Challenging the Peremptory Challenge: Sixth Amendment Implications of the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges

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Attorneys commonly use peremptory challenges\(^1\) in jury selection to effect a fair and impartial jury.\(^2\) Notwithstanding the importance courts accredit to this function,\(^3\) the peremptory challenge should not survive a conflict with constitutionally protected rights.\(^4\)

Courts perpetually struggle to reconcile those rights guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments with the unconstrained nature of peremptory challenges. *Batson v. Kentucky*\(^5\) marked the Supreme Court's first overt intrusion\(^6\) into the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. The Court held a prosecutor violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment\(^7\) if his peremptory challenges exclude venire members\(^8\) based on their race.\(^9\) Further, the Court reduced the evidentiary burden required of a defendant to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.\(^10\)

The Court in *Batson* specifically declined to express a view on the mer-

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1. A "peremptory challenge," as opposed to a challenge for cause, allows an attorney to exclude a potential juror without a reason. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 n. 9 (1965) (quoting 4 Blackstone Commentaries 353 (15th ed. 1809)) ("[A]n arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all . . . is called a *peremptory* challenge. . . .") (emphasis in original)). "Challenges for cause have the virtue of being unlimited, and peremptories have the advantage of not needing to be defended." J. Van Dyke, *Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels* 140 (1977).


4. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130. If a peremptory challenge does conflict with a constitutionally protected right, "it is the inscrutability of the peremptory challenge that must yield, not the constitutional right." Id.


8. A jury pool or "venire" refers to the panel of potential jurors summoned. From this group, the actual or "petit jury" is selected.

9. 476 U.S. at 96.

10. 476 U.S. at 93-98. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
its of the petitioner's sixth amendment claims. However, a number of federal circuit courts have considered the potential for a sixth amendment "fair cross section" objection to the petit jury's composition.

Despite its narrow holding, the Batson decision has created controversy and confusion. Prior to Batson, the potential of a sixth amendment claim was important because of the difficulty of obtaining relief against peremptories under an equal protection theory. Even though Batson eased the restrictions on equal protection claims, a viable sixth amendment claim remains valuable because of Batson's limitations. First, Batson is not retroactive, whereby it deprives many defendants

11. The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." U.S. Const. amend. VI. 12. 476 U.S. at 84-85 n.4. "The Court has avoided any confrontation between the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury and the peremptory challenge, although Batson presented a ripe opportunity for such an appraisal of these apparently conflicting principles." Note, supra note 2, at 1204.

The sixth amendment guarantee applies to criminal matters only. This Note, therefore, analyzes the peremptory challenges solely as used in criminal prosecutions. This Note will not discuss peremptory challenges regarding civil litigation except to note "[t]he Batson rationale has not widely been held to apply" there. D. Breck, Peremptory Strikes after Batson v. Kentucky, A.B.A. J., 54, 60 (April 1, 1988). But see, e.g., Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989) (Batson applies to civil as well as criminal cases); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).

Several lower courts have extended Taylor's requirement of a fair cross section in the jury pool to a fair cross section in the petit jury. This creates the possibility that a venire's improper cross sectional composition will carry over to the actual jury. See, e.g., Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989); Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 767-68, 770 (6th Cir. 1985) (further discussion of what amounts to an impartial jury), remanded, 478 U.S. 1001, aff'd, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).

Before Batson, the challenger had to overcome a virtually impossible burden of proof to establish an equal protection violation. See supra note 6, infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 15. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259-261 (1986) (Batson decision not retroactive on collateral review of convictions made final prior to Batson opinion). The Court defined "final" as "where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before.... Batson v. Kentucky." Id. at 258 n.1 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)).

17. Batson will not apply to defendants who initially challenged jury composition any time prior to the Court's opinion in Batson, if the Court deems such challenges to be "final." See supra note 16.
of its decreased burden of proof. Because the Court stripped pre-\textit{Batson} defendants of a feasible equal protection claim by denying retroactivity, they must look for alternative grounds to challenge a jury make-up. Second, the scope of a sixth amendment claim may be broader than an equal protection challenge. While unavailable to date under the equal protection clause, a sixth amendment claim would provide a defendant with a vehicle to challenge the jury composition on nonracial grounds. Moreover, a sixth amendment challenge eliminates the problem of standing potentially raised by an equal protection claim. Finally, sixth amendment and equal protection challenges may provide distinct

18. \textit{Batson}, as opposed to its predecessor \textit{Swain v. Alabama}, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), \textit{see supra} note 6, permits a defendant to establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory selection merely using facts from the defendant's trial, rather than requiring a prior pattern of discriminatory exclusions. \textit{See infra} notes 49, 54-56 and accompanying text.


20. The Supreme Court applies a "strict" level of scrutiny when analyzing race-based classifications under the equal protection clause. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); (The "core" of the equal protection clause is to combat racial discrimination, thus, race-based classifications are "suspect" and merit "rigid scrutiny."); \textit{Korematsu v. United States}, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."); \textit{See also} \textit{Alschuler, The Overweight Schoolteacher from New Jersey and Other Tales: The Peremptory Challenge after Batson}, 25 \textit{Crim. L. Bull.} 57, 65 (1989) ("Whether some nonracial forms of discrimination are as invidious as racial discrimination [to merit such heightened scrutiny] remains a subject of dispute."). The Supreme Court's holding in \textit{Batson} rested only on race-based discrimination. Whether the Court will broaden the scope of \textit{Batson} to include other racial minority groups and women remains uncertain.

A sixth amendment challenge rests on the right to a possible fair cross section of the community on one's jury. It extends to discrimination against any cognizable group. \textit{See infra} note 68. Of course, a future clarification of "cognizability" (\textit{see infra} note 68) will assist in defining the parameters of a sixth amendment claim. \textit{See e.g.}, \textit{Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death Qualification Reexamined}, 24 \textit{Am. Crim. L. Rev.} 1, 46 n.185 (1986) (While the Court in \textit{Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.}, 328 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1946), recognized daily wage earners as cognizable for fair cross section purposes, "it is unclear whether the Court considers \textit{Thiel} to have precedential significance in the sixth amendment context."). Hence, the nature of the underlying claim is potentially broader for the sixth amendment claim than for equal protection. Unless the Court extends \textit{Batson} to groups such as women and daily wage earners, the availability of a sixth amendment claim is imperative to combat alternative forms of systematic discrimination in jury selection.

21. Pursuant to article III of the United States Constitution, a person has standing to bring a claim only if he meets three conditions. First, he must show a distinct and palpable injury. Second, the challenged activity must have caused injury. Finally, the court must be able to redress the

The Supreme Court's current position on standing to challenge jury composition is muddled. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), six members of the Court held a white defendant had standing to challenge the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury pool. Id. at 504. No majority of the Court, however, agreed to the theory behind its holding. Justice Marshall's opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, recognized a due process violation "[w]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service." Id. at 503 (opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice Marshall explicitly declined to consider the defendant's equal protection claim. Id. at 497 n.5 (opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice White's opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, arrived at a judgment granting standing without detailing its holding on either the due process or equal protection grounds. Instead, Justice White recognized a "central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment with racial discrimination." Id. at 507 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Peters v. Kiff articulates a standard of eligibility to contest the exclusion of a group from jury service. Moreover, the decision is not based on the equal protection clause. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 65. Hence, Kiff fails to set clear precedent for lower courts to determine standing when the defendant asserts an equal protection claim based on the exclusion of a group from the petit jury. Compare, United States v. Townsley, 856 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (no basis exists for white defendant to argue the prosecutor's exclusion of black jurors violated defendant's rights under the equal protection clause) and United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir. 1988) (nonblack defendants cannot complain about prosecutor's use of peremptories to eliminate blacks from jury) with United States v. Gomez, 730 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (citing Peters v. Kiff; a white defendant has standing to make a sixth amendment challenge to the exclusion of blacks from his jury), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984) and United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799, 804 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (a defendant has standing to challenge—under the fourteenth amendment—the exclusion of a cognizable group from his grand and petit juries, even though he is not a member of the group).

Perhaps because Kiff is a poor guide, lower courts rely more readily on the Court's language in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), expressly requiring that the defendant be a member of the excluded racial group. See, e.g., Townsley, 856 F.2d at 1190; Angiulo, 847 F.2d at 985.

Thus, the issue of who has standing to make an equal protection challenge alleging racially based exclusions from the petit jury remains unclear. Moreover, it is also uncertain whether Kiff would extend standing in an equal protection claim of gender based or some alternative discrimination. Of course, the viability of such equal protection claims to date remains unclear. See infra note 138.

In contrast to an equal protection objection, a sixth amendment challenge may survive regardless of the correlation between the defendant and the challenged jurors. In Teague, Justice Brennan, noted that a sixth amendment extension:

would bar the prosecution from excluding venire persons from the petit jury on account of their membership in some cognizable group even when the defendant is not himself a member of that group, whereas the Equal Protection Clause might not provide a basis for relief unless the defendant himself belonged to the group whose members were improperly excluded.


Under a sixth amendment challenge, defendant would argue a violation of his right to a possible fair cross section. The defendant might suffer a distinct and palpable injury if he were unable to benefit from the diverse viewpoints or the impartiality that certain groups in the community might afford. Therefore, any defendant could have standing if denied a fair cross section pursuant to the prosecutor's systematic exclusion of a group of prospective jurors.

In Kiff the Court hypothesized that the white petitioner "would clearly have standing to challenge the systematic exclusion of any identifiable group from jury service" if he brought the claim under the sixth amendment. 407 U.S. at 500. The Court reasoned that excluding a "discernable class"
Resolution of the sixth amendment issue is crucial in understanding the scope of peremptory challenges. Because of the conflict among the circuit courts concerning the relevance of the sixth amendment to petit juries, this issue is ripe for the Supreme Court's consideration.

Although some observers maintain that the Sixth Amendment's "fair cross-section requirement" differs from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of equal protection and looks to discriminatory effect rather than discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court has never suggested that the "fair cross-section requirement" forbids more than the "systematic" exclusion of distinctive groups from jury service. The difference between "deliberate" exclusion and "systematic" exclusion is far from clear. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 66 n.38 (citation omitted).

The breadth of a sixth amendment claim, in contrast to that of an equal protection challenge, would further expand the potential groups of defendants with valid challenges to their petit juries. See supra note 20.

22. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979) (equal protection challenges are "not entirely analogous" to fair cross section claims). But see Duren, 439 U.S. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (sixth amendment justification for classification by gender has strong overtones of equal protection standard). See also Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1145 (11th Cir. 1987) (if sixth amendment offered defendant any protection, this protection would be inseparable from protection afforded under the equal protection clause); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1012 n.8 (5th Cir. 1987) (same). Furthermore, as one commentator argues:

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23. The danger in extending the fair cross section analysis to the petit jury is the resulting "virtual limitlessness" of defendants' challenges to exclusions by prosecutors. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 113, 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) ("It effectively eliminates the peremptory challenge for all but the most frivolous reasons (people who wear gray, smile, or wear contact lenses.").), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).

24. See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.

25. In a recent decision, Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) the Supreme Court once again sidestepped a resolution of the sixth amendment controversy. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see infra note 57. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, held it unnecessary to consider whether to extend the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury. O'Connor reasoned that a new rule would not retroactively apply to Teague because his case reached the Court on collateral review, not on direct appeal. Id. at 1069 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Conversely, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun, not only believed the Court should have decided the sixth amendment issue, but that it should have extended the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury. Id. at 1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); 1092, 1094 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

This split among the Justices merely heightens the sixth amendment issue. For the distribution of votes and a further discussion of the Supreme Court's action in Teague, see infra notes 61-62.

In Teague's lower court opinion, the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc refused to extend the sixth amendment to the petit jury's composition. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text for further discussion of Teague. Most recently, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989). The Second Circuit in Roman, unlike the circuit court in Teague, did utilize a sixth amendment analysis to examine the peremptory challenges used in selecting a petit jury. 822 F.2d at 224-27.
This Note considers the sixth amendment implications on the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in petit jury selection. Part I introduces the history and intended purpose of peremptory challenges. Part II examines the extent to which courts have limited attorneys' use of peremptories. The section reviews both the equal protection approach and federal courts' positions on sixth amendment guarantees regarding the petit jury. Part III analyzes the merits of a sixth amendment claim. Finally, Part IV considers alternatives to the existing peremptory challenge. This Note concludes that peremptory challenges should be eliminated because of their procedural deficiencies and their innate failure to effectuate their intended purpose.

I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

The peremptory challenge, although not a constitutional right, has existed since common law. Though originally a defendant's right, the prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges developed by the nineteenth century. Today, both state and federal rules of procedure and statutes grant defendants and prosecutors the right to utilize peremptory challenges.

26. The equal protection guarantee under the fourteenth amendment is the other major ground for challenging the alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. While this Note focuses on challenges based on the sixth amendment, the analysis will require some discussion of equal protection.

27. While both prosecutors and defense attorneys can use peremptory challenges, see infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text, only their discriminatory use by prosecutors is at issue in this Note. See infra note 151 and accompanying text for a brief consideration of the defense's use of peremptory challenges. Extensive consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.


30. Note, supra note 2, at 1198 (citing VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 85-175). See also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894) (the peremptory challenge is one of the most important rights of the accused).


32. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130. All state and federal courts permit some use of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Bertolet, Peremptory Challenges Should be Eliminated in Criminal Trials, 34 St. Louis B.J. 23 (1987). However, the number of challenges allowed to each party varies by jurisdiction. Swain, 380 U.S. at 217. In general, the number of allotted challenges increases with the seriousness of the crime. Note, supra note 2, at 1197. In addition, the defense has more peremptory challenges than the prosecution. Bologna, supra note 14, at 151. In the federal system each side in a capital case receives twenty peremptories. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b). In all other felonies, the defendant receives ten peremptories and the prosecutor six. Id. In a misdemeanor prosecution each side is
In theory, the peremptory challenge's primary purpose is attaining an "impartial" jury. By affording each litigant a limited number of unquestioned juror exemptions, the selected jury will be partial to neither party.

Peremptory challenges allow attorneys great latitude in the jury selection process. Unquestioned challenges allow removal of a potential juror without expressing reasons for the actual challenge. Peremptories thus provide an accepted mode for dismissing a legally qualified juror merely because the attorney does not want that type of person on the jury. Because peremptories traditionally permitted exclusion without an explanation, courts were unable to review for possibly unconstitutional exclusions.

Thus, the peremptory challenge supplements "challenges for cause."
Peremptories provide a vehicle for eliminating potential jurors based on an attorney's intangible uneasiness regarding that individual's likely performance on a jury. This "uneasiness" alone would not justify disqualification for "cause." Moreover, peremptories allow aggressive voir dire without fear of provoking resentment or hostility in the prospective juror.\footnote{See Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376, cited in Swain, 380 U.S. at 220; Krauss, supra note 35, at 537; Note, supra note 2, at 1200. See also Babcock, supra note 33, at 554-55 ("[T]he peremptory challenge is . . . a shield for the exercise of the challenge for cause. Questioning . . . may have so alienated a potential juror that, although the lawyer has not established any basis for removal, the process itself has made it necessary to strike the juror peremptorily.").}

In \textit{Swain v. Alabama},\footnote{380 U.S. 202 (1965).} the Court declared the use of peremptory challenges was to be "without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."\footnote{Id. at 220.} The Court reasoned that when analyzed in light of their intended purpose, peremptory challenges do not merit scrutiny. Despite \textit{Swain}, several courts have exercised a considerable degree of judicial scrutiny over the utilization of peremptory challenges.\footnote{See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 113, 1130 (2d Cir. 1984) (peremptory challenge not beyond scrutiny under the sixth amendment or the equal protection clause), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). See supra note 13.} These courts require attorneys to use their peremptories within the confines of the sixth amendment's guarantee of impartiality and fair cross section of the community. Such judicial scrutiny clearly encroaches upon the traditionally unqualified right which afforded attorneys wide latitude in jury selection.

\section{II. Judicial Scrutiny}

\subsection{A. Equal Protection Analysis}

\textit{Strauder v. West Virginia}\footnote{100 U.S. 303 (1880).} provides the foundation for nondiscriminatory jury selection analysis. In \textit{Strauder}, the Supreme Court held the state's purposeful exclusion of black jurors deprived Strauder, a black defendant, of his right to equal protection.\footnote{Id. at 310.} Although \textit{Strauder} did not imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable." (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).

Attorneys also use peremptory challenges to exclude an individual for other, less tenuous reasons, including: (1) "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices" conceived from the person's looks and gestures, Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892), cited in \textit{Swain}, 380 U.S. at 220, and (2) the juror's "habits and associations," Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70, cited in \textit{Swain}, 380 U.S. at 220.
involve peremptory challenges, it did require impartiality in venire selection. Other cases have extended the equal protection guarantee to both grand juries and petit juries.

The legal principle expressed in *Strauder* was instrumental in guiding the permissible use of peremptory challenges. In *Swain v. Alabama*, the Supreme Court held it would find improper and purposeful discrimination by the State only when the defendant proved systematic juror exclusion over a period of time, solely based on race. This evidentiary burden, however, was nearly impossible to satisfy. Coupling the defendant's difficult burden with the long recognized good faith presumption afforded prosecutors, the Court showed its reluctance to impinge upon the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges. While the Court could not condone the unconstitutional discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, it clearly tried to protect the unqualified nature of peremptories by making their impermissible use so difficult to prove.

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42. *Strauder* involved a West Virginia statute which provided only white males were eligible to participate on a jury. *Id.* at 305. The Court vacated the defendant's murder conviction by such a restricted jury and ordered the case retried in federal court. *Id.* at 312.
43. *Id.* at 308-09.
44. See, e.g., *Ex parte Virginia*, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (judge held liable for discriminatory grand jury selection in violation of equal protection clause).
46. In *Strauder*, the Court reasoned:

The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied . . . all right to participate . . . as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them. . . . an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others. 100 U.S. at 308.
47. See, e.g., Bertolet, *supra* note 32, at 23.
49. *Id.* at 227. In *Swain*, an all-white jury convicted a black defendant of raping a white girl. The prosecutor utilized his peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from selection. Despite the fact that no black had served on a jury in that jurisdiction since 1950, petitioner failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden. *Id.* at 226.
50. Note, *supra* note 2, at 1203 (citing State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979)); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (only two cases ever to satisfy evidentiary burden set by *Swain*).
51. The *Swain* Court approved the existence of a presumption in each case that the prosecutor fairly and impartially used his peremptory challenges. 380 U.S. at 222.
52. The Court was concerned about subjecting the prosecutor's challenge to equal protection demands. *Id.* at 221. It feared requiring an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for challenge would radically alter the nature and operation of the challenge. *Id.* at 222.
In *Batson v. Kentucky*, the Supreme Court's reluctance to intrude upon prosecutorial discretion came to an end. The Court concluded, "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial." Contrary to the good faith presumption in *Swain*, the *Batson* Court recognized that peremptory challenges permit "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." The decreased standard of proof approved in *Batson* affords defendants a greater opportunity to prove the unconstitutional use of peremptories. *Batson* will undoubtedly promote more frequent claims contesting a prosecutor's peremptory challenges.

The Supreme Court, however, narrowly stated the *Batson* holding, resting the decision solely on equal protection principles. Thus, the

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53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In *Batson*, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude all four black veniremen from the petit jury. An all-white jury convicted the black defendant of burglary in the second degree.

54. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). Hence, the Court rejected the evidentiary burden it imposed in *Swain*. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The defendant no longer must establish a "long-continued unexplained absence" of members of his race "from many panels." 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion)). In *Batson* the Court permitted a defendant to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based on the following showings: membership in a "cognizable racial group;" prosecutor's removal of members of defendant's race from the venire; and facts that allow an inference that the prosecutor excluded veniremen from the petit jury solely on account of their race. 476 U.S. at 96-97. Once defendant makes the prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a "neutral" explanation for his challenges. Id.

In defining a "cognizable" group, the *Batson* Court cited *Castenada v. Partida*, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), which required a "recognizable, distinct class singled out for different treatment under the laws." Id. at 494 (citations omitted).

55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.

56. 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).

57. 476 U.S. at 84 n.4. In the trial court, Batson alleged a violation of both his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 83. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, contended that petitioner brought both claims before the Supreme Court. Id. at 84 n.4. Justice Powell then resolved petitioner's claims solely on equal protection grounds. Id. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger found the Court's equal protection holding troublesome. Petitioner did not press the fourteenth amendment equal protection issue in *Batson*. On the contrary, petitioner argued the sixth amendment guarantee of "an impartial jury and jury composed of persons representing a fair cross section of the community." Brief for Petition of Certiorari, quoted in 476 U.S. at 113 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted that during oral argument, petitioner's attorney based his claim solely on sixth amendment grounds. Id. at 113-14.

Question: Your claim is based solely on the Sixth Amendment?
Mr. Niehaus [Batson's attorney]: Yes.
Question: Is that correct?
Mr. Niehaus: That is what we are arguing, yes.
status of the sixth amendment as a challenge to the discriminatory use of peremptories in petit jury selection is unclear.

B. Sixth Amendment Analysis

1. The Supreme Court's Position

When the Court decided Swain v. Alabama, it had yet to apply the sixth amendment's impartial jury guarantee to the states. Hence, the Swain Court, in reviewing the state's use of peremptories, did not address the sixth amendment. Controversy remains whether Swain grants constitutional protection through the sixth amendment against discriminatory petit jury selection.

To date, the Supreme Court has not held whether a defendant has a sixth amendment right to a nondiscriminatory petit jury. Although a majority of the Court declined to address the issue in Teague v. Lane, four Justices expressly approved of the sixth amendment extension to the

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Question: You are not asking for a reconsideration of Swain, and you are making no equal protection claim here. Is that correct?

Mr. Niehaus: We have not made an equal protection claim.

Id.

The Chief Justice explained that the Court should have asked the parties to brief the equal protection issue in addition to the sixth amendment, directed reargument on the issue, or dismissed the petition "as improvidently granted." Id. at 115. The Court, however, refused. Id. at 114.


59. The Supreme Court extended the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court handed down Swain in 1965.

60. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) ("We have never invoked the fair cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either for cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large."). The Court wrote the Lockhart decision more than twenty years after its Swain opinion. This language suggests Swain did not invoke the sixth amendment. See also McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1124 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (constitutional analysis in Swain focused on equal protection clause and nothing was intended to remove this focus); People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042-43, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1052 (1982) ("Swain does not apply to an accused's right not to have the State affirmatively frustrate his 6th Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community... "); But see United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) (courts have consistently followed the systematic exclusion analysis in Swain, both before and after Taylor, hence Taylor does not overrule Swain).

If Taylor's sixth amendment analysis did not overrule Swain, arguably no subsequent authority has. See Childress, 715 F.2d at 1320 ("Supreme Court has not reconsidered Swain and until that time, of course, we must follow Swain."). If the contrary body of case law holds true, however, the scope of the sixth amendment right to a nondiscriminatory petit jury is unclear, especially in light of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

petit jury.\textsuperscript{62}

2. **Dissension among the Circuits**

   a. **The Taylor Approach**

   The Supreme Court, in *Taylor v. Louisiana*,\textsuperscript{63} emphasized there is "no requirement that petit juries actually mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population."\textsuperscript{64} Essentially, two schools of thought exist among the circuit courts delineating the impact of *Taylor* on the potential expansion of the sixth amendment right to a fair cross section in the venire to the actual petit jury. Both views agree that the Supreme Court has failed to sufficiently address the issue. However, the circuits are split in their reading of the *Taylor* language.

   Under one approach this language is not a barrier to a sixth amendment extension to the petit jury. For example, the Second Circuit, in *McCray v. Abrams*\textsuperscript{65} interpreted the *Taylor* holding\textsuperscript{66} to afford the de-conviction on alternative grounds, concluding petitioner was procedurally barred from asserting his equal protection claim under both *Batson* and *Swain*. \textit{Id.} at 1067 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).


   The ultimate resolution of the issue is uncertain. In Part IV of her opinion, Justice O'Connor avoided expression of her view on the viability of the sixth amendment extension. \textit{Id.} at 1069 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Scalia and Kennedy, joined in Justice O'Connor's decision to dismiss the issue on retroactivity grounds. \textit{Id.} at 1055. Justice White, however, concurred only with Parts I through III of Justice O'Connor's opinion. \textit{Id.} at 1078 (White, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Hence, Justice White apparently does not approve of Justice O'Connor's sidestepping of the sixth amendment issue. However, Justice White himself chose not to address the issue. The positions on the sixth amendment extension of five Justices of the Court are therefore unknown to date. The fact that the traditionally liberal branch of the Court favored the extension may indicate the continuing viability of the issue. However, the fate of the sixth amendment analysis rests in the hands of the five more conservative Justices of the Court.


64. \textit{Id.} at 538. *Taylor* concerned the systematic exclusion of women from the jury venire. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction for kidnapping because "the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." \textit{Id.} at 528. Hence, women as a class are no longer excludable from the venire if exclusion produces an almost totally male venire. \textit{Id.} at 537.

65. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), \textit{vacated}, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). In *McCray*, the prosecutor utilized his peremptory challenges to eliminate all blacks and Hispanics from the jury. \textit{Id.} at 1114. The all-white jury convicted McCray (who is black) of first and second degree robbery. \textit{Id.} at 1115.
fendant the *possibility* that the venire's representative character translates to the petit jury.\textsuperscript{67} The *McCray* Court concluded the sixth amendment prohibits the state from unreasonably restricting the chance of a fair cross section of the community on a petit jury.\textsuperscript{68} This prohibition exists during both the venire and petit jury selection processes.\textsuperscript{69}

The Eighth Circuit, representing the opposing school of thought, does not recognize a sixth amendment right against a prosecutor's allegedly discriminatory use of his peremptory challenges in petit jury selection. In *United States v. Childress*,\textsuperscript{70} the court interpreted the *Taylor* language\textsuperscript{71} as expressly limiting the fair cross section analysis to the venire.\textsuperscript{72}
Similarly, in *Teague v. Lane*, the Seventh Circuit refused to extend the sixth amendment analysis to the actual jury. Relying largely on a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court stopped short of making such an extension, the *Teague* court refused to "disrupt the trial process by making such an enlargement of the parameters of prior decisions." The Supreme Court recently affirmed *Teague* on other grounds, specifically declining to address Teague's sixth amendment claim.

**b. An Alternative Approach: Booker v. Jabe**

At least one circuit deemphasized the *Taylor* language when it analyzed the sixth amendment expansion. In *Booker v. Jabe, (Booker I)* the Sixth Circuit held the systematic use of peremptory challenges to initiate, the Eighth Circuit ordered rearraignment en banc, specifically requesting the parties to consider People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982). 715 F.2d at 1313-14. In *Payne*, an Illinois court applied *Taylor* and concluded, "the 6th Amendment precludes the State . . . from affirmatively frustrating the right of the accused to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community by utilizing peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the jury solely because they are Blacks." 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1043, 436 N.E.2d at 1052. While the *Childress* court did not "entirely disapprove" of the analysis in *Payne*, it came to a different result. 715 F.2d at 1320. *See infra* note 118.

73. 820 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).

74. *Id.* at 841. In *Teague*, pursuant to the prosecutor's exclusion of ten black potential jurors, a nonblack jury convicted the black defendant of attempted murder and armed robbery. *Id.* at 833. Teague's contention that such a jury was not comprised of his peers failed in each of the lower courts.


76. 820 F.2d at 841.

77. *See supra* note 25 and accompanying text. Because the Court relied on procedural grounds when it declined to address the sixth amendment issue, the Court's affirmance of Teague's conviction does not moot consideration of either the rationale of petitioner's claim or the Seventh Circuit's analysis.

78. The Sixth Circuit in *Booker v. Jabe*, 775 F.2d 762, 770 (6th Cir. 1985) (*Booker I*), did recognize *Taylor* as the "seminal authority governing the application of the Sixth Amendment to state jury trials." Moreover, the court did cite the critical *Taylor* language. *Id.* at 768. However, the *Booker I* court chose an alternative line of Supreme Court authority from which to base its sixth amendment extension to the petit jury. *See infra* note 82 and accompanying text. The rationale underlying the *Booker* approach, just as in the *Taylor* approach (*see supra* notes 64, 66-67 and accompanying text) remains the same—that selection of the petit jury must preserve the mere *possibility* of a fair cross section.
exclude members of a cognizable group from a criminal petit jury violates the sixth amendment. The court reasoned that Swain foreclosed the defendant's fourteenth amendment claim, but it did not exempt peremptory challenges from sixth amendment review. The Booker I court relied on the principles of a series of Supreme Court cases in construing the true nature of the "impartial jury" guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The court concluded that the "selection methods" for both the venire and the actual jury must guarantee the "possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community." On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded Booker I pursuant to Batson. On remand the Sixth Circuit in Booker v. Jabe (Booker II) adhered to its prior ruling.

80. Id. at 772. Booker I involved the removal of jurors by both the prosecution and defense on the basis of race. Id. at 764-65. Booker and his codefendant, both black, faced armed robbery charges. Id. Booker's co-defendant faced an additional charge of intent to commit rape on a white female. Id. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove blacks. Id. An all-white jury convicted Booker. Id. at 763.
81. Id. at 767.
82. Id. at 768-70. Collectively, Glasser, Thiel and Ballard teach that an impartial jury is the product of jury selection methods that do not systematically exclude members of a distinct group from jury service.... [A sixth amendment] violation lies in the exclusionary conduct or policy, not in any documented partiality by a particular jury.

Id. at 769.
83. Id. at 770-71.
84. 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). Chief Justice Burger believed the Supreme Court simply should have reversed Booker I. Id. at 1001-02 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As in McCray, however, the Court chose to remand. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
85. Booker v. Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The Supreme Court denied the state's petition for certiorari. Michigan v. Booker, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987). This case perhaps furthers the proposition derived from McCray v. Abrams—that the sixth amendment analysis is viable—because the Sixth Circuit actually decided, on remand, to adhere to its prior decision. The Second Circuit in McCray did not have that opportunity, see infra note 86. In light of its action in Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989), however, the Second Circuit would likely have reaffirmed its prior decision.

Roman involved a joint trial of two white defendants who subsequently alleged the prosecutor improperly utilized his peremptories to exclude whites from the petit jury. Id. at 216. The Second Circuit in Roman expressly praised McCray's sixth amendment analysis. Id. at 215-16. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court's actions in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), Booker I and Booker II to confirm its belief in the supremacy of the sixth amendment analysis it held viable in McCray. 822 F.2d at 226-27.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT APPROACH

An examination of the circuit cases suggests the viability of applying a sixth amendment analysis to the petit jury. The Second Circuit's *McCray v. Abrams* decision has meaningful repercussions for the future breadth of the fair cross section requirement. The Supreme Court's decision not to reverse *McCray* but vacate and remand in light of *Allen v. Hardy* and *Batson v. Kentucky* has several implications. First, the Court would have simply reversed *McCray* if it intended to restrict challenges of discriminatory peremptory use to the equal protection clause. The Court did not address *Batson*'s or *McCray*'s sixth amendment analysis. Therefore, *McCray* reveals by negative inference the Court's refusal to restrict challenges to an equal protection analysis. Second, the Court's remand of *McCray* may indicate an intent to endorse a sixth amendment challenge in the future. Finally, remanding *McCray*'s sixth amendment claim suggests *Batson* may have sixth amendment implications. If so, the breadth of permissible judicial scrutiny concerning peremptories could possibly permit a fair cross section complaint.

The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in *Booker II* adds additional support for application of the sixth amendment analysis. Even though a denial of certiorari has no precedential value, at least one court has noted that "the denial of review in *Booker II* certainly seems inconsistent

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86. 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). Pursuant to the remand, the parties stipulated the state would withdraw its appeal. *Roman*, 822 F.2d at 225.
87. 478 U.S. 235 (1986) (concerning the retroactivity of *Batson*). See supra note 16.
89. See *Roman*, 822 F.2d at 226 (the Second Circuit's final decision came down before *Batson*). The possibility exists that the Court remanded *McCray* to enable the parties to brief their arguments in light of an equal protection analysis.
93. See supra note 57.
94. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text; infra note 138 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 139.
95. But see *Teague*, 820 F.2d at 844 ("subsequent denial of certiorari in ... [Booker II] ... [is] worthy of little weight in our determination").
with any view that the remands in \textit{McCray} and \textit{Booker I} were meant to foreclose adherence to our Sixth Amendment analysis.\footnote{Roman, 822 F.2d at 227.}

Opponents of the sixth amendment extension note Supreme Court precedent, such as \textit{Lockhart v. McCree},\footnote{476 U.S. 162 (1986).} as foreshadowing the Court's refusal to apply the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{Teague v. Lane}, 820 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).} In \textit{Lockhart} the Court refused to extend the fair cross section requirement to petit juries.\footnote{476 U.S. at 174. The Court recognized the practical impossibility of providing every defendant with a petit jury which was a truly representative cross section of the community. \textit{Id.} The Court concluded such a broad extension of the sixth amendment would be "unworkable and unsound." \textit{Id.} See also \textit{Teague}, 820 F.2d at 840.} Nevertheless, the Court expressed ambivalence in foreclosing all sixth amendment claims by hypothetically entertaining the sixth amendment argument.\footnote{476 U.S. at 174 ("if we were willing to extend the fair cross-section requirement to petit juries ... ").} Furthermore, in light of the Supreme Court's action in \textit{McCray v. Abrams} and \textit{Booker I}, the Court's \textit{Lockhart} decision cannot be construed as foreclosing the opportunity for sixth amendment analysis.\footnote{In \textit{Lockhart} the judge removed for cause all prospective jurors who expressed inability under any circumstances to impose the death penalty. \textit{Id.} at 106. The jury convicted the defendant of murder. \textit{Id.} The defendant filed a federal habeas corpus petition under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. \textit{Id.}} The \textit{McCray} majority concedes that the sixth amendment guarantees no particular petit jury composition.\footnote{750 F.2d at 1128. \textit{See supra} note 64 and \textit{infra} note 107.} Nonetheless, nothing in \textit{Lockhart} prevents finding the sixth amendment forbids peremptory challenge usage that eliminates \textit{all possibility} that a petit jury will reflect a cross section of the community.\footnote{Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 226 (2d Cir. 1987), \textit{cert. denied}, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989).} Arguably, the \textit{Lockhart} Court believed it would be premature to take the drastic step of ex-
tending the fair cross section analysis to the actual jury.\textsuperscript{105}

Critics of the sixth amendment argument rely on the Supreme Court's language in \textit{Taylor v. Louisiana}\textsuperscript{106} that denied a defendant a jury of any particular composition.\textsuperscript{107} In \textit{Taylor} the Court expressly "impose[d] no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community."\textsuperscript{108} Lower federal courts, however, have misconstrued this language\textsuperscript{109} in considering the premise of the sixth amendment guarantee.\textsuperscript{110} The sixth amendment fair cross section requirement does \textit{not} guarantee a venire of a particular composition.\textsuperscript{111} The requirement merely guarantees the method used for venire selection will provide the \textit{possibility} of a representative cross section.\textsuperscript{112} Similarly, extending the sixth amendment guarantee to the petit jury will do no more than retain the \textit{possibility} of a jury comprised of a representative cross section of the community.\textsuperscript{113}

Contrary to the holdings by these courts, the \textit{Taylor} decision actually supports the sixth amendment's extension to the petit jury. The Court

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{105}] Pursuant to respondent McCree's "invitation" the Court merely "decline[d] . . . to adopt such an extension." \textit{Lockhart}, 476 U.S. at 174.
\item[\textsuperscript{106}] 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). \textit{See supra} text accompanying note 64.
\item[\textsuperscript{108}] 419 U.S. at 538.
\item[\textsuperscript{109}] \textit{See infra} note 126 and accompanying text. Despite believing "'[t]he extension of \textit{Taylor v. Louisiana} from the venire to the petit jury has much logical and practical appeal[,]" the Eighth Circuit interpreted the \textit{Taylor} language to limit the fair cross section analysis to the venire. 715 F.2d at 1319-20.
\item[\textsuperscript{110}] In \textit{Booker I}, the court elaborated on the rationale requiring the presence of a cross section of the community drawn from a pool selected absent the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group. 775 F.2d at 770. An impartial jury provides diversity in the judicial process, enabling greater "public confidence" in the system. In addition, an impartial jury deters an improper conviction by supplying laypersons' views to interpret the evidence against a defendant. \textit{Id}.
\item[\textsuperscript{111}] \textit{See supra} note 103 and accompanying text. To require that a venire reflect a particular composition would be at least as "unworkable and unsound" as it would be in the context of the petit jury. \textit{Lockhart}, 476 U.S. at 174.
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] \textit{See Teague v. Lane}, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1092 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Petitioner 4); \textit{Taylor v. Louisiana}, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975); \textit{Booker}, 775 F.2d at 771. Indeed, "'[t]he essence of a fair cross-section claim is the systematic exclusion of a 'distinctive' group in the community.' \textit{Lockhart}, 476 U.S. at 174 (quoting Duren \textit{v. Missouri}, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979))." 

Courts such as the Seventh Circuit in \textit{Teague v. Lane} have misconstrued defendants' sixth amendment challenges to demand the petit jury be "identical" in composition to the community. 820 F.2d at 837.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
recognized the sixth amendment guarantees a "fair possibility for obtaining a jury constituting a representative cross section of the community." Unless a fair possibility exists that the actual jury will represent a cross section of the community, requiring that possibility for venire selection is senseless.

In addition, the leading cases opposed to the Booker/McCray analysis, United States v. Childress and Teague v. Lane, have several defects. To begin with, although Childress has garnered some support among other circuits, Childress has two flaws. First, the Eighth Circuit in Childress expressed ambivalence in its opinion. The court admitted it did not "entirely disapprove" of the sixth amendment analysis. It conceded the practicality and logic of extending sixth amendment analysis to the petit jury. Nevertheless, the court ultimately rejected the sixth amendment analysis. The second flaw is timing. The Eighth Circuit decided Childress prior to several important decisions, including Booker II and McCray. Furthermore, neither the Eighth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to reconsider Childress in light of Batson v. Kentucky.

114. 419 U.S. at 528 (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972)).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984) (pre-Batson decision concluding Swain still good law to adjudicate a sixth amendment claim of racial discrimination in jury selection).
118. 715 F.2d at 1320. The Childress court examined the sixth amendment proposition accepted in People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982). In Payne, the state court relied on the sixth amendment to restrict the prosecutor's use of peremptories. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1041-43, 436 N.E.2d at 1051-52, (cited in Childress, 715 F.2d at 1318). The Payne court reasoned "[t]he systematic exclusion of prospective jurors solely because of their race is equally invidious and unconstitutional at any stage of the jury selection, i.e., from the time the general jury list is prepared . . . until the jury is actually selected." 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1056-57, 436 N.E.2d at 1051-52 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit in Childress recognized Payne when the Childress court made a motion to rehear the Childress appeal en banc. 715 F.2d at 1313-14. The Eighth Circuit found Payne's sole reliance on the federal Constitution more significant than other state cases which relied on their state constitutions. 715 F.2d at 1318.
119. 715 F.2d at 1319. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
120. 715 F.2d at 1318, 1320. The court's reluctance to entirely disprove of the Payne proposition, notwithstanding its ultimate rejection of the analysis suggests the Eighth Circuit could at some point change its position. See infra note 123.
121. 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986).
122. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
123. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Childress, a pre-Batson decision, the Eighth Circuit relied on Swain
The circuit court's opinion in *Teague v. Lane* has similar deficiencies. The Seventh Circuit in *Teague* rested its decision on a mere refusal to expand the scope of prior Supreme Court decisions. The factors the court considered in its decision lack accuracy and merit. Moreover, the court misconstrued the essence of the defendant's sixth amendment claim. Finally, the *Teague* court failed in its attempt to minimize the support of a series of cases dealing with jury size.

*Teague* determined a small number of jurors decreases the opportunity for fair cross section representation. Applying similar reasoning to the facts of *Teague*, removing potential jurors solely on the basis of race would decrease—if not eliminate—the opportunity for minority jury representation.

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124. *820 F.2d at 839.*

125. The court relied on two factors which allegedly “mandate against such an unwarranted expansion” of precedent. First, the *Teague* court considered that a randomly selected venire, or a petit jury selected only with the use of challenge for cause might result in under or over representation of particular groups. Second, the court considered the administrative problems that would result if the court required the representation of a specific group on a petit jury. Both factors grow out of an erroneous belief that proponents of the sixth amendment extension propose a guaranteed representation of certain groups on a given jury. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

126. *Teague* and other defendants relied on sixth amendment entitlement to a fair possibility of a cross sectional jury. Nowhere did they contend the Constitution guarantees any specific representation on a jury. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. On appeal in *Teague*, Justice Brennan believed the plurality of the court guilty of that same misconstruction or “mischaracterizing” of petitioner's claim. 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1091 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

127. *See Teague, 820 F.2d at 839-40.* Nothing in *Batson*, *Taylor* or *Lockhart* alters the Constitution's ensuring the chance of a proportionately representative petit jury. Admittedly, “it would be impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation to the petit jury.” *Id.* (citing *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 85-86 n.6).

128. *See Teague, 820 F.2d at 842-43.*

129. *See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).* In *Williams*, the Court held a six member jury is constitutional because it effectively satisfies the purpose of the jury trial—to protect against governmental oppression. *See also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 243 (1978).* In *Ballew*, the Court held a five member jury violates the sixth and fourteenth amendments. *Id.* at 243. The Court suggested a jury of fewer than six may promote “inaccurate and possibly biased decision making, that causes untoward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly representing their communities.” *Id.* at 239 (emphasis added). Such a jury “attains constitutional significance.” *Id.*

130. *Teague, 820 F.2d at 837.*

131. The court’s opinion does not reflect that *Teague* alleged such improper selection may actually eliminate all opportunity for minority representation. However, if such conduct effectively de-
thus violate the sixth amendment. However, the *Teague* court rejected this analysis, noting "*decreasing* the possibility of obtaining a fair cross section . . . does not violate the sixth amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury."1\textsuperscript{33} Contrary to the court's reasoning, the systematic challenge of all blacks solely on the basis of their race would in fact eliminate the very requirement *Teague* acknowledged: the "*possibility* of obtaining a truly representative jury."1\textsuperscript{34}

An examination of existing case law, therefore, does little to refute the arguments for extending the fair cross section analysis. However, before recommending an extension of the fair cross section requirement one must consider the ramifications of an extension. The Supreme Court with its decision in *Batson* has already made a drastic intrusion\textsuperscript{135} into the traditional nature of peremptory challenges.\textsuperscript{136} This infringement upon the peremptory challenge will continue to produce undesirable repercussions. First, because of the decreased standard for a prima facie showing of prosecutorial discrimination, defendants will challenge a prosecutor's conduct more frequently. This will add to the burden of an already overburdened judicial system.\textsuperscript{137} Second, the bases for intrusion into discretionary challenges undoubtedly will expand limitlessly.\textsuperscript{138}
Batson's increased judicial scrutiny may suggest a trend away from deferential treatment. Such a trend could extend the lenient Batson standard to racial and nonracial attacks on grounds other than equal protection, thereby opening the door to a sixth amendment objection. Finally, unless the Supreme Court clarifies the permissible scope of sixth amendment challenges, attorneys and judges will continue to misinterpret the law.

Moreover, the desirability of a sixth amendment extension is questionable. The extension would provide greater opportunity to challenge the improper use of peremptory challenges and consequently might deter discriminatory conduct. However, permitting substantial judicial scrutiny of peremptories would undeniably destroy their original purpose of allowing unquestioned exclusion, making survival of the peremptory challenge doubtful. In addition, the Courts' burden would increase, given the potentially infinite challenges based on sixth amendment grounds.

Even if the Court refuses to extend sixth amendment analysis to the petit jury composition, the existing scrutiny made possible in Batson

139. In McCray v. Abrams, Judge Meskill in dissent, expressed concern regarding the limitless-ness of the sixth amendment analysis. 750 F.2d 1113, 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Meskill feared the less burdensome standard for a prima facie case under the sixth amendment—showing the exclusion of a cognizable or distinctive group—will eliminate the use of peremptories for all but the most frivolous reasons. Id. See supra note 23. See also United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984); infra note 147.

140. See supra note 20.

141. Such misinterpretation exists in Sgro, 816 F.2d at 30. The defendant in Sgro claimed the government improperly used its peremptory challenges to exclude Italian-Americans from the jury, in violation of equal protection under Batson. A jury without any Italian-American members convicted the Italian-American defendant. The First Circuit affirmed Sgro's conviction. In its analysis, the court utilized the standard from Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979), to define a "constitutionally cognizable group." 816 F.2d at 33. The court's reliance on this standard is misplaced because Duren involved a sixth amendment, not equal protection, analysis of a jury venire from which the state excluded all women as a group. The Duren Court held the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination against women, producing a jury in violation of the fair cross section requirement. 439 U.S. at 367-70. See supra notes 54 & 68 (recognizing different standards for equal protection and sixth amendment claims).

142. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. The sixth amendment challenge would likely be broader than its equal protection counterpart.

143. See infra note 146.

144. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (discussing the limitlessness of sixth amendment claim and its undesirable consequences), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986), and supra note 139.
thwarts the efficacy of peremptory challenges. The intrusion already allowed in Batson may alone destroy the peremptory challenge. Future courts may also apply Batson to a broader scope of cases other than those concerning the exclusion of blacks.

IV. PROPOSAL

Peremptory challenges do not fulfill their purpose unless exercised with full freedom. Therefore, unless the Court preserves the unqualified nature of peremptories, the Court will deny peremptories their intended and necessary flexibility. Peremptory challenges mock their purpose when misused. Regardless of the Court's ultimate decision on the sixth amendment issue, its decisions to date have decimated the peremptory challenge.

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145. "Jury trials once were simple, straightforward, and expeditious proceedings; and the right to jury trial was a right that defendants got not merely one that they had . . . . [W]e appear to be headed in the wrong direction, and Batson illustrates some fundamental defects of American trial procedure. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 79 (footnote omitted).

146. See infra note 147. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125-26 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (the Batson decision "sets aside the peremptory challenge"); United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984) ("opponent would have to come forward with a reason for wanting to exclude the juror. . . . [I]n other words he would have to provide good cause, or something very close to it; and the peremptory challenge would collapse into the challenge for cause"). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (though potentially limiting "the full peremptory character of the historic challenge" it "need not rise to the level justifying . . . challenge for cause").

147. United States v. Clark, although decided prior to Batson, effectively expresses the fear accompanying such intrusive inquiry into the use of peremptories.

If such objections [to an adversary's use of peremptories] are allowed, it is hard to see how the peremptory challenge . . . will survive. Whenever counsel alleged that his opponent had a racial or similar type of motivation in exercising a peremptory challenge (whether he used that challenge to exclude a white or a black—and it would have to be one or the other—or extending the principle as one could hardly resist doing, a man or a woman, a Jew or a gentile, etc.) the opponent would have to come forward with a reason for wanting to exclude the juror.

737 F.2d at 682 (emphasis added). See also Alschuler, supra note 20, at 65 (Although limiting of Batson to cases of racial discrimination is "unattractive," an extension of Batson might leave "little left of the peremptory challenge.").

148. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (decision will not undermine the value of peremptory challenges to the administration of justice).

149. First, any assertion that peremptories serve to keep questions of race out of the jury selection process is empty in the face of Batson, Booker, and McCray. Clearly, these are cases in which this time-honored right has been misused in a manner that propels racial issues to the forefront. Secondly it is said that peremptories protect minority jurors from oppression at the hands of their communities; the best that can be said for this idea is that it is condescending.

Bologna, supra note 14, at 164 (citations omitted).

150. See supra notes 1, 145-47 and accompanying text and infra note 157. This destruction of
A. Alternatives

In light of the inherent deficiencies of peremptories, the Court should consider a reevaluation of the peremptory challenge. One alternative may be to eliminate the prosecutor's right but preserve defense counsel's right to use peremptory challenges. This solution would better protect defendants from historical prosecutorial discrimination. However, it would have the drastic disadvantage of enabling the accused to select a jury biased in his favor.\footnote{151} A second alternative might be to reduce the

the traditional peremptory challenge is precisely what the Supreme Court feared as early as 1965 in \textit{Swain}. See \textit{supra} note 52 and accompanying text.


Nonetheless, support exists for treating the prosecutor differently than the defendant. To begin with, the Constitution affords no particular right to the "prosecution." In contrast, the sixth amendment protects only an "accused," while the fourteenth amendment protects "any person" from certain conduct of the "State." In addition, the prosecution generally possesses fewer allotted challenges than the defense. Bologna, supra note 14, at 151. This different treatment may also be the system's acknowledgment that prosecutors use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner more often than defendants. \textit{But see} Batson, 476 U.S. at 125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting the need to balance the "scales" between the defendant and state by similarly limiting the defense's discriminatory use of peremptories); Booker, 775 F.2d at 772 ("neither prosecutor nor defense counsel may improperly use their peremptories"); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1138-39 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (because restrictions on the defense's use of challenges are probable once the prosecutor's use is limited, it will likely "spell the end of peremptory challenges") (quoting United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 250 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977)), \textit{vacated}, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); Clark, 737 F.2d at 682 (recognizing the need to provide prosecutors with comparative protection against discrimination).

In an analysis of this so-called reverse-Batson issue, one commentator supports the need for an equivalent power for a prosecutor to attack the defense's use of peremptories. However, he recognizes the standing dilemma accompanying such a concept. As with the standing issue presented when a defendant alleges discrimination against a group other than his own, see \textit{supra} note 21, this commentator would reconcile both problems by approving a less "restricted concept of [third-party] standing." Alscher, supra note 20, at 73.

Another commentator believes the selection of constitutional approach of the challenge made against a defense attorney's use of his peremptories may be dispositive on this reverse-Batson issue. A fair cross section limitation, for example, will apply equally to the defense as to the prosecution. An equal protection challenge, on the contrary, raises concerns of the absence of state action and standing. Fisher, Batson v. Kentucky: \textit{Purposeful Discrimination in Jury Selection}, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1988, at 1, Col. 2. Hence, a resolution of the potential sixth amendment extension may have significant bearing on the viability of a future, reverse-Batson extension.

The Court in \textit{Batson} specifically declined to "express . . . whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel." 476 U.S. at 89 n.12. The Supreme Court recently declined to settle the reverse-Batson controversy when it denied the state of Alabama's petition for certiorari in Alabama v. Cox, 109 S. Ct. 817 (1989). In that case, the state sought to restrict the defense's use of its peremptory challenges. The state claimed that in the trial of
number of challenges allotted.\footnote{152} A reduction in challenges would provide fewer opportunities for discriminatory use.\footnote{153} However, the presence of a few peremptory challenges will still afford attorneys some flexibility in jury selection.\footnote{154}

A third alternative might be to recognize a right to minority representation on the jury.\footnote{155} This would protect minority defendants by providing for their representation on a jury. However, such a solution would require the court to impose an unconstitutional quota.\footnote{156}

Given the apparent dissatisfaction and potential catastrophe accompanying \textit{Batson},\footnote{157} a fourth alternative would be for the court to either modify or overrule \textit{Batson}\footnote{158} and revert to the rigorous burden of \textit{Swain}. While this would solve the current dissatisfaction with \textit{Batson} and prevent any future poor decisions caused by courts misinterpreting \textit{Batson}, such a return to \textit{Swain}\footnote{159} would be unsatisfactory. The defense's virtual inability to meet the \textit{Swain} burden\footnote{160} would deprive defendants of any recourse against the prosecution's discriminatory jury selection.
B. Solution

Peremptories do little more than provide a vehicle for jury selection manipulation. In addition, they burden the judicial system with additional causes of action for litigants claiming discrimination. Although peremptories may provide flexibility in jury selection, they fail to effect the intended impartial jury. In reality, they provide an opportunity for each party to select a partial jury. Essentially no distinction exists between an unconstitutional law purposefully excluding a group solely on the basis of race and a prosecutor's peremptory challenge misuse in a discriminatory manner. Both involve a form of inappropriate state action. The Court should not condone either conduct. As a solution, this Note proposes the elimination of peremptory challenges.

This suggestion has received some support, most notably by Justice Marshall in his Batson concurrence. Justice Marshall recognized that the peremptory challenge is not a constitutional right. He articulated that a court may withhold peremptory challenges "without impairing the constitutional guarantee of impartial jury and fair trial." As noted above, the court must withhold the peremptory challenge should the challenge impair a constitutionally granted right.

Such a solution is problematic because it would require a reconstruction of current jury selection procedure. Peremptories supply attorneys with significant discretion in jury selection. Therefore, attorneys will likely disfavor the elimination of such cause-less challenges.

To minimize the harsh impact of this solution, the Court might consider increasing the allowable criteria of challenges for cause. This increase would provide attorneys with more flexibility in challenging jurors yet deter the unconstitutional discriminatory elimination of jurors.

161. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); supra note 42.
162. Bologna, supra note 14, at 166. "The reality of the practice . . . shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate. . . ." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). The court in United States v. Clark feared that entertaining certain objections to peremptory challenge use would undesirably stretch out trials. 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984).
163. Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring); Bertolet, supra note 32, at 26. But see Bologna, supra note 14, at 164-65 (conceding that the elimination of peremptory challenges would "provoke a rash of protest from the trial bar.").
164. 476 U.S. at 108. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
165. 476 U.S. at 108 (citations omitted).
166. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (the inscrutability of the peremptory challenge must yield to a constitutionally granted right).
168. See Bertolet, supra note 32, at 26.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in *Batson v. Kentucky*\(^{169}\) left many questions unanswered.\(^{170}\) The question of whether the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the possibility of a cross sectional petit jury remains unresolved. In light of the conflict among the circuits\(^{171}\) the issue is ripe for adjudication.\(^{172}\)

The peremptory challenge is a paradox, by nature immune to review, but nonetheless subject to constitutional scrutiny. Because of the peremptory challenge's deficiencies,\(^{173}\) its elimination may better protect litigants and their constitutional rights.

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\(^{169}\) 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

\(^{170}\) See *supra* note 14 and accompanying text.

\(^{171}\) See *supra* notes 65-85 and accompanying text.

\(^{172}\) See *supra* note 25 and accompanying text.

\(^{173}\) See, e.g., *supra* notes 148-50 and accompanying text.