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Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation of Energy Resources: A Suggested Framework for Analysis

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I. Introduction

Since the 1973 OPEC oil boycott, the nation has felt the pervasive effects of higher energy costs. The cost of energy has a dramatic impact on industry, the economy, and individuals' purchasing power. When industry, legislatures, or foreign governments make a decision altering the cost of an energy resource, the nation is directly affected. As the price of energy surges upward, energy expenditures require a larger relative percentage of income. Energy-rich states are increasing the cost of energy by levying taxes on production of their energy resources, even when produced predominantly for customers outside the taxing states. Consumers and utilities have recently challenged several of these state energy taxes on constitutional grounds. Because of the increased significance of energy resources, the manner in which the courts analyze and resolve these tax challenges is of paramount importance for the nation.


2. This statement presumes that demand for energy, regardless of the type, is fairly inelastic, at least in the short run. For a more thorough discussion of this matter, see notes 126-52 infra and accompanying text.

3. For a chart showing state severance taxes on coal, see Gillis, A Tale of Two Minerals: Severance Taxes on Energy Resources in the United States, in Growth and Change 60 (January 1979). For a chart showing state severance taxes on uranium, see id. at 62. For data showing coal's distribution in the United States, see U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Data Report: Bituminous and Subbituminous Coal and Lignite Distribution, Calendar Year 1979 (1980).

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, a recent challenge to a state energy tax, demonstrates the conflict between state and federal interests in such disputes. In Commonwealth Edison the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Montana's Coal Severance Tax, which levied a charge on coal of up to thirty percent of the coal's contract value. Producers shipped as much as ninety percent of Montana's coal, more expensive because of the severance tax, to other states. Montana

6. See Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 15-35-101 to -111 (Supp. 1981). The state imposed a severance tax on each ton of coal produced according to the following schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heating quality of coal:</th>
<th>Surface Mining</th>
<th>Underground Mining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 7,000</td>
<td>12 cents or 20% of value</td>
<td>5 cents or 3% of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000-8,000</td>
<td>22 cents or 30% of value</td>
<td>8 cents or 4% of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000-9,000</td>
<td>34 cents or 30% of value</td>
<td>10 cents or 4% of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 9,000</td>
<td>40 cents or 30% of value</td>
<td>12 cents or 4% of value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Id. at 15-35-103.
8. One commentator defined a severance tax as "a levy assessed at flat or graduated rates by a government on the privilege, process, or act of commercially severing or extracting natural resources from the soil or water, and measured by the physical amount or the gross or net value of the natural resources produced or sold." Lockner, The Economic Effect of the Severance Tax on Decisions of the Mining Firm, 4 Nat. Resources J. 468, 469 (1965). In light of this definition, this Note uses the terms "severance tax" broadly to include production taxes, occupation taxes, gross (or net) receipts taxes and ad valorem property taxes measured by the gross (or net) value of the minerals produced. See H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Terms 203, 352, 416 (4th ed. 1976).
asserted that the tax was justifiable on several grounds. First, the state asserted that funding was necessary to finance governmental involvement in the areas impacted by the coal mining industry. Second, Montana claimed that revenue was needed to prepare for economic depression in the mining area once the mining ceased. The plaintiffs contended, *inter alia,* that because nonresidents shouldered the burden of the tax's disproportionately high rate, the tax violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The trial court dismissed the complaint before trial on the merits and held as a matter of law that the coal severance tax did not violate the commerce clause. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision. The United States Supreme Court, in a split decision, ruled that Montana

10% of the United States' demand for coal in 1977; it is estimated that Montana and Wyoming will supply 33% of the Nation's coal by 1990." 101 S. Ct. at 2965 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing *Hearings, supra,* at 22 (statement of Rep. Bruce F. Vento)).

10. Montana provided several other justifications for the tax. See *Hearings, supra* note 9, at 232-33 (reprinting prepared statement of Mont. State Senator Thomas E. Towe, Chief Sponsor of Montana Coal Tax Law); Towe, *Memorandum: Explanation of Reasons for Montana's Coal Tax* 2-3 (date not ascertainable) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly). For an explanation of the tax's purposes, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the North Dakota State Tax Commissioner at 3, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, Mont. at 615 P.2d 847 (1980). One student commentator explained Montana's justifications as follows:

Montana justifies its severance tax on three grounds. First, Montana contends that it may share in the profits from resources leaving the State. Fearing exploitation of its mineral resources and seeking financial security, Montana has opted for short-term monetary benefits. Second, although artificially high coal prices will decrease production in the short term and may inhibit contracting and decrease total tax revenues over the long term, the unmined coal will be preserved as a source of revenue for future generations. Third, the severance tax ensures that Montana will not be destroyed in the coal rush. As utility companies shun the highly taxed Montana coal, the ecological balance of the State and the lifestyle of its citizenry should be preserved.


12. "Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

The commerce clause is a means to engender national economic unity by prohibiting states from conducting reprisals against other states. Further, it promotes federal uniformity. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 394 (1849); Abel, *The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment,* 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432, 481-94 (1941).


15. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). Justice Marshall wrote for the majority and Justice White con-
tana's tax did not offend the commerce clause.\textsuperscript{16}

Part II of this Note sets out the analytical framework established by the judiciary for determining the constitutionality of state taxes challenged on commerce clause grounds.\textsuperscript{17} Part III discusses and analyzes the \textit{Commonwealth Edison} decision. In Part IV, this Note suggests that, in light of the critical role energy now plays in society, courts should modify their approach to commerce clause challenges of state energy taxes. Part V focuses on alternative methods for regulation of state exploitation of the nation's energy predicament.

\section{II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE FRAMEWORK}

\subsection{A. The Relationship Between State Tax Case Analysis and State Regulation Case Analysis}

Whether in the form of regulations or taxes, state legislative actions that affect interstate commerce are subject to the commerce clause.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 2952, 2960.

\textsuperscript{17} The scope of this Note is limited to commerce clause issues. The constitutional issues involved in state energy tax challenges, however, are numerous. See generally C. Dumas & L. Brown, Legal Issues in State Taxation of Energy Development 1 (1979); Van Baalen, Mineral Export Legislation—Can It Withstand Preemption and Commerce Clause Challenges?, 12 Land & Water L. Rev. 131 (1977); Note, The Effect and Validity of State Taxation of Energy Resources, 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 345 (1980); Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Severance Taxes, 20 Nat. Resources J. 887 (1980).


Although many of these cases concern the positive power of Congress to reach intrastate activities under the commerce clause, the cases involving the negative implications of the commerce clause power to restrict state activity rest on the same doctrine. The commerce clause has equal power in both its positive and negative aspects. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38-39 (1980); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1978). "[T]he definition of 'commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979).
The judiciary's analytical approach to resolution of commerce clause challenges to state regulations and taxes has evolved significantly during the past one hundred and fifty years. The doctrinal basis of judi-

19. In Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), Chief Justice Marshall declared that the commerce clause impliedly prohibits all state taxation of interstate commerce. Id. at 448-49. Marshall relied on McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in reaching his decision. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 449. The prevailing view after the 1827 Brown decision was that the commerce clause vested the federal government with the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. This exclusive federal power to regulate interstate commerce did not, however, pre-

vent states from exercising their police power over local matters such as safety, health and morali-

See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); P. Hartman, State TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 23 (1953). Courts distinguished between permissible state police power enactments that affected commerce and impermissible state regulations on interstate commerce. See id. at 23. Under this view, activities involved in interstate commerce were immu-


Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), was the next case to affect signifi-

coercers the division of power between federal and state regulation of interstate commerce. The Cooley Court divided the possible subjects of regulation into two classes: 1) sub-

jects national in character, which required uniform rules of regulation and were exclusively under Congress' power; and 2) subjects local in character, which required diversity of regulation and were concurrently under the power of the states and the federal government. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319. See P. Hartman, supra, at 24-25. The Court first applied the Cooley doctrine to a tax situation in 1867 in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 42 (1867). The Crandall Court struck down a state tax levied on railroad and stagecoach companies' passengers, reasoning that the tax fell on interstate commerce. Id. at 44-49. The Court also applied the Cooley doctrine to strike down taxes in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887), and Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885).

From the 1880s to the 1930s the framework for analyzing commerce clause challenges evolved into two unclear lines of cases from Cooley's distinction between exclusive and concurrent power. The Court, relying either implicitly or explicitly on the Cooley doctrine, consistently immunized interstate commerce from state taxation because the power of Congress over taxation was exclu-

See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9 (1933); Henson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 562 (1925); Kansas City, F. S. & M. Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, 231 (1916); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27, 37 (1902); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 298, 308 (1894); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 58-59 (1891); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887). The Court also looked to the Cooley distinction when resolving challenges to state regulations. Courts invalidated regulations imposed on subjects national in character, but validated those on subjects local in character. See, e.g., California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113 (1941); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399-400 (1913); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1890). The Cooley concurrent power doctrine thus applied to regulatory measures while the exclusive power doctrine applied to tax measures. This dual standard allowed states to restrict commerce more by regulation under the police power than by the taxing power. See P. Hartman, supra, at 31. For a more thorough explanation of these matters, see id. at 23-31.
cial analysis in state tax challenges originated in cases challenging state regulations. Despite this similarity of origin, the analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of state taxes developed separately from the framework for state regulation challenges. Two distinct but related lines of cases developed: state tax cases and state regulation cases. The ultimate question in both lines of cases is

20. See note 19 supra.
21. See notes 26-85 infra and accompanying text.
22. Courts resolving commerce clause challenges of state regulations look to whether the regulation discriminates against interstate commerce or unduly burdens interstate commerce. A state may not single out nonresidents and place them at a disadvantage to residents solely because of nonresident status. Facial discrimination is a ground for automatic invalidation. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), a New Jersey statute prohibited importation of garbage for disposal. Id. at 618-19. The Supreme Court invalidated the state regulation without determining New Jersey's ultimate purpose in enacting the statute. Id. at 626-27. When a state's legislative objectives are credibly advanced and no patent discrimination against interstate commerce exists, the Court applies a more flexible balancing test:

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits . . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted, as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.

Id. at 624 (citations omitted).


If a regulation creates an undue burden on interstate commerce, a court may invalidate it. For cases discussing burdens on interstate commerce, see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). A burden, however, does not necessarily constitute a constitutional infirmity. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 144 (citing Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear—Commerce and Due Process, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 446, 451 (1951)). If a court does find a burden, then it must ask whether there is an undue, and thus impermissible, burden on interstate commerce. See Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 169.

A state may justify a burdensome state regulation if the action protects a legitimate state interest. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306 U.S. 346 (1939); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 343-44 (9th ed. 1975); Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 144-45. Whether a state imposed burden on interstate commerce is justified by a legitimate state interest is determined by balancing the federal and state interests involved. The judiciary has the task of balancing the competing interests to determine the constitutionality of the state regulation. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 340 & n.2; Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 161; Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1762, 1774 n.72 (1974).

One significant factor a court must consider is the state's purpose for its exercise of power. If the purpose of the regulation is improper, then the court will strike down the regulation as repug-
whether the challenged state action discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce. Consequently, the two lines of cases overlap. Courts faced with a decision concerning one line of cases, therefore, often relied on precedent from the other.

B. The State Tax Line of Cases

The analytical framework for state tax challenges differs subtly from that used in state regulation analysis. Despite the similarity of the general issues raised in the two types of cases, courts resolve state tax challenges by relying predominantly on state tax cases.

1. The Changing Interpretations of the States' Power to Tax Interstate Commerce

The Supreme Court's approach to commerce clause challenges of

See generally Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 145.

24. The cases also overlap because taxes can operate as regulations. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824); McCulloch v. Mary-land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 365 (1819); National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heff-erman, 454 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Conn. 1978). The general commerce clause framework for analyzing state regulations sheds light on the more specific framework developed in the state tax line of cases.


26. See notes 27-85 infra and accompanying text.
state taxes has shifted numerous times, spawning much confusion. For over a hundred years the Court interpreted the commerce clause as immunizing interstate activities from state taxation. The Court reaffirmed taxation immunity for activities involved in interstate commerce as late as 1946 in Freeman v. Hewit. In Freeman Justice Frankfurter explained that a state may not exercise its power in a manner that impedes the free flow of trade between states. Justice Frankfurter stated that this proscription applies regardless of whether the state subjects local commerce to the same encumbrance. He concluded that the

27. "[The Supreme] Court alone has handed down some three hundred full-dress opinions spread through slightly more than that number of our reports. As was said in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347, U.S. 340, 344 (1954), the decisions have been 'not always clear . . . consistent or reconcilable.' " Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959).

28. The immunity concept began with Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), and ended with Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text; notes 35-44 infra and accompanying text. The extent of the immunity varied significantly during this period. Brown declared that all state taxation of interstate activity was impermissible. As states began needing more revenue, the Court discarded the rigid, formalistic approach that disallowed state taxation of interstate commerce and instead adopted the direct-indirect test for determining the constitutionality of a particular state tax. See Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce—"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 496, 497-506 (1951); Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Business: A More Liberal Trend, 35 U. La. L. Rev. 304, 306 (1975). See generally P. Hartman, supra note 19, at 28-33. The direct-indirect approach permitted state taxes indirectly affecting or burdening interstate commerce but invalidated state taxes directly imposing a burden on interstate commerce. See id. at 28-29. Compare Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (invalidating a state tax imposed directly on interstate commerce) with Postal Tel-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 261 (1919) (validating a local tax on an intrastate aspect of a company doing both interstate and intrastate business). In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), the force of the immunity doctrine decreased significantly because the Court permitted a fairly apportioned tax on interstate commerce to stand. The Court, however, shifted back to the direct-indirect test in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). See notes 29-33 infra and accompanying text. For further discussion of the early development of state tax analysis under the commerce clause, see P. Hartman, supra note 19, at 21-48; Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Business: An End To The Privilege Tax Immunity, 29 U. Fla. L. Rev. 752, 753-54 (1977).


30. Id. at 252.

31. Id. at 254. One commentator wrote as follows:

The infirmity of the tax, according to Freeman, was simply the "direct" bearing and "incidence" of the tax on interstate commerce alone . . . . Freeman resurrected the judicially declared doctrine that the commerce clause "created an area of trade free from interference by the States," and that it "is immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance."

commerce clause prohibits a direct tax on interstate commerce. 32 Under this approach, states could tax activities indirectly involved in interstate commerce, but could not tax activities directly involved in interstate commerce. 33

Analysis shows that the formalistic direct-indirect distinction is unsatisfactory as a means to determine which activities a state may tax. Assume two corporations engaging in the same line of business compete even though one may be involved strictly in intrastate commerce while the other is directly involved in interstate commerce. The Freeman direct-indirect approach prevents the state from taxing the interstate business. Thus local business, forced to shoulder an additional tax burden, competes at a disadvantage relative to its tax-immune competitor. 34

In contrast to the direct-indirect test, the Court has also supported the proposition that interstate commerce must pay its way. 35 Under this approach, the state may tax interstate commerce if the tax is levied on activities transacted within the taxing state. 36 Adhering to this view, the Supreme Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 37 significantly reduced the tax-immune status of interstate commerce. 38 The Northwestern Court upheld a state net income tax that was properly apportioned 39 to the local activities of a foreign corpora-

32. 329 U.S. at 256-57.
33. See generally P. Hartman, supra note 31, at 76-81.
34. See P. Hartman, supra note 19, at 33.
35. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338, 351 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). Although these cases were decided before Freeman, they are cited merely to contrast differing approaches to commerce clause interpretations. These differing approaches shifted with various Courts. See P. Hartman, supra note 19, at 41-48.
36. Justice Stone explained: "It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938), quoted in P. Hartman, supra note 31, at 66.
38. See J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 246-49.
tion engaged in interstate commerce. After Northwestern, interstate activity was no longer immune from state taxation merely because of involvement in interstate commerce. Permitting apportioned taxes on interstate businesses destroyed the citadel of tax immunity for interstate businesses.

The Northwestern Court, while upholding a net income tax on interstate commerce, also reaffirmed an earlier decision that prohibited a state from levying a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Although the Northwestern decision indicated that interstate commerce was clearly taxable in some situations, exactly what aspects of interstate commerce were taxable was left unresolved. After Northwestern, the constitutionality of such taxes often depended on tenuous distinctions, such as the label the state attached to the tax. If the legislative draftsmen gave a proper label to the tax, then the state could levy on the interstate activity.

In Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a state tax on the privilege of doing business in the taxing state. Connecticut measured the tax by the net income allo-

40. 358 U.S. at 452. Before validating the tax, the Court required the state to show that the tax was nondiscriminatory and that a nexus between the taxed activity and the taxing state existed.

41. See Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Business: An End To The Privilege Tax Immunity, supra note 28, at 755-56. As courts made interstate business pay its own way, apportionment "became one of the keys to validation of State taxes." J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 243.


44. In Colonial Pipeline, Inc. v. Triangle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975), the Court upheld a state tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate form. The Court distinguished this tax from the forbidden levy on the privilege of doing business which had previously been disallowed by a Louisiana State court. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1969). The United States Supreme Court permitted the Louisiana legislature, by changing a few words in the statute, to levy the tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate form. Dissatisfied with the Court's distinction between doing business and doing business in corporate form, Justice Blackmun described the Court's analysis as "taxation by semantics." Id. at 115 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text.


cated to the state, a method very similar to that used in *Northwestern.* 47.

The *Spector* Court, however, held that the commerce clause precludes states from taxing the privilege of engaging in an exclusively interstate business, even if the tax is fairly apportioned. 48 The distinction engendered in *Spector* is best demonstrated by the 1954 case of *Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia* 49 (*Railway I*) and the 1959 case of *Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia* (*Railway II*). 50 Plaintiffs in *Railway I* challenged a Virginia annual license tax upon gross receipts 51 earned in the state by an interstate business. The Court struck down the tax, which was expressly levied on the privilege of doing business in the state. 52 The Virginia legislature then redrafted the statute, eliminating the word privilege, but in all other respects retaining the same taxing measure. 53 In *Railway II* the United States Supreme Court, asserting that legislative draftsmanship can determine constitutionality, 54 upheld the reworded statute even though its practical effect was the same as the tax in *Railway I.* 55 The Supreme Court finally rejected this line of reasoning in *Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady* 56 by overruling

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47. *Northwestern* involved a Minnesota tax levied “on that portion of a foreign corporation’s net income earned from and fairly apportioned to business activities within the taxing State when those activities are exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce.” 358 U.S. at 452.

48. 340 U.S. at 609. “The constitutional infirmity of [a state tax upon the privilege of carrying on a business exclusively interstate in character] persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business done within the state.” *Id.* (citations omitted).


52. 347 U.S. at 369. The Court stated: “[T]he fact that its measure is gross revenue is consistent with a tax on the privilege of doing a volume of business which would yield that revenue . . . .” The Court then noted that gross receipts are not a sound measure of a business’ true profits. *Id.* at 367.


54. “One must comprehend . . . the difference between the use of magic words or labels validating an otherwise invalid tax and their use to disable an otherwise constitutional levy. The latter this Court has said may sometimes be done.” 358 U.S. at 441 (citations omitted).

55. The tax in *Railway I* was a “privilege tax” based on gross receipts; the tax in *Railway II*, which the Court upheld, was a “franchise tax” based on gross receipts. The state applied both taxes to the same parties and measured both taxes by gross receipts. 358 U.S. at 435-36. See note 53 supra.

Spector. The Complete Auto Court, describing Spector as merely a trap for the unwary draftsman, emphasized that courts must analyze the economic realities of a tax's practical effect in order to determine its constitutionality.

2. The Complete Auto Framework

Complete Auto set down a four-part test that a state tax must satisfy to withstand a commerce clause challenge. The Complete Auto Court, in a unanimous decision, explained that a state tax does not offend the commerce clause if it “[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to services provided by the State.” State tax challenges subsequent to Complete Auto have followed and supported this four-step analysis.

Courts and commentators have frequently addressed the first three of these four tests. Whether a business has a nexus with the taxing state is a due process question. A state cannot levy a tax on a business unless that business carries on some activity within the taxing state. In addi-

57. Id. at 288-89.
58. Id. at 284-89. The Court explained:
There was no real economic difference between the statutes in Railway I and Railway II. The Court long since had recognized that interstate commerce may be made to pay its way. Yet under the Spector rule, the economic realities in Railway I became irrelevant. The Spector rule had come to operate only as a rule of draftsmanship, and served only to distract the courts and parties from their inquiry into whether the challenged tax produced results forbidden by the Commerce Clause.

Id. at 284-85. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, concluded that “[t]here is no economic consequence that follows necessarily from the use of the particular words, ‘privilege of doing business,’ and a focus on that formalism merely obscures the question whether a tax produces a forbidden effect.” Id. at 288.

60. 430 U.S. at 279.
62. See notes 63-67 infra and accompanying text.
63. Quite simply, “[t]he requisite 'nexus' is supplied if the corporation avails itself of the "substantial privilege of carrying on business" within the State . . . .” Mobile Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 436-37 (citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940)). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that a state tax have a "minimal connection" or "nexus" with the interstate activities and the taxing state. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 219-20. For a discussion of the nexus requirement, see 28 DePaul L. Rev. 205, 211-16 (1978).
tion, a state must fairly apportion its tax. An apportionment formula estimates how much of a corporation's earnings are derived from doing business in the taxing state. The state thus taxes the percentage of a corporation's total income that results from doing business in that state. A tax is fairly apportioned if the formula roughly approximates the amount of the taxpayer's business income that is properly attributable to the taxing state. Under the discrimination part of the test, like the discrimination analysis found in the state regulation cases, a state may not place nonresidents at a disadvantage in relation to residents merely because of nonresident status. The fourth criterion—that a tax must bear a fair relation to the services provided—has not received as much judicial attention as the other three prongs of the Complete Auto test.

3. The Fairly Related Requirement

Although interstate commerce must pay its own way, a state's levy must reasonably approximate the taxed activity's cost to the state.


65. See note 64 supra.

66. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72-75 (1963); note 22 supra and accompanying text. In reaching its decision whether the tax discriminated against interstate commerce, the Halliburton Court relied on various state regulation cases. 373 U.S. at 72-75. The Supreme Court has recently invalidated a state tax on discrimination grounds. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 753-60 (1981). In Maryland the Court explained that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that no State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may 'impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.' " 451 U.S. at 754 (citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)). See generally Hellerstein, State Tax Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1977).

67. See note 66 supra.

68. See note 60 supra and accompanying text; notes 69-79 infra and accompanying text.

The tax, however, must not be a gross overreaching. Analysis of a tax's relation to services is usually couched in due process terms. Courts typically separate due process and commerce clause issues in tax cases. Due process analysis focuses on the nexus requirement. Once the Supreme Court finds a nexus, the due process analysis is nearly completed. In recent cases, the Court has finished the due process analysis by resolving the "fairly related" question without critically examining the issue.

Prior to Commonwealth Edison, courts had clearly established that resolution of a fairly related issue necessitates a factual inquiry. In

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72. In Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980), for example, the Court analyzed the due process issues in section II of the opinion, id. at 219-27, and the commerce clause issues in section III of the opinion, id. at 227-30. Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-49 (due process discussed in section II of the Court's opinion while the commerce clause is discussed in section III). In contrast, Justice Marshall in Commonwealth Edison mixed these two constitutional concepts together. 101 S.Ct. at 2956-57.

73. In Japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court responded to the fairly related requirement with only the following: "The tax . . . is 'fairly related to the services provided by' California, services that include not only police and fire protection, but the benefits of a trained work force and the advantages of a civilized society." Id. at 445. In a state tax challenge a year before Japan Lines, the Court stated that the challenger proved no facts suggesting that the tax was not fairly related to services and protection provided by this state. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750-51 (1978). The Court's statement implied that a factual record is needed to determine the fairly related issue. Until Commonwealth Edison, Supreme Court decisions following Complete Auto had not critically analyzed the fairly related question because it was not at issue in those cases. In two recent cases the Supreme Court, for example, devoted less time to the fairly related question than it did in Japan Lines. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). Exxon merely deferred to Japan Lines' response to the matter. 447 U.S. at 228.


In addition to highway and public facility taxes, courts have considered the amount of the tax in
Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court addressed the fairly related question in detail. The Court looked at a full factual record to determine the constitutionality of a state “user” tax levied on an airport’s passengers. After examining the facts, the Court held that the tax was a reasonable estimate of the public expenditure.

Recently, however, states have justified their taxes by asserting that the tax is for the privilege of doing business in a civilized society. A state using this argument purports to tax for providing police and fire protection, the benefits of a trained workforce, and other advantages of a civilized society. Prior to Commonwealth Edison, the Supreme Court, treating the argument as talismanic, ended the fairly related inquiry once the state asserted the civilized society argument.

4. Complete Auto and Other State Tax Doctrine

Although Complete Auto synthesized miscellaneous state tax doctrines into a workable checklist, the four tests did not incorporate all determining the constitutionality of certain capital stock franchise taxes. Professor Hartman has stated:

There are a few types of exactions where the Court has considered the amount of the tax as a factor in resolving the constitutional issue. In a number of capital stock franchise taxes, the amount of the tax has been a “material factor” in determining the constitutionality of the tax, both on commerce and due process clause grounds.

P. Hartman, supra note 31, at 31 (footnote omitted).

75. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).

76. Id. at 716-17. As the Court in Evansville stated:

Thus, while state or local tolls must reflect a 'uniform, fair and practical standard' relating to public expenditures, it is the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is of central concern. At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use, as was that before us in Capital Greyhound, [399 U.S. 542 (1950)]. . . . it will pass constitutional muster . . . . 405 U.S. at 716-17 (emphasis added).

77. 405 U.S. at 720.

The Court’s application of this “governmental benefits” test in the Evansville case indicates that it will assess the facts to determine whether a state use tax upon air carriers is excessive in relation to the benefits conferred. Because of the similarity between this governmental benefits test and the fair relationship test enunciated in Complete Auto and because of the essential similarity between a use tax for the use of facilities provided by the state and a privilege tax for the privilege of using the facilities, the same type of factual inquiry probably will be extended in future cases to the Court’s evaluation of state taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.

19 B.C.L. Rev. 312, 324 (1978) (footnote omitted).

78. See note 73 supra.

79. See id. The Commonwealth Edison majority, although discussing the fairly related question in more depth than past cases, was nevertheless unduly influenced by talismanic labels. See notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has subjected the field of state taxation to many different doctrinal approaches. A significant and current Supreme Court trend is to look at the practical effect of a challenged state tax, rather than to determine constitutionality on the basis of the label a state may give to the tax. In Commonwealth Edison, however, the

80. See J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 242-44; P. Hartman, supra note 19, at 33-40. See also Barrett, supra note 28. The Hellersteins explained the multiple tax doctrine in their textbook:

[Justice Stone] swept away the traditional view that under the Commerce Clause "interstate commerce may not be taxed at all" and that the Commerce Clause created an area of trade free of State taxation. In its place, he erected the multiple taxation doctrine, under which interstate businesses were no longer immune from tax merely because the levy was imposed on interstate commerce or on the receipts from the commerce. Instead, such levies would be invalidated only if the Court thought that they subjected interstate commerce to a risk of multiple taxation not borne by local commerce.

J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 243 (citations omitted). Multiple inconsistent taxation may cause unconstitutional multiple burdens on interstate commerce.

81. Although the multiple burden doctrine is related to the apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test, analysis of this doctrine is distinct from analysis used to ascertain the validity of apportionment formulae. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text. Compare Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 271-75 (1978) (apportionment formula discussion) with Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1980) (multiple burden doctrine discussion).

In addition, Professor Hartman has explained that in Japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court considered two additional constitutional matters after going through Complete Auto's four steps. First, whether the state's tax, notwithstanding its apportionment, created a substantial risk of international tax multiplication, 441 U.S. at 446, 451, and, second, whether the tax prevented the federal government from "speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." Id. at 451. P. Hartman, supra note 31, at 96 (quoting 441 U.S. at 448, 451).

82. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 228-29; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 443-46. These two cases do not clarify exactly when the Supreme Court will apply the multiple burden doctrine in the future.

83. See notes 11 & 27-51 supra and accompanying text.

84. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981) ("[a] state tax must be assessed in light of its actual effect considered in conjunction with other provisions of a State's tax scheme"); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1980) (the Court is to examine the "practical effect" of a tax in determining constitutionality under the commerce clause); Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. at 750 (constitutionality of a state tax under the commerce clause "depends upon the practical effect of the exaction"); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 281 (the Court has "moved toward a standard
III. COMMONWEALTH EDISON

A. The Majority's Approach

After deciding that Montana's Coal Severance Tax has subject to commerce clause scrutiny, the Commonwealth Edison Court held that...
the tax was not repugnant to the commerce clause. In upholding the constitutionality of the tax, Justice Marshall focused on the four-part Complete Auto test. The significant issues in Commonwealth Edison involved Complete Auto's third prong, the proscription of discriminatory taxes, and fourth prong, the fairly related requirement.

The appellants asserted that because ninety percent of Montana's coal is shipped to other states, the ultimate burden of the tax was shifted to consumers in those states. The tax, then, as a practical matter, operated as a discriminatory burden on non-Montana citizens. Justice Marshall disagreed and distinguished the Montana tax from those cases involving facial discrimination. He explained that the tax did not discriminate because Montana taxed the amount of coal mined, without any distinction regarding in-state and out-of-state consumers.

(1937), shifted the emphasis of commerce clause inquiries from a stream of commerce approach to an approach analyzing the effect of the activity on commerce. If a state action has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, a court should apply commerce clause analysis to determine constitutionality. 301 U.S. at 37. This approach greatly expanded the reach of the commerce clause into intrastate activities. The substantially affecting test, see 301 U.S. at 31-32, is the modern test for determining the applicability of commerce clause restraints and makes any activity that substantially affects commerce subject to commerce clause scrutiny. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.

In Commonwealth Edison the appellee, Montana, argued that Heisler and its progeny precluded the severance tax from commerce clause scrutiny. See Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 6-12, 101 S.Ct. 2946 (1981). The Commonwealth Edison Court, recognizing that the "affecting commerce" test was the appropriate approach, declared that state "taxes levied on a 'local' activity preceding entry of the goods into interstate commerce may substantially affect interstate commerce, and this effect is the proper focus of Commerce Clause inquiry." 101 S. Ct. at 2953.

88. 101 S. Ct. at 2960.
89. 101 S. Ct. at 2953.
90. See id. at 2954-55; notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 2955-60; notes 68-79 supra and accompanying text.
92. 101 S. Ct. at 2954. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, noted that allegedly as much as 90% of Montana's mined coal "is exported to other states pursuant to long-term purchase contracts with out-of-state utilities." Id. at 2965 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. See Jurisdictional Statement at 13, 21-22, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). Appellants argued that the tax "was designed to shift billions of dollars to Montana directly from the citizens of [other] states by the end of the century . . . ." Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 21-22.
95. 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
96. Id. Justice Marshall looked only for overt, facial discrimination. Only a few weeks before deciding Commonwealth Edison, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981) (quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940)). See note 22 supra; notes 105-11 infra and accompanying text.
Appellants also claimed that Montana’s severance tax was not fairly related to the services provided by the state, as required by the fourth part of the *Complete Auto* test. They specifically argued that the trial court should have granted them an opportunity to establish a full factual record to show that the tax was not fairly related to Montana’s additional costs incurred because of coal mining. By rejecting this contention the majority in essence held that a taxing state, whose tax satisfies the first three *Complete Auto* prongs, may tax interstate commerce at any rate it so chooses, unrestricted by the commerce clause.

Justice Marshall explained that a general revenue tax, such as the Montana tax in question, was not a means of reimbursement for the specific benefits the state has provided. Unlike user taxes, a tax imposed for the overall support of the state government helps defray the costs of general, rather than specific, benefits the state provides, such as police and fire protection, a trained work force, and the advantages of a civilized society. Under the majority’s approach, the rate of a tax on interstate commerce is thus not subject to judicial scrutiny if

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97. 101 S. Ct. at 2955.
99. “The simple fact is that the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative, and not judicial, resolution.” 101 S. Ct. at 2959.
100. Taxes are either general, that is, imposed for the raising of a revenue for the support of the government and for public purposes generally, or they are special or local, that is, for the benefit of a specific governmental function. 27 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 581 (2d ed. D. Garland & L. McGehee eds. 1904). Accord, BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY 617 (5th ed. 1979).
101. Justice Marshall noted the following:

[T]he linchpin of appellants’ contention is the incorrect assumption that the amount of state taxes that may be levied on an activity connected to interstate commerce is limited by the costs incurred by the State on account of that activity. Only then does it make sense to advocate judicial examination of the relationship between taxes paid and benefits provided. But as we have previously noted, see supra, at 2957, interstate commerce may be required to contribute to the cost of providing all governmental services, including those services from which it arguably receives no direct “benefit.” In such circumstances, absent an equal protection challenge (which appellants do not raise), and unless a court is to second-guess legislative decisions about the amount or disposition of tax revenues, it is difficult to see how the court is to go about comparing costs and benefits in order to decide whether the tax burden on an activity connected to interstate commerce is excessive.

101 S. Ct. at 2959 n.16 (emphasis in original).
102. Justice Marshall distinguished, without in-depth analysis, the line of cases involving “user” taxes on highways and public facilities. 101 S. Ct. at 2956. In this line of cases, the Court did determine the tax’s relation to benefits provided. See note 74 *supra*.
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2955-60.
the taxing state satisfies the first three parts of the *Complete Auto* approach, deems its tax a general revenue tax, and asserts that the taxpayer enjoyed the benefits of a civilized society.104

B. Analysis

In his analysis of the *Complete Auto* test’s third prong, Justice Marshall, having found no facial discrimination, declared that no discrimination existed at all.105 This approach, however, contravenes the Court’s recent approach of looking at the practical effect of a tax.106 If the Court were really willing to look at the practical effect of the Montana tax, then it would have scrutinized for less blatant, underlying forms of discrimination.107

Courts are well aware that discrimination can take place in unique ways.108 As the dissent correctly pointed out, a state tax tailored to fall on interstate commerce must receive careful judicial scrutiny.109 Examination of the Montana Coal Severance Tax legislative history reveals a tailored tax and a taxing scheme arguably conceived with an illegitimate purpose.110

104. *Id.*

105. *See* note 96 *supra* and accompanying text.

106. The *Commonwealth Edison* majority even asserted that they were to look at the practical effects of the tax. 101 S. Ct. at 2953. In *Moorman Mfg.* Co. v. *Bair*, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), the Court refused to look at an Iowa tax’s practical effect, despite the wishes of Justice Powell. *Id.* at 288-89 (Powell, J., dissenting). *Moorman* involved a challenge to a state apportionment formula that differed from the type of formula used in other states. *See id.* at 269-71 & n.3; notes 64-65 *supra* and accompanying text. *Moorman* is easily distinguishable from *Commonwealth Edison*, as the tailored discrimination in *Commonwealth Edison* is eminently more egregious than that in the *Moorman* case. Therefore, *Moorman* lends no support to the *Commonwealth Edison* majority’s untenable approach, which involved a failure to consider the practical effect of a tailored tax.

107. The Supreme Court has invalidated state actions when the practical effect of the state action operates discriminatively. *See*, e.g., *Dean Milk Co.* v. *City of Madison*, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). In *Dean Milk* an ordinance on milk inspections and sales applied to the municipality’s residents and nonresidents alike. The Court nevertheless found the ordinance discriminatory and noted that: "[i]t is immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area is subject to the same proscription as that moving in interstate commerce." 340 U.S. at 354 n.4.


109. 101 S. Ct. at 2964-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). *See* notes 110-12 *infra* and accompanying text.

110. Montana recognized that the tax would shift a large burden onto nonresidents. *See* Towe, *supra* note 10, at 4.

Most of Montana’s coal is shipped out of state to power plants and utility companies in

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Heightening the level of scrutiny for a tailored tax is consistent with the well-established doctrine that a court should carefully analyze any state legislative action when the burden falls predominantly on nonresidents.111 The rationale for this doctrine is that nonresidents do not have access to the political checks available to residents. The legislative process is the usual political check to undesirable state action. Res-

the Midwest. In reviewing the contracts between the coal companies and the utility companies who purchase the coal, all of the contracts that were shown to our Legislative Committee contain an escalation clause for taxes. In other words, the local companies simply add the additional taxes to their bill, and the entire cost is passed on to the purchasers in the Midwest or elsewhere. Because most of the purchasers are regulated utility companies, it is reasonable to assume these companies will, in turn, pass on their extra costs to their customers.

Id. “[The tax revenue] is used and needed for the general operation of State Government.” Id. at 1. State Senator Thomas E. Towe was Chief Sponsor of the Montana Coal Tax Law, 1975. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 232.

Vice Chairman of the Montana House Taxation Committee, Representative Ora Halvorson said that “[i]n the energy crunch today, Montanans should remember that the Arabs have the oil but Montana has the coal . . . .” Kalispell Representative Says Coal Tax Too Low, Missoulian, Jan. 11, 1975. Rep. Halvorson’s statement suggests that a purpose of the tax was to exploit the energy situation in the country.

One commentator believes that, as a factual matter, Montana and the other Northwestern states possess enough of the supply of low-sulphur coal to cause the shifting effect of the burden of the tax onto coal importers. Gillis, supra note 3, at 63. For a thorough, technical explanation of tax exportation, see Shelton & Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Exportation and Regional Energy Policies, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 261 (1977).


111 In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Mr. Justice Stone provided a justification for use of more rigorous judicial scrutiny in some situations. His now famous "footnote 4" stated as follows:

There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.

Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted). Soon after Carolene Products, Justice Stone applied the "footnote 4" rationale to a state taxation challenge. "[T]o the extent that the burden falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely interests within the state." McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-46 n.2 (1940).
idents displeased with a state regulation or tax can exercise their political power to effect change. To assume, however, that state legislators will consider the needs of nonconstituents as well is unrealistic. Nonresidents, consequently, have no political recourse in the taxing state. The courts thus provide the only restraint to whatever tax burdens a state may levy on nonresidents. 112

Ninety percent of the Montana severance tax burden ultimately fell on out-of-state consumers. 113 If the Commonwealth Edison majority had given more weight to the practical effect of the tax, the Court would have found that by exporting the burden of the tax to nonresidents, it operated as a discriminatory burden. 114 Because the indicia of tailoring were present, 115 the Court, at a minimum, should have more, carefully scrutinized the tax. At the least, the appropriate level of scrutiny mandated the development of a full factual record. 116

Despite the reasons to scrutinize the tax carefully, the majority affirmed the trial court decision that the tax, as a matter of law, was fairly related to the services provided by the state. 117 Justice Marshall im-

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112. If the political process cannot function properly, then the judiciary must be more willing to exert its power. See note 111 supra.
113. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
114. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. The dissent in Commonwealth Edison did not make factual conclusions about the tax’s effects. 101 S. Ct. 2946, 2966-67 & n.7 (1981). They merely contended that the plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity to have a trial on the merits. Id. at 2964-65.
115. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 74 supra.
117. See 101 S. Ct. at 2955-60. Justice Marshall expressed concern about the evidentiary tasks that might ensue if the plaintiffs were allowed the opportunity to prove their factual allegations. [I]t is doubtful whether any legal test could adequately reflect the numerous and competing economic, geographic, demographic, social, and political considerations that must inform a decision about an acceptable rate or level of state taxation, and yet be reasonably capable of application in a wide variety of individual cases. But even apart from the difficulty of the judicial undertaking, the nature of the factfinding and judgment that would be required of the courts merely reinforces the conclusion that questions about the appropriate level of state taxes must be resolved through the political process. Id. at 2959. Despite Justice Marshall’s fears about evidentiary problems, much of the relevant factual information was readily ascertainable. Montana monitors governmental expenses in the coal impact areas. See generally R. Robinson, Memorandum: Coal Impact and Coal Board Grants (Sept. 20, 1977) (from the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst to the Legislative Finance Committee) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly). Montana has a Coal Board which grants funds from the severance tax to the impacted areas. Id. at 6. “Grants are made by the coal board ‘to local government units and state agencies to assist local governmental units in meeting the local impact of coal development by enabling them to adequately provide governmental services and facilities which are needed as a direct consequence of coal development.’” Id. Montana keeps meticulous records of requests and grants concerning the impacted areas. Montana’s
plied that the required relation to services provided by a state is not a function of the specific services provided by the state to the taxpayer.\textsuperscript{118} The fourth prong of the test, he explained, pertains to the measure\textsuperscript{119} and not the rate\textsuperscript{120} of a tax. An improper tax measure, however, would have problems satisfying \textit{Complete Auto}'s first prong, the nexus requirement, or the second prong, the fair apportionment requirement. The majority, by treating any tax rate as constitutional so long as the first three prongs of the test are met, thus rendered the fourth prong— the fairly related requirement—meaningless.\textsuperscript{121} After \textit{Commonwealth Edison}, the fourth prong, despite no apparent ambiguity in its wording, has negligible independent significance in determining the constitutionality of a state tax.

In several pre-\textit{Commonwealth Edison} decisions the Supreme Court looked to the practical effect of the state's tax scheme, rather than the label applied to the tax.\textsuperscript{122} After \textit{Commonwealth Edison}, however,
courts may resolve challenges regarding the fair relation of a tax to state services by adhering to talismanic labels. The state, after meeting the first three prongs of the Complete Auto test, need only describe the tax as a general revenue tax and assert that the tax is compensation to the state for having provided the taxpayer with the benefits of a civilized society. Courts presumably will not give future state tax challengers an opportunity to demonstrate that the tax, even when manifestly disproportionate to the services provided, is not related to the benefits provided by the taxing state. States with informed draftsmen can now make any tax rate constitutional by merely giving the tax the proper labels. As to the fairly related inquiry, Commonwealth Edison's result is untenable. A state may now constitutionally tax at a rate of one hundred percent, or even one thousand percent, of the value of the taxed good. Justice Blackmun, writing a cogent dissent, correctly stated that the majority emasculated the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test.

IV. A Suggested Commerce Clause Framework For Analyzing State Energy Tax Challenges

A. The Actual Burden of State Taxes on Energy Resources

The burden caused by state energy taxes is not accurately reflected by simply examining the extent to which the levy decreases the movement of the taxed resource in interstate commerce. The significance of a state's energy tax is manifested by the effect it has on the nation's economy. Economic analysis reveals that state taxes on energy resources affect the entire nation.

123. "The Court implicitly ratifies Montana's contention that it is free to tax this coal at 100% or even 1000% of value should it choose to do so." 101 S. Ct. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

124. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's point, although well made, is hyperbolic because such a high "tax" would be a "taking," not a tax. See U.S. Const. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1.

125. Id. Justice Marshall's approach promotes the Balkanization of the states, a result directly contrary to the purpose of the commerce clause. See note 12 supra.

126. A burden on interstate commerce is typically revealed by showing that an interstate activity slowed down as a result of the state action. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 252-56 (1978). In Commonwealth Edison, however, the exporting of coal, the "activity," increased in Montana after the tax was imposed. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, ___ Mont. ___, 615 P.2d 847, 849-50 (1980). Despite this increase in the taxed activity, a burden of interstate commerce arguably still existed. See notes 127-52 infra and accompanying text.

127. See notes 128-52 infra and accompanying text.
Energy is vital to a developed, industrial nation. Many aspects of modern society, such as industry, transportation, and heat, are heavily dependent on energy. A state tax that directly affects the price or allocation of an item basic to the nation’s economic well being may constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.

A tax raises the price of a good for a consumer. If a consumer continues to buy the same quantity of a taxed good, a greater percentage of the consumer’s real disposable income is spent on the taxed good and less is available for spending on other goods and services. This reduction in consumption and spending occurs when an energy resource is taxed by a state exporting a large percentage of the taxed resource. The aggregate consumption in the nation consequently moves downward as consumers pay more of their disposable income to obtain the taxed good. This decline causes a lower equilibrium level of net national product. In noneconomic terms, the nation is producing and consuming at an inefficient level—at a level lower than the nation’s capacity given its quantity of capital, labor, and technology. When a tax has this dampening effect on the economy, commerce slows down. Because less money is available for purchasing goods, movement of goods in interstate commerce is reduced.


129. See J. Darmstadter, J. Dunkerly & J. Alterman, supra note 1, at 101-40; N. Kannan, supra note 128, at 149-59; M. Slesser, supra note 128, at 44-58. See also note 1 supra.

130. See J. Darmstadter, J. Dunkerly & J. Alterman, supra note 1, at 70-100.

131. See id. at 56-61.

132. A state tax does not necessarily impose a significant burden on the nation’s commerce. See notes 138-40 infra and accompanying text.

133. If, at this point, consumers attempt to purchase as many goods and services as they previously did, an inflationary trend develops. See notes 144-45 infra and accompanying text. If, however, the purchaser spends only within his means, a dampening occurs from the increased energy cost. See notes 135-37 infra and accompanying text.

134. If the state taxed a good that the state did not export on a large scale, then the tax would produce only slight economic effects on the nation.

135. If this reduction in consumption does not occur, inflation results. See notes 144-45 infra and accompanying text.

136. The most basic definition of net national product is the total money value of private (nongovernmental) consumption expenditures in the nation. See P. Samuelson, Economics 181 & n.2 (9th ed. 1973).

137. This Note uses “economy” and “commerce” synonymously in some situations. Any activity affecting commerce must—a fortiori—affect interstate commerce.
The effects of a price increase in a given natural resource depend upon the willingness and capabilities of consumers to shift to alternative resources. A price increase in an elastic good results in a reallocation of consumer purchasing, whereas a change in price of an inelastic good does not produce a shift to other alternatives.

If coal is elastic, then an increase in the price of coal may cause consumers to shift to oil. In the United States, this shift would require increased oil imports. Because the price of imported oil has increased significantly, higher coal costs force consumers to pay more for energy, regardless of whether they switch to oil or continue to use coal. Consumers would then have to allocate a greater percentage of their disposable income to energy. The result is a general dampening of the economy. Arguably, then, a tax on an energy resource may burden commerce if demand for the resource is elastic.

An increase in the general cost of energy leads to inflation because a greater percentage of disposable income is then spent on energy costs. The demand for money will increase as people attempt to purchase as many goods as they purchased before the increase in the cost of energy. As monetary authorities increase the money supply to meet this increased demand, the aggregate level of prices will rise.

138. For an explanation of the substitute goods concept, see P. SAMUELSON, supra note 136, at 430-31.
139. A good is elastic if the demand for the good is responsive to a change in its price. For a more technical definition of elastic, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 80-91 (3d ed. 1972); P. SAMUELSON, supra note 136, at 379-81.
140. If a change in price has no effect on demand for a good, its demand is inelastic. For a more technical definition of inelastic, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 139, at 80-91; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 136, at 379-81, 435.
141. This shift is premised on the substitutability of coal for oil.
142. See NEP II, supra note 1, at 15-21. In 1979 alone, oil prices rose over twenty percent. Id. at 15-16.
143. See notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text. This shifting effect caused by a tax on an elastic good also harms the efficiency of the nation's production and consumption. Anytime consumers are forced to shift to more expensive alternative goods, a corresponding shift occurs away from the optimum allocation of goods. "Insofar as a tax makes interstate commerce more expensive, it tends to alter the scheme of production and trade from that which would be established by other economic forces, reducing the output and discouraging the expansion of efficient out-of-state producers." Developments In The Law—Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 957, 969 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
144. This behavior occurs only if consumers continue to attempt to purchase as many goods and services as before the state imposed the tax.
145. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN II APPENDIX C: ENERGY AND THE ECONOMY 9 (1979) (hereinafter NEP II APPENDIX C). In theory, when consumers spend a higher percentage of disposable income on one good, the economy adjusts by forcing the price of

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A shift resulting in increased oil imports causes additional problems of its own. Any increase in oil consumption causes more dependence on unstable oil-exporting nations, a politically undesirable development. Importing more oil also leads to inflation. A chain of events produces this inflationary effect. First, increased purchases of expensive imported oil raises the bill of the United States for oil imports. This and other factors cause an excess supply of dollars in foreign exchange markets. The dollar in turn depreciates in value because this increased supply is greater than demand. As the value of the dollar decreases in foreign markets, all imports become more expensive. Paying more dollars for all imported goods then contributes to inflation.

If coal is inelastic, the consumers will continue to purchase the same pre-tax quantity, despite the increased cost. Individuals will then spend a greater percentage of their disposable income on energy, just as if they had switched to oil. This necessarily leaves less real money available for consuming other goods and services and adversely affects the general economy. The tax on coal thus serves to lower the nation's production and consumption and reduce the country's standard of living.

Regardless of whether demand for an energy resource is elastic or inelastic, a high state tax on an energy resource has serious national economic consequences. An activity that either reduces the nation's aggregate consumption and production or contributes to inflation is clearly a burden on commerce. Energy is vital to commerce. Without an adequate justification, state-imposed economic action that di-

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146. See NEP II, supra note 1, at 21-22.
147. See NEP II, supra note 1, at 19-21, 158-60.
148. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
149. For a more thorough explanation of the economic effects stemming from a reduction in consumers' real disposable income, see notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text. Another problem occurs from taxing an inelastic resource that is produced predominantly for exporting to other states. The problem concerns the constitutionality of “tax exportation.” See Developments, supra note 143, at 968-71; note 110 supra.
150. See notes 141-47 supra and accompanying text (elastic); notes 148-49 supra and accompanying text (inelastic).
151. See note 128 supra.
152. Adequate justifications are similar to legitimate purposes. A tax, for example, that operates to reimburse the state for services provided is adequately justified.
B. *A Proposal for Commerce Clause Analysis*

An important premise of the proposed analytical framework is that because interstate commerce must pay its own way,\(^{153}\) a state may exact a tax which reasonably estimates the state's cost in providing any related services.\(^{154}\) Flowing from this premise, the proposal is simply that courts construe any tax on a good involved in interstate commerce as an undue burden to the extent that the amount of the levy is greater than the cost to the taxing state.\(^{155}\) The proposal is nothing more than a corollary of the plain language in the *Complete Auto* fairly related test. To make a fairly related determination, which courts have recently been reluctant to do,\(^{156}\) would require development of a full factual record. This process is admittedly time consuming, but by no means an impossible task.\(^{157}\) The proposal, then, requires that courts shoulder the task of making factual determinations regarding the cost of the services provided by a state that taxes an energy resource taken from within its boundaries. Because the task is large, requiring the courts to make a factual determination in every state tax challenge case is impractical. Energy resource taxation, however, presents a different situation. Few matters are as important as energy to an industrial nation. Because a state tax on an energy resource may have such significant and pervasive effects on the nation,\(^{158}\) the judiciary should decide the fairly related question on the basis of facts in situations involving challenges to state energy taxes. In energy tax disputes, courts should not stop the fairly related inquiry as soon as a state asserts the benefits of a civilized society justification.\(^{159}\) The amount by which an inter-

\(^{153}\) See, e.g., *Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue*, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). See also note 69 *supra* and accompanying text.

\(^{154}\) See notes 60 & 69 *supra* and accompanying text.

\(^{155}\) For a discussion of a cost-based approach to state taxation of energy resources, see Comment, *An Outline For Development of Cost-Based State Severance Taxes*, 20 *Nat. Resources J.* 913 (1980).

\(^{156}\) See note 73 *supra* and accompanying text.

\(^{157}\) The court must determine whether the state has any reasonable basis for its judgment that the tax is necessary to compensate the state for particular costs resulting from the taxed activity. "The task is likely to prove to be a formidable one, but its difficulty does not excuse our failure to undertake it." 101 S. Ct. at 2972 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

\(^{158}\) See notes 1 & 128 *supra* and accompanying text.

\(^{159}\) See notes 78-79 *supra* and accompanying text. The analysis proposed in this Note is
state activity increases these costs is a finite, ascertainable amount.  

When the amount of the tax is greater than the services provided by the state, courts should construe the tax as an undue burden on the nation, thus violating the commerce clause.  

If a court gives substantive meaning to the fairly related issue, that court must develop a full factual record to reveal the cost of the services provided by the taxing state.  

As with many evidentiary battles, the final outcome may depend significantly on the allocation of the burdens of proof. In state tax challenges, the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of a tax rests on the challenger.  

In various circumstances, however, shifting the burden from one party onto an adversary is a reasonable action for a court. Shifting the burden is prudent when social and economic circumstances change. The increased significance of energy for the nation justifies a shifting of the burden onto the taxing state.  

limited to situations involving state taxes on energy resources when such resources are involved in interstate commerce.  

160. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.  

161. Thus any unjustified tax impinging on interstate commerce is invalid. The court can reach this conclusion by balancing in the same manner as the state regulation cases involving state-imposed burdens. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.  

Since Complete Auto has shifted the focus of the examination of state taxes on interstate commerce from a per se approach to a balancing approach, the law respecting commerce clause limitations applicable to state tax schemes is now consistent with the approach employed by the Court in determining the validity of state statutes regulating interstate commerce.  


As to energy taxes, this Note proposes the use of some form of heightened judicial scrutiny because of the increased significance of energy. For a discussion of the heightened scrutiny applied to state taxation of foreign commerce, see Comment, The Negative Commerce Clause—A Strict Test For State Taxation Of Foreign Commerce: Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 13 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 135 (1980).  

162. See C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 17, at 81-114 (describing a method for acquiring a factual record); Comment, Constitutional Limitations On State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 887, 910-11 (1980) (concluding a factual record is essential in cases such as Commonwealth Edison). See also notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.  

163. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221-22 (1980) (the complainant has the distinct burden of showing by "clear and cogent evidence" that it results in extraterritorial values being taxed).  


165. Id. at 807.  

166. Id. In terms of the proposed analysis, this shift in the burden requires a state to show that its tax is a reasonable estimate of the services provided to the taxed enterprise. Any amount of the tax above the state's cost is an undue burden on interstate commerce, thus invalidating the tax. For further discussion of a cost-based energy tax, see Comment, supra note 155.
Another accepted reason for shifting the burden of proof is one party’s superior access to the proof.\footnote{See C. McCormick, supra note 164, at 806-07.} If a state’s records and statistics on matters relevant to a cost determination are not reasonably accessible, then a court is further justified in requiring the state to prove that the tax reasonably estimates the cost to the state of services provided.

C. Commonwealth Edison Revisited Under the Suggested Commerce Clause Framework

The Commonwealth Edison Court, asserting that the rate of a tax is not a matter for the courts to analyze,\footnote{101 S. Ct. 2946, 2952, 2960 (1981).} held, as a matter of law, that the severance tax was fairly related to the governmental services Montana provides.\footnote{See note 117 supra and accompanying text.} The Court did not permit a factual showing that the tax was actually related to Montana’s costs.

Under the suggested analytical framework, courts would not decide the fairly related issue as a matter of law in cases involving taxes on energy resources. A court would, at a minimum, permit the challenger to demonstrate that the tax is not fairly related to the services provided.\footnote{As national demand for coal increased, Montana experienced a large growth in population in communities near the mining areas. The increased population affected local school districts. The effects of this and other problems associated with the coal-related growth boom are closely watched by the state. Montana has a Coal Board specially created to aid in funding coal-impacted areas. Montana, which monitors the impact of the coal industry, has the data necessary for determining the cost of the services provided by the state. See, e.g., Cohea, supra note 117; R. Robinson, supra note 117, at 12.} A court could go still further and force the state to justify the amount of its tax in terms of actual costs incurred as a result of the energy-related activity.\footnote{See notes 164-67 supra and accompanying text.} Under the proposed approach, if the factual record revealed that the Montana severance tax, for example, reasonably approximated the services provided by Montana, then the tax would be valid. If, however, the factual examination revealed that the amount of the tax exceeded the costs to Montana, then the tax would be unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce.\footnote{See note 161 supra and accompanying text.}

V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF LIMITING STATE ENERGY TAXES

Commerce clause constraints are not the only way to limit the
amount a state taxes its energy resources. Various legislative alternatives are also available. The House of Representatives is currently reviewing a bill designed to limit state severance taxes on coal. The bill mandates that state severance taxes not exceed a rate of twelve and a half percent of the value of coal extracted in a given year for use in any powerplant or major fuel-burning installation and prepared for transportation in interstate commerce. Congressional imposition of this ceiling on severance taxes is unlikely to meet any serious constitutional challenges.

173. Actually, not one but three nearly identical bills are receiving legislative attention. Because they are in essence the same proposal, the bills are treated as "a" bill in the text of this Note. The bills are: H.R. 6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); and H.R. 7163, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The proposal reads as follows:

A BILL

To further the objectives of national energy policy of conserving oil and natural gas through removing excessive burdens on production of coal.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress finds that, in order to alleviate the national energy emergency, reduce national dependence on petroleum imports, encourage the highest and best use of domestic petroleum and natural gas, and enhance interstate commerce by promoting increased reliance on our national reserves of coal for the generation of electricity and power, it is necessary to remove excessive burdens on production of coal used in powerplants and major fuel-burning installations.

SEC. 2. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.) is amended by adding immediately following section 807 the following new section:

"SEC. 808. COAL FOR POWERPLANT AND INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of State or Federal law, with respect to any coal which is destined for shipment in interstate commerce for use in any powerplant or major fuel-burning installation, the sum of all severance taxes or fees, in respect of any fiscal year, levied upon or collected from any taxpayer, by a State or any political subdivision thereof on such coal or on any improvements or other rights, property, or assets produced, owned, or utilized in connection with the production of such coal shall not exceed a total of 12½ per centum of the value of such coal produced during such fiscal year at the time it has been extracted and prepared for transportation free on board the production site, exclusive of all State and local taxes and fees.

(b) For purposes of subsection (a), 'severance taxes or fees' include any tax or fee, by whatever name called, levied or collected upon coal or upon any improvements or other rights, property, or assets produced, owned, or utilized in connection with the production of coal except for income, sales, property or other similar taxes or fees of general application which are not disproportionately imposed thereon."


174. Id.

175. Congress' power under the commerce clause is extremely broad. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (federal requirements imposed under commerce clause power applied to out of the way Birmingham restaurant because it used meat which had been moved in interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (hotels and motels
The greatest advantage of the proposed twelve and a half percent limitation is simplicity. A federally imposed tax ceiling allows the judiciary to avoid a time consuming determination of whether a tax is fairly related to services provided by the state. The proposed tax ceiling also serves the main purpose of restraining a state's energy taxing power and prevents any state severance tax on coal from reaching outrageously high rates.

This simplicity, however, also leads to the bill's primary disadvantage—inefficiency. Setting an inflexible rate of taxation risks forcing a coal exporting state to absorb governmental costs properly attributable to nonresident coal consumers. The state's actual costs might exceed the amount of revenues obtainable with a twelve and a half percent tax. Residents of coal exporting states should not have to pay for coal shipped to nonresidents. If a state needs more than a twelve and a half percent tax rate to recoup the legitimate costs incurred as a result of the coal industry's impact, then the proposed bill would lead to an inequitable situation.

While an unfairly low rate in some situations, the twelve and a half percent rate is too high in other situations. In some states, a twelve and a half percent tax rate arguably exceeds the rate necessary for the state to recoup its costs stemming from the coal industry. Enactment of the proposed bill will render the fairly related issue moot for severance

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affect interstate travel and are thus subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (federal regulation of crops applied to a local farmer); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (upheld federal fixing of minimum prices to be paid to milk producers in Chicago). An argument to restrain Congress' action in this area may arise from National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The chances of success with such an argument are left to speculation. For discussion of intergovernmental taxation immunities, see Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271, 290-91 (1977); Hellerstein, supra note 87, at 252-53.

176. Clearly, interstate commerce must pay its way. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.

177. North Dakota, for example, may eventually have actual costs exceeding the amount of revenues obtainable with a 12½% limit. Because North Dakota generates electricity for export in addition to mining, special costs are incurred. The generating plants release sulphur dioxide into the air and use large amounts of the state's scarce water supply. Added to the existing costs associated with coal mining itself, these special costs may place North Dakota in an incongruous situation if recouping its costs are limited to a 12½% rate. See Brief Amicus Curiae of The North Dakota State Tax Commissioner at 6, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, ___ Mont. ___, 615 P.2d 847 (1980).

178. One researcher concluded that Montana could recoup all of her costs by other existing taxes and restrictions. See Coal Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 173, at 274-75, 296 (statement of Irwin M. Stelzer).
taxes up to twelve and a half percent.\textsuperscript{179} A simple illustration reveals the harm of legislatively abrogating the need for a state to set its tax in relation to services provided. Under the proposed bill a state that actually needs only a small tax to recoup its costs can nevertheless tax up to twelve and a half percent without any judicial interference on commerce clause grounds. If such a state exports a large percentage of coal produced within its boundaries, then the nation unnecessarily suffers the adverse effects associated with higher energy costs.\textsuperscript{180} The proposed bill, in an effort to prevent unnecessarily high severance tax rates, may thus permit and even encourage these unnecessarily burden-some rates.

A much more accurate and efficient legislative alternative would be to create an agency to regulate the rate of coal taxation. An agency is the ideal entity for accurately determining the cost to a state of the coal industry's activity.\textsuperscript{181} The majority of the country's low-sulphur coal, however, exists in only a few states.\textsuperscript{182} Creating a federal agency solely to monitor the coal-related costs incurred by these few states is bureaucratic overkill, inconsistent with the growing intolerance of excessive federal agency regulation.\textsuperscript{183}

VI. CONCLUSION

Energy is of such great importance to the nation that states should not be allowed to tax energy resources at any rate they desire. A state levy must reasonably approximate the actual governmental costs arising from the intrastate aspects of the interstate activity.\textsuperscript{184} Because increased energy costs have a major impact on the nation,\textsuperscript{185} states must not tax energy resources at an unjustified rate.\textsuperscript{186} The national significance of energy should compel the courts to shoulder the task of making a full factual inquiry into whether a state tax fairly relates to the services provided by the state. In addition, courts hearing challenges to energy taxes should shift the burden onto the taxing state to prove that

\textsuperscript{179} Rates up to 12½% would have Congressional approval.

\textsuperscript{180} See notes 128-52 supra and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{182} See Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 133.

\textsuperscript{183} See W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P. Strauss, supra note 181, at 79-80.

\textsuperscript{184} See note 69 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{185} See notes 128-52 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{186} See notes 70, 155 & 161 supra and accompanying text.
the tax approximates the state’s costs. If the Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison had given substance to the Complete Auto fairly related requirement, the commerce clause would have prevented energy-rich states from taxing at rates that unjustifiably burden interstate commerce and the nation. If the judiciary continues to refuse to give effect to the commerce clause, Congress may have to act to rectify the situation. The recently proposed bill setting an inflexible severance tax ceiling suffers from oversimplification. Residents of states with legitimate coal-related costs greater than the amount recoverable with a twelve and a half percent tax will absorb part of the costs for nonresidents’ coal. The proposed legislation also permits a state with relatively low coal-related governmental costs to tax at a rate of up to twelve and a half percent without fear that the judiciary will scrutinize the fairness of the rate. The bill could thus protect—not prevent—unjustifiable and unnecessary burdens on interstate commerce and the nation. The legislative alternative of establishing an agency to monitor states’ coal-related expenditures and corresponding tax rates would provide the most accurate method of determining fair rates. Creating a new agency, however, requires unnecessary growth of federal bureaucracy. Commerce clause scrutiny by the judiciary is the most functional method of preventing energy-rich states from exploiting their resources at the expense of the nation as a whole. In matters concerning the commerce clause, the judiciary is the “final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.”

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187. See notes 164-67 supra and accompanying text.
188. See note 173 supra.
189. See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
190. The problems that would be caused by enactment of the proposed bill or the creation of an agency would result in significantly greater problems than requiring courts to make factual records, something they do on a daily basis.