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Federal Common Law of Nuisance in Intrastate Water Pollution Disputes, Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976)

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The Fourth Circuit evaded an opportunity to clarify the availability of federal common law actions to abate interstate water pollution. Consequently, federal common law actions may still be possible despite the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCAA of 1972).¹

In Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train,² a group of Maryland residents sought to enjoin a Baltimore sewage plant from adding new customers to its system.³ The plant was already overloaded, and untreated sewage overflowed into a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay.⁴ Appellants neglected to allege that the pollution had an interstate effect.⁵ Because city and state officials had complied with the requirements of the FWPCAA of 1972, no claim under the statute was possible;⁶ the citizens’ group therefore based its request for an injunction on an asserted federal common law right. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.⁷ The Court of Appeals found jurisdiction to hear the suit, dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and held: Private citizens have no federal common law right to enjoin intrastate pollution.⁸

The recent history of federal common law actions to abate water

2. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
3. Id. at 1011 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 1007.
5. Id. at 1009-10. Because they showed that Jones Falls Stream was navigable, appellants thought it unnecessary to allege an interstate effect. Navigable waters are covered under the Act. See Supplemental Brief for the Appellants on Rehearing at 36, Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976). Congress intended to define “navigable waters” as broadly as the Constitution would allow. [1973 Current Developments] 3 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1240.
pollution is confused. In *Erie Railroad v. Tompkins*, the Supreme Court held that, except in matters governed by the Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. *Erie* therefore ended the era of federal general common law, but signalled the beginning of a "new federal common law." This new federal common law arises from two independent sources—important national interests implicitly or explicitly recognized by the Constitution, and federal statutes. Illustrative of the first source is the federal common law governing issues such as admiralty, foreign relations, etc.

9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11. 304 U.S. at 78.

and disputes between states.\textsuperscript{16} The need for federal rules to protect federal constitutional interests in these areas outweighs the presumption in favor of state law.\textsuperscript{17}

Courts interpreting federal statutes may generate federal common law when it is clear that Congress intended the federal courts to fill gaps left in the statute.\textsuperscript{18} Although courts have not precisely defined the conditions in which such federal common law gap-filling is appropriate,\textsuperscript{19} relevant circumstances include situations in which questions of federal rights and duties are involved;\textsuperscript{20} the extent to which the


16. Friendly, \textit{supra} note 10, at 408 n.119 (Constitution requires the fashioning of federal common law when the interstate nature of a dispute makes the application of either state's law inappropriate); Monaghan, \textit{supra} note 13, at 14 (presumption of the Constitution is that federal law should be used to settle interstate disputes); Note, \textit{The Federal Common Law}, \textit{supra} note 13 (concept of national sovereignty dictates a nationwide solution to interstate disputes). See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); West Virginia \textit{ex rel. Dyer} v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), \textit{modified}, 345 U.S. 981 (1953); Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213 (1944); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). \textit{But cf. C. WRIGHT, \textit{supra} note 13, § 60 (the use of federal common law to settle interstate disputes is not mandated by the Constitution).}


19. When fashioning federal common law, courts should follow, not formulate, congressional policy by finding evidence in the legislative history or scheme that demonstrates a congressional judgment that federal law should govern the issue before the court. Note, \textit{The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision}, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1092; Note, \textit{The Federal Common Law}, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1522.

20. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (federal substantive law fashioned to promote the overall statutory purpose); Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967) (federal right to inspect list so that voting privileges granted by \textit{Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1970)}} are mean-
subject is governed by federal statute(s); the overall purpose of the statutory scheme; and, a jurisdictional grant to the federal courts.

For cases where federal common law has been created to protect the federal government’s “proprietary” interests, see Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (validity of federal officer’s defense when charged with a tort in the line of duty); Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (interpretation of a clause of crop insurance contract); American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961) (clause interpretation affecting liability of U.S.).


An example of this is the comprehensive federal regulation of common carriers engaged in interstate telephone and telegraph transmission that has resulted in a federal common law of torts. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920) (carrier’s liability for negligence); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920) (carrier’s liability for negligence); Postal-Telegraph Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919) (validity of contract provision on carrier’s negligence liability); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (remedy for tort or breach of contract against carrier); O’Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940) (carrier’s liability to person defamed by transmission of a libelous message).


See also Note, Implying Federal Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963); Comment, Environmental Protection: A Limited Expansion of the Citizen’s Role, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 54 (1972):

Four prerequisites appear necessary to an implied cause of action: a statutory policy must be furthered by the right implied; the plaintiff must be within the class of persons the statute seeks to protect; the right asserted must not be protected by other remedies; and, the plaintiff’s injury must be the result of another’s breach of a statutory duty.

Id. at 59 (footnotes omitted).

When the statute implicitly authorizes it, federal courts develop a body of federal common law to implement the scheme intended by Congress. 24

The leading case discussing the federal common law of water pollution is Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 25 in which the Supreme Court found that Illinois could sue under federal common law to enjoin a public nuisance originating outside the state, but polluting property within Illinois. The Court discussed two possible sources for this right without specifying the weight attaching to either. First, the federal interest in controlling water pollution on interstate or navigable waters required the Court to fill the gaps in federal water pollution statutes. 26 Although the 1965 FWPCA contained no provision granting a state the right to bring a cause of action, the Court noted that the common law remedy would complement the policy of the statute. 27 If the Illinois result rested primarily on this statutory justification, the 1972 amendments may have mooted the holding, since the amended Act is intended to provide comprehensive remedies for water pollution abatement. 28 In Illinois, the Court recognized that subsequent federal regulations might preempt the federal common law of nuisance; until that time, however, federal courts were "empowered to appraise the equities of suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution." 29

26. Id. at 101-04, 105 n.6.
27. Id. at 104. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970). Illinois was decided under the FWPCA before the 1972 amendments were enacted. The Court in Illinois referred to 33 U.S.C. § 1160(b), which specifies that state and interstate action to abate pollution is not displaced by federal enforcement, in determining that Illinois' action was not precluded by the statute. A similar provision appears in the 1972 amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. V 1975).
28. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
The second rationale for the *Illinois* result was that, even without a specific jurisdictional grant, the Constitution implicitly requires federal courts to resolve interstate disputes concerning states’ rights in interstate water pollution cases.\(^{30}\) Even before *Erie*, courts had developed “a body of federal common law by which a nuisance in one state which infringes upon the environmental and ecological rights of another state may be abated.”\(^{31}\) When neither state’s law provides impartial relief, federal common law, accommodating both state and national interests,\(^ {32}\) recognizes a state’s cause of action. If the federal common law in *Illinois* were derived from the constitutional interest in federalism, rather than from a federal statute, it would extend only to parties asserting states’ rights in interstate water.\(^ {33}\) The Supreme Court has not stated whether the *Illinois* common law right arose from this recognized body of federal common law or from the authority of a statute which has since been amended.\(^ {34}\)

The ambiguity of the *Illinois* opinion has caused confusion in the lower courts.\(^ {35}\) While one district court held that only sovereigns have


\(^{31}\) Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976). See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (state can be enjoined from polluting the coastal waters of another state); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (state enjoined from utilizing a method of water drainage that adversely affected neighboring state); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (state can be enjoined from dumping material into harbor that polluted waters of neighboring state); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (private business enjoined from discharging noxious fumes that polluted air of neighboring state); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (state has right to enjoin neighboring state’s sanitation district from polluting water that flowed into plaintiff state). See also Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) (private business enjoined from dumping chemicals that polluted coastal waters of neighboring state).

\(^{32}\) Monaghan, *supra* note 13, at 14; 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 597. Federal common law can also provide relief when application of a single state’s law is impractical.

\(^{33}\) See note 16 supra and accompanying text. States have “quasi-sovereign” ecological rights. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.


\(^{35}\) See, e.g., *Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp.*, 512 F.2d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1975).
federal common law rights to abate water pollution, another court allowed any party to seek abatement of pollution of interstate or navigable water based on federal common law. A third district court recognized a state's federal common law right to enjoin a private business' intrastate pollution of an interstate body of water; the Eighth Circuit, however, dismissed a similar claim because plaintiff failed to allege an interstate effect. Most courts have sustained the federal government's federal common law right to abate pollution of navigable water by private sources.

This judicial inconsistency may be due to the enactment, since Illinois, of the FWPCAA of 1972 which creates a comprehensive scheme to establish and administer water pollution standards. "[A]lthough [the Act] technically amend[s] the FWPCA of 1965, for all practical purposes [it] replaces all federal water pollution control statutes."
Under the FWPCA of 1972 the federal government sets limits for pollutant discharges, although states may establish more stringent standards. A state has jurisdiction over its own waters and boundary waters; if a state chooses to enforce its own, and consequently the federal, standards, it must create a pollution discharge permit system. Failure by a state to act promptly to enforce water quality standards automatically results in federal intervention.

The FWPCA of 1972 authorizes private citizen actions in federal district court to enforce statutory effluent limitations. Any citizen may bring an action against any person alleged to have violated the effluent limitation or against the federal administrator for failing to perform a nondiscretionary act. Courts may grant injunctions, impose

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47. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975). The statute provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf—

(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.

Other subsections of § 1365 are concerned with notice (b), venue (c), litigation costs (d), other citizen rights (e), effluent limitations (f), citizen defined (g), and civil actions by a state governor (h).


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civil penalties, or both. The citizen suit provision also has a "saving 
clause" which preserves citizens' rights and remedies not granted by 
the statute: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which 
any person . . . may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other 
relief . . . ."

The FWPCA of 1972 also permits private parties to seek judicial 
review of an administrative action. Application for review must be 
made within ninety days of the administrator's contested action. 
Action of the administrator which could have been reviewed, and 
was not, is immune from subsequent judicial review.

51. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) and (d). The citizens' provision of the FWPCA of 1972 
is modeled after the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970)). 
One of the primary differences is this authorization, under § 1365, for the courts to 
impose civil remedies.

52. It should be noted that the section [§ 1365] would specifically preserve 
any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, 
other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under 
this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages.
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reported in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1499 

33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) has been successfully invoked as maintaining a citizen's right to 
bring an enforcement action under other federal jurisdictional statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 
1331(a) or 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, besides § 1365. This can be important if the citizen has 
lost the right to suit under § 1365(a) because of noncompliance with § 1365(b). See, 
e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 
Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 423 
U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).


Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd in part on other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 
965 (1977); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); 
American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 
515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). See also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reported 
in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
NEWS 3668, 3750-51.


In *Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train*, the Fourth Circuit declined to consider whether, in light of the FWPCA of 1972, there is currently a federal common law right of action to abate interstate water pollution. The court reasoned that federal common law is necessary to resolve interstate water pollution controversies only when application of either state's law would be inequitable. In this case the court applied Maryland law because it would not be inequitable: the controversy was local, required no vindication of a state's rights, and—on plaintiff's allegations—involved no interstate effect. Furthermore, *Illinois* only recognizes a right to assert a state's rights, and therefore does not apply to private parties.

Although federal interest in water pollution is apparent, the policy of the FWPCA of 1972 is "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution . . . ." The court suggested that appellants turn to the state for relief since the saving clause preserved their right to do so. Noting that plaintiffs were barred from proceeding under the FWPCA of 1972, the *Jones* court concluded that "it would be an anomaly to hold that there was a body of federal common law which proscribes conduct which the 1972 Act of Congress legitimates."

The dissent argued for the preservation of earlier federal common law rights enunciated in *Illinois*. The statute's grant of federal jurisdiction for citizen enforcement combined with the saving clause suggests

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57. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 1008.
59. Id. at 1010.
60. Id. at 1009 n.8. The court, citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), stated that a state need not be a party if the state's rights are implicated. *But see* Joint Supplemental Brief for Appellees and Intervenors at 67, Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (only sovereigns can seek relief under *Illinois*).
61. Suits by the United States government might be an exception to this rule, said the court, but suggested this proposition may be questionable since the enactment of the FWPCA of 1972. *See* 539 F.2d at 1009 n.7. *See also* note 40 *supra* and accompanying text.
62. 539 F.2d at 1009.
63. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. III 1973)).
65. 539 F.2d at 1009. *See* note 6 *supra* and accompanying text.
66. 539 F.2d at 1009.
67. Id. at 1011.
that Congress intended to retain the federal common law in actions to abate pollution in navigable waters. The dissent reasoned that the federal interest in water pollution is pervasive and is not dependent on state law.

The dissent's primary disagreement with the majority, however, lay in its reading of Illinois. According to the dissent, Illinois does not limit the common law right to abate public nuisances to suits by state governments. Rather, it holds that the federal common law may fill statutory gaps with uniform rules to advance the statute's purpose and grant relief not included in the statutory remedies. The dissent concluded that appellants should amend their complaint to allege an interstate effect. The district court should then decide on the merits appellants' right to federal common law relief.

While the court's holding in Jones is not incorrect, the opinion is incomplete. The Jones opinion lacks understanding of the federal common law and avoids the crux of the problem. To assess the validity of a claim based on federal common law a court must make two determinations: first, it must decide whether either the Constitution or an act of Congress demonstrates a federal interest in the party's claim; and, second, if it finds a federal interest, it must decide whether it is adequately protected by state law or requires application of federal common law.

Rather than analyzing the validity of appellant's claim, the court dismissed it by distinguishing Jones from Illinois and by assuming that the Illinois result rested solely on the constitutional interest in preserving the federal structure. If this interpretation of Illinois is correct, Illinois provides no support for a private federal common law right of action to abate water pollution. The federalism rationale requires interstate pollution, the involvement of state rather than private interests,

69. 539 F.2d at 1011.
70. Id. at 1012.
71. Id. at 1014.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1016.
76. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
and a finding that application of state law would be either inequitable or impractical. *Jones* does not meet these criteria.

On the other hand, the majority did not adequately refute appellant’s contention that *Illinois* also rested on the theory that courts may fashion federal common law remedies to fill the gaps in federal statutes.77 Instead, the court avoided the issue by relying on plaintiff’s failure to allege pollution of interstate waters.78 The court did acknowledge that Jones Falls Stream is a tributary of Chesapeake Bay;79 pollution of the Stream results in pollution of Chesapeake Bay, an interstate body of water. Consequently, the interstate effect of polluting Jones Falls Stream, while not alleged, is apparent. In the same way the court avoided the question, addressed by the dissent, of whether the FWPCA of 1972 created or preserved federal common law rights of action by private parties.

To ascertain what common law rights can be derived from the FWPCA of 1972 requires a determination whether federal common law is necessary to fill its gaps. A finding that the statutory scheme would be frustrated or that the federal interest would not be protected by state law would justify the creation of federal common law.80 Here, appellant was asking a federal court to develop a federal common law rule that would require the abatement of pollution permitted by the FWPCA of 1972.81 The statute creates two private rights of action: one, a citizen suit provision for enforcement of effluent standards;82 and, two, a provision for judicial review of administrative decisions.83 Other than these explicit exceptions, Congress did not intend citizens to litigate water pollution control disputes under federal law.84 Citizen suits are part of the enforcement system created by the FWPCA of

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77. Supplemental Brief for Appellants on Rehearing at 18, Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
78. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976).
79. *Id.* at 1007.
80. See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
84. Congress expressed concern at cluttering the federal courts with citizen suits, thus it provided certain technical limitations to both provisions providing for citizen action. *See Reath, Pollution—The Right of Private Enforcement in the Courts, 43 Pa. B.A.Q. 238, 242 (1972).*
1972, but the legislative history does not indicate that Congress intended to authorize the federal courts to create a separate system of standards and enforcement.

Citizens seeking to abate pollution not enjoinable under the FWPCA of 1972 may litigate their complaints under state law. The FWPCA of 1972 provides for such citizen suits by permitting states to impose more stringent standards, and by preserving common law rights to seek relief under state law. Congress' failure to preempt state law, however, does not support the Jones plaintiff's argument that the door is therefore open to federal common law. Neither the legislative history nor the administrative scheme of the FWPCA of 1972 support this contention. By carefully defining the role of both federal and state governments in the administration of the FWPCA of 1972, the filling of any statutory gaps is left to state law.

85. See notes 47 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 52 & 53 supra and accompanying text.
89. The legislative history demonstrates that the regulatory scheme was deliberately designed to provide for citizen participation in the FWPCA of 1972. Congress sought to accomplish this by providing for: (1) public participation in the development of effluent standards, § 1251(a), (2) making permit applications and permits issued under § 1342 public records, § 1342(j), (3) federal enforcement, § 1319, (4) judicial review of Administrator's actions, § 1369(b), and, (5) the citizen suit provision for enforcement actions, § 1365. H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1972), reported in A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1973). See Proposed Amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 11,966 Before the House Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reported in A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1111-1251 (1973).

In answer to a question expressing concern about citizens filing suits without reference to the EPA standards, Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, responded: "We have felt it very important that citizen's suits be directed to enforcing standards set by law and regulation rather than hypothetical standards which are not related to statutory and regulatory enactment, and I think that this is an important matter to keep in mind." Id. at 1153.
Citizens' ability to enjoin intrastate water pollution not enjoinable under the FWPCA A of 1972 is therefore limited to appellate review of administrative actions\(^\text{91}\) and to litigation under state law.\(^\text{92}\) It has been suggested, however, that the rule in *Illinois* does permit a federal common law cause of action for a citizen in one state who seeks to abate pollution in another state.\(^\text{93}\) The pitfalls of *Jones* might have been avoided had a citizen of another state brought suit alleging that the pollution of Jones Falls Stream created a nuisance in his state. Such a suit would have raised the larger constitutional and statutory questions discussed, but not clearly decided, in *Illinois*.

In holding that there is no body of federal common law that confers rights upon private citizens to enjoin intrastate pollution not enjoinable under the FWPCA A of 1972, the Fourth Circuit found that this statute expresses the extent of federal interest in intrastate pollution. The more important question concerning interstate actions remains unanswered.


\(^{91}\) In *Jones* the appellees alleged that the appellants failed to exercise these rights. See Joint Supplemental Brief for the Appellees and the Intervenor Appellees at 16-17. But the appellants claimed they were misled by the state into believing that the permit in question was only a temporary permit, and therefore they did not challenge it within 90 days after its issuance. See Reply Brief for the Appellants at 1-2.
