IN CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Interpretation and Enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act

The National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) established the bedrock of national labor policy when President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed it into law on July 5, 1935. Congress’s primary goal when it enacted the Act was to encourage unionization and collective bargaining. Sections 7 and 8 of the Act protect employees engaged in union activities from employer retaliation. These two Sections also protect group actions by employees aimed at changing or protesting their terms and conditions of employment, even if no union organizing drive has been contemplated.

The Act vests responsibility for application and enforcement of its mandates with the NLRB. The Board’s jurisdiction extends to all private-sector employers affecting interstate commerce. It performs a unique “quasi-judicial” (administrative and judicial) function to resolve unfair labor practice allegations. A presidentially appointed General Counsel investigates unfair labor practice charges filed by employees, labor organizations, and employers through its Regional Offices. The General Counsel then assumes an advocacy role and issues a complaint if it is determined that a charge has merit. Prosecution of the complaint initially occurs before an administrative law judge, whose decision is then

5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to . . . encourage[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and [to] protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . .”).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), See NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948) (“A proper construction [of Section 7] is that the employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved, or collective bargaining be contemplated.”); see also Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection In the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1673, 1701 (1989).
12. Id. § 153(d); What We Do: Investigate Charges, NLRB.GOV (last visited Oct. 25, 2015, 12:29 PM), https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges [https://perma.cc/8GQH-ARJQ].
13. What We Do: Investigate Charges, supra note 12.
reviewable by the five-member Board. The federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review Board decisions.

The President appoints Board members with advice and consent from the Senate. Traditionally, the President appoints three Board members from the President’s political party and two members from the opposing party. Board members typically vote in accordance with the labor or management preferences of their political party. As a result, Board standards often oscillate between pro-labor and pro-management positions as the White House changes hands.

B. NLRB Responsiveness to Changing Circumstances

The Board has unquestionably faced an evolving landscape over time. Passage of the Act was motivated by the unique circumstances of the Great Depression and the massive worker dislocation that it caused. The statutory language reflects the unique nature of that tumultuous period in

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15. What We Do: Decide Cases, supra note 14. A party may request review of a Board decision from either a court of appeals for the jurisdiction in which it resides or transacts business, or from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Practically speaking, the multiplicity of parties’ court of appeals review options means that Board and Supreme Court decisions are the only mandatory authority in charge investigations, administrative law judge decisions, and Board adjudications. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1963).


19. Turner, supra note 17, at 717–51 (describing thirteen areas in which Board standards have been modified at least once as a result of changes in the political composition of the Board); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 171 (1985) (“[A]brupt changes in policy appear[,] to rework in wholesale major areas of Board law, [and are] often undone three or four years later . . . .”)

20. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act and stating: “Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strike. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances.”); Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting that the Act was “conceived during the Great Depression and founded upon a frank recognition that our boom-and-bust economy was attributable in part to labor-management unrest”); see also Brandon C. Janes, The Illusion of Permanency for Mackay Doctrine Replacement Workers, 54 TEX. L. REV. 126, 127 (1975) (observing that the Act was “part of the great economic reconstruction during the depression of the 1930’s”).
American history. However, the social, economic, and technological circumstances of that time differ vastly from the dynamic characteristics of the modern economy.

Perhaps the most noteworthy change in recent decades from the perspectives of labor, management, and the Board alike has been the precipitous decline in union membership. Private sector union density peaked at an estimated 35% to 37% in the mid-1950s. That figure declined to 20.1% by 1983, and reached 6.9% in 2010. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ most recent studies place the current figure at just 6.7%.

Many supporters of the labor movement believe that unfavorable NLRB standards, particularly during the George W. Bush administration, have been partially responsible for the decline of unionization. A common narrative of such criticisms has developed, categorizing pro-management outcomes as evidence that the agency is “largely irrelevant to the contemporary workplace,” “ossified,” dead on arrival, and,
generally, obsolete. Labor advocates, in sum, viewed the Bush Board as unresponsive to changing circumstances. This criticism specifically targeted perceived unresponsiveness to the growth of technology in the workplace.

However, many observers have conflated adaptability to changing circumstances with political decision-making by the Board. This difficulty is amplified by the Board’s frequent reliance, throughout its history, on purportedly new circumstances to arrive at conclusions that many view as politically motivated. Accordingly, acknowledgment of the need to adapt to changing circumstances has not been limited to Boards controlled by the Democratic Party.

Nonetheless, the Board under the Obama administration has robustly responded to adaptability criticisms, particularly those regarding its approach to technology. The Board has held during the Obama

32. See id. at 282–85; Liebman, supra note 22, at 579; Fisk & Malamud, supra note 27, at 2068–77.
34. See Brudney, supra note 27, at 226 (“The Board’s recent performance has elicited sharp disapproval from legal academics as well as unions. Far from rendering the Act as effective as possible in modern circumstances . . . the Board has undermined a range of employee protections . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
35. The Board’s recent decision on the standard for joint employer status in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. (BFI Newly Island Recycler), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015), provides one such example. The decision emphasized adaptation to changing circumstances as a major reason for an outcome that facilitates union organizing efforts. Id. at 11. However, management proponents complained that the decision was “a case study in unaccountable government.” NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack: The Obama Labor Board Attacks the Franchise Business Model, Wall St. J. (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrb-joined-employer-attack-1440805826. Meanwhile, labor advocates were “sparked” by the decision because “it create[d] an incentive for workers to realize they have power.” Shan Li, On the Record: UCLA’s Victor Narro Explains NLRB ‘Joint Employer’ Ruling, L.A. Times (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-qa-nlrb-20150903-story.html. See also Fisk & Malamud, supra note 27, at 2043–44 (arguing that changes in circumstances cannot be separated from ideology).
36. See, e.g., IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1291 (2004) (pointing to “ever-increasing requirements” for employers to conduct discrimination and sexual harassment investigations, increases in workplace violence, and the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to support a holding that nonunion workers have no statutory right to representation in investigatory interviews that may result in discipline).
administration that employers may not retaliate against employees for union and other protected activities that occur on social media platforms.  

It issued changes to its Rules and Regulations for union representation elections that rely heavily on email and E-Filing, including a new requirement that employers provide employees’ personal and work email addresses to any union that petitions to represent them. The Board and General Counsel have also announced that electronic signatures are now acceptable for showings of interest in support of representation petitions. The Board has even attempted to bolster its public outreach efforts through the launch of a mobile app.

II. THE TENSION BETWEEN PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SECTION 7

While the debate over utilization of employer-owned electronic systems and devices for protected activities presents novel issues, the underlying tension between employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ property rights is as old as the Act itself. The Supreme Court has commented that the balance of employers’ property interests and employees’ Section 7 rights “must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.” Questions of how, when, and where employees must be permitted to engage in protected activities at the workplace often implicate these competing interests. The utilization of employers’ communications systems for

213204 [https://perma.cc/9SVN-45MV] (“‘As a management-side lawyer for 40 years,’ said Michael Lotito of the law firm Littler Mendelson, ‘I certainly have not seen such an activist board as this one on behalf of labor. Nothing close.’ Larry Cohen, who recently stepped down as president of the Communications Workers of America, doesn’t necessarily disagree. ‘The quality of this board is the best ever,’ he said. ‘The NLRB appointments is one place where President Obama would get a perfect score.’”).


40. Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, NLRB Gen. Counsel, to All Regional Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, & Resident Officers (Sept. 1, 2015).


42. Congress recognized this tension in the text of the Act. Employees’ Section 7 rights are protected under Section 8(a)(1)’s prohibition on employer actions that “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [S]ection 7.” 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (2012). In 1947, Congress amended the Act to also protect employers’ rights to use their property for their own free speech in Section 8(c). Id. § 158(c).

protected purposes implicates all three contextual questions, requiring a different balance.

A. The Nature of Protected Activities

Employers often advance at least one of two arguments claiming that purportedly protected activities were, in fact, unprotected. First, an employer may argue that the employee’s conduct was individualized in nature, and thus not “concerted.”44 While concerted activities regarding terms and conditions of employment enjoy the Act’s protection due to the policy concerns underlying Section 7, individualized complaints do not provide any justification for encroachment upon the employer’s property interests.45

Second, an employer may characterize such activities as unprotected misconduct because otherwise protected activities often run directly contrary to the employer’s business interests.46 Very serious misconduct, though otherwise protected, may so heavily burden the employer’s property rights as to lose the protection of the Act.47

B. The Time for Protected Activities

Long-standing Board precedent has maintained the maxim that “working time is for work.”48 The term “working time” is critical because

44. 29 U.S.C. § 157. The Board’s test for concert is whether the activity is “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.” Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986) (Meyers II) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
45. See, e.g., Tampa Tribune, 346 N.L.R.B. 369, 371–72 (2006) (employee’s complaints about favoritism not concerted because the employee “was speaking only for himself”); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684–85 (3d Cir. 1964) (finding, despite employee’s repeated conversations with co-workers regarding holiday pay, vacations, and assignment practices, no evidence that such conversations “involved any effort on his or their part to initiate or promote any concerted action to do anything about those matters”); see also Morris, supra note 7, at 1684–86.
46. See, e.g., University Medical Center, 335 N.L.R.B. 1318, 1320–21 (2001) (rule prohibiting “[ ]subordination, refusing to follow directions, obey legitimate requests or orders, or other disrespectful conduct towards a service integrator, service coordinator, or other individual” found unlawful because such conduct could include “vigorous proselytizing for or against a union”), enforcement denied in relevant part sub nom. Cmty. Hosp.s of Cent. Cal. v. NLRB, 335 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
47. Compare Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997) (“[The Employer], like any other employer, wants a friction free working environment. But . . . Section 7 activity may acceptably be accompanied by some impropriety.”), with Piper Realty Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1290 (1994) (“[A]lthough employees are permitted some leeway for impulsive behavior when engaging in concerted activity, this leeway is balanced against an employer’s right to maintain order and respect.”).
“that term connotes periods when employees are performing actual job
duties, periods which do not include the employees’ own time such as
lunch and break periods.”

Therefore, employers’ rules against, and
discipline for, employees engaging in protected activities (such as
distributing union literature) during working time are presumptively
valid. However, employees may not be prohibited from engaging in
protected activities during their own time, including breaks and lunches,
because that time does not implicate employers’ property rights.

C. The Place for Protected Activities

The Supreme Court recognized the Board’s authority to disallow
employer prohibitions on protected activities in certain areas of its
property in the seminal Republic Aviation case. The Court identified the
fundamental tension between employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’
property rights as an important reason for deciding the case.

One of the
issues, a prohibition on distribution related to concerns about littering and
thefts from automobiles, prompted the Court to quote the Board’s
balancing of interests with approval.

The distinction between working areas, where employers may
generally prohibit Section 7 activities, and non-working areas has been
one of the most important applications of Republic Aviation.

49. Id. at 395.
50. Id.
51. See id.; Peyton Packing, 249 N.L.R.B. at 843–44; see also Nations Rent, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B.
179, 186 (2004); Aluminum Casting & Eng’g Co., 328 N.L.R.B. 8, 9 (1999).
52. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
53. Id. at 797–98 (“These cases bring here for review the action of the National Labor Relations
Board in working out an adjustment between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to
employees under the [NLRA] and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in
their establishments. Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be
exercised without regard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon employer
or employee. Opportunity to organize and proper discipline are both essential elements in a balanced
society.”).
54. Id. at 802 n.8 (allowing that “[i]nconvenience, or even some dislocation of property rights,
may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining” (quoting LeTourneau Co. of
Ga., 54 N.L.R.B. 1259, 1260 (1944))). LeTourneau was consolidated with Republic Aviation before
the Supreme Court. Id. at 797.
55. The Board first explicitly drew this distinction in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
615 (1962). There, the Board emphasized its reliance on the Supreme Court’s balancing of interests in
Republic Aviation. Id. at 616–17. It applied a common sense balancing approach, noting the ability of
employees to engage in protected activities “at company parking lots, at plant entrances or exits, or in
other nonworking areas.” Id. at 620; see also McBride’s of Naylor Road, 229 N.L.R.B. 795, 795–96
(1977). Particularized standards have developed for various industries, such as distinctions between
patient care and non-patient care areas in healthcare facilities. See, e.g., Intercommunity Hosp., 255
N.L.R.B. 468, 471 (1981); St. John’s Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1150 (1976),

employer must demonstrate special circumstances in order to prohibit Section 7 activities in non-working areas.\textsuperscript{56} The Court’s approval of interest balancing in \textit{Republic Aviation} provided a basis for subsequent similar decisions regarding the place for protected activities. The Court again balanced interests when it held, forty-five years later, that the Board may not compel employers to grant nonemployee union organizers access to employer-owned property unless “no reasonable means short of trespass” exist for organizers to reach the employees.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{D. Protected Activities Using Employer-Owned Equipment}

The Board has consistently held that employees do not possess a right to use employer-owned communications equipment, other than email systems, for Section 7 purposes.\textsuperscript{58} Such property has ranged from communications equipment as rudimentary as bulletin boards,\textsuperscript{59} to more advanced equipment like public address systems,\textsuperscript{60} televisions,\textsuperscript{61} and copy machines.\textsuperscript{62} The Board also unequivocally stated in \textit{Churchill’s Supermarkets},\textsuperscript{63} that “an employer ha[s] every right to restrict the use of company telephones to business-related conversations.”\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{56}. \textit{Republic Aviation}, 324 U.S. at 793–94.
\textsuperscript{58}. See infra notes 59–64.
\textsuperscript{59}. Eaton Techs., 322 N.L.R.B. 848, 853 (1997) (“It is well established that there is no statutory right of employees or a union to use an employer’s bulletin board.”); see also NLRB v. Southwire Co., 801 F.2d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 1986).
\textsuperscript{60}. \textit{Heath Co.}, 196 N.L.R.B. 134 (1972) (refusal to allow pro-union employees to respond to anti-union broadcasts did not interfere with the conduct of a free and fair representation election).
\textsuperscript{62}. \textit{Champion Int’l Corp.}, 303 N.L.R.B. 102, 109 (1991) (employer possesses “a basic right to regulate and restrict employee use of [copy machine]”).
\textsuperscript{64}. \textit{Id. at 155; Union Carbide Corp.}, 259 N.L.R.B. 974, 980 (1981) (employer “could unquestionably bar its telephones to any personal use by employees”), \textit{enforced in relevant part}, 714 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1983).
III. THE BOARD’S TREATMENT OF EMPLOYER-OWNED EMAIL SYSTEMS

A. The Early Approaches

Despite the unambiguous background of “equipment cases,” the Board struggled early on to define the scope of employees’ Section 7 rights to use employer-owned email systems. As early as 1993, the Board ruled that an employer could not discriminatorily allow employees to use the email system for all types of communications except to organize a union.65 However, that case turned on the clearly discriminatory treatment of the union organizers, rather than on non-discriminatory prohibitions.66

Another early case, Timekeeping Systems,67 involved a mass email sent by an employee that disputed the employer’s assertions about proposed changes to its holiday policies. The Board found that the employer unlawfully discharged the employee for this email.68 However, the decision turned on the nature of the employee’s speech, rather than the forum in which it was communicated.69

As employers began to assert in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the same standards applicable to copy machines, public address systems, and telephones should also apply to email systems, the NLRB General Counsel’s Division of Advice (the Division of Advice) issued Advice Memoranda in several cases.70 The first such case was Pratt & Whitney.71

66. Id. Consistent with this limited holding, the Board granted the employer’s motion to alter the cease and desist remedy from cease and desist from “prohibiting bargaining unit employees from using the electronic mail system for distributing union literature and notices” to cease and desist from “discriminatorily prohibiting bargaining unit employees from using the electronic mail system for distributing union literature and notices.” Id. at 897, 920 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 244.
69. Id. The administrative law judge in Timekeeping Systems did address the employer’s contention that the employee’s emails amounted to a “take-over” of the email system, as in Washington Adventist Hospital, 291 N.L.R.B. 95 (1988), where an employee had used emails to disrupt transmissions between that employer’s computer terminals. Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 249. However, the judge distinguished Washington Adventist with reference to American Hospital Association, 230 N.L.R.B. 54 (1977), a case involving employee distribution of hard copy pamphlets. Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 249.
70. The Division of Advice is an office of the General Counsel. Regional offices submit cases involving novel, complex, or otherwise significant cases to the Division of Advice for legal opinions on those matters. Who We Are: Organization Chart, NLRB.GOV (Nov. 14, 2015, 1:38 PM), https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/organization-chart [https://perma.cc/SU7T-NA5Y].
in 1998. There, the employer prohibited all non-business use of its email system. The Division of Advice noted, “the evidence indicates that the employees in the instant cases use the Employer’s computers and computer network in such a way as to make them ‘work areas’ within the meaning of Republic Aviation and Stoddard-Quirk.” The Division of Advice acknowledged, but rejected, the employer’s objections that email, like paper litter, “can take up cyberspace,” and that even emails sent during the sender’s non-working time are likely to appear during the recipient’s working time. The Division of Advice subsequently relied on its Pratt & Whitney Memorandum when the issue arose, but noted that in some circumstances, there exist disparate reasons to apply or decline to apply this analysis. Some of these Memoranda stated, as early as 2004, that the Board would decide the issue in the pending Register Guard case. The uncertain environment regarding employees’ use of employer email systems persisted until that case was decided.

B. The Bush Board Decides Register Guard—2007

The Register Guard case arose when Suzi Prozanski, an employee of a newspaper publisher and president of her local union, sent three emails to employees at their company email addresses regarding union business.
The employer issued written warnings to Prozanski for using the company’s email system to conduct union business in violation of the employer’s Communications Systems Policy (CSP).  

The CSP prohibited employees from using the email system to solicit on behalf of outside organizations. Management knew that employees sometimes used the email system for personal solicitation purposes, such as party invitations or requests for dog walkers, but the employer’s periodic United Way campaign constituted the only solicitation for outside organizations that could be shown.

The union filed unfair labor practice charges, and the General Counsel’s Regional Office issued complaints, alleging that the employer’s maintenance of the CSP violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that the written warnings issued to Prozanski violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3). The administrative law judge found that the CSP was lawful as written, but was discriminatorily applied to Prozanski’s union activities because the employer allowed employees to use the email system for personal purposes other than union activities.

The Board, in a three-to-two decision along party lines, held that employees do not have a statutory right to use their employer’s email system for Section 7 purposes. The majority recognized that the issue was whether electronic communications had changed “the pattern of industrial life . . . to the extent that the forms of workplace communication sanctioned in Republic Aviation ha[d] been rendered useless and that employee use of the Respondent’s e-mail system for Section 7 purposes might attend a planned union rally. Prozanski’s email attached an email from the police stating that it was the employer who had notified police that anarchists might attend. The relevant provision of the policy stated:

Company communication systems and the equipment used to operate the communication system are owned and provided by the Company to assist in conducting the business of The Register-Guard. Communications systems are not to be used to solicit or proselytize for commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations, or other non-job-related solicitations.

The judge observed, “The Board has yet to hold that an e-mail system owned by an employer constitutes a workplace where an employer is prohibited from limiting all employee Section 7 solicitation.”
must therefore be mandated.” The Board, in other words, once again engaged in the balancing of employer property rights against employee Section 7 rights.

While it acknowledged that “e-mail has, of course, had a substantial impact on how people communicate, both at and away from the workplace,” the Board found that the Section 7 interests served by employee utilization of email systems were minimal because “employees at the [employer]’s workplace have the full panoply of rights to engage in oral solicitation on nonworking time and also to distribute literature on nonworking time in nonwork areas, pursuant to Republic Aviation and Stoddard-Quirk.” It reasoned that the continued existence of these rights matters because “Republic Aviation requires the employer to yield its property interests to the extent necessary to ensure that employees will not be ‘entirely deprived[] . . . of their ability to engage in Section 7 communications in the workplace on their own time.’” The Board also emphasized precedent holding that employers’ property interests in equipment such as televisions and telephones outweigh employees’ interests in using such equipment for Section 7 purposes.

Similarly to employers’ legitimate business interests in that equipment, employers’ business interests in email systems include the system’s efficient operation, protection against viruses, diminished server space, dissemination of confidential information, and liability for employees’ inappropriate emails. As a result, the Board determined that the “basic property right” of employers to “regulate and restrict employee use of company property” applies to email systems in the same manner as it applies to other employer-owned equipment. The recognition of this right rendered inapplicable the Republic Aviation presumption that a blanket

86. Id. at 1116.
87. Id. at 1115–16.
88. Id. at 1115 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 n.6 (1945)).
89. See supra notes 59–64.
90. Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114. The majority acknowledged that:
e-mail has some differences from as well as some similarities to other communications methods, such as telephone systems. For example, as the dissent points out, transmission of an e-mail message, unlike a telephone conversation, does not normally ‘tie up’ the line and prevent the simultaneous transmission of messages by others. On the other hand, e-mail messages are similar to telephone calls in many ways. Both enable virtually instant communication regardless of distance, both are transmitted electronically, usually through wires (sometimes the very same fiber-optic cables) over complex networks, and both require specialized electronic devices for their transmission.
91. Id. at 1114.
92. Id. (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663–64 (6th Cir. 1983)).
ban on solicitation is unlawful absent special circumstances. Accordingly, the Board determined that employees do not have a statutory right to use employer-owned email systems for Section 7 purposes.

Based upon this conclusion, the Board agreed with the administrative law judge that the employer’s CSP did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on its face. The Board also found that the first of Prozanski’s disciplinary warnings violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) as a discriminatory application of the CSP, but found no violation based on the warning for her second and third emails.

Democratic Members Liebman and Walsh dissented vehemently. They first argued that email had drastically changed workplace society:

"Today’s decision confirms that the NLRB has become the ‘Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies.’ Only a Board that has been asleep for the past 20 years could fail to recognize that e-mail has revolutionized communication both within and outside the workplace. In 2007, one cannot reasonably contend, as the majority does, that an e-mail system is a piece of communications equipment to be treated just as the law treats bulletin boards, telephones, and pieces of scrap paper. National labor policy must be responsive to the enormous technological changes that are taking place in our society."

Second, the dissent took aim at the majority’s assertion that the employer’s property interest in its equipment removes it from the Republic Aviation framework. It asserted that the issue pertained to “cyberspace,” which is not owned by anyone, and not to “equipment.”

Third, the dissent accused the majority of substituting the Lechmere standard (regarding facility access by non-employee union organizers) for

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93. Id. at 1115.
94. Id. at 1110.
95. Id. at 1116.
96. Id. at 1119–20. The Board made these determinations pursuant to a new articulation of “discrimination” as drawing distinctions “along Section 7 lines.” Id. at 1117–19. While beyond the scope of this Note, this important and often overlooked aspect of the Register Guard decision remains the Board standard even after Purple Communications. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 5 n.13 (2014).
97. Id. at 1122 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)).
98. Id. at 1126 (“[E]-mail, the ‘World Wide Web,’ and mail listing services ‘constitute a unique medium—known to its users as “cyberspace”—located in no particular geographic location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997))).
the Republic Aviation standard for protected activity by employees.\footnote{Id. at 1126–27 (citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)).} This criticism targeted the majority’s reliance on the fact that employees can still communicate with each other through other means, such as face-to-face contact, without using their employer’s email system.\footnote{Id. The majority disputed this characterization, clarifying that it only referred to alternative means in order to assess how email had changed the workplace. Id. at 1116 n.12 (citing Lechmere, 502 U.S. 527).}

The D.C. Circuit reviewed the objections to Register Guard.\footnote{Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).} The court agreed with the union that all of Prozanski’s warnings violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) because they were discriminatorily issued.\footnote{Id. at 59–61.} The union did not challenge the CSP’s facial validity.\footnote{Id. at 58 (“The union states that, although it believes the company violated section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a policy that prohibited e-mail use for all ‘non-job-related solicitations,’ it does not seek review of the Board’s ruling to the contrary.”). According to AFL-CIO Associate General Counsel James Coppess, the union did not seek review of this issue because the court would likely view the issue as a policy choice within the Board’s discretion. Susan J. McGolrick, D.C. Circuit Rules Guard Publishing Illegally Disciplined Copy Editor for E-Mails, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. No. 128 at AA-1 (July 8, 2009). Furthermore, since the 2008 election had occurred in the interim, the union felt optimistic that a Board appointed by President Obama would reverse Register Guard at its first opportunity. Id.}

C. Backlash to Register Guard

The Board’s Register Guard decision provoked vociferous criticism from pro-labor advocates. One local union categorized the decision as part of an “all-out attack on the labor movement.”\footnote{Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Restricts Union Use of E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/us/23labor.html?_r=0.} AFL-CIO General Counsel Jonathan Hiatt stated that the Board “has again struck at the heart of what the nation’s labor laws were intended to protect—the right of employees to discuss working conditions and other matters of mutual concern” because “[a]nyone with e-mail knows that this is how employees communicate with each other in today’s workplace.”\footnote{The Bush NLRB and What It Has Done to American Workers, TEAMSTERS LOCAL 19, http://www.teamsterslocal19.org/NLRB_Flyer-basic_with_cites_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE9H-JQUY].}

Pro-labor scholars also accused the Register Guard Board of failing to adapt to changing circumstances. William Corbett, for example, argued that the Board “interpreted the NLRA in a restrictive way that threatens to make it irrelevant and obsolescent.”\footnote{William R. Corbett, Awaking Rip Van Winkle: Has the National Labor Relations Act Reached a Turning Point?, 9 NEV. L.J. 247, 252 (2009).} Jeffrey Hirsch expressed a similar perspective, describing the decision as a “disturbing . . . . failure [that]
highlights the fact that the Board has yet again shown no inclination to reassess broadly its enforcement of the NLRA to reflect the nature of the modern economy.”

Register Guard, Hirsch argued, constituted significant evidence of the Act’s “obsolescence.”

Member Liebman also made it clear that these sentiments were shared by the Board’s Democratic appointees. In a speech at the University at Buffalo Law School, she referred to Register Guard, stating, “This case I sometimes subtitle ‘The Act is Surely Dead,’ if the majority could not find a way to accommodate employees’ rights to communicate with each other at the workplace through this new technology.”

President Obama appointed Lafe Solomon, one of outgoing Chairman Liebman’s staff members, as Acting General Counsel on June 21, 2010. Ten months later, Solomon issued a General Counsel Memorandum identifying cases that regional offices must send to the internal Division of Advice for evaluation as potential policy priorities. Solomon listed “[c]ases involving the issue of whether employees have a Section 7 right to use an employer’s e-mail system” among the “[c]ases requiring development of a litigation strategy in light of adverse circuit court law or new Board precedent.” The (Acting) General Counsel’s office thus officially announced its interest in providing the Obama Board with an opportunity to overturn Register Guard.

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108. Id. at 262. Additionally, the title of Hirsch’s article, “The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?” asks a question that demonstrates the depth of pro-labor scholars’ dissatisfaction with Register Guard and other NLRB decisions related to technology. See also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1121–22 (2011).
112. Id. at 2–3.
113. No such vehicle to challenge Register Guard reached the Board during Solomon’s tenure as Acting General Counsel. As a result, this mandate was reiterated by newly-appointed (and confirmed)
D. Purple Communications—December 11, 2014

The opportunity to re-examine this issue came before the Board in late 2014. The employer in that case, Purple Communications, provided sign language interpretation services at sixteen southern California video call centers.\(^{114}\) The union, Communications Workers of America, filed petitions to represent seven of those facilities in the autumn of 2012.\(^{115}\) The union, after failing to win elections at two of the facilities, filed objections to those elections, alleging that the employer’s rules restricting email usage interfered with employees’ free choice in the elections.\(^{116}\) The union also filed an unfair labor practice charge in support of those objections.\(^{117}\)

Three of the employer’s handbook rules implicated Register Guard issues. The first such rule stated that the employer’s electronic equipment, Internet access, and email system “should be used for business purposes only.”\(^{118}\) The second and third rules prohibited using the employer’s equipment, internet, or email for “[e]ngaging in activities on behalf of organizations or persons with no professional or business affiliation with the Company” or “[s]ending uninvited email of a personal nature.”\(^{119}\) The administrative law judge, relying on Register Guard, dismissed these allegations.\(^{120}\) The General Counsel then sought review from the Board.\(^{121}\)

The Board framed its analysis as a reevaluation of the balancing of interests examined in Register Guard by identifying three arguments, which, taken together, encompass both sides of the balance of interests.\(^{122}\) The majority first generally asserted that Register Guard had “undervalued employees’ core Section 7 right to communicate in the workplace about their terms and conditions of employment, while giving too much weight

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\(^{114}\) Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B No. 126, at 2 (Dec. 11, 2014).

\(^{115}\) Id.

\(^{116}\) Id.

\(^{117}\) Id.

\(^{118}\) Id. at 3.

\(^{119}\) Id. at 2.

\(^{120}\) Id. at 3.

\(^{121}\) Id. at 3.

\(^{122}\) Id. at 4–5.
to employers’ property rights.” 123 Second, the Board argued that Register Guard had undervalued the importance of email to employee communications. 124 Third, the majority attacked Register Guard as relying too heavily on earlier Board decisions discussing employers’ property rights to their equipment. 125

The Board focused its argument about the importance of workplace email to employees’ Section 7 rights on the workplace as the locus of protected activities. 126 The Board argued that this focus motivated the Supreme Court’s articulation of the “special circumstances” standard in Republic Aviation. 127

Next, the Board relied on several studies showing the pervasive role of email in the workplace. 128 It pointed to the decreased costs of email due to ever-increasing processor and hard drive capabilities, 129 as well as the development that “[m]any employers expect or at least tolerate personal use of [electronic communications] equipment by employees because it often increases worker efficiency.” 130 Furthermore, telework arrangements have accompanied increases in technological capabilities. 131 Based on

123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 4–5.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id. (“The workplace is ‘a particularly appropriate place for [employees to exercise their Section 7 rights], because it is the one place where [employees] clearly share common interests and where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their union organizational life and other matters related to their status as employees.’” (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978))).
127. Id. at 6 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803–04 (1945)).
128. Id. at 6–7. The Board relied on the Radicati Group’s April 2014 conclusions that “[e]mail remains the most pervasive form of communication in the business world” and “that work-related email traffic will continue to increase.” Id. at 6–7 (quoting THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2014–2018, at 2, 4 (Sara Radicati ed., 2014), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Email-Statistics-Report-2014-2018-Executive-Summary.pdf). Additionally, a 2008 Pew Research Center Study showed that “96 percent of employees used the internet, email, or mobile telephones to keep them connected to their jobs, even outside of their normal work hours.” Id. at 6 (citing MARY MADDEN & SYDNEY JONES, NETWORKED WORKERS, PEW RESEARCH CENTER’S INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 1 (2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/2008 /09/24/networked-workers).
129. Id. at 7 n.24.
130. Id. at 7 (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010)). It should be noted that the Quon case involved text messages on a pager, rather than an email system. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 at 750.
these developments, the Board likened email communications to workplace cafeterias as “‘the natural gathering place’ for employees to communicate with each other.”\textsuperscript{132} As a result, it described \textit{Register Guard}’s “reluctance” to “fully acknowledge” email’s role in the modern workplace as “a failure ‘to adapt the Act to the changing patterns of industrial life.’”\textsuperscript{133}

The Board then turned to \textit{Register Guard}’s reliance on “equipment” cases.\textsuperscript{134} This analysis focused first on the property rights aspect of the balancing of interests, emphasizing that one person’s use of email does not interfere with another’s use, or add significant costs, particularly in light of increased computing capacities.\textsuperscript{135} Even though telephones are comparable to email systems in many respects, the majority decided to draw a line between these two types of equipment by categorizing them as “distant cousins.”\textsuperscript{136}

The Board also rejected, in a footnote, the dissent’s contention that increased use of other forms of technology, including personal email, texting, and social media, tipped the balance of interests in favor of employers’ property rights because these developments made employees’ use of employer-owned email systems less necessary to Section 7 activities.\textsuperscript{137} The majority premised this rejection on the value that precedent placed on communications “\textit{in the workplace}”\textsuperscript{138} and explained that employees view Section 7 communications as work-related, rather than personal, in nature.\textsuperscript{139} While agreeing that these other forms of technology facilitate communications amongst groups of people, the Board reasoned, “[e]mployees do not share all of the same private media options, due to the cost and variety of those options; some employees do not privately use any electronic media.”\textsuperscript{139} As a result, employees who work at different facilities, on different shifts, or in different departments, may be “virtual strangers” to one another with “no practical way to obtain

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{132} \textit{Id.} at 8 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978)).
\bibitem{133} \textit{Id.} (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 521, 523 (1976)).
\bibitem{134} \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{135} \textit{Id.} at 8–9.
\bibitem{136} \textit{Id.} at 9. The Board noted that the General Counsel had argued for reversal of the Board’s prior telephone cases in addition to \textit{Register Guard}. However, since that issue was not directly presented in this case, the Board declined to decide the telephone issue. \textit{Id.} at 9 n.38.
\bibitem{137} \textit{Id.} at 6 n.18.
\bibitem{138} \textit{Id.} (emphasis in original) (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978); NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tennessee, 415 U.S. 322 (1974)).
\bibitem{139} \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{140} \textit{Id.}
\end{thebibliography}
each other’s email addresses, social media account information, or other information necessary to reach each other.”

Furthermore, the majority, like the Register Guard dissent, asserted that the Republican Board members’ argument inappropriately applied the reasonable alternative means standard for non-employee access to facilities. Consequently, its decision did not “turn on the current availability of alternative communication options using personal electronic devices and other electronic media—e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogging, or personal email accounts.” The Board’s justification for disregarding other means of communication relied largely on a statement by Justice Brennan in Beth Israel that, “outside of the health-care context, the availability of alternative means of communication is not, with respect to employee organizational activity, a necessary inquiry.” As a result, the Board concluded that alternative means of engaging in protected activities are only relevant for non-employees.

The Board thus decided that the Republic Aviation standard that protected activities must be permitted absent “special circumstances” applied to employees’ use of employer-owned email systems. It viewed this determination as “consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act, with our responsibility to adapt the Act to the changing work environment, and with our obligation to accommodate the competing rights of employers and employees.”

The majority also decided that it would apply this new standard retroactively. However, retroactivity required that the case be remanded to the administrative law judge in order to allow for the application of the new standard to these facts. The case, as of this writing, remains

141.  Id.
142.  Id. at 14.
143.  Id.
144.  Id. at 13 n.62 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978)).
145.  Id. at 14 (citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992)).
146.  Id. The majority acknowledged that this standard makes it possible for an employer to establish special circumstances warranting a prohibition of employee use of an employer-owned email system for protected activities, but viewed such circumstances as a “rare case.”  Id.
147.  Id. The Board also clarified that employers continue to possess the ability to monitor their email systems for legitimate business reasons without being vulnerable to allegations that they unlawfully surveilled employees’ protected activities.  Id. at 15–16 (“[T]hose who choose openly to engage in union activities at or near the employer’s premises cannot be heard to complain when management observes them.” (quoting Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 887, 888 (1991))).
148.  Id. at 16–17. The Board applies new standards retroactively unless doing so will cause a “manifest injustice.”  Id. at 16 (quoting Pattern Makers (Michigan Model Mfrs.), 310 N.L.R.B. 929, 931 (1993)).
149.  Id. at 17.
As a result, no Court of Appeals has yet had occasion to address the Board’s Purple Communications holding.\textsuperscript{151}

Dissenting Member Philip Miscimarra began by attacking the majority’s refusal to consider how other forms of electronic communication have changed interpersonal communications.\textsuperscript{152} He also asserted that evaluation of alternatives is appropriate beyond non-employee access cases based on the manner in which the Board and the Supreme Court have balanced interests in the past.\textsuperscript{153} He noted that the majority’s argument on this point was particularly wanting because it relied on the premise that activities at the workplace were especially valuable but discounted other means of communication such as text messaging and social media.\textsuperscript{154}

Miscimarra then argued that, because the majority had overvalued the importance of access to employer-owned email systems to employees’ Section 7 rights, its balancing of employer property rights and employee rights was fundamentally flawed.\textsuperscript{155} He noted that the Board had recently decided many cases in which employees, without a statutory right to use their employers’ email systems, had nonetheless utilized other technological developments to further protected activities.\textsuperscript{156} Miscimarra

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{150} The administrative law judge found on March 16, 2015 that special circumstances justifying the employer’s rule did not exist, and thus that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining these rules. Purple Comm'ns, Inc., No. 21-CA-095151, 2015 WL 1169344 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Mar. 16, 2015). The parties filed exceptions and cross-exceptions with the Board, and the final briefs regarding these exceptions were filed on July 7, 2015. \textit{Docket Activity}, NLRB.GOV, https://www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-095151 [https://perma.cc/GZ9B-3RRS]. The Board has not yet issued a decision regarding these exceptions. \textit{Id.}\textsuperscript{151} The \textit{Purple Communications} decision has, however, been applied to other Board cases, one of which may reach a Court of Appeals before \textit{Purple Communications} does. One such case was decided on August 27, 2015. UPMC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 191 (2015). \textit{UPMC}, extending \textit{Purple Communications} to the healthcare industry and appearing to represent a strong candidate case, is currently pending a motion for reconsideration filed by the employer to the Board on October 2, 2015. \textit{Docket Activity}, NLRB.GOV, https://www.nlrb.gov/case/06-CA-081896 [https://perma.cc/ZAP3-VXMG]. However, even multiple adverse rulings from the courts of appeals will not alter regional office charge investigations, administrative law judge decisions, or Board adjudications, until and unless either the Supreme Court or the Board itself alters the \textit{Purple Communications} standard. \textit{See} Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1963).\textsuperscript{152} Purple Comm’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 18 (Dec. 11, 2014) (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting).\textsuperscript{153} Id. at 20. Member Miscimarra relied particularly on the balancing of interests conducted by the Supreme Court in both \textit{Republic Aviation} and in \textit{Beth Israel}. \textit{See} Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1978) (upholding employee rights to engage in protected activities in cafeteria, in part, because employee locker rooms provided insufficient opportunities to exercise rights).\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Purple Comm’ns, Inc.}, at 21 n.29.\textsuperscript{155} Id. at 22–24.\textsuperscript{156} Id. at 22–23 (citing Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (2014) (employee used Facebook); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2012) (same); Laurus Tech.
also pointed to the power of social media, video websites, and mobile devices in the Arab Spring uprisings.\textsuperscript{157}

He then turned to the importance of employers’ property rights, criticizing the majority’s assertions that employees’ emails impose few costs on employers as “the perspective of someone who misunderstands the nature of property rights or is determined to disregard them.”\textsuperscript{158} He likened the majority’s standard to a requirement that any employer maintaining a company car must permit its employees to take the car wherever they wish.\textsuperscript{159}

Finally, Miscimarra emphasized that the 1937 Supreme Court case that established the Act’s constitutionality relied on a balancing of employees’ collective action and employers’ property rights.\textsuperscript{160} Even then, he argued, the Court validated the Act because the statute, “instead of being an invasion of the constitutional rights of either [employers or employees], was based on the recognition of the rights of both.”\textsuperscript{161}

Member Miscimarra concluded his argument by objecting that the Board’s new standard would be difficult for all parties to administer and understand, particularly with regard to “working time” and “work[ing] area” requirements.\textsuperscript{162} Based upon all of these considerations, Miscimarra asserted that “the Board cannot reasonably conclude . . . given the current state of electronic communications[,] that an employer-maintained email system devoted exclusively to business purposes constitutes an ‘unreasonable impediment to self-organization.’”\textsuperscript{163}

Member Johnson’s dissent expanded even further on Member Miscimarra’s reliance on other forms of electronic communications available to employees.\textsuperscript{164} However, Johnson also made an argument that

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 23–24.
\textsuperscript{159} Id. at 24.
\textsuperscript{160} Id. (discussing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
\textsuperscript{161} Id. (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33–34).
\textsuperscript{162} Id. at 24–26.
\textsuperscript{163} Id. at 28 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 n.6 (1945)).
\textsuperscript{164} Id. at 29 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“The question presented here is whether the [Act] requires an employer to surrender possession and control of \textit{its own email network} so that employee communications about [protected] activities related to their employment, may be made as a matter of right across that network \textit{at any time}, effectively including \textit{on working time} paid for by the employer, even when . . . there are \textit{multiple other} electronic communications networks that employees could use
\end{flushleft}
Miscimarra had not explicitly articulated: that the electronic communications environment had changed significantly since Register Guard.165

Johnson relied on a variety of statistics in support of his assertion that “[s]ince Register Guard issued in 2007, there has been [a] dramatic change in how individuals communicate with each other.”166 He pointed out, for example, that significant changes in device utilization had taken place.167 Mobile phones were owned by 90 percent of Americans by 2014, at which point 58 percent owned smartphones and 42 percent owned tablet computers.168 Furthermore, smartphone ownership was expected to increase to 68 percent by 2017.169

Similarly, Johnson noted that personal email accounts allow for virtually unlimited messaging and mass emailing capacities.170 Users utilize these capacities on an extremely regular basis, as shown by the 87.6 billion personal emails sent per day worldwide.171 Consequently, “people have at least an equal opportunity to use email in their personal lives as they do in their professional ones.”172
Furthermore, while less than 10% of adult Internet users utilized social media in 2005, that figure had ballooned to 72% by September 2013.\textsuperscript{173} The total number of social media accounts had reached 3.6 billion in 2014, and is expected to reach 5.2 billion accounts by the end of 2018.\textsuperscript{174} Johnson described social media websites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter as “gigantic,”\textsuperscript{175} citing examples such as the 17 million Facebook posts related to the 2014 ALS “ice bucket challenge,”\textsuperscript{176} LinkedIn’s 300 million members,\textsuperscript{177} and the 271 million monthly active Twitter users.\textsuperscript{178} Furthermore, 42 percent of social media users utilize multiple platforms.\textsuperscript{179} He also pointed to the extensive use that unions have made of social media as an organizational tool as evidence of the effectiveness of social media for protected activities.\textsuperscript{180} Consequently, Johnson asserted that “most employees already have access to technology which they can use to communicate with one another about protected concerted activity without needing to use their employer’s business email system.”\textsuperscript{181}

Johnson further disputed the majority’s dismissal of these other communication platforms on the basis that employees may be “virtual strangers” with one another.\textsuperscript{182} Not only do social media websites allow users to search for others, but sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn also use complex algorithms that enhance search capabilities and suggest

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
  \bibitem{173} Id. (citing \textit{Social Networking Fact Sheet}, \textsc{Pew Research Ctr.}, (Jan. 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/VVE9-Q4TP]).
  \bibitem{174} Id. (citing \textit{The Radicati Grp., Inc., supra} note 128).
  \bibitem{175} Id.
  \bibitem{176} Id. at 41 n.30 (citing \textit{The Ice Bucket Challenge on Facebook}, \textsc{Facebook} (Aug. 18, 2014), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/08/the-ice-bucket-challenge-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/GME6-SMNV]).
  \bibitem{177} Id. (citing \textit{LinkedIn}, http://www.linkedin.com/about-us (last visited by Johnson Sept. 15, 2014)). Consistent with Johnson’s point that these technologies will continue to grow, the LinkedIn website, as of January 2016, had been updated to claim 400 million members. \textit{LinkedIn}, http://www.linkedin.com/about-us (last visited Jan. 14, 2016 7:47 PM).
  \bibitem{178} \textit{Purple Commc'ns, Inc.}, at 41 n.30 (citing \textsc{Twitter}, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited by Johnson Sept. 15, 2014)). As with LinkedIn, Twitter usage has continued to grow. As of January 2016, the Twitter website stated that Twitter had 321 million monthly active users. \textsc{Twitter}, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Jan. 14, 2016 7:58 PM).
  \bibitem{180} Id. at 42 (citing Robert Quackenboss, \textit{Technology: Friending the Unions}, \textsc{Inside Counsel} (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/04/20/technology-friending-the-unions).
  \bibitem{181} Id. at 41. Johnson subsequently noted the increased role of text messages in communications, noting that 81% of mobile phone users sent or received text messages as of May 2013. Id. at 42 (citing \textit{Mobile Technology Fact Sheet}, \textsc{Pew Research Ctr.}, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/R5TC-TDY6]). Elsewhere, he asserted that personal email accounts perform a similar function. Id. at 40–41.
  \bibitem{182} Id. at 55–56.
\end{thebibliography}
potential connections. Importantly, users can easily search for one another by the “employer” field on these sites.184

Johnson, in addition to advancing the argument that circumstances had changed since Register Guard and expanding on many of Member Miscimarra’s points,185 also addressed the “reasonable alternative means” issue in a section entitled, “The Role of Alternative Means of Communication: The Majority’s Dispute with Me, and Why They Are Wrong.”186 He first explained that his emphasis on other means of communication did not refer to a reasonable alternative means test in the vein of non-employee access cases.187 Instead, alternative means constitute essential aspects of the balancing test endorsed by Republic Aviation.188

Second, Johnson argued that Republic Aviation’s consideration of “the availability of alternative areas [of communication of the facility] in which § 7 rights effectively could be exercised” suggests that such analysis is appropriate in weighing employees’ rights.189 Johnson then distinguished cases cited by the majority purporting to hold to the contrary.190 While he agreed with the majority that employees need not show that solicitation or

183. Id. at 41.
184. Id. (citing Creating a Killer LinkedIn Profile: Tips from Link Humans, LINKEDIN OFFICIAL BLOG (July 1, 2014), http://blog.linkedin.com/2014/07/01/creating-a-killer-linkedin-profile-tips-from-link-humans).
185. Johnson elaborated on Miscimarra’s argument that employee use of employer-owned email systems for personal purposes infringes on employers’ property rights. He pointed out that email discussions are not analogous to “water cooler” discussions because emails, which may arrive at any time while an employee is working, can materially interfere with productivity. Id. at 31–34. He also asserted that the Board’s equipment cases must apply, and that employee convenience does not require a contrary conclusion. Id. at 34–36. Johnson compared the majority’s rationale to “adverse possession through . . . work usage.” Id. at 36. Additionally, he viewed the fact that personal emails can be authored and received on working time as fundamentally bearing on the interference with employers’ property rights within the balancing test due to Republic Aviation’s affirmance that “working time is for work.” Id. at 49–51 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945)). Furthermore, he asserted that, by requiring employers to “subsidize hostile speech,” that the majority’s holding violated the First Amendment. Id. at 56–59. Finally, Johnson strongly emphasized many of the practical workability issues identified by Miscimarra’s dissent. Id. at 59–60.
186. Id. at 51.
187. Id. at 52.
188. Id. (citing Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 802).
189. Id. (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 506 (1978)). The Board, in the consolidated LeTourneau case, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944), reasoned that the location and layout of the employer’s facility made off-site solicitation very difficult. Id. at 1260–61.
190. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 53. Johnson focused on Justice Brennan’s statement in Beth Israel that “outside of the health-care context, the availability of alternative means of communication is not, with respect to employee organizational activity, a necessary inquiry.” Id. (quoting Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 505). Johnson noted that this statement did not pertain to physical spaces. Id. More importantly, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Beth Israel, Republic Aviation, and other cases cited by the majority all take the overall context of employees’ abilities to exercise Section 7 rights into account. Id. at 53–54.
distribution off of their employer’s property would be “ineffective” in order for the balance to tip in their favor, “that does not answer the question presented, for various reasons, including that this case does not involve solicitations or distributions in physical space.”191

As a result, Johnson viewed the further growth of mobile devices, personal email, text messaging, and social media as weighing heavily in favor of finding that the balance of interests tips in favor of employers’ property rights.192 He concluded, in a forceful echo of the criticisms leveled against the Register Guard majority, by arguing:

My colleagues accuse the Register Guard majority of being Rip Van Winkle. But, in ignoring all the changes in social media since Register Guard, we need to ask who is the Rip Van Winkle here. . . . The Board should get with the present, and concern itself with protecting Section 7 rights on that new [technological] frontier. It should not be burning up government resources and its claim to institutional deference by refighting a war over terrain that indisputably no longer matters today to Section 7 . . . .193

IV. CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY USAGE SINCE 2007

The Purple Communications majority and Register Guard dissent both correctly argued that email has drastically changed the nature of interpersonal communications.194 While communications have been characterized by telephones, traditional mail, and fax machines for most of the Act’s history, the rise of email during the last quarter century truly has “revolutionized” the manner in which all Americans, including coworkers, communicate with one another.195

However, as Members Miscimarra and Johnson explained, the revolution has continued to evolve since 2007.196 As the Purple Communications majority acknowledged, “technological changes are continuing; indeed, they are accelerating.”197 Evidence of these developments can be found throughout modern society. One reflection of continued technological change can be found in the development of the

191. Id. at 55.
192. Id. at 61.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 6; Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
195. Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
196. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 18–41.
197. Id. at 17.
American Management Association study relied upon by the Register Guard dissenters. The 2004 version of the study focused exclusively on email and instant messaging. However, the 2009 version of the same study addressed social media, Twitter, blogs, smartphones, texting, video sharing, and personal email, in addition to business email and instant messaging.

Personal email provides the avenue for protected activities that is most directly comparable to employer-owned email. As Member Johnson noted, the sheer volume of personal emails sent or received per day, 87.6 billion, is staggering. This volume reflects a sharp growth in the utilization of personal email spanning the time periods before and after Register Guard. Furthermore, the average consumer now maintains 3.9 personal email accounts, more than twice as many as the average number of business email accounts (1.7). Consumers log into personal email accounts 3.8 times per day. Given the extensive role of personal email in modern life, it seems disingenuous to argue that employees must have access to their employer’s email system in order to effectively exercise their Section 7 rights.

However, even if personal email accounts are insufficient, numerous other platforms for interpersonal electronic communications have grown explosively in recent years. Text messaging provides one such example. While 58 percent of cell phone owners used those phones for text

199. Id.
201. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 40 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (citing THE RADICATI GRP., supra note 128).
202. Approximately 55 percent of online Americans used email in 2002, and 49 percent of those people did so every day. Those numbers increased to 70 percent and 60 percent, respectively, by 2011. Kristen Purcell, Search and Email Still Top the List of Most Popular Online Activities, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/08/09/search-and-email-still-top-the-list-of-most-popular-online-activities/ [https://perma.cc/MWS5-G5G6].
204. Id.
Messaging in 2007, that number had grown to 80 percent by 2012.\textsuperscript{205} Messaging apps such as WhatsApp, SnapChat, and Livetext offer other platforms through which individuals can communicate quickly and easily.\textsuperscript{206} Even employees who work at distant facilities can now engage in virtually face-to-face conversations through videochat platforms such as Skype, FaceTime, and ooVoo.\textsuperscript{207}

Perhaps even more importantly, social media has become ubiquitous in recent years. Johnson provided many statistics showing this growth and the massive presence established by social media sites.\textsuperscript{208} Additionally, the Pew Research Center issued a new report in 2015 detailing the growth of social media since 2005.\textsuperscript{209} This report shows that, while only 7 percent of American adults used social media in 2005, 65 percent did so in 2015.\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore, social media usage will almost certainly continue trending upwards amongst the working population due to major differences between demographic groups. The proportion of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 who used social media in 2015 was 90 percent, while 77 percent of those between 30 and 49 did so.\textsuperscript{211} However, those who are currently aged 50–64, and will thus soon reach retirement age, only used social media at a rate of 51 percent in 2015.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{206} The Pew Research Center reports that 36 percent of smartphone users utilized such apps as of April 2015. \textit{Messaging Apps Appeal to Smartphone Owners}, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-social-media-2015/2015-08-19_social-media-update_01/ [https://perma.cc/D2J6-HUPB]. This study also reported a feature of such apps that should be particularly interesting to employees concerned that their employers will discover their protected activities: 17 percent of smartphone users use apps that delete messages upon reading. \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{208} See supra notes 173–80 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{211} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Id}. To the extent that many individuals over age 65 continue to work, it is noteworthy that only 35% of that age group’s members used social media in 2015. \textit{Id}.
Social media platforms also provide many features that are useful for organizing purposes, which email systems simply cannot match.213 A video of a union rally, for example, could be both posted on Facebook and sent to coworkers via email. The video sent via email may be deleted immediately. However, the video posted on Facebook will appear on the employee’s News Feed, even if the employee has logged onto Facebook for reasons completely unrelated to work. In fact, if the employee’s “autoplay” feature is enabled (per Facebook’s default settings), the video will begin playing (without audio), even if the employee has not clicked on it.214

Furthermore, smartphone utilization has also grown significantly in recent years.215 The proportion of American adults who own smartphones reached 64 percent in 2015, a major increase from the 35 percent who did so in 2011.216 Similar to social media, those who have the longest remaining careers ahead of them are the most likely to own a smartphone.217 Smartphones now permeate virtually all aspects of society, with many Americans using them for purposes such as finding medical information, banking, reviewing real estate listings, job searches, pursuing government services, and education.218 In fact, many employers now actually require that employees have their personal smartphones at work through “Bring Your Own Device” policies.219

Smartphones are especially important because they provide a sort of multiplier effect to the importance of other forms of electronic communication by allowing all of them to be used anywhere the owner goes. Smartphones are used to send and receive personal email by 82.4

216. Id. at 2.
217. Americans aged 18–29 own smartphones at a rate of 85%, and 79% of those aged 30–49 do so. Meanwhile, only 54% of Americans aged 50–64 own them, and only 27% of those over age 65 use smartphones. Id. at 13.
218. Id. at 5.
percent of their owners, to send and receive texts by 90.6 percent, and to participate in social media by 66.6 percent. 220 All of these developments show that communication through means other than business email has changed significantly since 2007. Changes of this magnitude lend a great deal of credence to Johnson’s assertion that the “turf” of employer-owned email systems “has grown even more nonessential to Section 7 rights.” 221

V. THE RELEVANCE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

The Purple Communications majority, while acknowledging that it engaged in a balancing of employees’ Section 7 rights with employers’ property rights, 222 also asserted that alternative means of communication are irrelevant to that analysis. 223 Instead, the majority accused the Register Guard Board and the Purple Communications dissent of applying a reasonable alternative means analysis that is only appropriate for non-employee access. 224 The majority’s support for this proposition appears suspect when the Supreme Court cases that it relied upon are examined more closely. Johnson offered two reasons to reject the majority’s refusal to consider alternative means of communication. 225

First, he argued that Justice Brennan’s statement in Beth Israel had “no bearing on the argument here” because it pertained to face-to-face interactions in physical space. 226 Johnson may have overreached in this characterization of Supreme Court precedent. This history must, as a matter of stare decisis and judicial hierarchy, have at least some bearing on the Board’s decision-making, even in cases involving novel issues. 227 However, Johnson’s overall point that this issue requires a fresh look at the balance of interests does appear to be sensible due to the rapidly evolving nature of electronic communications. 228

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220. See supra note 203, at 21.
221. Purple Comm’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 61 (2014) (Johnson, Member, dissenting).
222. Id. at 14 (concluding that the framework adopted is “consistent with . . . our obligation to accommodate the competing rights of employers and employees”).
223. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 186–91 and accompanying text.
226. Purple Communications, at 53 (Johnson, Member, dissenting).
227. Furthermore, the Board has successfully applied traditional approaches to the electronic world in other contexts. See, e.g., Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Aug. 22, 2014); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012). (applying traditional analytical framework for retaliation to cases involving protected activities on social media).
228. The Board has not hesitated to re-engage in this balance of interests regarding other topics, such as off-duty and off-site employee access. See Tri-County Med. Ctr., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976)
Johnson’s second response, that existing Supreme Court precedent does not rule out consideration of alternative means of engaging in Section 7 activities, is an even stronger argument. The Supreme Court has never held that alternative means of engaging in protected activities are irrelevant to the balance of employers’ and employees’ interests. Most notably, Justice Brennan’s statement that “alternative means of communication is not, with respect to employee organizational activity, a necessary inquiry”\(^\text{229}\) is not the same as holding that it is an improper inquiry.

Additionally, Justice Brennan’s statement relied upon the comment by the Supreme Court in *Babcock & Wilcox* that “[n]o restriction may be placed on the employees’ right to discuss self-organization among themselves.”\(^\text{230}\) However, *Babcock & Wilcox* pertained to non-employee access, and this statement only illustrated the importance of the distinction between employees and non-employees.\(^\text{231}\) Thus, the relied-upon statement was dictum. Furthermore, this statement in *Babcock & Wilcox* relied upon a portion of *Republic Aviation* that merely expressed the Court’s approval of the Board’s balancing of interests, arriving at the “working time is for work” maxim of *Peyton Packing*.\(^\text{232}\)

Finally, the manner in which the Supreme Court has analyzed cases shows that alternative means do matter. *Beth Israel* itself, for example, considered the inadequacy of employee locker rooms for protected activities in upholding the right to engage in those activities in the cafeteria.\(^\text{233}\) *Babcock & Wilcox* proclaimed, in a statement necessary to its holding, that the balancing of interests requires “as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.”\(^\text{234}\) The extent to which one interest is destroyed, and another maintained, necessarily implicates the alternative means of maintaining each party’s interest. Likewise, the Supreme Court approved the Board’s reliance on the absence of other means to engage in protected activities in *Republic Aviation*.\(^\text{235}\)

\(^\text{231}.\) See id.
\(^\text{232}.\) Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
\(^\text{233}.\) *Beth Israel*, 437 U.S. at 489–90.
\(^\text{234}.\) Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
\(^\text{235}.\) 324 U.S. at 803 n.10.
examples provide significant support for the dissenting members’ positions that alternative means should be considered. Therefore, even putting Johnson’s arguments aside, it is nonsensical to suggest that competing interests can be weighed without consideration of the alternatives. Both employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ property rights must, in some manner, be assessed a value in the decision-maker’s mind in order to be compared to one another. It is impossible to assign a value to anything without reference to its alternatives. In fact, the consideration of alternatives constitutes the fundamental concept of “opportunity cost,” a basic principle of economic theory. Furthermore, any item’s value is based primarily on other buying opportunities available to its buyers (supply), and other selling opportunities available to its sellers (demand). These principles apply not only to the economic realm, but also to all decision-making processes. As a result, in order to weigh employees’ Section 7 rights against employers’ property rights, consideration of employees’ other means to engage in protected activities is both logical and necessary.

The majority’s refusal to consider other forms of electronic communications in Purple Communications thus stands in stark contrast to the vehement complaints of the Register Guard dissent, unions, and pro-labor academics that Register Guard demonstrated a failure to adapt to changing circumstances. The justifications that the Board offered for minimizing the importance of other forms of electronic communication further highlighted this contrast because its reasoning ignored some of the essential capabilities of these tools.

The majority’s emphasis on the ability to engage in protected activities in the workplace seems to suggest that media such as personal email and social media cannot be accessed at work. However, employees can log

236. It should also be noted that other cases cited by the majority in support of its position, Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) and NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773 (1979), both asked the Supreme Court to draw lines between working and nonworking areas in particular industries. As Member Johnson explained, this exercise “inherently incorporates a consideration of alternative means of communication (e.g. distribution in nonwork areas only versus distribution throughout premises).” Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 54 (Dec. 11, 2014) (Johnson, Member, dissenting).
237. PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 7–8 (2d ed. 2009).
238. Id. at 79–82.
239. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: THE EIGHTFOLD PATH TO MORE EFFECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 15–25 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the importance of alternative options to effective policymaking processes).
240. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 104–05.
242. See supra notes 106–08.
243. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
on to these accounts without using a business email system and, more and more commonly, can do so on their own smartphones. Likewise, as Johnson pointed out, the Board’s assertion that employees might be “virtual strangers” with one another ignores the significant search capabilities offered by social media websites and common search engines.

The majority concluded its opinion in *Purple Communications* by declaring:

The *Register Guard* dissenters viewed the decision as confirming that the Board was “the Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies,” by “fail[ing] to recognize that e-mail ha[d] revolutionized communication both within and outside the workplace” and by unreasonably contending “that an e-mail system is a piece of communications equipment to be treated just as the law treats bulletin boards, telephones, and pieces of scrap paper.” . . . In overruling *Register Guard*, we seek to make “[n]ational labor policy . . . responsive to the enormous technological changes that are taking place in our society.”

However, the development of other forms of electronic communications in the interim means that the majority’s rationale, which would have been far more convincing in 2007, is not reflective of more recent circumstances. As a result, in its attempt to stay modern and relevant, the Board got its wires crossed and actually failed to adjust to changes in circumstances between 2007 and December 2014.

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244. See supra notes 214–19 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
248. This Note expresses no opinion regarding whether the Board’s 2007 *Register Guard* decision was correct given the circumstances of the time. *Register Guard* dissenting Members Liebman and Walsh may well have been correct in their argument that access to employer-owned email was necessary because it offered characteristics that, at the time, were “unique” and “sophisticated.” *Register Guard*, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1125. On the other hand, the *Register Guard* majority may have correctly concluded that “e-mail has not changed the pattern of industrial life . . . to the extent that . . . employee use of [employers’] e-mail system[s] for Section 7 purposes must . . . be mandated.” *Id.* at 1116. Regardless of which perspective better reflected the realities of the workplace in 2007, this Note argues only that the growth of personal electronic communications between 2007 and 2014 tipped the scales much further towards protection of property rights.
CONCLUSION

Future developments in this area, including possible reversal of Purple Communications, will depend on the views of the federal courts and the political composition of the Board. Any such reversal would likely cite the evolving role of technology in the personal and work lives of Americans. Reliance on trends such as extensive use of personal email, text messaging, video chatting, social media, and smartphones would be justified based on recent societal developments. For now, the Board’s refusal to consider major recent technological changes stands, and represents a failed attempt to show adaptability.

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