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PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS OF CITY PLANNING IN THE SOVIET UNION

ZIGURDS L. ZILE*

INTRODUCTION

This article traces the forty-five year history of city planning in the Soviet Union. It describes and interprets the landmark events and the periods of progress which have alternated with periods of stagnation and retreat. The focus is on the principal normative acts and the agencies charged with their execution.

Soviet writings, especially those for foreign readers, propagate the notion that truly far-reaching city planning is possible only where private ownership of land is absent, where housing is publicly owned and where a single economic plan directs the national economy, as is the case in the Soviet Union. The same writings imply that Soviet planners have actually learned to control urban growth and are routinely creating individualized cities which blend into their physical environment and reflect the residents’ ethnic and cultural heritage.1

In fact, there is wide disparity between plans and results. The programs are not perfect, and their realization is beset by problems which have betrayed many an ideal. It should be kept in mind that the Soviet Union is inhabited and governed by human beings. Some of them are competent, imaginative and devoted; others are given to apathy or covet power, recognition and material wealth. Marxist-Leninist ideology has predicted the emergence of “the new Soviet man,” a man free of all unsavory traits, but he is still a fictitious figure. In the meantime, errors due to miscalculation, obstinacy, corruption and other failings are common.

It is true that a number of institutional factors which hamper city planning under market conditions are not found in the Soviet system. For one, the word “planning” does not arouse suspicion in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, planning is presented as a concept central to Soviet life and largely responsible for Soviet achievements. Secondly, the wealth of the country is state owned. It includes land and may, without violating any constitutional principle of inalienable rights,

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include anything attached to land as well. But, whereas a number of obstacles to comprehensive planning have been removed, many others remain and make themselves felt much the same as elsewhere. However vast and rich is the land of the Soviets, its resources are not superabundant. Some of them appear almost scarce when their immediate availability is set against the competing demands of all sectors of the country. Moreover, it is not for the professional planners to determine when and to what extent a major sector shall be advanced and where development shall be retarded. The making of these fundamental judgments, often without the benefit of open discussion or consultation, is reserved to a relatively small group of political decision-makers who hold the reins of the supreme organs of both the Communist Party and the State. This feature of the decision-making process, a belief in quick results through administrative reshuffling, and a propensity for doctrinal discourse have combined to produce impediments to planning which are peculiarly Soviet. The drastic shifts in high-level policy discourage the planners from formulating reliable long-range plans, the frequent administrative overhauls confound routine work, and the requirement of ideological conformity inhibits discussion of the ends and means. Despite a long history of urban planning, Soviet cities are not picturesque models of purpose and balance.

I. Post-Revolutionary Period of Disorganization and the First Steps Toward Recovery

During the years of Militant Communism (1917-1921), while the country was ravaged by external and internal strife, economic development in Russia came to a virtual standstill. The Program of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 1919 resolved to strive "for eradication of congestion and unsanitary conditions in the old neighborhoods; for removal of unsuitable, rebuilding of old, and construction of new housing...; and for rational resettlement of the working people" but, apart from redistribution of the existing housing space, no serious attempt was made to translate the slogans into deeds. Reconstruction in the peaceful areas was spotty. Only after liberal concessions had been made to private enterprise by the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, did the recovery get under way. But even from there on city planning worthy of that name was not among the immediate concerns of the workers' and peasants' government. Despite the fact that the land with its resources and the most important improvements had been made state property, that im-

important segments of economy had been removed from private control, that sizable urban areas had been practically cleared by war damage, wilful stripping, and natural dilapidation and that the new order had even inherited some experience in city planning antedating the revolution, there were compelling reasons for postponing any ambitious program. The material base was meager. It was a matter, first of all, of getting the destitute population somehow fed, clothed and sheltered. Some pits and plants had to be put back into operation and a degree of distribution and communications restored. The administration of the country was poorly structured and uncertain.

The October Revolution had not been fought in the name of planning, but with the “expropriation of the expropriators” the idea became implicit in the governmental management and control of the nationalized wealth. Planning initially did not amount to much more than an effort to maintain a rough balance in the economic life on a day to day basis. After a part of this burden had been shifted onto the revitalized private sector, the State General Planning Commission (Gosplan) was established in 1921 to chart the long-range course of the entire economy. However, for a number of reasons, among them a lack of precedents and up-to-date statistics, the planning agency’s early product was of limited value.

By 1925 no acceptable theory of city planning had yet been pro-claimed. There was no clarity of the concrete lines along which the new society intended to move and of the changes in the physical environment such advance would either presuppose or entail. The vague tenets of the Communist Manifesto concerning the “gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country by a more equitable distribution of population,” “the establishment of industrial armies” and the transformation of the family were not sufficiently meaningful to serve as starting points for community planning, had such planning been otherwise feasible. A movement favoring British-type garden cities was in vogue for a spell then dropped in the face of ideological objections. The advocates of private associations to promote the development of such cities were accused of trying to usurp a state function and use it in support of a relic of bourgeois individualism. It was conceded, however, that the repudiation of familiar concepts and practices had left a vacuum which begged to be filled with “guidelines reflecting an understanding of the tendencies in Soviet economic and cultural development.”

During the early 1920s the state tackled the desperate urban housing problem by building large multiple dwellings, including the com-

municipal or caserne types. However, the public effort fell far short of what was needed. Thus, in keeping with the spirit of the NEP, the government enacted the law of construction lease (*pravo zastroiki)* to encourage individuals to build on their own account. The response was excellent. From 1923 to 1926, individual builders contributed 88.7 per cent of the total of 162 million square feet of new housing space. Since most of this was small cubature construction, new sprawling suburbs were the natural result of the programs. In 1928 the government belatedly tried to reverse this trend by legislation designed to attract private investment in large apartment houses. Although the maneuver failed in its positive sense, soon thereafter the imbalance was redressed by a general decline in private activity with the expiration of the NEP. As much of the petty construction as continued to go on was tolerated. At the moment, a sustained attack on the housing shortage was apparently thought more important than the side effects of the scattered small buildings on future city plans and forms of community living.

II. Establishment of the Principles of Urban Administration in the RSFSR

During the 1920s the Soviet regime did more than blow life into the faltering economy. This was the decade in which the administrative structure of the country became established. The principles then adopted have, on the whole, survived to this day. It may be helpful to take a look at these fundamentals now.

The General Statute on Urban and Rural Settlements of September

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5. Sosnovy, The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union 73 (1954). Throughout this article metric units of measure found in original sources have been converted into American measures, using rough conversion factors.
7. After the Revolution, Russia proper and vast provinces inhabited by non-Russians (some of which were granted limited autonomy) were organized into a Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR). The “Soviet Union” (USSR), a federation of once formally independent Soviet republics, was formed in 1922 by a treaty between the RSFSR and its non-Russian counterparts (Belorussia, the Ukraine and the Transcaucasian Federation which consisted of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Since the founding of the federation, the laws of the constituent (union) republics, in their spheres of power, have been quite uniform, with the RSFSR setting the tone. For this reason, in many instances, only the laws and regulations of the RSFSR are used to illustrate the history of planning legislation.
15, 1924 classified all populated places (naselennye punkty) of the RSFSR into urban settlements or cities (gorodskie poselenia; goroda,) rural settlements or peasant villages (sel'skie poselenia; sela) and cottage, workers' and resort settlements (dachnye, rabochie, kurortnye poselki). The same statute recognized as cities all those populated places which had held that designation at the moment of the revolution, leaving further categorization to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee—VTsIK (now, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic). Nevertheless, an adult population of not less than 1,000 and nonagricultural pursuits as the basic occupation of at least two-thirds of the residents were listed as the minimum criteria for urban rank. Since then population of 12,000 has been fixed as the minimum requirement.

The administrative status of cities varies with their importance. The larger ones (e.g., Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev) are directly subordinated to their union republics; others to autonomous republics, territories or regions; still others to districts. With the exception of those over 100,000, which are further divided into boroughs or urban districts, cities are the terminal links in their respective chains of command. The cities are governed by nominally elected and periodically convened soviets (councils) of working people's deputies (gorodskie sovety deputatov trudashchikhsia), which in turn elect executive committees to provide working continuity. The ordinary municipal functions are performed by administrative sections appointed by the soviets. The Soviet Union knows no constitutionally guaranteed principle of home rule. The competence of city soviets is defined from time to time by all-union ("federal") or republic ("state") legislation and by directives emanating from the intermediate levels of the conciliar hierarchy, that is, the soviets of autonomous republics, territories, regions and districts. As a result, any ordinance or regulation issued by a city soviet is subject to annulment from above. Furthermore, the functional administrative sections, in accordance with the principle of "dual subordination" (dvinoe podchinenie), serve two masters, namely, the local soviet (horizontal subordination) and the counterpart section, department or ministry attached to the next higher soviet (vertical subordination). For example, the operations of the health section of City X, a city of regional subordination, are directed not only by the soviet of X and its executive committee but also by the health department of the regional soviet.

As one of its initial acts, the Soviet regime nationalized all land.

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Land administration itself was turned over to the local soviets. The RSFSR Land Code of 1922\textsuperscript{10} and the Statute on Urban Land Management, of April 13, 1925\textsuperscript{11} laid the foundation for the present administrative setup. Formally, the city soviet allocates tracts of land to authorized users in accordance with the city plan and enforces the local building, health and safety regulations. As a general proposition, it controls lands situated within the city limits. The bulk of these lands is used by juristic persons, i.e., mostly state-owned and cooperative entities. These juristic persons include housing authorities and enterprises that supply municipal services. Since the latter two are typically dominated by the local soviet, their policing is relatively simple. The rest, including all major industrial and trading establishments, have importance that transcends the boundaries of the city. They look to other state agencies (economic councils, economic ministries) for guidance and support. Indeed, Soviet writers do not agree among themselves whether the lands occupied by such establishments are actually urban lands (gorodskie zemli). Sometimes they are classified with lands allocated to external transportation, mining, important power stations and military and naval installations, under the label of specially designated lands (zemli spetsial'nogo naznacheniiia). Whatever their legal category, it is clear that lands belonging to this class in fact enjoy some extraterritoriality. Conversely, around the bigger cities one finds the so-called reserved lands (rezervnye zemli) earmarked for future annexation. Pending their absorption, the city concurrently with the neighboring rural district soviet exercises authority over the use and development of such adjacent territory.

Multiple administration of land and its resources, just as of any other factor of production, is unavoidable in a country as vast and as complex as the Soviet Union. Only those who have been deceived by the totalitarian myth could believe that in the Soviet Union everyone does what he is told and that everyone can be told by a single voice exactly what to do. No country can be that totalitarian.\textsuperscript{12} However, once this impossibility is admitted, the image of state planning as a deliberate and all-embracing process should be radically revised. Planning then emerges as a continuous series of actions by which divergent desires, needs and opportunities of governmental bodies and economic and other public organizations are more or less reconciled. The various socialist-type organizations which have replaced private

\textsuperscript{10} [1922] 1 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. text 901.
\textsuperscript{12} NOVE, SOVIET ECONOMY 17-18 (1961).
interest groups are almost as numerous as their predecessors. Regardless of what the theory says about a unitary class point of view, their more proximate interests are immensely varied and are often in sharp conflict with one another. Without denying the fact that countless commands are being sent out from the center through the bureaucratic hierarchies, it should be added that the extent to which decisions are reached through negotiation and a give-and-take has not always been fully appreciated.

III. EARLY BUILDING REGULATIONS IN THE RSFSR

In 1925 the first uniform building regulations13 were issued by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the RSFSR to replace deficient local improvisation. They were concerned mainly with problems of zoning. Two basic types of use districts were recognized: industrial and residential; the latter to include administrative, service and commercial facilities. Residential districts were to be located beyond the range of harmful industrial influences and separated from industrial districts by landscaping buffers, at least 330 feet wide. Both were to be interconnected by a reliable network of transportation. Each use district was further broken down into fire safety zones depending on the fire-resistive qualities of structures situated therein. Local authorities were empowered to carry out more detailed zoning. Non-conforming uses were to be combatted both before their inception, by preventing the erection of unsuitable buildings, and during their lifetime, by prohibiting major repairs and renovation.

The block (kvartal), not larger than 825 feet by 825 feet (15.6 acres), was designated as the basic residential planning unit with emphasis upon multiple dwellings, presumably of the communal kind. Each residential block and clusters of blocks were to be designed for organic unity. By fixing a minimum of 6,050 square feet of land for each dwelling unit, it was calculated that enough space would remain for greenery, playgrounds, dining halls, reading rooms and other facilities shared by all residents. Not less than 10 per cent of the area of a block was to be made available to such public buildings, and another 10 per cent assigned to greenery, exclusive of trees planted along streets. The overall density of construction within blocks set aside for multiple dwellings three to four stories high was to range from 10 to 30 per cent. Every 625 acres of new residential land was to have at least one park of 12.5 acres or more, to be credited towards

the 10 per cent greenery norm and so interspersed as to permit any dwelling unit to find a green spot within a radius of 2,000 feet. But, as the Temporary Instruction candidly admitted, there were practical limits to this generosity. Whereas higher density reduced air and light and increased fire and health hazards, lower density inflated the cost of laying and maintaining streets, sewers and court yards. For the individual builder it also meant a higher land rent. As a consequence, considerably higher construction density was permitted in case of small dwellings: 10 to 40 per cent for two-story, and 10 to 50 per cent for one-story houses. Also, the minimum size of lots for single-family homes built by individual citizens (construction lessors) was set at a modest 6,600 square feet (i.e., a lot equivalent to 66 feet by 100 feet, yet comparable to the average for an apartment house unit).

IV. PREPARATIONS FOR SYSTEMATIC CITY PLANNING IN THE RSFSR IN THE FACE OF RAPID URBAN GROWTH

By a decree\textsuperscript{14} late in 1926 the government of the RSFSR ordered all cities and other urban settlements to prepare, at their own expense, plans for expansion and redevelopment and to conduct all their future affairs in conformity with such plans. A year later, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) approved a list of over 50 cities, fixing deadlines for the submission of their proposals.\textsuperscript{15} Responsibility for the actual preparation of the plans (each projected over a term of at least fifteen years) was imposed upon the local sections of communal economy in coordination with the local sections of health and engineering. Every draft plan was then to be made available to the public for examination and comment, not less than thirty days prior to its being considered by the city soviet. Upon passage, the draft was to be sent up to the NKVD for a higher level interdepartmental review. The final approval rested with the Economic Council (EKO-SO) of the Republic, with the exception of the plans for Moscow and Leningrad over which the SNK of the Republic had the final word. As will be seen, the decree of 1926 remained a dead letter.

The already alarming population influx into cities gained momentum after the inauguration of the first five-year plan in 1929 with its drive for industrialization and collectivization of the country. There was a certain parallel between England of a few centuries ago and the Soviet Union of the late 1920s and the early 1930s. In either case, the country had turned to industry. Promises of ample employment and earning opportunities in manufacturing induced people to abandon farming. In the Soviet Union the movement to cities was

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aided by repressions and horrors wrought by the simultaneous drive for collectivization of peasants, which bordered on consciously con-
trived demoralization of the countryside. The spontaneous and chaotic Industrial Revolution in England had produced seas of squalid workers' tenements around the new factory towns. In the light of this experience so much belabored by Marxist-Leninist theoreticians, it was now for the Soviet system, equipped with both lofty ideals and new institutions specifically designed for orderly economic develop-
ment, to avert the recurrence of similar calamity. This challenge the Soviet Union failed to meet. From the final years of the NEP to the late 1930s the population of most of the largest cities doubled or even trebled.

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Growth in Selected Cities of the USSR</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>2,029,000</td>
<td>4,187,000</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>1,690,000</td>
<td>3,191,000</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalingrad (now Volgograd)</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>445,000</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>405,000</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the first five-year plan commenced the construction of 60 new cities. In order to provide shelter for the millions streaming into the old and the new industrial centers, the first two five-year plans had earmarked an average of ten per cent of the total capital investment for public housing construction, but the actual per-
formance fell below one-half of the target figures\(^\text{17}\) and the housing shortage remained as grave as ever. As stated earlier, the volume of construction by individual citizens had shrunk considerably and their contribution could not mitigate the crisis.

The early 1930s were therefore a period of improvisation in the face of extreme scarcity. Industrial workers were moving into dug-
outs and shacks instead of the once envisaged attractive and well-
served residential blocks. The Decree of November 4, 1927, had set the dates for the submission of the plans quite far off (e.g., Novosi-
birsk—May 1, 1931, Stalingrad—May 1, 1932, Moscow and Leningrad —May 1, 1933) but even these deadlines were not met. The planning actually undertaken was sporadic and superficial. Frequent disregard

\(^{16}\) Figures from 12 Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediiia 204 (2d ed. Moscow 1952).

\(^{17}\) Sosnovy, *op. cit. supra* note 5, at 57, 66.
of topographical features rendered the plans useless. Some plans incorporated future dreams but overlooked such prosaic needs as transportation and public baths for the protracted interim period. Whether because of these defects or by reason of innumerable pressures on the choice of economic priorities, the finished plans turned out to be merely suggestive rather than binding.\footnote{18}

The period also failed to yield a workable concept of a Soviet city. Literature on urban living under socialism was voluminous yet devoid of any concrete, thought-through proposals for creating an appropriate physical setting.\footnote{19} The “skyscraper city,” oriented only to principles of sanitation and engineering, had a number of advocates but never came to be regarded as a practicable model. “Satellite towns,” “linear types,” and “dispersion cities” were all experimented with, but no pure specimens were actually constructed. The concept of dispersion cities was particularly well received because it seemed to fulfill the Marxist prediction that under socialism differences between town and country would disappear. To achieve this, cities were to be kept relatively small (50,000 to 100,000 population) and built around industrial complexes. Life within the intervening agricultural areas would have been centered on large machine-tractor stations serving collective farms. Economic considerations and recognition that the acquired living habits of the people were incompatible with the proposed physical environment, compelled the abandonment of this model, too. The plan for satellite towns, that is, small or medium-sized towns situated around major urban hubs, was greeted with many of the same arguments pro and con. The linear city also had ideological appeal. It was fancied that a linear city’s “tentacles” (urbanized strips along major transportation arteries) would pipe urban amenities to peasant homes. Volgograd had been originally proposed as a linear city (River Volga on the windward side—river bank park zone—residential zone—thoroughfare—landscaped buffer zone—industrial zone—railroad) but eventually developed into something resembling a distended dispersion city along the west bank of Volga. Likewise, the new city of Magnitogorsk did not grow to fulfill the vision of the planners and was later called a “city without a center, without squares, without streets; with endless monotonous rows of buildings,” its population of 120,000 strung out over a distance of 150 miles.\footnote{20}
V. LANDMARK EVENTS OF THE 1930s

A. The June Plenum (1931)

Formulation of the fundamentals of Soviet city planning is credited to the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party in June of 1931, known as the June Plenum. In brief, the party resolved that expansion of the large cities was to be either halted or slowed down by diverting new industries to other localities and the interior of the cities redesigned for socialist living. The balance of the resolution was a catalog of economic prerequisites to better urban development; speed of construction work had to be increased, costs lowered, financing problems solved, new construction methods sought, better materials devised and the known materials properly produced and allocated.

Regarding the character of Soviet cities, the document was less than specific. It made it clear that the concept of “socialist living” had to be purged from the extreme “left-wing” ideas about community life but offered no substitute ideas. As a Soviet writer reviewing the achievements of the June Plenum cautiously observed, however wrong the left-wing ideas might have been, their proponents (such as Sabsovich, Larin, et al.) were the only ones who had produced a coherent body of thought.

In 1929 Sabsovich wrote:

In order to create a socialist society, the existence of the material and social premises (in the form of an extremely high level of development of production, the abolition of classes and the socialization of all the tools and means of production) is not enough. What is also needed is a cultural revolution: man must be completely re-made, for which purpose the conditions of living and forms of human existence must be radically changed.

The conditions of living must above all be changed by the elimination of the individual household, of that “family hearth” which is and has always been the origin of women’s slavery.

Calculations of the number of workers that will be required in the different branches of social labour in 1942-3 lead to the conclusion that even if there is a steep rise in labour output, a shortage of man-power in fifteen years’ time can be averted only if all able-bodied men and women between the ages of 21 and 49 are employed by the community on its essential services. Consequently the complete liberation of women-power household slavery and the elimination of the individual household is not only a task whose achievement would be desirable within the general plan; but a task whose satisfactory solution is an un-

21. No industrial enterprises were to be built in Moscow and Leningrad beginning in 1932.
22. 2 Direktivy 291.
23. Koldomasov, supra note 19.
avoidable necessity, one of the important prerequisites for a realization of other fundamental objects of the general plan, including above all the projected development of the productive capacity of the entire country’s economy. And, again:

Dwelling houses should be designed to accommodate two or three thousand people. Such houses need no separate kitchens or laundry rooms. They need no separate apartments and no family rooms used in common. Each worker quartered in such a house would have a small separate room for sleeping and sometimes, perhaps, for leisure. There should be no rooms for cohabitation of spouses.

The ideological error of the people of Sabsovich’s stripe lay in their uncompromising adherence to classical Marxism and their penchant for deductive reasoning. There was no room for their teachings in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. Stalin was an adept improviser. Without openly denying the sanctity of Marxist tenets, he boldly set out to reinterpret the scriptures by a series of pragmatic measures which ran head on into the principles advocated by the left-wingers. Stalin was all for the remaking of man. However, in his view a number of steps had to precede this human transformation. The problem and the Stalinist solution amounted to this: In order to mold the new Soviet man, the system had to create a physical environment conducive to new habits. But such a program made massive expansion of the country’s industrial capacity imperative. As an aside, heavy industry at the same time served to strengthen the Soviet Union’s posture vis à vis the non-communist powers which were viewed, and not without reason, as hostile to the USSR. The industrial growth required, among other things, a better trained and more responsible and productive labor force. Since the workingman of this day was still typically a man of pre-Soviet mentality, greater devotion and efficiency on his part had to be bought by incentives which had proved effective before. Consequently, the principle of distributive justice under communism, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” was relegated to limbo for the length of the transitory epoch of socialism (pre-communism). A slogan of socialism, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work,” was proclaimed as the operative principle during this phase. The recognition of individual merit meant piecework, bonuses, and, consequently, unequal incomes. To carry the new approach still further, depersonalization in everyday life was beginning to be re-

25. Quoted, with disapproval, by Rostovskii, supra note 18, at 52.
garded as harmful as depersonalization in the productive process. For instance, the wage-earner was not to be denied enjoyment of family life, insofar as such enjoyment was possible under the generally shocking housing conditions and shortages of consumer goods. As a matter of fact, the Soviet worker was now asked to assume the duties of a family man particularly with respect to support and discipline of his offspring. This was not decreed merely to enrich the parents' lives. The habits of loose living tolerated during the preceding years had produced an alarmingly high rate of juvenile delinquency and dire misery among abandoned or neglected children. Law, which had been expected to show signs of imminent withering away, was all at once given new respectability. Notwithstanding many gaps and odious regressions, it grew to become a stabilizing element in the Soviet society.

In the light of all this, the phrase "socialist living" in the party's resolution was not really used to describe a revolutionary form of human existence. Its authors, it seems, merely wanted the Soviet cities to provide adequate comforts to workers' families which were, by and large, dependent upon a socialistically owned and operated economy. In the eyes of the party leaders it apparently was at the time more important, as it was simple, to brand certain prevailing ideas wrong than to come forth with a detailed description and analysis of the right course. The resolution concluded with a warning and a promise:

The party will deal a decisive blow both to right-wing opportunists who drag us backward and try to defile our construction and to "leftist" phrase-mongers who do not take into account the concrete conditions of the current period and who in word and deed give aid and comfort to the rightists.

In executing the general Leninist line, the party has sought successful rebuilding and development of urban economy. In accordance with this very same principle it will proceed to convert the existing cities into cultural, technological and economically developed proletarian centers and to build tens and hundreds of new socialist cities.

B. The First Law Dealing with the Substance of City Planning in the RSFSR (1932)

The first consequence of the June Plenum was the passage of a law\footnote{26. 2 DIREKTIVY 303.} to pick up matters which the previous legislation had left by

\footnote{27. Decree of Aug. 1, 1932, [1932] 1 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. text 305 (R.S.F.S.R.). It was superseded by Decree of Jan. 20, 1934, [1934] 1 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. text 45 (R.S.F.S.R.), which followed closely the 1932 law, modifying it only insofar as the all-union law of 1933 (See text, p. 32) required. Evidently, the 1934 law has in turn been superseded by Decree of Aug. 9, 1945, ZHILISHCHNOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO 460 (Moscow 1950) (R.S.F.S.R.).}
the wayside. The act was significant for at least two reasons. First, it admitted a lack of progress in preparation of the required plans over the preceding five-year period. A new deadline (January 1, 1933) was fixed, although this time only for scheduling the actual planning work.  

Second, it outlined the types, scope and contents of the components of the general plan (obshchii plan) of a city. Internally, the plans were not to be divorced from considerations of architectural beauty while, externally, the cities were to be conceived as integral parts of planned regions. The law also dealt with the objectives and organization of regional planning but, since a year later all final authority over such planning was vested in the all-union government, it will be discussed in the next subsection. The People's Commissariat of Communal Economy (NKKKh) replaced the NKVD in charge of the new law. This might be construed as an indication that the urban problem had come to be regarded chiefly as a function of national economic growth and not as an aspect of the administrative organization and policing of the country.

C. The First All-Union Law on Regional and City Planning (1933)

The 1930s saw increasing governmental centralization. Most problems began to be viewed as country-wide and were tackled as such at the federal level. This was easily accomplished, for neither the constitutional texts nor beliefs and habits of the people revolted against control out of a single center. Even where the making of certain decisions was clearly reserved by law to republic and local governments, they behaved more like field offices of unitary bureaucracy than autonomous seats of power within recognized spheres of authority. Since both the federal and republic governments were legislating on city planning it was difficult then (and more so in retrospect) to tell what provisions were formally binding upon the planners at any given time. It was difficult even to evaluate the impact of any new law on the prior laws of the same lawmaker body. However, friction between the several levels of government and between individual officials was seldom caused by differences over the strict meaning of words and phrases in constitutions, laws or regulations. The legal language in general was not very precise by Western standards. It tended to be general and exhortative, slogan-like.

The all-union law "On Preparation and Approval of Plans for Design and Socialist Reconstruction of Cities and Other Populated


Places was an expression of concern on the part of the top decision-makers over the mounting problems of dispersion of industry, development of new centers and coordination of inter-city relations. In addition to requiring planned development of individual cities and other urban settlements, the law subjected to regional plans "every kind of construction in regions where there are either situated or being established clusters of . . . enterprises and of cities and settlements to serve them, provided, such localities are interconnected by a single system of transportation, a common base of either raw materials or energy, or by mutually dependent productive, municipal, social and cultural facilities." It also stated that:

Selection of sites either for construction of new industrial and transportation enterprises or for expansion of existing ones shall proceed simultaneously with selection of sites for construction of cities and settlements to serve those enterprises, in conformity with the regional plans.  

Construction of new and expansion of existing industrial and transportation enterprises shall be permitted, as a rule, only after the plans of the urban centers serving such enterprises have been approved.

The authority for approval of regional plans was given to the SNK of the USSR, to be exercised upon recommendation by SNKs of the union republics and in coordination with the Gosplan and the soon abolished All-Union Council for Communal Economy at the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the USSR. The responsibility for approving individual city plans was allocated in accordance with a principle of graduated decentralization:

i. All cities up to 50,000 population—SNKs of the autonomous republics and territorial or regional executive committees; in union republics not having such administrative divisions—their SNKs.

ii. Existing cities of 50,000 to 300,000 population and new cities of 50,000 to 100,000 population—SNKs of the union republics.

iii. Existing cities over 300,000 population and new cities over 100,000 population—SNK of the USSR.

It was implicit in the Law of 1933 that the physical plans (planirovka) of smaller units, such as cities or parts of cities, were to be

31. Art. 5, Decree of June 27, 1933, [1933] 1 S.Z. S.S.S.R. text 243 (U.S.S.R.). Molotov's report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party (1939) stated: "[The third five-year plan], in conformity with the basic interests of the state, calls for the centering of industries on sources of raw materials and on areas of their use so as to eliminate irrational and extremely long hauls and to contribute to the further improvement in economically backward regions of the USSR." XVIII S'ezd Vsesoiuznogo Kommunisticheskoi partii (b): Stenografiicheskii otchet 381 (Moscow 1939).
deduced from plans of larger units and ultimately from an all-embracing effort at social planning (planirovanie). This is in contrast to planning in the West, where separate limited schemes are coordinated for the achievement of broad indeterminate social objectives.

D. The General Plan of Moscow (1935)

The planning of Moscow failed to progress as per schedule. Only after the original 1933 deadline had been reached and passed, did the planners of the Soviet capital city seriously get to work. At the outset, a world-wide contest was organized which attracted, among others, the great names of Frank Lloyd Wright (with a proposal to replace the existing agglomeration with a landscaped cottage city) and LeCorbusier (with a proposal for a skyscraper city). The outcome of the contest was not, however, viewed with satisfaction. Next, a number of workshops were organized on the spot and manned by homegrown specialists committed to stress the realities of the time and the place. In July of 1934 the draft of a ten-year general development plan was completed and submitted to the Communist Party and the Soviet government. After prolonged deliberations in which Stalin himself took an active part, the plan was enacted into law on July 10, 1935.32

The plan treated Moscow as an indivisible unit, but, at the same time, ordered to check the city’s overly fast rise in population below a ceiling of 5,000,000 for 1945. To accommodate the increase anticipated by the law and to secure room for decongestion, new territory was annexed raising the area within the city limits from 71,000 acres to 150,000 acres. On the outskirts, a six-mile deep nature zone (green belt) of forest massives and open land was set aside as a reservoir of fresh air and vacationland. Provisions were made for connecting the outlying preserve with the center of the city by bands of greenery extending along riverbanks and highways. The plan left intact the historical pattern of circular and radial streets.

The integrated block was retained as the principal residential planning unit, except that its size was enlarged from the maximum of 15.6 acres specified in the early regulations of the RSFSR to an optimum size falling between 22.5 and 37.5 acres (“superblock”). An inclination towards bigness was also evidenced by the retreat from 3 and 4-story multiple dwellings in favor of houses not lower than 6 stories and up to 14 stories high. Obviously, the permissible population density had to be revised upward. The early regulations had aimed to allot an estimated 1,210 square feet of residential land to each

habitant, or an acre to every 36 persons. In the case of Moscow simple arithmetic shows that this rate could have been barely achieved by spreading the 5,000,000 population over the entire territory of 150,000 acres. The planners had to start from a residential density figure of 140 per acre (over 400 within the inner core). Thus, they could at best try to keep the overall rate from exceeding 160 (allowing it to reach 200 in vertically built up sections). Facilities serving the social, cultural and everyday needs of the people were to be scattered throughout the residential districts but so that each agency, institution or shop would serve several superblocks. The average size of the blocks being in the vicinity of 5,000 dwellers, the requirement, on its face, called for huge, efficiently designed and wisely distributed service facilities. By this time, however, some everyday services, such as trading establishments, had been denied separate buildings. The law required that they be placed on the ground floors of apartment houses. The cramped shops eventually helped to lengthen the bread and milk queues.

The general plan of Moscow became a model for Soviet city planners. In Moscow itself some of the progress in tidying-up the city, widening streets and developing intraurban transportation and utilities was quite remarkable. In other respects, there were serious deficiencies. Above all, the planners were embarrassed by the rate at which the city's population continued to increase. Despite steps to restrain incursion of new industries, it soon became evident that the 5,000,000 mark would be overshot long before 1945. Secondly, the relentless struggle over economic priorities created shortages and dislocations, causing abandonment of numerous projects. By stressing the spectacular (e.g., the plush subway stations, the grandiose boulevards and the monumentally designed embankment along Moscow River) the planners and builders were compelled to neglect unexposed detail, such as the interior of buildings, their rear view, etc. Finally, a great many variances were approved under pressure. In particular, permits were granted for temporary operation of industrial enterprises outside the appropriate use districts, where they became permanent with the passage of time. Since the population growth was running far ahead, while housing construction was lagging 80 per cent behind the plan, every addition to living space was desirable whether or not the structures violated building regulations and the accepted

33. See text, p. 25 supra. There was to be 6,050 square feet of land to each residential unit; assuming a family of five per unit, each person would have had 1,210 square feet.
35. PARKINS, op cit. supra note 20, at 41-47, 50-51.
VI. IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
AND POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

War interrupted the third five-year plan and much of the non-
military construction was suspended. Still greater was the physical
damage inflicted by the years of hostilities. Numerous cities were
either completely or partially destroyed. A total of 6,000,000 buildings
were damaged depriving some 25,000,000 people of shelter. The housing
problem which had been far from solved by 1941 was now immensi-
antly magnified. Millions of people again had been driven into
dugouts and mud huts. Industrial plants, transportation and com-
munications networks were in ruin. This time, however, a respectable
material base and an established administrative machinery provided
the preconditions for a comparatively speedy recovery.

A gigantic reconstruction program was hatched already before the
end of the war. A decree of August 21, 1943 outlined a crash hous-
ing program for the territories recaptured from Germans. The pro-
gram advocated extensive use of local resources, established thirty-
eight new factories to produce building materials, and extended state
credit to individual citizens desiring to build family-type dwellings.

36. Mikhailov & Tagiev, Sotsialisticheskaia planirovka gorodov, [1937] 5
Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo 60, 66.

By the time the plans for the beautiful dream city arrived from Moscow,
a whole pioneer town was already there, alive and kicking. Even if the plans
were completed in time, things often were not much different. The plan
might place the residential section at a distance of several miles from the
factory gate in order to protect the houses from the smoke. But there were
no roads, no trolleys, no water and sewer mains, and no steel and cement to
build them, and so a “temporary” settlement was built, close to the factory
gate, in a place where the plan had shown the virgin green of the “protec-
tive zone.” Blumenfeld, Regional and City Planning in the Soviet Union, 3
Task 33, 43 (1942).

37. Chossudovsky, supra note 1, at 82-83.

38. 2 Direktivy 765, 789-90.
A few months after the armistice in Europe, another program was adopted, this one for the reconstruction of the devastated cities of Smolensk, Viazma, Rostov-on-Don, Novorossiisk, Pskov, Sevastopol, Voronezh, Novgorod, Velikie Luki, Kalinin, Briansk, Orel, Kursk, Krasnodar and Murmansk, having a combined population of well over 2,000,000. In 1949 it was decided to proceed with a new plan for Moscow.

The leading principles of Soviet city planning had survived: establishment of cities in conformity with regional considerations; curbing urban growth so that the population of any one city would not, as a rule, exceed 500,000; and minimization of contrasts between centers of cities and their outlying districts.

It is difficult to ascertain whether the recently founded cities have been wisely located. There were many hasty decisions made under the exigencies of war when urban settlements were springing up along eastern railroad tracks on spots where evacuated plants happened to be unloaded. As to "urban explosion," the Soviet Union is still searching for an effective preventive. Equalization of centers and suburbs has not been impressive. The new industrial cities, whether put up during or shortly after the war, have too often taken the shape of centrally situated plants surrounded by stretches of huts, thus violating the very concept of the center as the administrative core of the city encircled by multi-dwelling residential districts and with the industry sufficiently remote lest it interfered with the comforts of the city folk. In the existing cities, the process of equalization has been hampered by another deliberately encouraged wave of small housing construction. As once during the period of the NEP, the Soviet government again acted to induce massive participation by individual citizens. Self-help received a strong boost in 1948, when the construction lease was replaced by a right to build and own small dwelling houses as personal property for indefinite duration.

40. Chossudovsky, supra note 1, at 88.
41. Id. n.73.
42. PARKINS, op. cit. supra note 20, at 49.
43. See text, table 3, p. 40 infra.
44. Raymond, Nameless Cities of Russia, 1 U.N. World 15 (1947); Izvestiia, Dec. 2, 1960, p. 3.
areas of small housing were added to cities. As late as 1957, top policy declarations continued to call for more individual construction. Figures show that this type of construction has been significant both in absolute quantitative terms and relative to the total volume of new housing.

TABLE 2
Urban Housing Construction by Individual Citizens in the USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Housing Million Square Feet</th>
<th>Individual Housing</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Five-Year Plan, 1933-37</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(last full prewar plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Five-Year Plan, 1938-42</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(actual 3½ yrs to June ’41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(five-year projection)</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Five-Year Plan, 1946-50</td>
<td>1131</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(first full postwar plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Five-Year Plan, 1951-55</td>
<td>1669</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the five-year period from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>3605</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The state itself joined in building small one and two-story dwellings allegedly as more practicable because of material shortages for heavy structures and in the light of cost calculations. Personally owned houses were built mainly by family effort and with the help of neighbors, off the regular working hours, without any diversion of the labor force. Introduction of simple pre-fabs, albeit in limited quantities, further facilitated such do-it-yourself projects. It is apparent that under those conditions the residential “superblock” was not one of the realities of planning. Large districts were zoned for individually owned and small public housing, although professedly so as not to hinder subsequent heavy construction. At any rate, the 1958 conference of builders and city planners was advised that lands suitable for single-family dwellings had been already exhausted or almost exhausted in several of the largest cities: Kalinin, Khar’kov, Kuibyshev, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, etc. In some cities (Kuibyshev, Magnitogorsk, etc.) incorrect zoning had resulted in waste of scarce residential

SSSR I SOUZNYKH RESPUBLIK 186 (Moscow 1957). Houses owned under construction leases were henceforth considered as personally owned.


47. Figures from NARODNOE KHOZIAISTVO SSSR V 1960 GODU 611 (Moscow 1961).

48. See also PARKINS, op. cit. supra note 20, at 60-63.

49. BRAUDE, PRAVOVYE VOPROSY INDIVIDUAL’NOGO ZHILISHCHNOGO STROITEL’STVA 8 (Moscow 1957).
It was reported in 1960, that one and two-story dwellings constituted 75 per cent of all urban housing.\footnote{51} In addition, problems have been caused by widespread unauthorized construction of mislocated, hastily built houses by "squatters on socialist property." These unplanned additions to already far-flung suburbs have presented the planners with the choice of either acquiescing in the \textit{fait accompli} (with all the damage to respect for the legal order and to the urban centers into which the new communities are integrated) or razing the buildings (and thus contributing to the housing shortage and embittering the people).\footnote{52} There are republic laws which allow removal of unauthorized structures as well as prescribe criminal penalties for both insolent builders and lax administrators.\footnote{53} They are not, however, enforced with determination.\footnote{54} Pressure is sometimes applied by other means which strike between the horns of the dilemma. In the RSFSR, for instance, an unauthorized builder is treated for purposes of taxation and insurance as the owner of the house he inhabits. Moreover, some of the required payments are considerably increased. In return for such exactions and harassment, the offender gets only precarious indulgence on the part of the land authorities. If he is eventually evicted at the pleasure of the latter, he may remove his house either intact or as wreckage but receives no compensation for his input of labor and materials that may be lost.\footnote{55}

\section*{VII. Recent Standards and Practices}

\subsection*{A. The Rules of 1958}

The passing of Stalin was followed by release of creative energy unprecedented in Soviet life. The mid-1950s saw a steady stream of writings on city planning and architecture. The same years produced

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Report by Kulriavtsev to the All-Union Conference on Construction, April 10-12, 1958 [hereinafter called 1958 Conference], \textit{Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie po stroitel'ству 10-12 aprelia 1958 g.: Sektsii zhilishchnogo i kul'turno-bytovogo stroitel'ства planirovki i zastroiki gorodov} [hereinafter cited as Soveshchanie 1958] 108, 127-28 (Moscow 1958).
\item \textsuperscript{51} Pravda, June 8, 1960, p. 1 (Promyslov's remarks to the Conference on City Planning and Construction, June 7-10, 1960 [hereinafter called 1960 Conference]).
\item \textsuperscript{52} Sovetskaia Bolorussiia, Aug. 28, 1955, p. 2, reports the establishment of an entire new squatters' settlement, Novye Shepichi, on the outskirts of Minsk, inhabited by several hundred workers and employees but without a store, telephone or medical aid station.
\item \textsuperscript{53} E.g., Decree of May 22, 1940, \textit{Sbornik aktov} 157 (R.S.F.S.R.); Edict of July 22, 1958, [1958] 11 \textit{Sotsialisticheskaiia zakonnost' 76} (Lith. S.S.R.).
\item \textsuperscript{55} Decree of Nov. 4, 1955, \textit{Sbornik aktov} 160 (R.S.F.S.R.).
\end{thebibliography}
dozens of sets of regulations covering anything from superhighways to buildings in seismic regions and from industrial plants to young pioneer camps. But the most significant achievement was the “Rules and Norms of Planning and Building Cities,” approved by the State Committee on Matters of Construction (Gosstroi), on December 1, 1958. This document superseded the “Construction Norms and Rules” of 1954, which had not set sufficiently specific standards. The new Rules, more than 500 sections long and embellished by supplemental tables, go a long way toward supplying answers to a multitude of technical questions. The Rules apply to all cities of the USSR save those situated in exceptional climatic zones, though Section 7 provides for local regulations to adapt them to the peculiarities of the place, subject to the State Committee’s approval.

The cities are classified as huge (population 250,000 or more), large (population from 100,000 to 250,000), medium-sized (population from 50,000 to 100,000) and small (population up to 50,000). To check inordinate urban growth, the plans of huge cities must not provide for additional industrial plants unless they only serve the needs of the residents. Instead, new industry must be diverted to small and medium-sized cities in conformity with regional plans. However, the cities so selected are not to be allowed to become “huge” but kept below a population ceiling of 200,000 to 250,000.

| TABLE 3 |
| Urbanization in the USSR |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                         | 1926a            | 1939a            | 1961            |
| Number of cities        | 709              | 923              | 1,685           |
| of those 100,000 or over| 31               | 82               | 167b            |
| of the latter 250,000 or over | 30       | 30               | 61b             |
| of the latter 500,000 or over | 3       | 11               | 26b             |
| Urban population        | 26,300,000       | 56,100,000       | 108,300,000b    |
| as per cent of total    |                  |                  | 50              |
| a Within the September 17, 1939 boundaries. |
| b January 1, 1961 estimate. |
| c Not available. |

61. Figures from Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu 9, 50-59 (Moscow 1961).
The Rules of 1958 do not appear to aim at “gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country.” Instead of calling for sprawling suburbs or small loosely connected urban settlements, they stress compact cities. In fact, Soviet literature on city planning now quotes Lenin to the effect that the abolition of the distinction in a physical sense is unnecessary. The doctrinal requirements, so runs the argument, could be met by leaving the centers of historical and cultural heritage intact and making them easily accessible to every inhabitant of the country by means of modern rapid transportation. Satellite towns to hold 30,000-50,000, and under no circumstances more than 80,000, residents are to be built around the huge cities within a radius of 25 to 30 miles. Their purpose is not, however, to bring urban amenities to the rural populace but rather to upgrade metropolitan life by scattering some places of employment and residence over more picturesque and wholesome environs. The idea admittedly has been borrowed from Western Europe, especially England. At present, while satellite towns are being planned and built (e.g., Kriukovo for Moscow, Gorskaia and Sosnovaia Poliana for Leningrad, Sumgait for Baku), new industrial plants continue to move into the existing cities “for no special reason.” If the growth controls will readily yield to the demands of high-priority economic programs and to the pressures of vested bureaucratic interests, the satellites will have served merely as bridgeheads for another wave of urban onslaught. Existing urban centers appeal to cost-minded administrators of the economy. An infant project can be started more easily if a transportation network, utilities, and related enterprises and services for the work force are already there. Opening of new plants in existing cities, although contrary to law, is thus for a “special reason.” Where a new industrial settlement is built close to a city but still outside its boundary, the city’s population, formally speaking, is not increased. But before very long, temptation may be great to merge the two. Furthermore, according to the Rules of 1958, cities must be surrounded by a specially protected suburban zone (prigorodnaia zona) to serve primarily as a fresh air reservoir and as an area for mass recreation. Usually most of the land within the suburban zone is agricultural, but every type of construction is also permitted, with the exception of industrial plants which produce things beyond the requirements of the city. The inner ring of the suburban zone around a huge city is a 3 to 7-mile deep forest-park belt subject to a much stricter regime. Here, all

62. KHAUKE, ORGANICHENIE ROSTA KRUPNYKH GORODOV, PLANIROVKA I ZASTROIKA BOLSHIKH GORODOV 5, 18 (Moscow 1961).
construction is prohibited except that relating to mass recreation or appertaining to suburban forestry, agriculture or transportation. Satellite towns are to be located within the suburban zone but beyond the forest-park belt. It is obvious that construction within the inner belt in violation of the Rules could irreparably damage the city's future.

City plans in conformity with the Rules of 1958 are to be projected over the next 20 to 25 years. This means that concepts and techniques on which the present Rules are based will determine the character of Soviet cities up to and even beyond the threshold of full communism predicted by the Party Program of 1961. Therefore, it is of some significance that the Rules do not call for any drastic transformation of the urban centers. Perhaps their most ambitious objective is to create zones according to basic land uses—residential, industrial, storage, external transportation and miscellaneous municipal services—clearly separated from each other and grouped around a well-defined center.

Residential zones, each having population not in excess of 30,000 to 50,000, are further divided into microboroughs (mikroraiony) (counterparts to the superblocks of the 1930s) as the basic residential planning units. A microborough includes not only housing for a maximum of 10,000 to 12,000 people but also sundry administrative, educational, trading, storage and other uses necessary to make each unit reasonably self-sufficient. The Rules place all service facilities within easy walking distance (a maximum of one-third mile) from any dwelling. Some facilities (department stores, hospitals, houses of culture, etc.), however, are designated to serve the entire zone, that is, the entire group of microboroughs. The Rules suggest roughly 25 acres of residential land per thousand of inhabitants in huge and large cities. The corresponding figures are 28.75 for medium-sized and 33.75 for small cities.

Industrial zones may consist of a single large enterprise or a group of enterprises of diverse sizes interconnected technologically as well as through transportation, storage, power and sanitation. Such a district is planned to contain about 25,000 workers on an area not to exceed 1,000 acres. The industrial zones may be broken down into sub-zones depending on whether or not some of their segments present fire and health hazards in varying degrees.

Warehouses together with accessory transportation facilities are assigned to special storage zones, each for the keeping of specified materials and products. The maximum area of a storage zone is set at 70 acres. However, not all storage is concentrated in the designated zones. For example, hazardous substances must always be kept beyond city limits. Conversely, adequate storage space for retail trade inventories, for stocks of solid fuel and for building materials serving local residential needs must be set aside within residential zones. The standards call for up to 44 square feet of residential storage space per capita.  

Zones are not ranked so as to permit “superior” uses within “inferior” zones. The law desires to keep them as distinct as possible.  

Purity along the fringes is to be achieved by landscaping buffers separating one zone from another. According to the Rules, the width of these buffers varies from 165 foot demarcation strips between compatible uses to two-thirds mile sanitary protection zones between residential neighborhoods and districts containing noxious industrial plants. The buffers are not to be confused with parks. Although the buffers should be quite green and, if possible, include scenic rivers, canals and boulevards, they can have also public baths, fire and militia stations, laundries, warehouses, administrative buildings, stores, clinics and restaurants. Perhaps for this reason the landscaping buffers are not counted toward the greenery norm which ranges from 110 square feet per inhabitant for small cities to 165 square feet for huge cities. It is noteworthy, that the actual greenery figures in many huge cities fall far short of the legal minimum: in Arkhangel’sk (271,000), Irkutsk (380,000) and Perm’ (678,000) the average is down to 16 square feet, Kuibyshev (863,000)—22, Magnitogorsk (328,000)—33, Gor’ki (1,003,000)—53, Rostov-on-Don (645,000)—73, Voronezh (496,000)—76, etc. The average for the entire RSFSR is 66 square feet. Riga (607,000) has in its central part which is inhabited by some 300,000 people only about 25 square feet of greenery per capita and as of 1960 no plan for beautification of the city. On its outskirts, green areas are reportedly destroyed in pursuit of departmental interests. 

The natural environment is neglected in other ways too. Water
pollution by industrial waste and untreated sewage is common. Rivers Volga, Kama, Belaia, Northern Donets, Chusovaia and Moscow are seriously polluted. The existing system of fines for dumping deleterious waste has failed, despite the fact that the amounts collected reach tens of millions for individual cities (e.g., Gor’kii—12,000,000 old rubles per annum). Industrial enterprises have begun to calculate the fines in their financial plans. This practice is less costly than installation of purifying equipment. Air contamination is likewise a problem. In numerous industrial cities, such as Dzerzhinsk (176,000), Berezniki (117,000) and Novokuznetsk (formerly Stalinsk) (405,000), it is not countered by any effective measures. Only about 30 to 40 per cent of Soviet enterprises have the required purification devices. Even the contribution of motor vehicle exhaust fumes begins to be felt and the need for improving both engines and the quality of fuel is being discussed.\textsuperscript{76} The fume situation is not worse, because ownership of automobiles by individuals is not widespread. As for the future, the Rules of 1958 do not envisage rapidly increasing numbers of private automobiles. The planners are asked to plan facilities for off-street parking on the basis of 30 to 50 automobiles used (not necessarily owned) by each 1,000 residents.\textsuperscript{77}

B. Moscow

While the planners were musing over the new planning standards, the boundaries of Moscow were again moved outward.\textsuperscript{78} The capital city is now bordered by the Moscow belt highway and embraces a number of previously independent settlements for a total of 220,000 acres, an increase of 46 per cent over the territory of 1935. At the same time, a forest-park belt was delimited to embrace roughly 450,000 acres more. The estimated population of Moscow stood at 6,208,000 on January 1, 1961. Before establishment of the suburban zone in 1960, many towns had sprung up around Moscow. Whereas from 1926 to 1959 the population of Moscow increased 2.5 times, the population of the urban-type settlements within a radius of 31 miles

\textsuperscript{76} Kurashov, supra note 74.


(50 kilometers) grew 8 times. On January 1, 1959, the 37 cities and 47 workers' settlements of the suburban zone had a combined population of 2,300,000. Eleven of them each had 50,000 inhabitants or more.\textsuperscript{79} Today the largest of them fall within the forest-park belt contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Rules. Some are economic centers in their own right, likely to grow independently of the core area. In 1958, on each workday, 70,000 Muscovites commuted to places of employment within the suburban zone. Simultaneously 415,000 workers descended upon Moscow from points within the suburban zone.\textsuperscript{80} To keep the latter away from Moscow, industries would have to be developed near their homes. This, as shown before, would tend to destroy the character of the suburban zone, and especially of the forest-park belt.

Theoretically the Soviet state is capable of providing jobs and housing for all its people at any one time. Theoretically it can found new industries and cities where it pleases and shut down those which have served their purpose. But the matching of people with jobs and residences implies human mobility more or less perfect. It is true that, when necessary, the state will relocate desirous people without charge. It is equally true that a Soviet citizen's proprietary ties with the place where he lives are limited. But, as shown before, millions of Soviet families still live in their own homes and thus have property ties at least in this respect. It is therefore conceivable that one of the reasons behind the recent attacks on personally owned dwellings\textsuperscript{81} has been to make the labor force less resistant to relocation plans. But this is not the only problem. Free transferability is hampered also by the fact that in the Soviet Union ordinarily more than one family member is regularly employed and not necessarily in the same factory, store or institution. Each worker has his own legally protected interest in his job. If one member is out of work and willing to move, the other(s) may be less than eager to follow. Besides, a Soviet citizen has certain intangible bonds with his city, which he is reluctant to sever. These are relationships developed with kinfold and neighbors and through work, school and play, or just fondness for the city. For instance, there is evidence that people of such centers as Moscow,

\textsuperscript{79} Khauke, supra note 62, at 11.

\textsuperscript{80} Blinkova, Trudovye sviazi s Moskvoi naseleniia prigorodnoi zony, PLANIBNOVKA I ZASTROIKA BOL'SHIKH GORODOV 105 (Moscow 1961).

Leningrad, Kiev or Riga, which have comparatively excellent cultural attractions, sporting events and recreational opportunities, are not indifferent to the choice of alternate places of residence and employment. There are always openings in Virgin Lands Territory to which excess urban dwellers could be syphoned off, but too many of the new hands leave after a brief try. If experience is a guide, any resettlement program short of compulsory evacuation will encounter popular inertia and ingenious schemes devised to circumvent it.

The main industries of Moscow are on its east side. The west side is primarily residential. Residential zones continue to expand in the southwesterly direction. In 1958 each inhabitant of Moscow took, on the average, 706 trips aboard public conveyances. The average length of a trip was more than 2.5 miles at a speed not exceeding 6 to 8 miles per hour. In some others cities, e.g., Leningrad (2,997,000) and Vologograd (632,000), the situation was worse. It was not uncommon for some people to spend two to three unproductive and wearisome hours each day on getting to and from work. To restore balance in Moscow, it has been proposed to develop an administrative center and several industrial zones on the west side. If by this is meant transfer of industries operating on the east side, the plan will have to be held in abeyance, because the present Soviet economic policies would not tolerate an essentially "wasteful" undertaking of this magnitude. If new industries should be developed there, then, of course, this move would have to be counterbalanced by setting aside new residential territories on the east side.

C. Agricultues

Apart from the figurative truth that modern means of transportation shrink distances, the distinction between Soviet town and country is not vanishing. One wonders whether contrasts between them are not in fact accentuated as more amenities are introduced into cities while the countryside trudges behind struggling with its perennial problem of low productivity. It is one thing to quote Lenin's gloss on the "gradual abolition" and quite another to suggest seriously that any collective farm maid might, with some regularity, hop aboard an IL-18 for an evening at the Bolshoi and return exhilarated for the early milking.

83. Khauke, supra note 62, at 13-16.
84. Id. at 16.
85. See text, p. 41 supra.
There is, however, a program which has promised to turn the farmworker into an urbanite. It is the idea of agricities (agrogoroda) conceived by Khrushchev in the late 1940s. The most ambitious version of this plan calls for the arrangement of collective and state farm lands around new urban centers inhabited by 10,000 to 30,000 “rural industrial” workers and their families. It seems that the proposal in a less radical form was originally inspired by Khrushchev’s wish to subject the scattered rural population to closer supervision by the party. The agricity idea was unveiled at a time when small collective farms all over the country were being amalgamated for purposes of administration. Late in 1949 Khrushchev had a model agricity built near Kherson in the Ukraine. It was then appropriately presented to Stalin as a “gift” on his seventieth birthday. Stalin initially at least acquiesced in Khrushchev’s undertaking. On the strength of this, plans for about 50,000 settlements were prepared, and in January, 1951 Khrushchev outlined his proposal in a vigorous speech. However, only a few months later Khrushchev’s plan was denounced and abandoned under puzzling circumstances. Khrushchev returned to the old idea after having consolidated his power in the post-Stalin period. The present effort, too, has a theatrical element in it, reminiscent of the gift village. The much publicized showplace—the “Dawn of Communism” State Farm—is located south of Moscow in the city’s suburban zone and is anything but representative of Soviet rural conditions. Another is Kalinovka, in Kursk region, which happens to be Khrushchev’s native village and the place at which he resurrected his agricity theory in 1960. The agricities under construction contemplate very small population. Stripped of all double-talk, they are new villages in which individualistic garden plot economy will be done away with. The showplace centers will probably get the standard precast concrete urban apartment houses “but,” to quote Khrushchev, “not more than five stories high.” Elsewhere construction of single-family dwellings goes on. If urbanization is attempted there at all, it does not amount to much more than clustering of newly built or transferred peasant houses on city-type lots. Neither the state nor the collective farmers themselves can afford, at this time, to equip the new villages with urban conveniences. Simultaneously, the farm folk

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86. Izvestiia, Dec. 2, 1959, p. 3. Estimating a collective farm population of 60 to 70 million for 1950, the average size of the 50,000 proposed settlements would have been only 1,200 to 1,400 people. The latter could have qualified, at best, as a stunted variety of “enlarged rural settlements of the urban type.” Ibid.


89. Speech by Khrushchev to the collective farmers of Kalinovka, Cina, Sept. 4, 1960, p. 2.

are urged to retain around their dwellings only a small portion (up to .38 acres) of their total allotment of 1.25 acres. They are expected
to put the remainder outside the settlement for common tillage.91
The regime aims at scoring gains in two respects. For one, the most
important vestige of legitimate private enterprise would be removed.
Also, by making the villages more compact, sizeable areas would be
added to arable land. If high apartment houses were built, still more
land could be put under the plow. Calculations for the “Dawn of Com-
munism” State Farm demonstrated that a one-story town would have
occupied 225 acres; the actual four-story town was contained within
an area of 75 acres. On the other hand, there is the unpleasant truth
that the yields of the household plots contribute appreciably to the
country’s meager food supply.92 It is also quite possible that the
present system of farming, which seems to offer a greater degree
of privacy and more room for individuality than city life, helps to
keep people “on the farm.” The latter might flock to cities once these
features were eliminated. In that case the state would have to be pre-
pared either to offset the loss of hands by increased agricultural pro-
ductivity or to curb the exodus by legal or other pressures.

It is a safe prediction that many years will elapse before electric
trolleys will be making regular runs between carpeted agracity apart-
ments, cornfields, hog-pens and palaces of culture. The Party Program
of 1961 promised but a small apartment for each family by 1980.93
Only last year the Soviet government increased prices on some basic
necessities of life94 in order to obtain revenue needed to provide basic
farm machinery, fertilizers and insecticides. Under those circum-
stances, a simultaneous proposal to raze tens of thousands of farm
settlements and transfer their inhabitants to newly built cities
equipped with centrally heated apartments, sewage disposal systems,
schools, hospitals, theaters, paved streets and transportation is noth-
ing but a hoax. Any undertaking of this kind would violate the in-
junction to “economize.” Most of the recent urban housing construc-

Union of 1961 has this to say: “All these developments, which must proceed on a
voluntary basis and when the necessary economic conditions exist, will gradually
impart to collective farm-cooperative property the nature of public property... The
collective farm villages will gradually grow into amalgamated urban-type
communities with modern housing, communal utilities, services and cultural and
medical institutions.” 13 C.D.S.P. No. 46, at 3, 8 (1962).

dopolnitel’nyi iatechnik proizvodstva sel’skohoziaistvennykh produktov, [1962] 7
VOPROSY EKONOMIKI 58, translated in 14 C.D.S.P. No. 34, at 3 (1962).

No. 46, at 3, 10 (1962).

tion, for example, has taken place on vacant land leaving undisturbed large sections of dilapidated housing more centrally located. The housing shortage makes the planners reluctant to prescribe the ball and bulldozer treatment, despite the fact that their present approach creates a backlog of undeveloped streets and utilities in the new neighborhoods and postpones the problems of urban blight.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{D. Urban Architecture}

The 1920s, as we saw earlier, were not a decade of extensive construction. However, young architects sought to create a style expressive of the mood and the requirements of the post-revolutionary era. A new system meant also new artistic forms. Whatever had been received from the past had to be swept out as antiquated. Glorification of plain technological efficiency became the hallmark of all art, including architecture.\textsuperscript{96} By contrast, the 1930s and the early postwar years were an era of pseudoclassicism, a period of exaggerated ornamentation. To get the flavor of the times one has only to look at the unrealized prize-winning project of the Palace of Soviets (1931) by Iofan, Shchuko and Gelfreikh, which subordinated everything to monumentality. In the same vein, huge artless structures patterned after the Moscow University were erected following World War II and before the trend had been denounced in the 1955 decree "On Eliminating Excesses in Design and Construction."\textsuperscript{97}

In some respects, the reversal of 1955 was overly radical. Since then design has been too often sacrificed to momentary economic expediency. The respect for national culture and heritage, much talked about during the postwar reconstruction,\textsuperscript{98} is now de-emphasized. Soviet architects who are being assured that the present policies do not belittle ethnic forms are in the same breath reminded that the forward march toward communism is leveling national differences.\textsuperscript{99} The party and the government are committed to provide 15,000,000 new apartments (or, in a favorite phrase, the equivalent of 180 new cities with a population of 250,000 each) by the end of the current Seven-Year Plan in 1965. But, to accomplish the task, costs have to be held down. The most common apartment houses are 4 or 5-story walk-ups assembled of precast concrete elements. Economic

\textsuperscript{95} Report by Kucherenko to the 1960 Conference, Pravda, June 8, 1960, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{96} Literaturnaia gazeta, Feb. 20, 1960, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{97} Decree of Nov. 4, 1955, POSTANOVLENIA TS K KPSS I SOVETA MINISTROV SSSR PO VOPROSAM STROITEL'STVA 163 (Moscow 1956) (U.S.S.R.). The decree lists many examples of tasteless waste.
\textsuperscript{99} Izvestiia, Nov. 25, 1959, p. 2.
and speedily built, they are a familiar sight all over the Soviet Union. At the same time, legitimate fear has been voiced that uniform and dull cities are in the making and in every part of the Soviet Union at that.

The high-pitched rule-making of the mid-1950s was accompanied by much exuberant writing by Soviet architects. The two parallel activities subsided when the narrow objectives of the Seven-Year Plan became evident. One could not help but sense disillusionment among the architects caught between the slogans and the "objective conditions." In May of 1962 Khrushchev inspected the models and plans for rebuilding Moscow by 1980 and re-emphasized the need for "a rational approach" and for "correct use of material means and existing reserves." The fact is that construction work can be considerably simplified and money saved by laying out corridor streets and arranging closely spaced buildings around old-fashioned blocks. In so doing, the concept of integrated microborough is sacrificed. Retail, educational and service facilities cannot be properly located in small rectangular blocks. Indeed, in the rush for more housing units, construction of the auxiliary facilities is neglected. Many of the auxiliary buildings built are substandard. Stores and similar facilities continue to be put on ground floors of apartment buildings. As a result, they appear improvised because they are dissected by staircases and pierced by a multitude of pipes. Courtyards, once expected to be tranquil and tidy, are used for heavy delivery purposes, with adverse effect upon safety and cleanliness. Whereas these short-cuts admittedly enable Soviet builders to keep near the planned rate of output, they are, in reality, deferred vexations for future planners.

100. In Moscow the 6-story minimum height for apartment houses, decreed in 1938, was lowered to 5 stories in 1941. Decree of Feb. 22, 1941, ZHILISHCHNOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO 457 (Moscow 1950) (U.S.S.R.). It is not clear on what basis the prewar small-housing construction was permitted in Moscow. The present 4 or 5-story rule is found in Decree of Aug. 24, 1955, § 3 (c), SBORNIK AKTOV 161 (U.S.S.R.). In 1962 the Chief Architect of Moscow, Posokhin, warned that if the city was to stay within its present boundaries selective building of 9, 14, 16-story, or even higher, apartments should be begun. Pravda, July 12, 1962, p. 6.

101. Pravda, June 1, 1960, p. 2; Danin, Material i stil', [1961] 1 NOVYI MIR 166, translated in 13 G.D.S.P. No. 13, at 10 (1961). An American correspondent describes Baku (1,038,000), the capital of the Azerbaidzhan SSR: "The traditional two-story dwellings of stone with iron balconies are disappearing. On the new streets there is a parade of large gray apartment houses of standardized reinforced concrete slabs, identical to those going up all over the Soviet Union." N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1959, p. 35.


103. Kucherenko, supra note 95; Trud, Feb. 22, 1961, p. 2 (lack of children's institutions); id., April 4, 1961, p. 2 (lack of stores, laundries, parking lots, etc.).
VIII. Administration of City Planning

A. Responsibilities and Personnel

The Soviet state machine is frequently overhauled, especially in sectors of great economic exertions. The administration of city planning has been no exception. The model for the present organization was adopted in 1943 by a decree104 creating a Committee on Matters of Architecture attached to the SNK (since 1946, the Council of Ministers—SM) of the USSR. Its authority encompassed all questions of architecture irrespective of other patterns of departmental subordination. Specifically, it furnished guidance in matters of city planning and urban construction, controlled design and quality of buildings, worked out and approved model plans and standards, and supervised protection and restoration of architectural monuments. Shortly thereafter, in accordance with the all-union mandate found in the same decree, Administrations on Matters of Architecture at republic SNKs and in cities of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, and sections on such matters at territorial and regional executive committees were created “to work under the direction of the Committee.”105

The new hierarchy took its place alongside other authorities exercising similar, if not identical functions, and either existent or soon to be created:

i. People’s Commissariats (since 1946, Ministries) of Communal Economy on republic level, which

manage[d] planning of populated places and work[ed] out and issue[d] norms, rules and instructions concerning questions of planning, allocating and developing tracts of land in cities, . . . settlements and district centers.106

The Commissariats (Ministries) were represented on the municipal level by sections of communal economy (otdely komunal’nogo khoziaistva).

ii. Commissariats (Ministries) of Civilian Housing Construction created between 1944 and 1945 in the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian,

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Moldavian, Latvian and Estonian Republics and charged with planning and construction of dwellings and accessory communal, cultural and service facilities in cities and workers' settlements.

Since they were also entrusted with the establishment of plants for the manufacture of building materials, fixtures and furnishings, there was an evident connection with the just announced massive program for housing reconstruction—a special machinery for a special task.

Chief architects (glavnye arkhitektry) on city level working to secure compliance with the approved plans.

In 1949 a new all-union Ministry of City Construction began a brief career by absorbing the Committee on Matters of Architecture. But already the next year, the abolished committee reappeared as the State Committee on Matters of Construction (Gosstroi). For a moment, there existed an uneasy division of authority between the Ministry which was expected to plan and design, and the Committee which was to concern itself with the actual construction. The differences were resolved a year later simply by doing away with the Ministry. Subsequent redefinition and clarification of functions affected also the Ministries of Civilian Housing Construction. In 1964 they were remade into all-union-republic ministries which, on the whole, retained the previous responsibilities. They were felled in the grand reorganization of 1957.

The Gosstroi, presently at the top of the city planning structure, is empowered to promulgate building and planning regulations binding on all ministries, departments and economic councils and to hand down interpretations of such regulations. Control over the observ-

107. STUDENIKIN, VLASOV & EVTIKHIEV, SOVETSKOE ADMINISTRATIVNOE PRAVO 380-81, 391 (Moscow 1950).
109. See text, p. 37 supra.
110. Two laws have been cited as creating the office of Chief Architect but the full text of neither could be obtained at the time of writing: Decree of Sept. 4, 1940 (R.S.F.S.R.), cited by EVTIKHIEV & VLASOV, ADMINISTRATIVNOE PRAVO SSSR 358 (Moscow 1946) and Decree of Oct. 13, 1944 (U.S.S.R.), cited in ZHILISHCHNYE ZAKONY 33 (Alekseev ed. Moscow 1947).
111. Edict of June 1, 1949, ZHILISHCHNOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO 446 (Moscow 1950) (U.S.S.R.).
113. This description of the duties of Gosstroi is by STUDENIKIN et al., op. cit. supra note 107, at 391.
PLANNING IN THE SOVIET UNION

ance of decisions made by the Gosstroi were, until very recently, exercised by Committees, Administrations or Sections on Matters of Construction and Architecture, attached to republic councils of ministers or executive committees of territories, regions and cities, as the case might be.\textsuperscript{118} However, these lower agencies had not been set up in adequate numbers to form a complete hierarchy with easily ascertainable lines of responsibility. Where they did not exist, the planning function was performed by some other body, more or less as a side line. The RSFSR, for example, not only had failed to establish all the authorized agencies, but had actually abolished some existing ones.\textsuperscript{119} On November 24, 1962, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR reorganized the Gosstroi as an all-union-republic organ.\textsuperscript{120} The new designation of the central agency seems to promise creation of branch offices in the fifteen republics. This decision may have been prompted by the non-exercise of local powers discussed above.

The general plan of a Soviet city is characteristically a composite of goals suggested by various administrative departments responsible for their realization. Apartments, schools, stores, laundries, hospitals and other public buildings are pushed by different departments each having its own plan to fulfill and its own future to justify before its superiors. Large tracts of land are withheld from balanced development because of excess allocations to industrial enterprises which hold them “for emergencies.”\textsuperscript{121} While interdepartmental rivalry should not be regarded as an unusual and altogether undesirable phenomenon, it is clear that a strong authority is needed to reconcile the competing interests and direct them into proper channels. Formally it is the job of the chief architect to iron out the conflicts. But the chief architect’s office is weak. The city executive committee or some other powerful group often decides important questions in a way that shows little concern for the city’s future. In some cases general plans have been worked out without so much as consulting the chief architects.\textsuperscript{122} In other instances progress is hampered by personnel shortages. It seems that both a lack of induce-

\textsuperscript{119} Report by Rubanenko to the 1958 Conference, Soveshchanie 1958, 5, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{121} Kucherenko, supra note 95.
\textsuperscript{122} Izvestiia, April 15, 1960, p. 3.
ment and of adequately trained staff reserves preclude more rapid amelioration of conditions in some offices of chief architects. In 1960 only 212 out of the 875 cities in the RSFSR had chief architects. As a result, unqualified persons are employed and there is high mobility among specialists. Judging from the statements of men prominent in Soviet city planning, these shortages will persist unless drastic action is taken. Until recently, only the Moscow Institute of Architecture and the Leningrad Institute of Construction Engineering were preparing architects for urban development and hardly more than 40 specialists enrolled in these institutions in 1959. There have been very few opportunities for specialization in other institutions. The excessive turnover (e.g., Gor'kii has had at least six different chief architects in recent years) is undesirable since long tenure has proved to be one of the prerequisites to success. Impersonal attitudes are certainly not reduced by the practice of entrusting the actual drafting to design bureaus located in the major cities (Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev), far removed from the object of planning. There have been proposals made for some decentralization in this respect.

B. Preparation and Execution of Plans

In view of the organizational difficulties, it is not surprising that planning performance, even in quantitative terms, has fallen short of the contemporary needs. In 1960 there were still hundreds of cities that had no drafts of general plans. In the Ukrainian SSR, only 137 out of its 381 cities had draft plans. Such huge cities as Gor'kii, Novosibirsk (963,000), Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk (783,000), Kuibyshev, Khark'kov (976,000), Odessa (696,000) and Donetsk (formerly Stalino) (742,000) had no approved general plans. In May of 1961, the Third All-Union Congress of Soviet Architects was told that out of approximately 1,700 cities in the USSR, about half did not have approved general plans and that the absence or inadequacy of plans led to irrational use of valuable urban land. Kucherenko, then Chairman of the Gosstroi of the USSR, in his report to the Confere-
ence complained that the Soviet Union was still making inadequate use of the fundamental advantages of a socialist society—the principle of planning and the absence of private property in land and the means of production. Even rudimentary preconditions for effective planning have not been sufficiently developed. The writers cite a lack of survey data, the gathering of which is laborious and expensive. Similarly, forecasts of Soviet economic trends have in general been considerably off the mark, requiring repeated revisions of the approved plans. In particular, the much higher rate of urban population growth and the consequent changes in the volume and pattern of housing construction have continually complicated the planning of transportation and utility systems. It has been especially annoying to find draft plans, the preparation of which usually takes several years, outdated even before they have been finished. In planning Krasnoiarsk (463,000), the architects wasted a great deal of effort in arranging boulevards, parks and squares and in pinpointing the sites of future buildings in areas which, in the meantime, had been built up. In Dushanbe (formerly Stalinabad) (248,000), about 1,000 acres of cottonland were left untouched near the center of the city while a seismic area lying about four to six miles from the center was zoned for housing. In Kuznetsk Basin many apartment houses were built on lands marked for coal mining. They later had to be torn down.

An approved city plan is a legal document binding on all persons who build on the territory of the city, as well as on the administrative organs which allocate land for construction purposes and supervise the construction itself. However, the “planning discipline” leaves much to be desired. Before the 1960 Conference, Kucherenko complained in Pravda:

Industrial enterprises sprout up along highways in areas best suited for recreation, while large tracts contiguous to the city are occupied by settlements of individual dwellings or built up with warehouses. Often unplanned working of sand and gravel is carried on in the very same place.

Industrial plants slated for removal are being remodeled and expanded. Individual housing construction is allowed on land zoned for multiple dwellings.

128. Kucherenko, supra note 95.
129. Izvestiia, Feb. 10, 1960, p. 2; Pravda, June 1, 1960, p. 2.
130. Izvestiia, April 15, 1960, p. 3.
131. Kucherenko, supra note 95.
133. VLASOV & STUDENIKIN, SOVETSKOE ADMINISTRATIVNOE PRAVO 341 (Moscow 1959).
134. Pravda, June 1, 1960, p. 2.
Toleration of substandard technical performance is another source of trouble. The massive housing construction is, without any question, the most striking aspect of Soviet cities. This program, however, involves great risks: the risk of drabness, to which we referred before, and the risk of grandiose slums. Soviet newspapers abound in stories of municipal authorities accepting for use unfinished or shockingly faulty apartment houses which are then left to rapid deterioration through mismanagement. To enforce compliance, each stratum, from the Gosstroi down to chief architects, engages in what is known as state architectural and construction control. Yet, the chief architects and the local inspectors have again been subjected to damaging pressures from the local sovisets and their executive committees.135 As a dejected member of a local control board confessed: “We, in fact, have no rights.”136

### TABLE 4
Quality of Housing Accepted for Use in 1957 in Selected Cities of the USSR137

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>“Excellent”</th>
<th>“Good”</th>
<th>“Satisfactory”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>50.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev (1,174,000)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iaroslavl’ (483,000)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalinin (279,000)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ufa (588,000)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumgait (63,000)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is impossible to know the true meaning of these ratings, but one can fairly assume that a great many ramshackle structures pass the test as “satisfactory.” A report from Cheliabinsk reveals that 292 out of 562 buildings accepted in 1959 were unfinished. The leaders of the city and the regional party groups knew that housing construction targets were not being met and that unfinished buildings were opened for tenancy. They not only did not do anything to correct this situation, but actively embarked on hoodwinking the higher authorities. In 1960 the executive committee of the city soviet, under the pressure of influential party functionaries and in a desire to create the impression that all was well, decided to open for tenancy 36 apartment houses with a total area of 550,000 square feet (about 15 per cent of the

137. Figures from Rubanenko, supra note 119, at 84.
planned annual construction), before they had been completed and before they had been inspected by the control board. The buildings were not inhabitable. They had no floors, no plaster, no water supply, no sewer, no heat, no plumbing and no electrical equipment. Some even lacked roofs.\textsuperscript{138}

Even finished houses soon develop cracks between the precast concrete panels. The seams leak and admit drafts.\textsuperscript{139} Safety netting is seen strung around new buildings to protect passers-by from falling ornamental face tile.\textsuperscript{140} Older houses fall into disrepair. While from 1959 to 1961 the Soviet state-owned housing fund was increased by 1,870,000,000 square feet of new floor space, almost 200,000,000 square feet were lost for lack of repairs.\textsuperscript{141}

CONCLUSION

So far nothing has been said about traffic patterns (adequacy of thoroughfares, vehicular-pedestrian separation, interchanges, etc.), water supply and the maintenance of streets and utilities. The billboard advertising socialist style has not been mentioned either, although in 1961 in Moscow alone 7,500,000 rubles were spent on advertising signs, often of “extremely poor and tasteless” design.\textsuperscript{142} Not enough has been said about cultural values amidst the drive to give each Soviet citizen 100 square feet of floor space. Some of the forced efforts at beautification have yielded opposite results. To quote the Chief Architect of Perm,’ only the devil knows where all those statues of husky girls come from to clutter his city’s squares and lawns.\textsuperscript{143} Elsewhere, the bosses of construction brigades stand aside while their men scrape pre-Petrine frescoes off the walls, remove paint from ancient icons and use power shovels to crush centuries of history, all this with impunity, because the Soviet Union still has no law for the protection of historical sites and monuments.\textsuperscript{144}

The Soviet regime has, in its deeds, vacillated and drifted between individualism and collectivism, while extolling vague collectivist ideals, in theory. Not unlike a market economy, the Soviet system has sought to strike a rough balance between conflicting interests and values, in pursuit of relatively short-range objectives. When needed, individualism has been fostered at the expense of collectivist values. Revitalization of the family, institution of a system of unequal rewards and en-

\textsuperscript{138} Pravda, March 30, 1961, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{139} Pravda, June 21, 1961, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{140} Salisbury, \textit{Khrushchev’s Russia} (6), N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1959, pp. 1, 46.
\textsuperscript{141} Pravda, July 22, 1962, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{142} Pravda, July 14, 1962, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{143} Izvestiia, March 20, 1960, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{144} Izvestiia, Aug. 11, 1962, p. 3.
couragement of private ownership of family-type dwellings have had that effect.

A look at the Soviet housing policy is instructive. Housing construction by individuals was until lately accepted as a useful weapon in the perennial struggle against the housing crisis. Today, by contrast, private houses are regarded as hatcheries of pernicious manners and morals. It is implicit in the current policy declarations and writings that the private house ought to go. Assuming this to be the top decision-makers' wish, three basic questions arise: Is it physically possible to accomplish this task within the foreseeable future? By what means could it be accomplished? What forms of life exactly would be encouraged by the universally used public housing settlements?

Private housing still constitutes a significant aspect of the total urban picture. As a matter of fact, from 1958 to 1960, while the socialistically owned square footage increased by 913,000,000, the private "fund" grew by 473,000,000. As of December 31, 1960, 39 per cent of the entire urban housing space was still privately owned, only a slight decrease from 40 per cent two years earlier.145 Construction of public apartments is in high gear. But even with further expansion of the output, an enormous number of units would have to be finished only to decongest the existing crowded buildings and to replace buildings which either become un serviceable or are razed in connection with urban redevelopment. It seems that only after the entire urban population will have been resettled in more convenient apartments, will the state be in a position to eradicate the private sector. Such resettlement may take anywhere from ten to twenty years or more, depending on many external factors.

Replacing private housing by public, whether it be done sporadically, as at present, or by a massive program, means expropriation. Is such expropriation feasible? Perhaps not, under the existing conditions. The Soviet regime has done much to build good will among the citizenry. A sweeping direct expropriation decree might undo years of careful cultivation. The occasional acts of expropriation which take place now involve compensation. Whereas the Soviet state does not have to pay for land, since it owns it all, it still recognizes a duty to compensate for loss of improvements.146 But even these items add up to substantial sums which bear heavily on the economy.147


147. E.g., in one estimate, it will take 15-20 years under the present expropriation laws to turn Sochi (101,000) into a socialist resort, by eliminating the private
tion has been heard that it is unfair to the state to be required to give an expropriated owner cash in addition to a "free" state-built and maintained apartment. The Ukrainian SSR tries to compromise by reducing the compensation payments up to 25 per cent in those cases in which the former owner chooses to take a state apartment rather than a substitute lot. The recent decrees providing for confiscation of houses whose owners are unable to show that they have been built or bought by legitimate means offer no workable solution. Discovery of an excessive number of infractions of law or socialist morality would only cause embarrassment to the regime.

Assuming that it would be possible to wipe out all private housing, the question still remains concerning the exact character of the ubiquitous public housing. There is widespread agreement that "the one-story house perpetuates the old form of life, where the woman remains 'the slave of the domestic hearth.' " However, it seems that even state-owned and maintained multiple dwellings are ideologically unacceptable, if they furnish separate housekeeping facilities. As one writer exclaims:

How long will soups be cooked simultaneously in one hundred apartments of the same house? Are these individual soups a symbol of our hearth and home?

These questions echo the appeal for simple, efficient caserne living, made by Sabsovich and his "left-wing" confreres in the 1920s. The Party Program of 1961 makes no specific commitments in this respect, but leaves the door open to experimentation with new forms of living, after the housing shortage is overcome. Of course, a decision aiming at greater equality of consumption will most likely go hand in hand with measures designed to level the rewards in production. If, in order to maintain managerial and labor incentives, it is necessary to retain the system of sharply unequal rewards, then it is difficult to see what advantages could be gained by restricting consumer choices. In the meantime, the apartments are built in accordance with conventional designs.

propietors whose annual income has been in the vicinity of 100,000,000 rubles. Literaturnaia gazeta, May 18, 1961, p. 2.
149. Braude, Vozmeshchenie usshcherba pri iz'iatii zemli 60-63 (Moscow 1960).
150. Prava i obizannosti individual'nykh zastroishchikov 70 (Kiev 1958).
151. See the two edicts cited in note 81 supra.
152. Izvestiia, June 6, 1961, p. 3.
154. See text, pp. 29-30 supra.