The Power of Municipal Corporations to Protect Public Health and Safety

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THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY*

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REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE USE OF STREETS AND SIDEWALKS

Municipal regulation of streets and sidewalks is regularly authorized under state law. It must, however, survive in its particular manifestations and applications state constitutional provisions, as well as the United States Constitution, particularly the latter's due process, equal protection, and commerce clauses. There is the possibility, too, that state statutes may confer upon state commissions exclusive or paramount authority over certain particulars. So, too, states may withdraw these powers from cities and confer them upon other bodies. Many forms of conflict with state authority occur in this field.

Subject to these above limitations, municipalities can control the speed of vehicles on their streets, establish stop intersections, create safety zones, order the removal of obstructions, and prohibit the erection of billboards likely to obstruct the


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1. Western Auto Transport v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d 550 (1942); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1943); Goldstein v. City of Hamtramck, 227 Mich. 263, 198 N.W. 962 (1924). Delegation of power to administrative officials without adequate guides will invalidate traffic ordinances. Compare: City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925); City of Chicago v. Mariotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N.E. 369 (1928); City of Cleveland v. Gustafson, 124 Ohio St. 607, 180 N.E. 59 (1932).


vision of, or constitute unreasonable distraction to, drivers. Municipal corporations can inspect vehicles using their streets, and often license them. Although cities have sometimes been sustained in completely excluding from the streets certain kinds of vehicles, courts are often unwilling to sustain complete bans, by prohibitive licensing or otherwise, upon vehicles useful in trade and commerce.

Ordinances prescribing time limits on parking are valid, and parking in certain locations may be completely prohibited. Cars parked in violation of ordinances may be impounded by municipal authorities, and the payment of pound fees thereupon de-


14. And the license fees can generally be sufficient to cover costs of construction, maintenance and policing. Firestone v. City of Cambridge, 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925). See also cases cited infra in notes 26, 33 and 34.


16. Gurland v. Town of Kearney, 128 N.J.L. 22, 24 A.2d 210 (1942) (ice cream vendors); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1943) (same); Bogue v. Bennett, 156 Ind. 478, 60 N.E. 143 (1901) (traction engines.)


manded. Municipalities are regularly upheld in installing parking meters, and even in purchasing and maintaining off-the-street parking facilities. Theoretically, parking meters installed under a regulatory police power cannot produce revenue grossly or regularly in excess of expenses, but it is the rare case that has invalidated a parking meter ordinance therefor.

It is generally said that there is no right to use city streets for purpose of private gain, and such use can be subjected to extensive municipal regulation and, at times, even prohibition. So it has been held that municipalities can completely ban from the streets jitneys or cabs, and licensing of such vehicles is everywhere sustained. Cities are also upheld in limiting the number of cabs, and in regulating their solicitation practices, stands and parking, load limits, indemnity insurance coverage, and fares.

20. Steiner v. City of New Orleans, 173 La. 275, 136 So. 596 (1931). And note City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N.E.2d 802 (1943); upholding an ordinance making a prima facie case against an owner whose car was parked at a fire hydrant.


Busses operating solely within the city can be licensed, and there is even authority for municipal licensing of inter-urban and interstate busses. Regulation as to routes and indemnity insurance coverage will almost certainly be sustained if reasonable and not in conflict with state authority. Rather frequently occupation of the field by the state prevents municipal regulation in this matter. If the busses operate interstate, unreasonable license fees will be invalidated under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Similarly, state constitutions are frequently deemed violated in the case of inter-urban busses by fees unreasonable in amount or discriminatory against out-of-town lines.

Hawkers and peddlers using the city streets are subject to licensing and regulation. However, here as elsewhere, local

Exclusive stands can be granted. McFall v. St. Louis, 232 Mo. 716, 135 S.W. 51 (1911). See Note, 33 L.R.A.(n.s.) 471 (1911).
32. Parsons v. City of Galveston, 53 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1932); Clem v. City of LaGrange, 169 Ga. 51, 149 S.E. 638 (1929).
33. State v. Palmer, 212 Minn. 388, 3 N.W.2d 666 (1942).
34. Star Transportation Co. v. Mason City, 195 Iowa 930, 192 N.W. 873 (1923); Sylvania Busses v. City of Toledo, 118 Ohio St. 187, 160 N.E. 674 (1928); State v. Palmer, supra note 33. Cf. McDonald v. Paragould, 120 Ark. 226, 179 S.W. 335 (1915).
38. Clem v. City of LaGrange, 169 Ga. 51, 149 S.E. 638 (1929) holding reasonable and valid many bus regulations; Pennjersey Rapid Transit Co. v. City of Camden, 6 N.J. Misc. 813, 142 Atl. 821 (Sup. Ct. 1928) holding unreasonable a prohibition upon double-deck busses.
41. McDonald v. Paragould, 120 Ark. 226, 179 S.W. 335 (1915); City of Lincoln v. Dehner, 268 Ill. 175, 108 N.E. 991 (1915).
ordinances are invalidated because of unreasonable fees or
discrimination against non-residents.

Trucks operating in or passing through cities can be regulated
by municipalities in many ways. Although the United States
Supreme Court has sustained New York's City's ordinance banning advertising on the sides of trucks not owned by the advertise,
a similar Chicago ordinance has been annulled under the state constitution by the Illinois Court. The Commerce Clause results in the invalidation of unreasonable license fees upon interstate truckers, but the courts are not agreed on whether inter-city trucks can be required to seek municipal licenses or franchises. Nor are they agreed on whether municipalities can require licenses and fees of out-of-town firms delivering in the city, when the ordinances do not apply to local distributors.

Subject to earlier mentioned limitations, municipalities have been able to regulate railroads passing through the community as to such things as speed and safety precautions at crossings.

43. Iowa City v. Glassman, 155 Iowa 671, 136 N.W. 899 (1912).
47. Chicago Park District v. Canfield, 382 Ill. 218, 47 N.E.2d 61 (1943).
49. Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Ore. 122, 211 Pac. 909 (1923) (denying power of municipality to require franchise); Western Auto Transport v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d 590 (1942) (denying power to require license, and collecting cases both ways); People v. Marcello, 25 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. Mag. Ct. 1941) (denying power).
50. General Baking Co. v. City of Belleville, 384 Ill. 459, 51 N.E.2d 546 (1943) (upholding where local bakeries inspected under other ordinances); Sanford v. City of Clanton, 31 Ala. App. 53, 15 So.2d 303 (1943) (upholding); Linen Service Corp. of Texas v. City of Abilene, 169 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1943) (denying).
52. State v. Jersey City, 29 N.J.L. (5 Dutch) 170 (1861); Buffalo & Niagara Falls R.R. Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Hill 209 (1843); Great Western R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 33 Ill. 381 (1864).
and regulating street railways, light, telephone and water utilities using the streets,\(^{53}\) and even to setting rates.\(^{54}\) However, such power is often vested in state commissions.\(^{55}\)

Cities can require permits for parades and processions in the streets, even as to those claiming dispensation because of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.\(^{56}\) Municipalities can punish those who use sound trucks in a loud and raucous manner.\(^{57}\) Those who interfere with street traffic by speech, assembly or the distribution of literature, are constitutionally subject to municipal control.\(^{58}\)

Courts generally acknowledge a common law right of ingress and egress in owners whose property abuts city streets.\(^{59}\) This usually permits the construction of a driveway so long as it does not materially interfere with the use of the walk by pedestrians or create a traffic hazard.\(^{60}\) Nevertheless, cities have often been sustained in prohibiting such owners from cutting curbs into streets and across boulevards,\(^{61}\) and it is frequently


60. See cases cited in note 59.

61. State ex rel. Copland v. City of Toledo, 75 Ohio App. 378, 62 N.E.2d 256 (1945); Breinig v. Allegheny County, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1939);
said that an abutting owner's rights are subordinate to any reasonable municipal regulation necessary to facilitate general travel. Courts similarly recognize an abutting owner's right of view, but this will not prevent municipal regulation of advertising on the owner's building, at least of products not sold therein. Although temporary obstructions necessary to building construction have been condoned, courts will deny abutting owners any right to unreasonably clutter sidewalks or obstruct streets in front of their premises. Municipal regulations of signs hanging over the walk or street have been upheld, as have limitations upon awnings and sidewalk obstructions. A ban upon the projection of voices irritating to pedestrians has also been upheld. Courts are not agreed as to the validity of municipal ordinances imposing upon abutting owners the cost of sprinkling the streets nor do they always uphold ordinances casting upon abutting owners the obligation of clearing snow and ice from sidewalks.

Collier v. City of Memphis, 180 Tenn. 509, 176 S.W.2d 818 (1944); City of Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1939); City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N.E.2d 278 (1946); Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244 (1946), noted in 31 MINN. L. REV. 292 (1946).


63. Yale v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 Atl. 268 (1928); Kelbro v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943).

64. Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Kelbro v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). Terry, The Constitutionality of Statutes forbidding Advertising Signs on Property, 24 YALE L.J. 1 (1914).


68. Laura Vincent Co. v. City of Selma, 43 Cal. App. 2d 473, 111 P.2d 17 (1941).


71. Compare City of Kalamazoo v. Crawford, 154 Mich. 58, 117 N.W. 572 (1908) or City of Owensboro v. Sweeney, 129 Ky. 607, 111 S.W. 364 (1908) with City of Lafayette v. Tanner, 149 La. 430, 93 So. 314 (1921) or City of Roswell v. Bateman, 20 N.M. 77, 146 Pac. 950 (1915).

Cities have been sustained in treating sidewalk newsstands as nuisances.73 Reasonable municipal regulation of sidewalk photographers is permissible,74 although prohibitory fees are apt to be voided.75 A city can prohibit the “pull-in” of pedestrains by zealous merchants.76 Control over sidewalk congestion has been held to justify a prohibition on parking lot operators from vender goods unless such business is conducted in a permanent building.77 Sidewalk vending ordinances are generally upheld,78 and it is only occasionally that a sidewalk trade regulation will be ruled unreasonable and invalid.79 On the other hand, courts will not permit cities to grant or lease sidewalks space for private business if the adventure will materially interfere with the public’s pedestrian use.80

A municipality cannot ban at all times and places the distribution of religious, economic or political literature,81 nor can it permit a public official to censor what will be distributed.82 Reasonable registration and identification ordinances, however, are probably constitutional even as applied to such distributors.83 Municipalities can prohibit violent picketing and even peaceful picketing if it is carried on in a context of violence,84 or at a location removed from the immediate area of the industrial

Frederick, 122 N.Y. 268, 25 N.E. 480 (1890) or Kansas City v. Holmes, 274 Mo. 159, 202 S.W. 392 (1918).
75. City of Racine v. Weyhe, 241 Wis. 133, 5 N.W.2d 747 (1942), noted in 27 MARQ. L. REV. 105 (1943).
dispute.85 And cities can at this writing even ban peaceful picketing at the locus of the industrial dispute if the objective is for a purpose unlawful or contrary to public policy.86

According to Valentine v. Chrestensen87 a municipality can completely prohibit the distribution of commercial matter. A number of state courts have upheld the Green River type of ordinance declaring solicitation and peddling without invitation a nuisance and punishing the same,88 although a sizable number of state courts have ruled this type ordinance violative of state constitutions.89 The Commerce Clause will hold municipal regulation of solicitors for out-of-state concerns to very narrow limits.90 And state courts apply a reasonable test in passing upon regulations of distributors and solicitors, upholding the great majority so long as they are not discriminatory against out-of-town merchants.91 Reasonable license fees are sustained.92

Street crossing ordinances are regularly upheld,93 so long as they are not in conflict with state vehicle codes.94 Of interest is a

87. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), noted in 26 MINN. L. REV. 895 (1942).
89. Rhyne, Burton & Murphy, Municipal Regulation of Peddlers, Solicitors and Itinerant Merchants, (Nat. Inst. of Mun. Law Officers, Report No. 118, 1947); McIntyre and Rhyne, Municipal Legislative Barriers to a Free Market, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 359 (1941); Note, Municipal control of peddlers, solicitors and distributors, 22 TULANE L. REV. 284 (1947); Note, Prohibitions of house-to-house canvassing by municipalities. 81 Ky. L.J. 291 (1943).
91. Ordinances prohibiting all itinerant peddlers on the streets are apt to be deemed unreasonable as unrelated to public health and safety, and invalid as a denial of due process. Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1943). Discrimination against non-residents will frequently invalidate an ordinance. Goldstein v. City of Hamtramck, 227 Mich. 263, 198 N.W. 962 (1924); Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commrs., 42 N.J.L. 364 (1880).
92. Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923); Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Troy, 80 P.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1935).
judicially approved Portland, Oregon ordinance to the effect that "between the hours of one and five a. m. it shall be unlawful for any person to roam or be upon any street, alley or public place without having and disclosing a lawful purpose." Generally speaking, municipal efforts to protect pedestrian safety will be sustained.

**FIRE PREVENTION**

Municipalities may regulate extensively activities constituting likely fire hazards, such as dry cleaners, laundries, lumber yards, coal yards, auto paint shops, producers of gas and oil, oil storage depots and gas stations.

Buildings constructed of certain materials may be excluded from particular areas of the community. One of the reasons recognized by the judiciary in sustaining municipal billboard regulation is the fire hazard occasioned by their collection of papers and trash. The amount of combustible or inflammable materials that may be assembled within a city may be limited. Buildings used by large numbers of the public, such as thea-

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97. In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 9 Pac. 139 (1885); Ruban v. City of Chicago, 330 Ill. 97, 161 N.E. 133 (1928); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). As elsewhere, arbitrary denial of licenses is unconstitutional. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
101. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179, 72 Pac. 970 (1903).
107. Clark v. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276 (1882); Davenport v. Richmond, 81 Va. 636 (1886); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Danville, 199 Ill. 50, 64 N.E. 1110 (1902).
ters,108 factories,109 hotels110 and rooming houses111 are subject to continual inspection and regulation, as are trailer camps and trailers.112

CONTROL OF ODORS, NOISES, SMOKE AND DIRT

Municipalities may keep out of the community, or parts thereof, or at least regulate extensively, industries emitting noxious odors such as slaughterhouses,113 sewage disposal plants,114 piggeries,115 horse and mule markets,116 livery stables,117 gas works,118 and brick burning concerns.119

Similarly, cities may exclude or regulate activities characterized by undue noise, such as rock crushers,120 garages,121 dog kennels,122 dance halls,123 and establishments using juke boxes.124

110. Daniels v. City of Portland, 124 Ore. 677, 265 Pac. 790 (1928).
118. Dobbs v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179, 72 Pac. 970 (1903).
121. People v. Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368, 105 N.E. 315 (1915); People v. Village of Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365, 107 N.E. 636 (1915); McIntosh v. Johnson, 211 N.Y. 265, 105 N.E. 414 (1914).
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Industries can be banned or extensively regulated when they cause excessive smoke, soot and dust. And municipal anti-smoke ordinances are regularly upheld. Because of the possibility of littering the public ways the distribution of commercial matter can be banned.

It should be noted that in this area extraterritorial regulation by municipalities is frequently authorized and upheld.

MILK CONTROL

Municipal corporations generally have the power to regulate conditions under which milk and dairy products are made available to the community. Accordingly, cities can license, regulate and inspect producers and distributors. They can inspect dairy products sold within the city, regardless of their origin. Municipalities can forbid the burning of certain coals, and even forbid the introduction of these coals into the city. Ballentine v. Nester, supra.

The municipal power over milk customarily extends to such items as ice cream, Wright v. Richmond County Department of Health, 182 Ga. 651, 186 S.E. 815 (1936); Simco Sales Service v. Brackin, 344 Pa. 628, 26 A.2d 323 (1942); and chocolate milk, Anderson v. City of Tampa, 121 Fla. 670, 164 So. 546 (1936).

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Cities have frequently been sustained in inspecting, outside the city limits, the herds and dairying facilities of concerns serving the urban market. Municipalities have also been upheld in regulating the temperature at which milk is transported into the city.

Conflict with state law will invalidate municipal milk ordinances and, accordingly, cities cannot ordinarily ban the sale of milk approved by state health authorities. However, state regulations of the milk industry does not preclude all municipal complementation. The attempts of municipalities to erect economic trade walls around the city and prevent the introduction of milk from outside will regularly be invalidated as beyond municipal power, as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.

City v. Henre, 96 Kan. 794, 153 Pac. 548 (1915). The ordinance cannot vest an arbitrary discretion in the licenser. City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937). The license can be revoked upon proof of unfitness, Prawdzik v. City of Grand Rapids, 313 Mich. 376, 21 N.W.2d 168 (1946), and customarily revocation can be effectuated summarily, without notice or hearing. State ex rel. Nowotny v. City of Milwaukee, 140 Wis. 38, 121 N.W. 658 (1909); People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health of City of New York, 189 N.Y. 187, 82 N.E. 187 (1907); Leach v. Coleman, 188 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1946). A reasonable license fee may be charged but the amount can not grossly exceed the cost of administering the regulation, unless it is an exercise of a granted power to tax. Coleman v. City of Little Rock, 191 Ark. 844, 88 S.W.2d 58 (1936); Pure Milk Producers and Distributors Assn. v. Morton, 276 Ky. 735, 125 S.W.2d 216 (1939); Stephens v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 199, 1 P.2d 367 (1931).

Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S.E. 717 (1903).

State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N.W. 1066 (1896); Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S.E. 717 (1903); Carpenter v. Little Rock, 101 Ark. 238, 142 S.W. 162 (1911).

Stephens v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 199, 1 P.2d 367 (1931); Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 Ill. 122, 104 N.E. 1104 (1915); Korth v. City of Portland, 123 Ore. 180, 261 Pac. 895 (1927). However, municipalities have no extraterritorial jurisdiction here unless expressly or impliedly conferred. City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937); Higgins v. City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E.2d 520 (1948); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949), noted in [1950] LAW FORUM 142. Note. 44 Ill. L. REV. 241 (1949).

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tection,"139 or as an unconstitutional direct burden on interstate commerce.140 The due process test of reasonableness must, of course, be satisfied by all municipal milk ordinances.141

**FOOD AND BEVERAGE CONTROL**

To safeguard the health of the community a municipal corporation can license,142 regulate and inspect slaughterhouses,143 bakeries,144 manufacturers and purveyors of candy,145 soft drinks,146 ice,147 meat markets,148 groceries,149 restaurants,150


141. Fieldcrest Dairies v. City of Chicago, 122 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1941), noted in 30 Ill. L.J. 257 (1942) holding invalid an ordinance prohibiting delivery of milk in anything but bottles. Courts also announce rather frequently that the power to regulate is not the power to prohibit. Good Humor Milk Corp. v. City of New York, 200 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1942).

142. The power to license generally flows from the power to regulate. Fees must be reasonable. Cases collected in Note, 117 A.L.R. 1319 (1938). Ordinances permitting arbitrary revocation will usually be void. State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 193 Pac. 845 (1920).


wholesalers and warehouse of foodstuffs,151 and vehicular distributors of the above.152 Reasonable inspection fees will ordinarily be upheld.153 However, ordinances passed under regulatory powers will be invalid if they require fees and contain no provisions for regulation or inspection.164 Unless the license fee is an exercise of an authorized municipal power of raising revenue,

the authority of a municipality is limited to such a charge for a license as will bear some reasonable relation to the additional burdens imposed upon the municipality by the business or occupation licensed and the necessary expense involved in police supervision.155

Municipalities can provide by ordinance against the sale of impure, unwholesome or adulterated foods,156 and food unfit for human consumption can be summarily seized and destroyed.157 Vendors of alcoholic beverages can be licensed158 and regulated by municipalities159 unless the sale thereof has been forbidden

powers will fail if they contain requirements for fees without provision for regulation or inspection. Herb Bros. v. City of Alton, 264 Ill. 628, 106 N.E. 434 (1914).


159. State ex rel. Hewlett v. Womach, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 809 (1946); Mutchall v. City of Kalamazoo, 323 Mich. 215, 35 N.W.2d 245 (1948); Nelson v. State ex rel. Gross, 157 Fla. 417, 26 So.2d 60 (1946); Cowan v. City of St. Petersburg, 149 Fla. 470, 6 So.2d 269 (1942); City of Hoboken v. Greiner, 66 N.J.L. 592, 53 Atl. 693 (1902); Foster v. Police Commissioners, 102 Cal. 483, 37 Pac. 763 (1894). See Waukesha v. Statistas, 255 Wis. 76, 37 N.W.2d 846 (1949) for the dilemma of Wisconsin cities in punishing any crime.
by the state or there has been occupation of the field by state authority.\textsuperscript{160} Here municipal corporations have frequently been granted statutory authority to project their regulations beyond city limits.\textsuperscript{161}

Occasionally food and beverage ordinances are invalidated because of discrimination against out-of-town merchants,\textsuperscript{162} and unreasonable classifications.\textsuperscript{163} Under the Commerce Clause federal occupation of the field will invalidate these, as well as other, municipal ordinances.\textsuperscript{164}

The keeping of food matter,\textsuperscript{165} its collection, transportation and disposition\textsuperscript{166} are subjects on which extensive municipal regulation is possible. The collection of garbage by private concerns may be forbidden.\textsuperscript{167} Reasonable charges for collection may be levied by cities,\textsuperscript{168} or, if it chooses, a municipality may confer a monopoly upon a single concern.\textsuperscript{169}

\section*{Sanitation and Health}

To protect the public health and safety municipal authorities can abate public nuisances, summarily if necessary.\textsuperscript{170} The courts

\begin{itemize}
  \item 160. Sparger v. Harris, 191 Okla. 583, 131 P.2d 1011 (1942).
  \item 161. People v. Raims, 20 Colo. 489, 39 Pac. 341 (1895).
  \item 162. Ex parte Irish, 122 Kan. 33, 250 Pac. 1056 (1926); Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commr., 42 N.J.L. 364 (1880).
  \item 164. Quaker Oats Co. v. City of New York, 295 N.Y. 527, 63 N.E.2d 593 (1946).
  \item 167. City of Canton v. Van Voorhis, 61 Ohio App. 419, 22 N.E.2d 651 (1939), app. dism. 135 Ohio St. 319, 20 N.E.2d 720 (1940), noted in 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1334 (1940); Ex parte Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 41 Pac. 955 (1905); Ex parte London, 73 Tex. Cr. 203, 169 S.W. 968 (1913).
\end{itemize}
recognize some power to impose by ordinance the label of nuisance upon things not considered common law nuisances,¹⁷¹ but a municipality cannot by ordinance declare and suppress something as a nuisance when it is not one in fact.¹⁷²

Cities can protect their water supply from pollution.¹⁷³ Plumbers can be licensed,¹⁷⁴ used plumbing fixtures can be inspected before sale,¹⁷⁵ and the regulation of plumbing facilities is generally sustained.¹⁷⁶

Sanitary facilities in multiple dwellings, such as hotels and tenement houses,¹⁷⁷ and in public buildings,¹⁷⁸ are subject to inspection and regulation. So, too, are conditions in trailer camps.¹⁷⁹ However, private dwellings can ordinarily be invaded only where necessary to abate a public nuisance or where the general health of the city will likely be endangered by the occupant’s failure to observe proper sanitary measures.¹⁸⁰

Municipalities can ban from the city activities and trades apt

¹⁷¹. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Sioux City v. Simmons Hardware Co., 151 Iowa 334, 129 N.W. 979 (1911); City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823, rehearing denied, 193 Iowa 1256, 188 N.W. 921 (1921); Hislop v. Rodgers, 54 Ariz. 101, 92 P.2d 527 (1939); City of Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616, 194 So. 388 (1940). "It is a rule that a municipal corporation has no power to treat a thing as a nuisance which cannot be one; but it is equally settled that it has the power to treat as a nuisance a thing that, from its character, location, and surroundings, may become such." Nash v. District of Columbia, 28 App. Cas. (D.C.) 598, 601 (1907).

¹⁷². City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155 S.W.2d 227 (1941); Potashnik v. City of Sikeston, 351 Mo. 505, 173 S.W.2d 96 (1943); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923); City of Milwaukee v. Milbrew, 220 Wis. 527, 3 N.W.2d 386 (1942).


¹⁷⁷. Tenement House Department v. Moeschen, 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E. 231 (1904); Keiper v. City of Louisville, 152 Ky. 691, 164 S.W. 18 (1913); Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910); Daniels v. City of Portland, 124 Ore. 677, 285 Pac. 790 (1928).


to imperil the public health,\textsuperscript{181} and other occupations, such as barbering, which may spread disease are subject to inspection and considerable regulation.\textsuperscript{182} Municipal corporations are frequently clothed with authority to extraterritorially enforce their sanitary and health ordinances.\textsuperscript{183}

**PUBLIC MORALITY**

There is authority to sustain municipal punishment of gambling, even though the state has penalized the same activity,\textsuperscript{184} although such authority has also been denied.\textsuperscript{185} Fortune telling may accordingly be forbidden by municipalities.\textsuperscript{186} If forms of gambling are not made criminal by state law, cities may license and regulate such things as dog races,\textsuperscript{187} pinball and marble machines,\textsuperscript{188} and other forms of chance.\textsuperscript{189} Of course, if the form of gambling has been outlawed by state action municipal licensing will fail.\textsuperscript{190}

Extensive regulation of pool and billiard rooms is regularly upheld,\textsuperscript{191} and frequently complete bans are sustained.\textsuperscript{192} Dance

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\textsuperscript{181} Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910); City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 (1942).


\textsuperscript{184} Hunter v. Mayor and Council of Teaneck, 128 N.J.L. 164, 24 A.2d 555 (1942).

\textsuperscript{185} In re Portnoy, 21 Cal.2d 237, 131 P.2d 1 (1942).

\textsuperscript{186} Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 835, 191 S.W.2d 612 (1945); Taylor v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, certiorari to the Supreme Court of California denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).

\textsuperscript{187} Town of Hallandale v. Broward County Kennel Club, 153 Fla. 302, 14 So.2d 97 (1943).


\textsuperscript{190} State ex rel. Sergi v. City of Youngstown, 68 Ohio App. 254, 40 N.E.2d 477 (1941).

\textsuperscript{191} Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912); Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Johnson v. City of Lawrence, 120 Kan. 65, 241 Pac. 1053 (1926). Occasional ordinances are deemed unreasonable and invalidated. Craig v. Mayor and Aldermen of Gallatin, 166 Tenn. 415, 79 S.W.2d 555 (1935) (ordering closing from 6 p.m. to 7 a.m.).

\textsuperscript{192} State ex rel. Baylor v. City of Hinton, 109 W. Va. 653, 155 S.E.
halls are similarly subject to inspection and regulation. Municipalities may adopt rules prohibiting vulgar, obscene and indecent exhibitions. Disorderly houses can, of course, be banned. Plays and motion pictures may be censored, and theater licenses can be revoked for performances shocking to the morality of the community. The utterance of language characterized as blasphemous, profane, and obscene can be punished. In the absence of conflict with state law ordinances forbidding Sunday business have been sustained.

THE PUBLIC PURSE

Municipalities have rather extensive powers to protect the community against fraud and deception. Cities are sustained in licensing and regulating pawn brokers, second-hand dealers, etc. Generally, See Notes, 20 A.L.R. 1482 (1922), 29 A.L.R. 41 (1924), 53 A.L.R. 149 (1928), 72 A.L.R. 1339 (1931).


196. City of Chicago v. Kirkland, 79 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1936).


198. Bonserk Theater Corp. v. Moss, 34 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1942). Cf. Holly Holding Co. v. Moss, 270 N.Y. 621, 1 N.E.2d 359 (1936) to the effect that the city could not revoke a theater license for violating statute relating to immoral stage entertainments in absence of a conviction for violating the statute relating to immoral plays and exhibitions. The revocation is, of course, subject to judicial review and cannot be effected arbitrarily by municipal authorities. Fox Amusement Co. v. McClellan, 62 Misc. 100, 114 N.Y. Supp. 594 (Sup. Ct. 1909).

199. Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1941); Cf. Lamere v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552, 63 N.E.2d 863 (1945).


201. Medias v. City of Indianapolis, 216 Ind. 155, 23 N.E.2d 590 (1939); Solof v. City of Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 296, 174 S.W.2d 471 (1943); City of Wichita v. Wolkow, 110 Kan. 114, 292 Pac. 692 (1921); Provident Loan Co. v. Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac. 10 (1918); See Note, 125 A.L.R. 598 (1940).
POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

stores, second-hand car dealers, auctioneers, ticket brokers and automatic vending machines. Municipalities have been upheld in prescribing the weight and quality of such things as bread and coal, as well as the capacity of milk containers. Unless over-ridden by state law, cities have been able to regulate charges of small loan companies and money changers. Municipal attempts to fix prices for commodities and services have generally been condemned as beyond civic power, although courts have been receptive to municipal ordinances making illegal the sale of rationed articles above ceiling prices. Except in a few home rule states the legislative power to fix rates for utilities is denied to municipalities, al-

though generally courts admit municipal power to set rates by contract or franchise. Municipal power to control deceptive advertising is generally recognized.\textsuperscript{216}

\textbf{TRADE REGULATION GENERALLY}

It should always be borne in mind that municipalities having strictly limited powers must find express or necessarily implied power to regulate any aspect of trade or business.\textsuperscript{217}

Although courts frequently announce that "... if a business sought to be regulated does not tend to injure the public health, public morals or interfere with the general welfare it is not a subject for the exercise of the police power,"\textsuperscript{218} it is universally recognized that if a business, e.g. a junkyard, is apt to become a nuisance it can be regulated extensively,\textsuperscript{219} and even be excluded from parts of the community.\textsuperscript{220}

In general the power to regulate a trade embraces the power to require a license.\textsuperscript{221} Accordingly, municipalities have regularly been sustained in licensing many forms of trade, business and professions such as merchants,\textsuperscript{222} manufactories,\textsuperscript{223} utilities,\textsuperscript{224} lawyers,\textsuperscript{225} amusement parks,\textsuperscript{226} and boarding houses.\textsuperscript{227} And

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\textsuperscript{216}. City of Springfield v. Hurst, 144 Ohio St. 49, 57 N.E.2d 425 (1944); City of St. Louis v. Southcombe, 320 Mo. 865, 8 S.W.2d 1001 (1928); Cf. Ritholz v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 258, 13 N.W.2d 283 (1944).
\textsuperscript{217}. Condon v. Village of Forest Park, 278 Ill. 218, 115 N.E. 825 (1917); power to regulate and license amusement places held not to authorize license of golf course; Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 10 N.E.2d 961, 1937; power to license junk dealers does not authorize licensing of car dealers who accepted in trade and stored used tires.
\textsuperscript{218}. City of Chicago v. R & X Restaurant, 369 Ill. 65, 15 N.E.2d 725 (1938). See also Jewell Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W. 664 (1940).
\textsuperscript{221}. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 52 N.E. 44 (1898).
\textsuperscript{222}. Van Hook v. City of Selma, 70 Ala. 361 (1881).
\textsuperscript{225}. Davis v. Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616 (Utah 1950).
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even graduated license fees on chains are generally upheld.\textsuperscript{228} License fees must be reasonable, however, and cannot grossly exceed the cost of policing the trade or activity.\textsuperscript{229} unless the fee is authorized as an expression of municipal tax power.\textsuperscript{230} Courts customarily rebel at municipal attempts to prohibit lawful trades through the licensing technique.\textsuperscript{231} Licensing ordinances will be invalidated when the standard of revocation is so vague as to permit an official to cancel “for good and satisfactory reasons.”\textsuperscript{232} There is always the possibility that municipal licensing of trades and occupations will fail because of conflict with state law.\textsuperscript{233}

The ability of municipalities to set closing hours for businesses and trades has been sustained in some cases,\textsuperscript{234} but denied in the majority of decisions.\textsuperscript{235} All municipal regulatory ordinances must be reasonable to survive.\textsuperscript{236} And there is a discernible judicial inclination to invalidate trade regulations if they appear to have been passed primarily to benefit a group of business concerns at the expense of competitors.\textsuperscript{237}


\textsuperscript{230}. McKay v. City of Wichita, 135 Kan. 678, 11 P.2d 733 (1942).

\textsuperscript{231}. Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 200 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 133 (1942); New Jersey Good Humor Inc. v. Board of Commrs. of Borough of Bradley Beach, 124 N.J.L. 162, 11 A.2d 113 (1940).


\textsuperscript{233}. Trimble v. City of Topeka, 147 Kan. 111, 75 P.2d 241 (1938); Jackson v. City of Sylacauga, 25 Ala. 244, 144 So. 125 (1932).

\textsuperscript{234}. Solof v. City of Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 296, 174 S.W.2d 471 (1943) (pawnshop); Justesen’s Food Stores v. City of Tulare, 12 Cal.2d 324, 84 P.2d 140 (1937) (grocery).


\textsuperscript{236}. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889); City of Chicago v. Gunning, 214 Ill. 628, 73, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905).

\textsuperscript{237}. S.S. Kresge, Co. v. Couzens, 290 Mich. 185, 287 N.W. 427
Notwithstanding some thought that municipalities cannot punish for crimes, and some further opinion that municipal punishment is invalid when the same act is penalized by state statute, municipal corporations should be permitted to punish as crimes violations of trade regulatory ordinances contrary to the safety and good order of the local community.

CONCLUSION

Home rule cities, as well as those municipalities depending upon legislative grants of power, usually have adequate legislative authority to protect the public health, safety, morality and general welfare. Generally speaking, municipal ordinances will be valid if they are reasonable and have a reasonable relationship to one of the aforementioned legitimate ends. The commerce, equal protection, and due process clauses of the United States Constitution are ever-present limitations upon the exercise of admitted municipal powers. Furthermore, municipal corporations in protecting the community health, safety, morality and general welfare must ever be on guard against conflict with state law or state occupation of the field. As in the past the satisfactory accomplishment of the municipal law job will depend upon the awareness and ingenuity of municipal legislatures, plus increasing understanding and sympathy to novel municipal solutions by state high courts often staffed with jurists from non-urban areas.


238. State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W.2d 345 (1947); City of Waukesha v. Stathas, 255 Wis. 76, 37 N.W.2d 846 (1949).


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