Admiralty—Collision of Steamers—Liability of United States upon Counter Claim

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REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS

ADMIRALTY—COLLISION OF STEAMERS—LIABILITY OF UNITED STATES UPON COUNTER CLAIM.


Appeal from circuit court of appeals of second circuit. The Luckenbach Steamship Co. on behalf of itself and other owners, libelled the barque Thenklia in admiralty for a collision with the steamship Luckenbach. The United States was made a party libellant after it filed a claim alleging possession and ownership at the time when the libel was filed, because the Luckenbach was used in war service under charter to the United States.

At the trial it appeared that the Luckenbach was alone at fault in the collision, and a decree for damages was rendered against the libellants and the United States. Counsel for the United States contended that a claim that would not constitute a cause of action against a sovereign could not be asserted as a counterclaim. It was held that when the United States comes into court to assert a claim, it so far takes the position of a private suitor as to agree by implication that justice may be done with regard to the subject matter. A libel in such a case is like a bill for an account, which imparts an offer to pay the balance if it should turn out against the party bringing the bill.

CONTEMPT—CONVEYANCE IN VIOLATION OF DECREE AS BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.—ATTORNEY ADVISING ACTION RESULTING IN CLIENT’S CONTEMPT, LIKewise GUILTY.


Defendant by a court decree was ordered to convey certain lands to plaintiff. Despite the decree, defendant conveyed the lands in question to one Ruth Naugle. She was informed of the decree by her counsel, but notwithstanding this, she accepted the deed from the defendant.

The Court held that defendant’s disobedience of the decree constituted both a civil and a criminal contempt, and that her attorney who advised her, was also guilty of contempt. An attorney is privileged to state to his client