Municipal Corporations—Liability for Torts—Proximate Cause

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Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, held that the contraction of typhoid fever may be regarded as accidental if the disease is contracted by accidental means. In Frankamp v. Fordney Hotel, 222 Mich. 525, an accident is defined to mean an unforeseen event occurring without the will or design of the person whose mere act causes it. That case specifically held that the contraction of typhoid fever from drinking water was an accidental injury. Other cases in accord are Ames v. Lake Independence Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 83; Wiltfong v. Lake Independent Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 91; Brodin's Case, 124 Me. 162; Vennen v. New Dells Co., 161 Wis. 370; Wasmuth-Endicott v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279. Two cases, contra, State ex rel Fairbault Woollen Mills et al. v. District Court of Rice County, 138 Minn. 210, and Industrial Commission v. Cross, 104 Ohio St. 561, can be distinguished because of differences in the Workmen's Compensation Acts under which they were decided. It would seem to follow that the case of John Rissman & Son v. Industrial Commission, the instant case, is decided on well established principles and is in accord with modern decisions. F. A. E. '28.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—LIABILITY FOR TORTS—PROXIMATE CAUSE.—Plaintiff was riding a bicycle. The wheel of a passing truck dropped into a hole in the cartway causing mud to splash in the plaintiff's eyes. Small stones in the mud penetrated the plaintiff's eye and caused loss of sight of the eye. Held, in an action against the city, that the defect in the street caused the passing vehicle to splash the mud in the plaintiff's eye, that such defect was the proximate cause of the injury, and that the city was liable. Stemmler v. City of Pittsburgh, (1926) 287 Pa. 365, 135 Atl. 100.

This case is interesting because of the indirect nature of city's liability. Municipal corporations are bound to keep streets in reasonably safe condition. Failing to do so makes them liable for all injuries due to such negligence. Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290. In Twist v. City of Rochester, 55 N. Y. S. 850, the court held that a city must use reasonable care in keeping its streets safe for public use, and if any injury results to a traveller it cannot claim exemption from liability because its streets are public. Authorities are practically uniform in holding a city liable for injuries resulting from its negligence in failing to keep streets in repair even though the defective street was not the sole cause of the injury. Belleville v. Hoffman, 74 Ill. App. 503. Thus a city was liable where the injury was produced as a result partly of a defect in the street, and partly of nature of the accident. Lacon v. Page, 48 Ill. 499; Vogel v. City of West Plains, 73 Mo. App. 588; Barrett v. Savannah, 9 Ga. App. 642, 72 S. E. 49; Vogel's v. City of St. Louis, 139 Mo. 127, 40 S. W. 653. In Joliet v. Shufelt, 144 Ill. 403, 32 N. E. 969, the city was held liable where a street was negligently constructed and plaintiff was thrown from his buggy and injured even though the accident would not have occurred if the horses' harness had not broken. If, however, the injuries are a result of a collision with a fire-truck the city is not liable although a defect in the street contributed to the collision. City of Louis ville v. Bridwell, 150 Ky. 589, 150 S. W. 672; Or if the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury there can be no recovery against the city even though the street was defective. De Camp v. Sioux City, 74 Ia. 392, 37 N. W. 971.

NEGligence—Motor Vehicles—Duty Owed by Driver to Self-Invited Guest.—The plaintiff in this case was a widow who was employed in Pine Bluff. The defendant was going to Little Rock by automobile and the plaintiff, who was anxious to see her children living there, obtained the defendant's permission to accompany him. The testimony introduced by the plaintiff tended to