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DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA AND ILLINOIS: ITS EFFECT ON SENTENCE DISPARITY AND PRISONER REHABILITATION

The movement away from "indeterminate" sentences for persons convicted of crime marks a major development in the administration of criminal justice in the United States. The trend emanates primarily from a growing dissatisfaction over indeterminate sentencing systems that have failed to rehabilitate criminal offenders and have created vast disparities in sentences imposed on like defendants for like crimes. California and Illinois have been in the vanguard of states that have turned to definite sentencing systems in response to


An indefinite sentence, in contrast, consists of a legislatively established minimum and maximum term of detention during which the prisoner may be released. See P. TAPPAN, *Crime, Justice, and Correction* 432-33 (1960); Prettyman, *supra*, at 13 n.27. See also Dershowitz, *Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm*, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 305 (1974).

2. "A definite commitment is said to be one fixed by the judge...at a term of years which may be less than (but not more than) the maximum provided by statute for the particular crime." S. Rubin, *The Law of Criminal Correction* 157-58 (2d ed. 1973). See also ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 131 (Approved Draft 1968).


these concerns over rehabilitation and sentence disparities. This Note analyzes and compares those provisions of the California and Illinois statutes most relevant to these concerns.

I. THE DEFINITE SENTENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT

The origins of the definite sentence can be traced to the late 1700's. The "classical" school of English penology objected to the harsh and arbitrary sentences imposed by judges who held unlimited sentencing powers. The classical school proposed that the legislature determine sentences for all types of offenses to make the "punishment fit the crime." 

In the 1880's, however, the neoclassicists argued that sentences should be less definite in their specificity and consistency of application, and urged consideration of extenuating circumstances such as the age and mental condition of the defendant. The positivist school, which originated in Italy in the nineteenth century, turned further toward individualized sentencing, proposing that judges should be educated in the psychological sciences and should fashion sentences according to the needs of each defendant. This proposal also contained elements of the indeterminate sentence because it removed the power of sentencing from the legislature and returned sentencing discretion to the judge.

Ultimate credit for the development of the indeterminate sentence, however, is given to Alexander Maconochie, an Australian who instituted a system in which prisoners reduced their sentences through scholastic and work achievement. Maconochie based his system on the theory that imprisonment should reform prisoners for their return to

8. Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at 27. The term "neoclassical" arose from the school's advocacy of a sentence whose length was specified at the outset.
9. S. REID, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 114 (1976); Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at 28; Weinstein, supra note 6, at 493-94. The term "positivist" was applied to this school of thought because of its optimistic belief that the criminal could benefit from his sentence.
10. Reid, supra note 6, at 567 n.13.
11. Id. See generally White, Alexander Maconochie and the Development of Parole, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 72 (1976); see also Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at 64-65 n.3.
society. The system thus combined the indeterminate sentence, in which a prisoner's personal progress determined his time of release, with rehabilitation. 12

In the United States the definite sentence prevailed until New York established an "indefinite" system in 1876. 13 By 1910 twenty-one states had adopted the New York model, 14 and today thirty-five jurisdictions use some form of indeterminate sentencing. 15 Until recently, California and Illinois also maintained indeterminate sentencing systems. 16 A California defendant received a statutorily determined maximum term during which he could be released at any time. 17 In Illinois the judge set the minimum and maximum periods for detention, and the parole board could release the prisoner at any point within that range. 18

California and Illinois, however, now lead the movement toward the definite sentence. One reason for this predilection is the failure of the indeterminate sentence to achieve its touted objective—the rehabilitation of prisoners. 19 The sole justification for the flexible indeterminate sentence is the belief that the prisoner can reform himself, however long a time that may take. 20 The definite sentence, on the other hand,
generally has been justified as a means to achieve the goals of dete-
rence and retribution. The historical vacillation between sentencing
postures directly relates to trends of thought in the psychological, be-
havioral, and criminal-penal fields; at times the societal interest in de-
terrence and retribution outweighs the rehabilitative ideal. The goals
of deterrence or retribution and rehabilitation are not incompatible
when combined cohesively, and modern sentencing approaches at-
tempt to reflect all three. Rehabilitation, however, seldom is prac-
ticed effectively, and the rehabilitation theory has not been tested
adequately for lack of satisfactory prison treatment facilities and medi-
cally knowledgeable judges and parole boards. These failures under-
lie the shift to determinate sentencing.

A second cause of the definite sentence movement is the disparity
among sentences imposed on like defendants who have committed the
same crime. Sentence disparity exists within a single jurisdiction,
among neighboring jurisdictions, and on a national level. Disparities

21. Reid, supra note 6, at 566.
22. See generally Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at chs. 5-15.
23. Id. at 71. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the Supreme Court approved of
the trend to combine rehabilitation and retribution in a single sentencing scheme. “Retribution is
no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.” Id. at 248. “[A] judge should consider
in imposing sentence: 1st. The protection of society against wrong-doers. 2nd. The punish-
ment—or much better—the discipline of the wrong-doer. 3rd. The reformation and rehabilitation
of the wrong-doer. 4th. The deterrence of others from the commission of like offenses.” Id. at
248-49 n.13 (quoting S. Glueck, Probation and Criminal Justice 113 (1933)). See also
24. D. Fogel, supra note 3, at 114-26; Morris, supra note 4, at 116; Prettyman, supra note 1,
at 19-21; Weinstein, supra note 6, at 497-98.
25. M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 88-100 (1973); Bayley,
supra note 3, at 551-63; Morris, supra note 4, at 1179; Reid, supra note 6, at 572-79, 593-601;
Weinstein, supra note 6, at 497. See generally In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1972); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439
(1974) (dangerousness, a crucial criterion of parole boards' decisions, cannot be accurately pre-
dicted or evaluated); Prettyman, supra note 1, at 25-37 (failure of Maryland's Patuxent Institution,
the foremost attempt at “curing” criminals through medical and psychological treatment on an
indefinite basis). Comment, Senate Bill 42 and the Myth of Shortened Sentences for California
Offenders: The Effects of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, 14 San Diego L. Rev. 1176,
1182 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Bill 42]. (tendency of psychiatrists to “overpredict” dan-
gerousness of prisoners often results in unnecessarily long prison terms).
26. See Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considerations,
71 Nw. U.L. Rev. 29, 32 (1976) (“At one level, disparity means no more than the imposition of
different sentences upon different defendants and as such is an inherent part of any system of
individualized sentencing.”); Rubin, supra note 5, at 56.
27. See Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 5, at 110; Rubin, supra note 5, at 55. For a criticism of
in the indeterminate sentencing systems result primarily from the personal reactions of judges to particular cases and the inconsistent actions of parole boards.\(^{28}\)

Judicial individualism may be controlled, in part, by a minimally discretionary sentence structure,\(^{29}\) but this solution deals inadequately with the distinct differences among defendants and fact situations. A more just method to reduce sentence disparity is to restrict the discretion of the parole board, because the board's function is secondary to that of the judiciary. The parole board operates with few, if any, guidelines on when a prisoner is "cured" and ready for release,\(^{30}\) and reaches its decisions after only a short review of each case.\(^{31}\) For prisoners with identical sentences, this system of parole results in vast differences in release dates that are unrelated to the prisoner's progress toward rehabilitation.\(^{32}\) Because the parole authority need exist only under an indeterminate sentencing system,\(^{33}\) a definite sentence structure eliminates this cause of sentence disparity.

disparate sentences given to codefendents, see United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 455-56 (7th Cir. 1959).

\(^{28}\) See D'Esposito, supra note 1, at 185; McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time": An Analysis of the Impact of the Justice Model, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 621, 640 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time"]; Rubin, supra note 5, at 58-60. Other reasons for sentence disparities include: excessive judicial discretion with few guidelines; differing social attitudes; varying personal backgrounds of judges; different geographic locations; race and ethnicity of the defendant; and the availability of presentence reports. Coburn, supra note 5, at 210-11. For a discussion on race and socioeconomic background of the defendant as major sources of disparity, see H. HAGAN, EXTRA-LEGAL Attributes and CRIMINAL Sentencing: AN ASSESSMENT OF A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT 357, 362-74 (1974).

\(^{29}\) The ideal definite sentence structure, under which the sentence is imposed entirely without regard to the defendant's personal history and attributes, eliminates judges' individual reactions. California and Illinois attempt to reduce this cause of sentence disparity by severely narrowing the range of years from which a judge can choose to impose the defendant's sentence. See note 47 infra and accompanying text. This range, however, still allows the judge to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant's case. See notes 98-100, 102-106 infra and accompanying text.

\(^{30}\) See note 25 supra and accompanying text.


\(^{32}\) Senate Bill 42, supra note 25 at 1185, 1203.

\(^{33}\) In a definite-sentence scheme, the judge sets the prison release date, and it may be altered only by that judge.
Dissatisfaction with indeterminate sentencing systems also arises from their susceptibility to constitutional infirmities. In *Specht v. Patterson* the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional under the due process clause a Colorado sex-offender statute that provided a special indeterminate sentence (one day to life) for defendants who present a particular danger to society, without opportunity for a presentence hearing. Although the Court based its decision on the defendant's inability to challenge the factual basis for his placement into the "danger" category, the Court may have been particularly protective of the defendant's rights because of the extraordinary potential for abuse inherent in open-ended sentences.

Several jurisdictions have found equal protection violations in sentencing schemes that permit longer indeterminate sentences for females than males on the assumption that women are more likely to reform.


On balance, however, the courts have rejected constitutional objections to the indeterminate sentence on either equal protection or "cruel and unusual punishment" grounds. Equal protection is too strict a standard to impose on the individualized indeterminate sentencing process. Berger, *supra* note 26, at 38-40. See People v. Kostal, 159 Cal. App. 2d 444, 323 P.2d 1020 (1958); Note, *Equal Protection Applied to Sentencing*, 58 IOWA L. REV. 596, 612-15 (1973); 81 HARV. L. REV. 890 (1968). The "cruel and unusual" clause has been applied to excessive sentences, *see*, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), but not, in general, to the indeterminate sentence. See Hendrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1966); Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1962); People v. Dyer, 269 Cal. App. 2d 209, 74 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1969); People v. Polk, 10 Ill. App. 3d 408, 294 N.E.2d 113 (1973) (four-to-twenty years for indecent liberties with child represents moral beliefs of People, and thus is not cruel or disproportionate); State *ex rel.* Nelson v. Tahash, 265 Minn. 330, 121 N.W.2d 584 (1963) (indeterminate sentence not cruel and unusual because maximum penalty is subject to discretionary reduction and is not frail for lack of certainty). But see People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975) (cruel or unusual punishment is that which is so disproportionate to the crime as to shock the conscience); *In re Foss*, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (same); *In re Lynch*, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (same); People v. Kane, 31 Ill. App. 3d 500, 333 N.E.2d 247 (1975) (seven-to-fifteen years for possession of heroin held disproportionate and reduced to minimum of four years because defendant was first offender with good work history); 61 CALIF. L. REV. 418 (1973). See generally Ugbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908) (indeterminate sentence is constitutional); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) (same), *In re Lee*, 177 Cal. 690, 171 P. 958 (1918).


Other courts have sustained due process challenges to indeterminate sentencing systems.\textsuperscript{37} Arguably, due process is denied when a person is held indefinitely until "cured" but does not receive effective treatment,\textsuperscript{38} particularly if the patient would be released at an earlier time under a definite sentence.\textsuperscript{39}

II. DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA AND ILLINOIS

Consternation over the indeterminate sentence led to the passage of determinate sentencing legislation in California in 1976 and Illinois in 1977.\textsuperscript{40} These enactments seek to promote uniformity of sentencing and to eliminate disparity in sentences.\textsuperscript{41} Each act also incorporates deterrence and retribution principles into its sentence structures\textsuperscript{42} and minimizes the importance of rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{43} This part of the Note


\textsuperscript{39} Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966).


\textsuperscript{42} “The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.” Cal. Penal Code § 1170(a)(1) (Deering 1979). See note 43 infra

\textsuperscript{43} “[Punishment] is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances.” Cal. Penal Code § 1170(a)(1) (Deering 1979). But see Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 1001-1.2 (1978), which provides for rehabilitation and penalties proportionate to the offense. For criticism of the Illinois “punishment-equality approach,” see Illinois Reconsiders “Flat Time,” supra note 28, at 660. The proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), provides that one factor to be considered when sentencing is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.” Id. § 2003(a)(F). One purpose of the proposed code is to “promote the correction and rehabilitation of persons who engage in such conduct, recognizing that imprisonment is generally not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” Id. § 101(b)(4).
compares major provisions of the California and Illinois statutes, focusing in particular on their effect on rehabilitation and sentence disparity.44

The most significant revision enacted by each state's legislature is the elimination of the minimum-maximum sentencing system under which the judge (in Illinois)45 or the statute (in California)46 sets a sentence range and the parole authority later decides the prison-release date.47 Both states now require a determinate sentence—a specific term of imprisonment selected by the judge from a relatively narrow range set forth in the statute.48 These states apply a determinate sentence to most felonies and all misdemeanors, but reserve an indeterminate sentence for certain aggravated felonies.49 California and Illinois also classify felonies and misdemeanors into a number of smaller categories (with corresponding ranges of sentences) to further restrict judicial discretion.50 Although it is too early for clear patterns to emerge, curtailed

44. California and Illinois have been chosen for discussion because those states' codes most clearly demonstrate the concern over inadequacy of rehabilitation and disparity among sentences. See note 122 infra for a list of states that have revised or considered revision of their indeterminate sentence laws. See generally Zarr, Commentaries on the Maine Criminal Code (Sentencing), 28 Me. L. Rev. 117 (1976).


46. "[Defendant shall] be sentenced to be imprisoned in a state prison, but the court in imposing the sentence shall not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (Deering 1976) (amended 1976).


49. The indeterminate sentence is retained for aggravated felonies because the judge should have unfettered discretion to deal with the unusual defendant in ways not contemplated by the narrow range of sentencing alternatives properly applicable to the vast majority of similar defendants and offenses. California regards murder as an aggravated crime, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (Deering 1979), and persons convicted of murder may receive a sentence of life imprisonment, life imprisonment without parole, or death. Id. Illinois imposes life imprisonment on persons found guilty of murder if the murder is "brutal" or if the person is adjudged a "habitual criminal." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a) (1979).

50. California treats misdemeanors in a single group, punishable by a term not to exceed six months, or a fine up to $500, or both. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (Deering 1979). Felonies comprise 10 classes. Id. § 1170(a)(2). Illinois classifies its offenses as Murder, Class X (aggravated felonies), Class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felonies, and Class A, B, or C misdemeanors. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1
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judicial discretion should produce greater uniformity in sentences imposed for identical crimes. At the same time, however, the elimination of minimum-maximum sentencing vests a new responsibility in judges. Both the California and Illinois statutes now require that the judge determine the prisoner's date of release. This emasculation of the parole authority especially alters sentencing responsibility in California. Prior to the new legislation, a California judge had only to decide whether imprisonment was warranted and automatically assign the appropriate statutory sentence range, allowing the parole authority to determine the ultimate length of imprisonment.

Another significant revision in California and Illinois law, which complements the adoption of the definite sentence, is the abolition of the parole authority. The California Department of Corrections now governs “parole,” but the process is wholly unlike the traditional parole procedure in which the crucial element is the board’s power to release a prisoner at any time. The Department of Corrections now adds “parole,” a period of up to three years, to each term of imprison-

(1979). Illinois maintained a classification system as early as 1973, but the prior system did not contain the “Class X” category. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1 (1973) (amended 1978). Other states also categorize criminal offenses. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-25 (six classes of felonies), § 53a-26 (four classes of misdemeanors) (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 4 (Supp. 1978) (five classes of crimes); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 55.05 (McKinney 1975) (five classes of felonies, three of misdemeanors).

51. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text; Reid, supra note 6, at 569.
53. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
55. Id. § 3020.
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(a) (1979).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5002 (Deering 1979).
ment for a felony,\textsuperscript{58} which the Department may waive for "good cause."\textsuperscript{59} The statute, however, provides no guidelines to determine "good cause"; thus the parole waiver may lead to disparity in the total length of sentences.\textsuperscript{60} The Community Release Board of the Department of Corrections sets guidelines for the conditions and length of parole,\textsuperscript{61} but again, disparity could result because the law provides no standard of "good cause."\textsuperscript{62}

An integral part of the new parole scheme in California is the extension to prisoners of credit for good behavior and for participation in work, educational, and vocational prison programs.\textsuperscript{63} The Department of Corrections has authority to reduce a prisoner's sentence by one-third for accumulated "good-time" credits.\textsuperscript{64} Conversely, a prisoner loses credits when he violates prison rules or fails to participate in prison programs.\textsuperscript{65} This system accords with the determinate sentence concept in that the prisoners themselves, rather than an outside authority, account for any unequal periods of incarceration for like crimes.

Illinois retains even fewer remnants of the traditional parole system. The Illinois statute establishes a Prisoner Review Board to supervise after-prison service.\textsuperscript{66} Members of the Board must have five years of actual experience in penology, corrections work, medicine, psychology,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Id. § 3000. The Uniform Determinate Sentence Act of 1976 permitted only a one-year period of parole. Id. § 3000 (Deering 1977) (amended 1978). Under the present code no person serving a life sentence may be paroled (if parole is allowed) before seven years' imprisonment. Id. § 3046 (Deering 1979). See also Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 73-87 (1978).
\item \textsuperscript{59} CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3000(a), 5003.5 (Deering 1979).
\item \textsuperscript{60} See Comment, Senate Bill 42—The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 133, 157 (1977).
\item \textsuperscript{61} CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(f) (Deering 1979). The Community Release Board, for example, must release a felon who completes one continuous year of his additional term even though the originally imposed term may have been longer, unless the Board determines that "good cause" exists to continue the parole. Id. § 3001(a). The statute, however, does not provide guidelines to determine "good cause."
\item \textsuperscript{62} See note 60 supra and accompanying text. Disparity also can arise because the Community Release Board may revoke parole for cause (again undefined) after a hearing. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3056-3064 (Deering 1979). For a discussion of prior California parole-revocation law, see Coonrad, supra note 17, at 15.
\item \textsuperscript{63} CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2930(a), 2931(c) (Deering 1979). See also Cassou & Taugher, supra note 58, at 25, 77-79.
\item \textsuperscript{64} CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2931, 4019 (Deering 1979).
\item \textsuperscript{65} Id. § 2932. The Community Release Board may deduct no more than 90 days of good behavior credit or 30 days of participation credit during any eight-month period. Id. § 2932(d).
\item \textsuperscript{66} ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(a) (1978).
\end{itemize}
or other behavioral sciences. The Illinois act, contrary to California's, lists the conditions that prisoners must follow on "mandatory supervised release," and specifies the length of supervision periods for various categories of crime. Because the Board may not waive the period of supervision for the first two years, the Illinois system of determinate sentences diminishes Board-created sentence disparity.

Illinois' system of "good-conduct" credits permits a one-day reduction in sentence for each day of prison time. This system implies that a prisoner need only refrain from rules-violations to accumulate credits toward his release. An Illinois prisoner thus may reduce his sentence by one-half, but his California counterpart may obtain only a one-third reduction. Illinois, however, does not grant "good-conduct" incentives for participation in prison work programs. The difference between the two states in "good-conduct" or "good-time" provisions, therefore, may only result in equalizing the actual length of time served by California and Illinois prisoners for similar crimes. Nevertheless, Illinois' new provisions concerning post-imprisonment service proba-

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67. Id. § 1003-3-1(b).
68. A prisoner must not violate any criminal statutes or carry any dangerous weapon; at the Board's discretion, a prisoner must attend work or school, undergo medical treatment, support his dependents, and report to an official of the Department of Corrections. Id. §§ 1003-3-7(a) to 1003-3-7(b). Illinois also allows the Board to assign other conditions. This allowance avoids over-restriction by the statute, but can lead to disparity.
69. Id. § 1005-8-1(d). The statute provides a three-year mandatory supervised release term for murder or a Class X felony, a two-year term for a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, and a one-year term for a Class 3 or Class 4 felony. Id.
70. Id. Under the former Illinois procedure, members of the parole board read the master files, interviewed the prisoners, and discussed the cases at the day's end to determine the parolees. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1 (1975) (amended 1978). The Illinois Board based its decisions on the following criteria: seriousness of the offense, number of prior offenses, participation in prison educational programs, history of prison rule-breaking, employment prospects, marital status and number of dependents, and age. A. Heinz, J. Heinz, Senderowitz & Vance, Sentencing by Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 17 (1976).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a)(2) (1978).
73. The statute states that the Department of Corrections is to prescribe rules regarding early release and forfeiture of good-conduct credits, but mentions no specifics. Id. § 1003-6-3 (1978). Maine allows a reduction of 10 days a month from a prisoner's sentence when the "record of conduct shows that [the prisoner] has observed all the rules and requirements." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1253 (Supp. 1978). The Maine system thus resembles the Illinois approach in that the prisoner need not participate in prison work programs to qualify for the reduction.
bly will promote sentence uniformity better than California's, because California retains more echoes of the disparity-prone parole system.75

The California and Illinois statutes also differ with respect to the length of sentences. In all classifications except certain cases of murder, Illinois allows the imposition of longer sentences on criminals than does California.76 Illinois, for example, punishes murder with a term of twenty-to-forty years, or a term of "natural life imprisonment" if specific aggravating factors are present in the case.77 California, on the other hand, imposes a sentence of death for murder under aggravated circumstances, death or life imprisonment for first-degree murder, and a term of five, seven, or eleven years for second-degree murder.78 Interestingly, both California and Illinois provided for substantially greater penalties under prior law for all felonies.79 The former California Adult Authority80 could determine a penalty for second-degree murder from a term of five years to natural life,81 and the prior Illinois statute required judges to impose a minimum sentence of fourteen years for murder and permitted judges to decree any maximum term of imprisonment over fourteen years.82 The actual sentences imposed under the new law, however, may not differ significantly from those under the prior law because the present statutory terms are based on average sentences imposed under prior law for the same crimes.83 Both the California and Illinois statutes provide that a prisoner shall not serve a longer term if sentenced under the new law for a crime committed before the effective date of the legislation than if sentenced under the prior law.84

75. See notes 54-55, 57-62 supra and accompanying text.
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1979). Aggravating factors exist: if the victim was a peace officer, fireman, inmate, or Department of Corrections official; if the defendant has been convicted previously of two or more murders; if the victim was aboard a hijacked vehicle; if the murder was committed pursuant to contract; or if the murder was committed in the course of another felony (armed robbery, robbery, rape, kidnapping, arson, or burglary). Id.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.2 (Deering 1979).
81. Id. § 190 (Deering 1979).
The new legislation in each state also affects the use of concurrent and consecutive sentences for multiple convictions. Both acts provide that sentences shall run concurrently if the court fails to expressly impose consecutive terms, and both states apply an “aggregate formula” to calculate multiple sentences when consecutive sentences are imposed. The Illinois statute, however, prohibits the judge from imposing a consecutive sentence unless “such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.” The California provision permits the judge who decides the later conviction to choose between the consecutive or concurrent form. Because the Illinois provision permits less judicial discretion in the use of consecutive sentences, it should better promote uniformity of sentences than the California version.

Under the recent revisions in California and Illinois, each state now requires a written record of the reasons for the judge’s selection of a sentence. This requirement represents an important departure from previous practices, in which California law did not provide for any justification and Illinois law allowed the judge to determine in his own discretion whether to write a summary of reasons for imposing a particular sentence. A major cause of appellate reticence in overturning trial courts’ discretionary acts is the lack of reliable information about the judge’s reasons for a ruling. A written record thus provides an

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85. Under a concurrent sentence system, a prisoner serves all sentences simultaneously; when sentences run consecutively, the additional sentences follow the completion of the original.


88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1979).

89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (Deering 1979).

90. See also Connell, supra note 85, at 440-41.

91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(c) (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(c) (1978). See also S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2003(b) (oral statement in open court). Maine requires no written or oral statement.


93. See Rubin, Judicial Resistance to Sentencing Accountability, 21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 201, 203 (1975) (written record of sentencing reasons is essential to effective appellate review); Note, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1357 (discussion of arguments for and against written statement of sentencing reasons).
effective basis for appellate review and promotes utmost judicial care. The requirement also encourages uniformity among individual judge's decisions because of the possibility that scrutiny of the record will reveal an arbitrary sentencing decision.

To aid the court in its sentence determinations, Illinois and California mandate presentence investigations. An Illinois judge may not sentence a defendant convicted of a felony until a presentence investigatory report is filed with the court. The Illinois statute specifies inclusion in the report of certain items calculated to reflect a complete view of the defendant's background and character. This requirement

94. "Without such statements, any future review must rely upon mere conjecture or surmise in determining how the final penalty was selected." Korbakes, Criminal Sentencing: Should the "Judge's Sound Discretion" be Explained?, 59 Jud. 185, 187 (1975). See also Berkowitz, The Constitutional Requirement for a Written Statement of Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentencing Decision: A Due Process Proposal, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 205, 211 (1974). The lack of a written statement was a consideration in the court's decision to remand the following cases: United States v. Bowser, 497 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Driscoll, 496 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973).


97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) requires that a presentence investigation be conducted in the federal courts, and that the contents be disclosed to the defense. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (denial of presentence report to defendant sentenced to death violates due process clause); 1977 Wash. U.L.Q. 728. But see lacovetti v. United States, 534 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1976) (court narrowly construed Rule 32 (c) to avoid release of report to defendant). For a criticism of disclosure, see Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation Report, 29 Alb. L. Rev. 206 (1965).

98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1978).

99. Id. § 1005-3-2 (defendant's personal, medical, and criminal history; availability of treatment facilities suited to defendant's needs; effect of the offense on the victims; defendant's status
substantially improves upon prior Illinois law, which allowed the defendant to waive the report and failed to delineate its content.\textsuperscript{100} Illinois demands the more complete report; California merely mandates a probation report that "may be considered either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment."\textsuperscript{101} Under either statute, presentence reports may reduce disparity by providing judges with a common set of reviewable factors, but these factors, which include the individual characteristics of each defendant, also may introduce greater disparity in sentencing for identical crimes.\textsuperscript{102}

Judges also consider factors in aggravation and mitigation of the sentence during the presentence (California) or sentence (Illinois) hearing.\textsuperscript{103} The California judge must sentence the defendant to the middle term of those specified in the statute for the particular crime (e.g., seven years for second-degree murder for which the statute prescribes a term of five, seven, or eleven years imprisonment), unless factors in mitigation or aggravation justify the lower or upper term.\textsuperscript{104} California law

\begin{footnotes}
\item[100] ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1973) (amended 1978).
\item[101] CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (Deering 1979).
\item[103] CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204 (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (1978) (the presentence report also includes these factors to some extent). \textit{See} People v. Burdine, 57 Ill. App. 3d 677, 373 N.E.2d 694 (1978).
\item[104] CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203-1204 (Deering 1979). \textit{See also} People v. Saffell, 87 Cal. App. 3d 157, 150 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978) (violation of equal protection to require mentally disordered sex-offenders amenable to treatment to serve the upper term when other defendants receive middle term for the same crime). \textit{Accord}, People v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 407, 145 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1978). \textit{See also} In re Eric J., 86 Cal. App. 3d 513, 150 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) (violation of equal protection to impose upper term on juvenile without finding of aggravating factors when such a finding is necessary for adult defendants); \textit{In re} John W., 81 Cal. App. 3d 994, 146 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1978) (adjustment of sentence under § 1170.2 for sentence imposed under indeterminate sentence law allows imposition of upper term even in absence of ordinarily required finding of aggravating factors).
\end{footnotes}
does not specify what factors must be considered in the determination of mitigation or aggravation. Illinois law, in contrast, delineates factors that must be "accorded weight" in the judge's decision to minimize or maximize a sentence. Illinois thus seeks to counterbalance disparity-causing considerations of a defendant's individual characteristics by specifying factors that courts must consider in aggravation or mitigation.

A final noteworthy revision in the Illinois and California statutes concerns appellate review. The Illinois act permits an appellate court to "modify . . . and enter any sentence that the trial judge could have entered, including increasing or decreasing the sentence or entering an alternative sentence to a prison term." The statute establishes a rebuttable presumption that the trial judge acted properly, but the presumption is less difficult to overcome than under the prior statute, which permitted an appellate court to alter a sentence only if the trial judge clearly abused his discretion. Along with Illinois' requirement

105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (Deering 1979). Either party may submit a statement in aggravation or mitigation to contradict or support the probation investigation. Id. For a criticism that these California provisions are unconstitutionally vague, see Uelmen, Proof of Aggravation Under the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act: The Constitutional Issues, 10 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 725, 731-35 (1977).

106. The statute lists these factors in mitigation: defendant's conduct caused no physical harm; defendant acted with strong provocation; grounds exist tending to justify defendant's act; another person induced defendant's act; no history of prior crimes; defendant's character indicates that recidivism is unlikely; defendant is likely to comply with probation terms; and imprisonment would endanger medical condition of defendant. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1 (1978). Factors in aggravation include: the conduct caused serious harm; defendant received compensation for the act; history of criminal activity; defendant by duties of his position was obligated to prevent the crime; and defendant held public office, and crime related to the official conduct. Id. § 1005-5-3.2. New York is the only other state to include specific factors in its statute. The list, however, is shorter and more general. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00(1) (McKinney 1975). For a criticism that lists are too restrictive, see Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time," supra note 28, at 632.

107. See text accompanying note 102 supra.


110. "While Illinois enjoys this broader scope of review, the practice of Illinois appellate courts is to respect the trial judge's discretion unless clearly abusive." Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time," supra note 28, at 637. See People v. Doyle, 50 I11. App. 3d 876, 365 N.E.2d 1184 (1977) (no reversal unless clear abuse of discretion); accord, People v. Givens, 46 I11. App. 3d 1035, 361
of a written statement from the judge of reasons for his choice of sentence, this change in standards of review facilitates appellate review and illustrates Illinois' firm intent to eradicate sentence disparity.

California also authorizes appellate review of sentences, but appears to adhere to the stricter "abuse of discretion" standard. California also mandates that the Community Release Board review a sentence within one year from the date of imprisonment and recommends that the sentencing court resentence the prisoner if the Board finds the sentence to be disparate with others. Review by the Com-


Arguments against appellate review include: the appellate court's inadequate view of the trial proceeding; the trial judge's greater familiarity with the defendant; the encouragement of frivolous appeals; and the few sentences that would be modified. Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A Method of Swift Appellate Action, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 492-95 (1976); Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis L.J. 221, 245-46 (1976); 58 IOWA L. REV. 469, 483-84 (1972).

Arguments in favor of appellate review include: correction of disparity in punishment; appellate freedom commensurate with other reviewable areas of trial discretion; correction of arbitrary sentences; and standardized guidelines for lower courts. Coburn, supra note 5, at 216; Hopkins, supra, at 491; Comment, ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice—A Student Symposium, 33 LA. L. REV. 559, 561-62 (1973).

Four states have created a specific court to review sentences: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-195 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2141 (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 28A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2501 (Supp. 1977).

For a discussion of England's Court of Criminal Appeals, which can review sentences, see D. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 40-45 (1970).

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (Deering 1979). See also Comment, supra note 60, at 156-58.


The proposed federal criminal code provides for review of sentences, but restricts it to sentences either below the minimum or above the maximum allowed. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 3725 (1978).

munity Release Board should decrease arbitrary sentencing.\textsuperscript{116}

### III. Conclusion

No nation has experimented as devotedly with the indeterminate sentence as the United States.\textsuperscript{117} The ideal of rehabilitation, which underlies the argument for the indeterminate sentence, is noble but unachievable in the overburdened American penal systems.\textsuperscript{118} Present prison facilities are sadly ineffective in "curing" the socially and mentally impaired prisoner,\textsuperscript{119} and terms served by prisoners under the indeterminate system differ arbitrarily.

California and Illinois lead the movement away from the indeterminate sentence system toward the more realistic and more evenhanded structures of the determinate sentence and the elimination of parole in its traditional form. Illinois more painstakingly outlines the procedures for implementing the new approach to sentencing,\textsuperscript{120} but California also has designed a plan that will likely increase uniformity of sentences and reduce judicial discretion.\textsuperscript{121}

Neither sentencing plan, however, will fully eradicate sentence disparity. Each state allows for consideration of the defendant's personal needs and situation, which inevitably introduces elements of inequitable treatment among defendants for similar crimes. Illinois' consideration of factors in aggravation and mitigation of the defendant's offense and California's manipulation of postimprisonment terms through its Community Release Board also inject elements of personal attention into an otherwise fair sentencing procedure. California and Illinois have nevertheless taken bold and commendable steps to eliminate sen-


\textsuperscript{118} See Cole, Will Definite Sentences Make a Difference?, 61 Jud. 58, 64 (1977). The author disputes claims that the definite sentence will control disparity and discretion, because the prison system remains bureaucratic in nature. The author also questions the wisdom of eliminating parole because the overcrowded prisons require an increasingly faster turnover rate.

\textsuperscript{119} See note 25 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{120} See notes 68, 106, 116, 139 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{121} See Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time," supra note 28, at 662; Comment, supra note 60, at 145.
entence disparity and to provide uniformity of sentencing.\textsuperscript{122}

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122. The following states also have considered or are considering sentencing reforms not based on rehabilitation: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. Cole, \textit{supra} note 118, at 59-60 n.5.

California has established a Judicial Council to study patterns of sentencing under the determinate system. \textit{Cal. Penal Code} § 1170(f) (Deering 1979). Illinois now also has a Criminal Sentencing Commission, which reviews the effect of determinate sentencing on prison populations, the effectiveness of felony classification and determinate sentencing, and the uniformity of sentences. \textit{Ill. Rev. Stat.} ch. 38, §§ 1005-10-1 to 1005-10-2 (1978).