Conditional Love: Imitation, Inheritance and Violent Relations in Early Modern Revenge Tragedies

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by

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Dedication

To Mom, who always supported me, and Grandma, who always believed in me.
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By

Megan Elizabeth Allen

Doctor of Philosophy in English Literature

Washington University in St. Louis, 2012

Professor Joseph Loewenstein, Chairperson

In “Conditional Love,” I reread narratives that seem to confirm normative kinship structures as excessive iterations of their very normativity. Examining revenge tragedies by Shakespeare, Marston, Middleton, Tourneur and Kyd, I argue that the metaphors each playwright uses to portray familial emotions reveal the ideologies underpinning both excessive and normative versions of familial relationships. For example, the pietas that causes Titus to refurbish his elaborate family tomb also leads him to murder one of his sons. It is because Piero, the villainous father in Marston’s Antonio’s Revenge, imagines his daughter as a physical part of him “as near my heart as is my liver” that when she disobeys he can imagine “rend[ing] her off.” I argue that the metaphors used to express normative familial relations reveal the pressures placed on family emotions by economic and political ideologies. The foundational topos of primogeniture (that the father can live on in the son) requires the son to resemble the father, which creates relationships founded on reproduction through imitation. These imitative relationships are then vulnerable to disruption should a son fail to resemble his father. While
critics have traditionally read instances of violent family breakdown in plays as moments that violate kinship norms, I argue that such moments of violence are caused by ideologies associated with inheritance structures which underpin descriptions and experiences of normative familial emotions. Revisiting tragedies commonly read as non-normative from the position that these violent behaviors are not exceptions but excesses, I am able to uncover the ideologies which create and, under pressure, distort familial relationships.
Introduction: What’s (Familial) Love Got to Do with It?

A recent BBC series asserts that the family makes us who we are, asking how the modern family came to be: *Turn Back Time: The Family* (2012) places three families in the roles of their ancestors from a hundred years ago to “find out how history made the family what it is today” (*Turn* 1.1). The program places three modern families in the positions of their ancestors (divided by lower, middle, and upper classes) in different eras, with social historian Dr. Juliet Gardiner establishing (and ensuring the families maintain) the social and cultural rules governing class-based family behavior of the Edwardian era. In the first episode, the upper and middle class mothers both express distress at the required separation from their children; in a striking moment, the ‘upper class’ mother, having been allowed her one hour per day with her children, tearfully asserts a difference between the emotional lives of families in Edwardian England and the family as it functions today: “In Edwardian times, perhaps the women didn’t know any better. They had no expectations that spending time with their children perhaps would be a nice thing. It wasn’t expected of them so they didn’t think to ask, whereas that’s the norm for me.” The ‘upper class’ father reports a similar experience. By the end of the episode (and the week), he describes, also in tears, how lonely the experience has made him. In the after-action interview, he describes the Edwardian family unit as “like a bunch of single people living in a big house.” His wife agrees, “I don’t think there’s any such word as the Edwardian family.” The perceived emotional difference experienced by this modern family attempting to live according to very different structures, and by very different rules, is quite striking. While a piece of popular rather than scholarly research, *Turn Back Time* suggests time and place affect how families are structured and perhaps even how emotions are affected by those structures. The program’s very existence demonstrates a certain curiosity about the effect of different historical periods, and the
rules and pressures prescribed by those periods, on family life, and the effect of class structures on expressions and experiences of familial emotions. The program’s opening assertion that the past can reveal “how the modern family came to be” suggests the currency of examinations into emotions across historical periods.

I open with these striking moments in *Turn Back Time* because they suggest that emotions are historically mediated in ways that encapsulate my own assertion: the ideologies underlying inheritance patterns affect how emotions associated with familial relationships are expressed and experienced. In John Marston’s *Antonio and Mellida* (1599), Andrugio, confronted with his son’s corpse, insists on the reproduction of martial virility, stating, “I hope he died like my son,” and determining that if Antonio’s courage had faltered, Andrugio would “mangle his bleak face.” My dissertation starts from the observation that the macabre finality of Andrugio’s expectations for his son’s behavior encapsulates the violence that haunts portrayals of kinship in early modern drama. Since Lawrence Stone’s groundbreaking *The Family, Sex and Marriage* (1977), literary critics writing on the family have tended to focus on the institutions that hedged or constituted it – marriage, inheritance – or the roles played by individuals within families – wives, husbands, sons.¹ Moreover, the family itself is often viewed as either an

unchanging site of idealized affective relationships fraught with violent exceptions – murder, incest – or a system of patriarchal oppression devoid of ‘real’ affective relationships. Like my fellow literary historians, I examine the effects of larger structures, such as inheritance, on particular familial relationships in the revenge tragedy, though to different ends. I find that plays provide access to beliefs about relationships not in the abstract, but in the “depicted unreflexive flow of the day-to-day conduct of social activity.” Where conduct manuals and pamphlets are self-consciously prescriptive, plays are not; play-writing employs discourses “not of abstraction but of embodiment … dramatizing the felt or disturbed or presumed – but known – provisional realities of capacity and limit in their social world.” In terms of my focus on a particular genre, I find that the revenge tragedy offers exaggerated or excessive versions of familial relationships that make ideological pressures more readily apparent. Locating places where structure impinges upon emotion, I argue not that family tragedies dramatize a break from ‘normal’ or everyday family life but that the tragic versions maintain continuity with the normative structures.


Examining the continuities connecting normal and tragic portrayals of family life through the plays of Shakespeare, Marston, Middleton, Tourneur and Kyd, I locate each playwright’s portrayal of normative kinship and uncover the violence that inheres in the structure of the norm.

Any study of kinship in early modern England must address Lawrence Stone’s foundational *The Family, Sex and Marriage 1500-1800* (1977), which not only created a new sub-discipline but provided an overarching narrative to describe major shifts in the composition of the English family over some three hundred years. His main thesis describes three stages of the English family that gradually superseded one another over time: the ‘open lineage family’ (c. 1450-1630), the ‘restricted patriarchal nuclear family’ (c. 1550-1700), and the ‘closed domesticated nuclear family’ (c. 1640-1800). Stone outlines the following narrative of the family’s development, still in use by most literary critics today: the family underwent significant changes in the period discussed, moving from distant emotional connections, large kin groups, and succession arranged by primogeniture, to close emotional connections, nuclear families at the expense of larger kin groups, and succession divided among the children (21-24, 37). Stone understands the development of the modern family as a shift from “distance, deference and patriarchy” to individualism and more democratic forms of interfamilial relationships brought about by the interference of newly formed systems of state (22, 29). Stone’s thesis has consistently been questioned by scholars in the field, but there is a general consensus that “the

family in the early modern period was of great political significance, since analysis of contemporary writings has shown that the health and security of the nation was believed to rest on the stability of family life. As one seventeenth-century author stated, ‘the family is a seminary of the Church and Commonwealth.’”

Many critics following Stone have noted the connection between inheritance patterns and the structuring of familial relationships. However, to counter Stone’s thesis, it is important to note that the political character of the early modern family does not necessarily preclude the existence of affective, emotional relationships between members of a family, as more recent social and cultural histories tend to argue. For instance, Linda Pollock has presented significant evidence for affectionate relationships between parents and children long before the eighteenth-century watershed described by Stone. Far from a lack of affect, Zvi Razi “has emphasized the strength of feeling in favour of expectant heirs and of the sense of obligation both towards non-inheriting children and ‘retired’ parents which existed in late medieval Halesowen.” The two approaches to the family, focusing on the economic or the emotional, should not be split between


7 Sociological accounts of familial structures tend to emphasize the exaggerated importance of the eldest son in a system of primogeniture. For instance, most critics following Stone agree that the eldest son was the favored party in a system of primogeniture – “the world revolved round him” (Larminie 23); see also Miriam Slater, Family Life in the Seventeenth Century, 26-34; Stone, 107. While exceptions have been noted (in, for instance, J.V. Beckett, “The disinheritance of Sir Christopher Lowther in 1701”. Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society lxx (1980). 131-6), the general rule in families organized around a system of primogeniture seems to follow both Slater’s and Stone’s conclusion, that the eldest son receives the lion’s share of both goods and affection. Ingrid Tague, in her “Aristocratic women and ideas of family,” notes that among many aristocratic families, while girls were loved, boys were the priority; she goes on to link the greater affection shown to male children to the necessities brought about by the inheritance system of primogeniture. For instance, she relates the story of Sophia, duchess of Kent, who bore only a single daughter in her marriage; the duke’s determination to preserve his family line meant that he settled his estate on his nearest (blood) male relative, leaving little for Sophia or their daughter (Tague 195). The aristocratic early modern family seems to be formed around a system that promotes, above all, a succession of male relatives, placing emphasis on the first-born son, and directing both emotions and resources toward future generations of inheriting males.


9 Qtd in Houlbrooke, 10. Halesowen is a small town in West Midlands, England.
Stone’s politicized family perspective and the kinship ideals expressed by writers like Gouge and Dodd.\textsuperscript{10} Jack Goody, writing just a year before Stone, notes that

the linking of patterns of inheritance with patterns of domestic organization is a matter not simply of numbers and formations but of attitudes and emotions. The manner of splitting property is a manner of splitting people; it creates (or in some cases reflects) a particular constellation of ties and cleavages between husband and wife, parents and children, sibling and sibling, as well as between wider kin.\textsuperscript{11}

That is, the pattern of inheritance deployed by a society, or by an individual family within that society, significantly affects how various family members relate to one another.

While Stone’s thesis was flawed, he opened up an important new area of social and cultural history, and studies in this new field of the family – whether attempting to prove or disprove his theories – have led to a wealth of information from which literary critics draw. As Richard Grassby notes in his \textit{Kinship and Capitalism} (2001), the Stone model is still widely accepted by literary critics, though social historians have provided volumes of evidence suggesting other models; the persistence of Stone’s model has led to an assumption in literary studies that while the structures governing family life alter over time, “human nature has not changed within recorded history”; that is, many literary critics accept in an ahistorical way that “Emotions such as love, friendship, anger, loneliness, and fear play a central role in the lives of individuals.”\textsuperscript{12} However, more recent developments in affect studies have led to the realization that emotions are as historically and culturally specific as the familial structures Stone first


\textsuperscript{11} Jack Goody, Introduction, \textit{Family and Inheritance: Rural Society in Western Europe, 1200-1800}. ed. by Jack Goody, Joan Thirsk, and E.P. Thomspson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1976), 3. In her \textit{Wealth, Kinship and Culture} (1995), Vivienne Larminie suggests that this realization is a more recent development: “Recently, discussion has opened out as historians have recognized the far-reaching implications of marriage and inheritance practices for society as a whole – for social structure, social mobility and the law, as well as for familial and social attitudes and relationships” (22).

\textsuperscript{12} Richard Grassby, \textit{Kinship and Capitalism} (2001), 27.
identified. As early as the mid-1980s, social historians Peter Stearns and Carol Stearns intriguingly propose the new term ‘emotionology’ to “distinguish the collective emotional standards of a society from the emotional experiences of individuals and groups” (813). Stearns and Stearns propose that “all societies have emotional standards, even if they are sometimes largely unspoken or undebated, and societies differ, often significantly, in these standards.” A thriving body of scholarship now explores the historical specificity of early modern experiences and descriptions of love, hate, fear, shame, among other emotions.

Book-length studies of emotion in early modern drama have tended to focus on what they term the violent ‘exceptions’ to familial norms. More recently, critics inspired by affect theory have begun to characterize a range of emotions, including shame, love, and friendship, as particular to an early modern context. Cora Fox notes that the rapid and marked cultural renegotiations caused by violent shifts between Protestantism and Catholicism in early modern England “opened up new possibilities for understanding emotional experience and the role of

Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards,” American Historical Review 90.4 (1985), 814. They note that Lucien Febvre called for a “historical psychology” that would “give up psychological anachronism” and “establish a detailed inventory of the mental equipment of the time” (816), and that while his call was taken up by a number of historians, they tended to focus on explaining “rituals, beliefs, and institutions in terms of the emotional climate” rather than on discrete emotions (816). The historical study of protest, for instance, “remains dominated by the claim to rationality” (816), though studies of the family have been the main exception to this trend (817). Nevertheless, Stearns and Stearns rely on Stone’s account of the family, which affects their conclusions about the “cold emotional quality of premodern families” (818). Still, their term ‘emotionology’ offers an interesting framework for inquiry into the experiences people have about their own emotions, the targeting of emotions (“the selection of what people or things are appropriate for particular emotional expressions”), and the judgment and perception of emotions themselves (833-4). These avenues of research appear to have been taken up by affect theory, with a slight rearrangement of terminology.

See, for instance, Deborah G. Burks, Horrid Spectacle: Violation in the Theater of Early Modern England (Pittsburgh, 2003), which focuses entirely on the dramatization of rape, or the collection edited by Linda Woodbridge and Sharon Beehler, Women, Violence, and English Renaissance Literature (Tempe, 2003), which focuses on violence done to and by women; on the other end of the spectrum, the volume edited by Rosalynn Voaden and Diane Wolfthal, Framing the Family: Narrative and Representation in the Medieval and Early Modern Periods (Tempe, 2005) is somewhat broader in scope, but nevertheless deals with narratives describing ideal families, or the circumstances preventing the ideal, rather than affective relationships between family members.
emotion in the experience of subjectivity.” Similarly, Wendy Olmstead argues that “early modern England has distinct emotions … writers use historically and culturally distinct topos to produce emotion.” Working on a different sort of relationship, Laurie Shannon notes that “The phrase ‘Renaissance friendship’ does more than invoke the terms of a literary-historical period; it also periodizes affect, setting an era of affectivity and its representations apart from its historical others.” More recently, the idea that emotions are embodied inspired the advent of affect theory, which describes feelings as “actively making sense of [felt] situations: they constitute significations by establishing value for themselves, and they adopt an orientation or direction of action.” As Olmstead notes, “some form of evaluation or appraisal [is] essential to and constitutive of … emotion.” That is, affect theory proposes that what we call ‘emotions’ are conscious evaluations of feelings – I feel that my heart is pounding and my breath is short, and

19 Quoted in Olmstead, 6.
because I am standing on the edge of a cliff, I attribute those feelings to fear. More complicated feelings, of course, require more complicated narratives. In the following pages I examine dramatic portrayals of the narratives used to describe emotions associated with familial relationships; my goal is to identify the repertoire of affective responses available to a particular type of fictive kin group in a particular early modern genre. Following Fox, Olmstead, Shannon, and others, I argue that the early modern aristocratic family as portrayed in the revenge tragedy has characteristic ways of making sense of what happens: by examining how individual characters describe their feelings, we can infer shared beliefs about the ways families make sense. In the revenge tragedy genre, individual characters question the validity of their shared beliefs in the face of traumatic instances, making those shared beliefs more visible. Following the lead of Cora Fox, I draw on research in the social sciences that seeks to “deconstruct naturalized ideas about emotional experience and uncover the cultural processes that determine[s] which emotions are privileged or even experienced as part of the experience of the self.” The revenge tragedies that I examine establish a “social grammar” that, along with affect, is co-constitutive of the worlds of the characters. Emotions are strategic, used to “represent (and therefore define) certain kinds of affective states.” What are the ‘emotion scripts’ available to members of a family? The heightened drama of the revenge tragedy casts a harsh light on those scripts and their uses in extreme circumstances.

I want to emphasize the plurality of the ‘scripts’ of which the revenge tragedy makes use, chiefly sanguine, arboreal, and architectural; multiple discourses can be brought to bear on a

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21 Fox, 5.
22 Protevi, 53.
23 Protevi, 26.
24 Fox, 2.
single feeling, which can lead to confusion and even violent struggles over which emotional response is ‘correct’ within the play’s framework. My sense of the plurality of emotional discourses comes out of Wendy Olmsted’s observation that a “multiplicity of discourses … shape emotion.”

I do want to specify that I am not following recent critical trends in writing about the passions; rather, I am writing about emotion. As Olmstead notes, the OED defines ‘emotion’ as “the stirring or exciting of a mental state” (OED 4a). Even though the term does not enter common usage until around 1660, it is pertinent because, as Olmstead points out, “It comes from the Latin emoveo, ‘I move out,’ and emota, ‘stirred,’ related to the verb moveo (‘I move, stir’) that is used figuratively to mean ‘move, influence, affect, excite, or inspire.’ Rhetoricians writing in Latin use this verb to refer to moving the audience’s emotions.”

While this is not the focus of my thesis, my conclusion will examine some of the ways revenge tragedies portray the consequences of moving someone’s emotions, or of failing to do so.

Examining several plays from the genre known as the revenge tragedy, I argue that these authors use specific discourses in order to move their audience’s emotions. Hereafter, I adopt the language of affect theory to differentiate the stages of this process of moving: an ‘emotion’ is a narrativized description of a ‘feeling,’ which is expressed physically or felt bodily as an ‘affect.’ The articulation of a feeling through the construction of a narrative reveals the relationship between emotion and ideology. In this aspect of my argument, I draw on Catherine Lutz’s groundbreaking text on the cultural construction of affect, Unnatural Emotion, in which she aims to “deconstruct an overly naturalized and rigidly bounded concept of emotion, to treat emotion as an ideological practice rather than as a thing to be discovered or an essence to be distilled,” as part of an attempt to counter the Western belief that “emotion is in essence a psychobiological

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25 Olmstead, 6.
26 Olmsted, 8.
structure and an aspect of the individual.”27 Lutz’s research enables me to look beyond identifying particular emotions in specific characters to the ideals underpinning the emotional descriptions attached to relationship structures. I am not locating expressions of ‘love,’ or determining their genuineness; instead, I am adapting Lutz’s work to examine the social and cultural ideals shaping how that love is described. The term ‘emotion,’ Lutz notes,

“is culturally defined, socially enacted, and personally articulated … Although we may experience emotion as something that rises and falls within the boundaries of our bodies, the decidedly social origins of our understandings of the self, the other, the world, and experience draw our attention to the interpersonal processes by which something called emotion or some things like joy, anger, or fear come to be ascribed to and experienced by us. I will demonstrate that the use of emotion concepts, as elements of local ideological practice, involves negotiation over the meaning of events, over rights and morality, over control of resources … emotion can be viewed as a cultural and interpersonal process of naming, justifying, and persuading by people in relationship to each other.”28

Drawing on Lutz’s important work, my project as a whole looks at how family members, drawing on the ideological practices underlying inheritance patterns, negotiate the meaning of the traumatic events that constitute revenge tragedies. What do these family relationships look like? How are they described, how are they imagined? In an attempt to answer these questions, I take note of Lutz’ conviction that emotion narratives serve “complex communicative, moral, and cultural purposes,” and are not simply “labels for internal states.”29 Along these lines, I examine emotions associated with familial relationships to uncover the ideologies underlying, hedging, and constituting the narratives used by playwrights to describe how families work, and how feelings associated with familial relationships are pressured by inheritance structures.

28 Lutz, 5.
29 Lutz, 5.
By ‘inheritance structures’ I mean the larger range of ideologies about who should inherit and why associated with specific patterns of inheritance; for instance, the inheritance pattern of primogeniture is associated with the belief that the eldest son is the best-suited to inherit. In my thesis, I argue that the belief underlying primogeniture, that the eldest son makes the best heir, is founded on the ideal that the eldest son is most like the father. That is, the eldest son is capable of replicating the father by imitating and resembling him, that the death of the father leads to the creation of a new father. The beliefs underlying the inheritance pattern of primogeniture contain inherent contradictions – the ideal of resemblance appeals to ‘nature,’ for instance, though that ideal is being fulfilled through the social construct of imitation – that make the completion of an inheritance cycle difficult, and even vexed.

The tragic events that can vex inheritance cycles are foregrounded in Thomas Kyd’s *The Spanish Tragedy* (1582); when Hieronimo realizes that his son has died, he laments the loss of his family’s collective future beyond the loss of the individual son. He describes Horatio as “The very arm that did hold up our house: / Our hopes were stored up in him” (Third Addition 30-33). This addition created a version of the play for its 1597 revival that highlights the connection between the emotional loss and the imperatives of this inheritance patterns by focusing on Horatio’s role within the ‘house,’ the family as a whole and as a genealogical continuation. While the father’s emotional devastation is pervasive, his preoccupation with what

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30 Tromly notes that “prescriptive and cautionary” texts stressed “the unquestioning obedience of sons to the unquestionable authority of fathers; this pervasive attitude was drummed into Shakespeare’s generation by the mutually reinforcing catechisms of church and state, bolstered by various legal sanctions, and enacted in the rituals of everyday life [and] preached the imitation and even replication of the father” (17). In Chapter 1, I connect these beliefs underlying primogeniture to broader humanist educational trends, and argue that the ideal that the eldest son should also be the best son pressures and creates violently conditional father-son relationships.

31 The 1602 passages, totaling 320 lines, may have been made for the 1597 revival of the play by the Admiral’s Men; various authors have been proposed by scholars, including Jonson, Dekker, Webster, and even Shakespeare. Thomas Kyd, *The Spanish Tragedy* Edited by Philip Edwards. The Revels Plays (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1986), xxi-xxvii. All quotations from the play are also taken from this edition.
Horatio should have done in the future is brought to the fore, reminding the audience that the loss of Horatio is the loss of an entire family – the line dies with him, and the addition makes much of Hieronimo’s reliance on his son to ensure the continuance of that line.

The relationship between feeling and its narrative articulation as emotion is captured by Hieronimo’s relationship with Horatio in The Spanish Tragedy (1582). Thomas Kyd’s best-known play deploys a discourse of emotion that connects feelings about family members with inheritance structures, suggesting a fundamental reciprocity between emotions (or the narrativization of those feelings) and inheritance. The overt effect of inheritance structures on feelings about inheriting family members are narrativized throughout by Hieronimo, who uses the vocabulary of genealogical focus and idealized familial emotions in a way that obscures the economic motive of the inheritance structure, and the conditional nature of the emotional discourse. The Spanish Tragedy opens in the underworld with the ghost of the murdered Don Andrea pleading for revenge from Proserpine. Don Andrea’s wish is granted, and with a personified Revenge he watches his lover, Bel-Imperia, fall in love with his best friend, Horatio, and the two unite in avenging Don Andrea’s death. At this point Don Andrea becomes secondary to the main action of the play. Horatio is the son of the Knight Martial, Hieronimo, an honorable man but of a much lower class than Bel-Imperia. As Knight Marshall, Hieronimo occupies an

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32 The dating of the play is uncertain. While most often dated at 1587, the composition of the play can only be narrowed down to a roughly ten year period, probably after 1582 as it adapts material from Sonnet XLVII of Thomas Watson’s Hekatompethia (1582), and certainly before 23 February 1592, when it was performed by Lord Strange’s men for Henslowe. See Arthur Freeman, Thomas Kyd: Facts and Problems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 70-9, 84; Philip Edwards, Introduction, The Spanish Tragedy, Revels Edition (London: Methuen, 1959), xxi-xxvii; FS Boas, The Works of Thomas Kyd (Oxford 1901), xxvii-xxx; TW Baldwin, “On the Chronology of Thomas Kyd’s Plays,” (MLN, XL 1925), 343-9; Kyd, Thomas. The Spanish Tragedy J.R. Mulryne, ed. (London: A&C Black, 1989), xvi; Clifford Leech, John Webster: A Critical Study (New York: Haskell House, 1970), xxi-xxvii. Lukas Erne argues that The Spanish Tragedy is a sequel to the lost Don Horatio, both of which were written before 1588 (31-7), and that two-part plays, in which the first is a comedy and the second a revenge tragedy, are actually a common feature of early modern plays (37-42), noting Marston’s Antonio duology, Chettle’s The Tragedy of Hoffman (possibly a sequel to a lost play), Chapman’s Bussy plays, and even 2 and 3 Henry VI and examples of the form, in Beyond The Spanish Tragedy: A Study of the Works of Thomas Kyd (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2001).
important bureaucratic position in the court; though this position is not necessarily hereditary, such elective positions often ran in families, and Hieronimo begins the play attempting to gain the king’s favor, not for himself, but for his son. Hieronimo's goal in preferring his son before the king appears to be the creation of a new heritable line of Knights Marshall.

Hieronimo’s first reference to his son occurs during the debate over Balthazar’s ransom. He introduces and recommends his son to his king in terms that appear to encapsulate the effects of inheritance structures on discourses of emotion:

That was my son, my gracious sovereign,  
Of whom though from his tender infancy  
My loving thoughts did never hope but well,  
He never pleased his father’s eyes till now,  
Nor filled my heart with over-cloying joy. (1.2.116-20)

Hieronimo’s preferment of his son notably establishes conditions on his relationship with his son. Hieronimo claims he has spent Horatio’s entire life (‘from his tender infancy”) expressing his own affection in expectation of Horatio’s eventual successes. However, as a result of that specifically martial success, Hieronimo states that Horatio has for the first time really pleased him, but also that the joy he now feels is somehow excessive. Hieronimo’s reference to the ‘joy’ brought by children is conventional, but he almost inadvertently suggests that there is

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33 A 1572 court document states that “The Baron of Lixnow is half marshall of the Earl’s castle and holdeth the same office by inheritance.” <www.nationalarchives.org.uk>

34 When speaking of his son, Hieronimo is consistently more likely to use the word ‘joy’ to describe him and the feelings aroused by him. Upon discovering Horatio’s body, Hieronimo laments, “Ay me most wretched, that have lost my joy, / In leesing my Horatio, my sweet boy” (2.4.32-3) – and similar terms are used throughout to describe Horatio as the object of various characters’ love: “my joy” (2.4.92); “my comfort and his mother’s joy” (Third Addition 31). Another repeated, linked term is bliss, used synecdochically to describe Horatio: “my bliss” (3.12.69); “Here lay my bliss, and here my bliss bereft” (4.4.92). See also: in Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy (1611), Montferrers similarly refers to his eldest son and heir Charlemont as his ‘joy,’ lamenting “that I am deprived of ... joy” (2.1.19-20). And in Middleton’s A Yorkshire Tragedy, the Wife is told, “Be comforted. One joy is yet unmurdered. / You have a boy at nurse; your joy’s in him” (Scene 8, 63-4). The anonymous A warning for all murderers (1620) tells the story of “three accursed kinsmen” who murdered “their Uncles sonne. / A kind and courteous Gentleman, / his aged Father’s joy.” A few other examples beyond drama suggest the commonplace quality of the terms hope and joy in early modern affective language used to refer to children. After losing a son “who so perfectly matched his own hopes, [John] Evelyn suffered ‘unexpressable griefe & affliction.’ There, he
something wrong with the joy, as if Horatio’s success has instantiated a rivalry between father and son, or caused Hieronimo to feel somehow diminished in comparison to his son. The story Hieronimo tells about what he is feeling in this moment, that is, his identification of that feeling as “over-cloying joy” brought on by the success of a son who “never pleased his father’s eyes till now,” suggests that both conditionality and rivalry underlie the relationship between father and son. The father’s expectations place conditions on how he articulates his relationship with his son; put simply, Horatio’s success in battle has finally pleased his father, but his description of that pleasure establishes the conditions under which similar emotions will be expressed. Horatio simply being his son will not trigger Hieronimo’s expression of pleasure. Hieronimo’s speech reveals a normative familial relationship quite distant from more modern ideals of “unconditional love,” which propose that familial relationships maintain affective bonds regardless of circumstances. Obviously this ideal is rarely fulfilled, but its manifest absence in early modern drama reveals an interesting difference in how familial relationships are imagined, described, and perhaps even experienced.

*The Spanish Tragedy* consistently links the continuation of lineage with individual experiences of affection, e.g. the Viceroy’s concern over his son (“By hate deprived of his dearest son, / The only hope of our successive line” (3.1.13-14)), or the syntax of the Ambassador’s speech at 3.12.32-56, in which the viceroy’s relief over news of his son’s continued health (“as a man extremely overjoyed / To hear his son so princely entertained, / Whose death he had so solemnly bewailed”), transitions smoothly to his offer of “a sure, wrote, ended the joy of his life” (Houlbrooke *Death* 236). When Bulstrode Whitelocke’s daughter died in 1654, her death “carried with her out of the world ‘much of the joy & comfort of her father, to whom she was a companion in his widowers estate” (Houlbrooke *Death* 236-7).
inexplicable bond”\textsuperscript{35} between Portugal and Spain via the marriage of his son to Bel-Imperia and the immediate succession of his son to the Portingale throne. The constitution of familial emotions by genealogical connections and continuities is replicated, to varying degrees, in each father/heir relationship in the play. The Portingale viceroy expresses his emotional connection with his son in terms of his inheritance and potential succession. Hieronimo’s conflation of emotional and lineal concerns encapsulates a tendency in early modern drama to represent familial relationships as under pressure from the ideologies underpinning inheritance structures.

In Chapter One of this thesis I analyze the vocabulary of familial emotion in John Marston’s \textit{Antonio and Mellida} (1599) and \textit{Antonio’s Revenge} (1600), revealing that kinship is treated in the language that erupts at scenes of violence as if it were constituted by imitation and inheritance – inheriting sons are expected to imitate their fathers, so that the devolution of property determines personal affect and emotional relationships. Andrugio expects his son to replicate and replace him; the way Antonio’s failure is portrayed reveals how uncertainties over the effective disposition of property haunt Andrugio’s expectations. Unlike sons, however, inheriting daughters are expected to abandon one family for another through the process of marriage, making the father’s expectations about his daughter’s obedience fraught, and the daughter’s transfer from father to husband inherently violent. Thus Piero, the villain of the plays, who consistently refers to his daughter as a piece of him, will represent her transfer to a husband as a rending-off. Though each father’s relationship is characterized according to gendered

\textsuperscript{35} Most modern editions correct 1592’s ‘inexecrable’ with 1594’s ‘inexplicable’; in his introduction to the 1959 Revels edition, Clifford Leech notes that ‘inexecrable’ is found in two other places where its meaning is not clear: \textit{Merchant of Venice}, IV.i.128, and Constable, \textit{Diana}, viii, Sonnet 1. As he argues, the nearest meaning appropriate to the 1592 edition of \textit{Spanish Tragedy} would be ‘that cannot be cursed away.’ Leech, xli.
In Chapter Two, I turn to how the language of familial affect undergirds fellow-feeling. In *The Maid's Tragedy* (1619), Beaumont and Fletcher idealize a model of friendship founded on the intimate sharing of thoughts and feelings that shears off from residual, but persistent models of friendship as a reciprocal relationship between unequal parties who each expect material benefit from the bond. Their descriptions of this new idealized model of friendship are accomplished through borrowing metaphors from idealized fraternal kinship. However, characters who borrow from fraternal metaphors are anxious to assert the superiority of friendship over kinship: “to me the name / Of brother is too distant: we are friends, / And that is nearer” (3.1.41-3); “The name of friend is more than family” (3.2.167). This model of friendship borrows metaphors from but is always set against models of fraternal kinship, revealing the conflicted relationship with its discourse of origin. Beaumont and Fletcher borrow from the discourse of fraternity to describe this form of friendship in an attempt to appropriate the legitimacy of the fraternal ideal. However, their appropriation actually foregrounds the unreliability and contingent nature of the ‘blood tie,’ while also engaging in contemporary pamphlet debates about the role of primogeniture (as well as other inheritance systems) in fratricide.

In Chapter Three, I focus on the pressure of Christian piety on familial affection by examining the emotional repertoire of the play’s titular atheist, D’Amville. His attempts to supplant his nephew Charlemont are explicitly linked to his lack of certainty in an afterlife. While the play, as an anti-revenge revenge tragedy, offers a Christian corrective to revenge, it also contains a spiritual disruption of two family *topoi*: the idea that the father lives on in his
sons; and the social imperative that the son imitates, and thereby replicates, his father. Tourneur criticizes a model of filial imitation that idealizes likeness (instead of virtue) as a goal in itself; his portrayal of D’Amville’s atheism foregrounds and portrays an extreme version of the desire to live through one’s posterity that is opposed to the apparently normative version of this truism represented by Montferrers and Charlemont. Both fathers focus on the economics of succession: Montferrers expresses concern for his son’s “substance,” while D’Amville pushes that concern further, using the familiar image of the ‘family tree’ to complain that his sons “from my substance … receive the sap / Whereby they live and flourish.” It is his deployment of the ‘family tree’ metaphor that later enables D’Amville to imagine “lopp[ing] them off.” Tourneur’s attempt to contrast banal and extreme versions of filial imitation and of the commonplace desire to live through one’s posterity highlights the violence that inheres in each relationship.

In Chapter Four, I argue that inheritance is once more figured as resemblance in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus* (1594), a play that opens in the midst of a succession crisis, in a crucial justification for primogeniture. The debate with which *Titus* begins speaks to its context in the 1590s: following Elizabeth’s illness and continued childlessness, belief in the ideal that monarchy could provide stability through the reproduction of children that resembled their parents had faltered. *Titus* responds to burgeoning nervousness over the Elizabethan succession, and this context makes the ideal of stability through continuity, and continuity through reproduction, extremely appealing but also quite fragile. Shakespeare uses the role of familial inheritance in structuring political conversations about monarchy versus republicanism to suggest the reciprocal impact of political structures and structures of kinship. The necessity of violence to buttress political action casts early modern models of kinship as endangered by a
predatory political system in spite of that system’s adoption of kinship metaphors to describe political actions and actors.

The anecdote with which this introduction began adduces the currency of examinations into the history of the family, and into the history of emotions. *Turn Back Time* explores how social structures shape experiences and expressions of familial emotions, suggesting a popular curiosity about how the past has made the family what it is today. Scholarly interest is no less piqued: the *PMLA* has proposed an issue dedicated to the special topic of emotions (Fall 2013); the Australian Research Council has established the Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions, and funds significant, interdisciplinary research on how ‘emotions make history’ in medieval and early modern Europe. My project intervenes in the tendency of literary critics to see violent family relationships as deviations from the norm; rather, normative familial relationships contain those deviations, which spring from the underlying inheritance structures that exert pressure on even idealized representations of the family. My project also intervenes in modern understandings of familial relationships. The modern ideal of “unconditional love,” from which my title is derived, is presumed to structure perfect familial relationships based on the affinity created by shared blood; a corollary of this ideal is that inheritance structures are presumed to have little relevance to our lives today. The plays I study in this thesis feature families that descend into a chaos of murder and revenge because of the ideologies underlying the inheritance structures that constitute their relationships. A father threatens to “mangle” his dead son’s face because that son failed his duty of imitation and replication; a younger brother murders his elder brother to bypass the inheritance structure of primogeniture, which creates violent competition for economic and affective resources; these scenarios come out of one of the most exaggerated dramatic forms, the revenge tragedy, but they could easily be used to explain
murders motivated by inheritance struggles, and even divorce settlement laws, in our own society. The recent murders in the French Alps, at first assumed to be the random, inexplicable slaughter of a family on vacation, have been connected to a feud between brothers over the division of their father’s assets\textsuperscript{36}; an LSU student was recently arrested for attempting to murder her mother to gain her inheritance early\textsuperscript{37}; a twenty-one year old man recently hacked his mother to death because he feared the loss of his inheritance after she remarried.\textsuperscript{38} The influence of inheritance structures on familial relationships is an often unacknowledged point of interest in contemporary life as well as in early modern life. Primogeniture may no longer create the conditions placed on family relationships, but families are still profoundly pressured by an unacknowledged competition for love and money. My examination of dramatic portrayals of the conditions placed on early modern relationships by inheritance structures could reveal something about how families are imagined to work today.


\textsuperscript{38} Murray Wadrop, “Son hacked mother to death with machete ‘over inheritance row.’” \textit{The Telegraph.}, 7 April 2011. Web. 15 Nov. 2012.
Chapter 1: “Worthy my blood”: Inheritance, Imitation, and Gendered Familial Emotions in John Marston’s *Antonio* Plays

I hope he died like my son, I’faith. …
He died unforced, I trust, and valiantly. …
Did his hand shake or his eye look dull,
His thoughts reel, fearful, when he struck the stroke?
And if they did, I’ll rend him out of the hearse,
Rip up his cerecloth, mangle his bleak face,
That when he comes to heaven, the powers divine
Shall ne’er take notice that he was my son.
I’ll quite disclaim his birth.  

(*Antonio and Mellida* 5.2.193-203)

When Andrugio is confronted with Antonio’s apparent corpse, his lament, given at his son’s funeral, expresses the expectation that Antonio somehow mirrors his father. Here valor is imagined as part of a genetic inheritance that nevertheless requires an imitative performance of familial relationship. Andrugio’s lament expresses regret for his son’s death, but dwells on Antonio’s comportment; his expectations implicitly equate the valor presumably expressed by Andrugio with their blood tie. The play consistently questions the relationship between father and son, portraying a relationship so tenuous that it requires continuous assertion and is constantly at risk of dissolution. Establishing his own martial character as imitative of a familial virtue, Andrugio determines to “show myself myself, / Worthy my blood” (*AM* 3.1.114-5), and when Antonio falters in their quest for revenge, Andrugio tries to revive Antonio’s spirit by asking, “O, where’s thy dauntless heart, / Thy father’s spirit? I renounce thy blood / If thou forsake thy valor” (*AM* 4.2.19-22). Sharing blood clearly is no guarantee of familial affection in this world, and Andrugio very explicitly lays out the terms under which Antonio may receive paternal regard and, by extension, maintain his position as heir. Andrugio consistently uses his own behavior as the model for Antonio’s, and clearly suggests that his own behavior is valorous,
spirited, and worthy of the family lineage. In this lament, Andrugio’s expectations for his son’s behavior in extremis are quite high – Andrugio fears that Antonio’s hand might have shaken or that his eye lacked the flash of bravery. However, Andrugio also fears that Antonio’s thoughts reeled – it is not enough to show bravery or conviction. The merest possibility that Antonio might have felt fear in his last moments is enough for Andrugio to threaten repudiation of the blood tie. The form of that repudiation is particularly gruesome, as Andrugio threatens to deny his son proper Christian burial, to disown him, and ultimately to disfigure his face. Each action is designed to destroy the connection between father and son, and Andrugio’s stated intention to ‘mangle’ his son’s face speaks to a powerful desire, should Antonio prove a poor imitator of Andrugio’s martial valor, to remove or destroy the thing that most displays their likeness.

John Marston’s *Antonio and Mellida* (1599) and *Antonio’s Revenge* (ca. 1599-1600) dwell on problematic inheritances and failed imitations, using moments of crisis (a war lost, a son murdered) to portray moments usually read by literary critics as a nightmarish violation of normative family relationships. However, I argue that the ideologies underlying those norms create both ideal and exaggerated versions of familial relationships. Marston’s plays represent the kinds of concerns that also shape tragedies and history plays, which tend to focus on issues of family and broken inheritance. Critics tend to read these moments as breaks in the norm, and in doing so make broad assumptions about the norm that is being opposed to its violation. For instance, in his recent *The Myth of Rome* (2011), Warren Chernaik argues of *Titus Andronicus* (1582) that the play ends “with an act of violent revenge in which the avenger becomes no less barbarous, no less a violator of pietas and the ordinary ties of kinship than the original criminal.”  

While he focuses primarily on Elizabethan views of Roman institutions, quite

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foreign to my concerns here, Chernaik’s argument can be enriched and reoriented if we consider the underlying ideologies creating the ‘ordinary family ties’ as well as the ‘barbarous’ instantiations of familial relationships. Many of those ideologies derive from property concerns and, as recent criticism has argued, property relationships then shape the gendered language of emotional family bonds.\(^{40}\) Relationships between fathers and sons are shaped by the structures of land inheritance, and relationships between fathers and daughters are shaped by the expectation that she will fulfill the role of wife and mother in the family structure. I argue that, shaped by differing socio-economic dynamics, father/son relationships are imagined in terms of mirroring and replication that are essentially derived from the ideals underlying the inheritance system of primogeniture, whereas father/daughter relationships are represented in terms of extension and incorporation derived from domestic prescriptive literature. Marston’s use of the normative languages of inheritance structures and domestic literature reveals something in normative kinship that causes or creates moments of perversion and excess.\(^{41}\) The moments of fissure inhere in the norm, so that Marston’s apparently normative portrayal of the relationship between father

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\(^{41}\) While the term ‘normative’ has a technical meaning in moral theory, where it is used in a prescriptive sense to designate those actions that are right and desirable, or that ought to be, I use the term throughout as Michael Warner does in *The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life* (Harvard, 1999). For Warner, the ‘normative’ describes the dictates and practices of the majorities. Attempting to detach ‘normativity’ from ethical arguments, Warner argues that “if normal just means within a common statistical range, there is no reason to be normal or not” (54). I follow Warner in placing ‘normativity’ on a spectrum rather than isolating the normative as an ideal. Following the logic of ‘ethical normativity’ would demand that I follow other critics in describing moments of violent family disruption as breaks in an abstract norm rather than excessive versions of conventional practices.
and son is related to and reliant on the exaggerated, even perverted excesses in his portrayal of the relationship between father and daughter.

Fathers and Sons

During the last four years of his father’s life (1595-1599), John Marston shared rooms with him in the Inns of Court.\(^{42}\) One of the Benchers of the Middle Temple, and Fall Reader in 1592, Marston’s father expressed the desire that his son follow him into the profession of law. However, before his death, he witnessed his son’s early satires burned by order of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and his son diverted from study of the law to writing plays for the Christmas revels.\(^{43}\) In an oft-repeated story,\(^ {44}\) Marston, Sr.’s will bequeathed:

> to my saide sonne the bedding and furniture in my chamber in the Middle Temple and my apparel there and else where and for my lawe books beinge a double Co[u]urse thereof I bequeath them to my sonne wherein I have taken greate paynes with delighte and hoped my sonne woud have profited in the studdie of the lawe wherein I bestowed my uttermost indevo[u]r but man purposeth and god disposeth his will be donne and send his grace to feare and serve him.”\(^ {45}\)

The broader social implications of the phrasing of Marston’s father’s will indicate a significant relationship between the father’s feelings and his heritable goods, with the material deliberately

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\(^{42}\) Finkelpearl, Philip J. \textit{John Marston of the Middle Temple}. (1969), 6. There is no birth date for the elder Marston, but there is record of his marriage to Maria (d. 1621?), daughter of Andrew Guarsi, at Wardington on 19 September 1575 (ODNB), which gives some indication of his age.

\(^{43}\) Finkelpearl, 119-24. While Marston could have done both, the shift from law to playwriting seems to have been viewed as a renunciation of the former by his father, and Marston makes a similar renunciation after his arrest over the Scottish parodies in \textit{Eastward Hol}, when he turns from the theater to a new career in the clergy.

\(^{44}\) Portions of the will are quoted on Ibid., 84, as is the assertion that the story is frequently referenced in Marstonian criticism. The portions quoted stem from an abstract of the will, which was quoted in Alexander Grossart, ed., \textit{The Poems of John Marston} (Manchester, 1879), pp. x-xi, as have all subsequent references to the document. For that reason I went back to the original will, and pulled out a longer quote than is usually analyzed.

\(^{45}\) Many thanks to the Old English mailing list for their help in transcribing the original will from its original Court Hand. [http://lists.rootsweb.ancestry.com/index/other/Translations_and_Word_Origins/OLD-ENGLISH.html](http://lists.rootsweb.ancestry.com/index/other/Translations_and_Word_Origins/OLD-ENGLISH.html) > The will itself is available through The National Archives: Catalogue Reference: prob/11/94; Image Reference: 782
used to signify the emotional. While this example concerns our playwright and his father, the will itself is emblematic of familial relationships in early modern England – its broader themes and concerns could obtain in any father/son relationship. When one makes a will one thinks on death, on attachments, and on property. The core functions of a will included the declaration of one’s faith, the disposal of one’s body and soul, the occasion to seek reconciliation and forgive one’s enemies, and the arrangement for the transmission of wealth.\(^46\) Wills in this period often contained expressions of anxiety about the future behavior of children, or bequests that were specifically dependent upon the good behavior of that child.\(^47\) John Marston having by this time abandoned his study of the law to write his satires and his early plays,\(^48\) his father signals his disapproval as a matter of public record: rather than denying his son an inheritance,\(^49\) he bequeaths carefully chosen material goods – law books – to his “willful disobedient son” who “deserveth them not,”\(^50\) as a reminder of his (disappointed) expectations.

\(^{46}\) Ralph Houlbrooke, *Death, Religion, and the Family in England, 1480-1750.* (Oxford 1998), 82-4. Houlbrooke notes that the advice literature of the period emphasized two primary roles of the will: the declaration of faith and the transmission of property. For instance, the Book of Common Prayer (1549) advises that “menne must be ofte admonished that they sette an ordre for theyr temporall goodes and lands, whan they be in health” (qtd in Houlbrooke *Death* 82), in what Houlbrooke describes as an attempt to “remove will-making from its traditional death-bed setting” in post-Reformation England (82). That is, while a will might involve thinking on death, it might not necessarily be an eminent death. William Gouge similarly “pointed out in his popular *Of Domesticall Duties* (1622) that the fit time for making a will was when a man’s understanding was still good, and his memory perfect, so that he might call to mind what goods he had to bestow, ‘and with discretion and wisdom order his estate’” (83).

\(^{47}\) Houlbrooke (*Death*), 143, 139-40

\(^{48}\) Wharton (1994) notes that his father lived just long enough to see Marston’s satires burned by order of the Bishop’s decree (98). The *Antonio* plays are generally dated to 1599-1601, and *Histriomastix* to 1598 or 1599.

\(^{49}\) The elder Marston leaves his son substantial holdings, including a ‘mansion house’, meadow and gardens in Coventry, after the death of his wife, Mary, along with the rents and interests in several other properties, on the condition his son provide a portion of those to Mary, along with his “blacke trottinge gelding.”

\(^{50}\) Qtd. in Wharton (1994), 98. According to the ODNB, these lines were canceled in the final version of the will, and so belong to an earlier draft than is available through the National Archives.
While a relatively mild version of parental influence and control, the elder Marston’s will sheds light on how heritable goods and parental affection shape one another: the material could on occasion come to stand in for the emotional, and the emotional could become justification for or idealization of the material. Specific economic values were placed on familial relationships, and expressions of love, fondness, or hatred were mediated through the transmission of material goods. Will-making was one of the few occasions that could actually produce a materialization of feelings. The will left by Marston’s father raises the issue of family resemblance, and a father’s disappointment in his son’s behavior and career choices suggests the importance placed on the son’s imitation of his father. That is, the main problem expressed by the will’s rebuke is John Marston’s failure to follow in his father’s footsteps, so to speak. The relationship in John Marston’s play between father and son, Andrugio and Antonio, typifies precisely the pressure placed on these relationships by inheritance structures and the demands of imitation ideals.

*Antonio and Mellida* begins post-bellum; the war with Piero, Duke of Venice, already lost, father and son separated and each believing the other dead, Andrugio, lately Duke of Genoa, and Antonio, his heir, independently decide to avenge each other along with their multiple losses of status, land, and prospects. However, their revenges differ significantly in motive. Antonio, the son, spends much of the play attempting to gain access to Mellida; the daughter of the enemy

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51 The punishment seems to be more emotional than material, as Marston’s other heritable goods are unaffected by his father’s displeasure.

52 Such expressions can be difficult to track without knowledge of the tropes and conventions of early modern will writing. For instance, in *The Second Best Bed* (1993), Joyce Rogers traces the religious and cultural traditions to contextualize the rather infamous bequest as denoting fondness rather than a malicious oversight, as has been theorized in the past. See especially 13-15, 51-2, 73-95.

53 While *Antonio and Mellida* is not itself a revenge tragedy, it contains revenge elements, and references to characters’ intent to commit acts of vengeance. Its sequel play, *Antonio’s Revenge*, is a revenge tragedy.
who has just defeated him, Mellida nevertheless returns Antonio’s love and spends much of the play pining for lack of it. Antonio disguises himself as an Amazon and infiltrates Piero’s court, focusing mainly on assessing whether Mellida is faithful to him, while in the play’s subplot, Andrugio plans with his one loyal advisor and friend, Lucio, to avenge the death of his son.

Based on incidents in the reigns of the three Sforza Dukes of Milan, Francesco, Galeazzo and Lodovico, Marston’s play takes major liberties in pruning of the family trees of each father. The historical Sforza family was overrun with heirs, with each generation producing several sons and daughters, both legitimate and not. The options for inheriting in Antonio and Mellida are significantly more limited. There are three fathers in the Antonio duology: Andrugio and Pandulpho, both of whom have a single son; and Piero, who has a single daughter. There is no question of sibling rivalry, and the inheritor of a father’s goods and offices is never in question. In this way, Marston both streamlines and naturalizes inheritance.\(^\text{55}\)

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\(^{\text{54}}\) The History of Antonio and Mellida derives its main plot from both the general idea of tyranny connected with the name ‘Sforza’ and the events in Italy that characterized the historical Sforza dynasty in their rule of the Duchy of Milan (1450-1535). The villainous character, Piero, is a “conscious fiction,” the name never having occurred in the Sforza family, and is based mostly on the first of the Sforza dukes, Francesco, but also partly on the subsequent dukes, Galeazzo Maria and Lodovico. The location of the play has been shifted from Milan to Venice. The information on the Sforza family was taken from W. Reavley Gail’s introduction to the Revels edition of Antonio and Mellida, (Manchester University Press, 1991, 2004), 18.

\(^{\text{55}}\) The play’s inheritance scheme is rather more accurate than some aspects of Marston’s historicity. While ducal offices in Italy were not inherited at this time, the Sforza name was associated with tyranny because the Sforzas had such dynastic (and violent) control over the duchy as to render the electoral system superfluous. The founder of the dynasty, Muzio Attendolo (1369-1424) even took the name ‘Sforza’ from ‘sforzare,’ to exert or force, embodying the tyrannical accusations following his military victories. The streamlining of inheritance issues isn’t necessarily a reaction against primogeniture, since “two areas in England, Kent and London, were recognized to have well-established inheritance customs that were, in effect, exceptions to the rule of primogeniture. In Kent it was gavelkind; in London, it was the power of devise,” Gregory Kneidel, “Coscus, Queen Elizabeth, and Law in John Donne’s “Satyre II” Renaissance Quarterly 61.1 (2008), endnote 93, which is why Marston’s father had to leave a will, since he couldn’t assume his eldest son would inherit or that his lands couldn’t be confiscated by the crown, but also allowed his father to make provisions to reprimand his son for the change in profession. In either case, limiting the options for inheritance limits the conflict that can be derived from arguments over competing inheritances, and focuses the audience’s attention on the conflict derived within a streamlined inheritance structure.
Plays specialize in such truncations; in the Antonio plays, with two or three members and little other competition for heritable goods and titles, the devolution of such goods seems natural in every sense of the word. Mellida is also an only child, and while she will presumably inherit her father’s goods, she is evidently incapable of inheriting his position as the next Duchess of Venice (and presumably of Genoa); instead, her inheritance will come in the form of marriage to an appropriate son (Galeazzo, son to the Duke of Florence) who will inherit his own father’s goods and titles, along with Piero’s, thereby enlarging Piero’s legacy and dukedom but simultaneously effacing it as Piero’s. However, in spite of Marston’s naturalization of the inheritance structures of the play, he more overtly demonstrates the conditional nature of familial love. Marston lays bare the mechanisms by which hereditary culture impinges upon experiences and expressions of familial emotion, and exposes normative and extreme familial relationships as not opposites or anomalies but part of the same continuum.

Marston’s construction of normative kin relationships centers on his portrayal of the relationship between father and son. In Antonio and Mellida, Marston characterizes the relationship between Andrugio and Antonio as emotional, close, and sincere – and as created by the structures of inheritance. When Andrugio questions his priorities, he decisively favors his son and heir, lamenting to his friend and advisor: “Ay, Lucio, having lost a son, a son, / A country, house, crown, son. O lares, miserl lares! / Which shall I first deplore? My son, my son, / My

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56 A younger brother, Julio, appears in the sequel play Antonio’s Revenge (mentioned by Antonio at 3.2.52, but not appearing until 3.3), though Piero’s primary motive in killing Andrugio and marrying Maria remains to “give his blood a son” (3.1.40). Julio appears to be a late addition designed to echo Ovid’s Metamorphoses, VI, specifically the story of Procne: her sister is raped by her husband, and the two women gain revenge by killing Procne’s son and feeding him to his father. A similar scenario is used in Titus 5.3. Aside from his role in intensifying Antonio’s revenge plot, Julio is largely absent from the play.

57 For criticism on John Marston’s milieu, see Finkelpearl (1969). For a full accounting of Marstonian criticism, see Wharton (1994); for a more recent accounting, see also T.F. Wharton, ed, The Drama of John Marston: Critical Re-Visions (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
dear, sweet boy, my dear Antonio” (*AM* 4.1.86-9). This moment centers on a critical question: ‘Which shall I first deplore?’ Andrugio’s answer seems to confuse his child and his goods, as he mourns the loss of ‘a son, a son, / A country, house, crown, son.’ Antonio is merely part of a list of woes, and while his is the most frequent repetition, he is also equated with material losses in such a way that the son becomes a possession just like the country, house and crown.\(^{58}\) Property and person become interchangeable and equally valuable.

However, another reading of the passage complicates Marston’s relationship to the material and the emotional. In wondering which loss should be grieved first, not exclusive of the others, but prioritized over them, Andrugio asks the audience to think about the issue, to empathize with his loss. The rhetorical nature of the question, answered immediately by his own prioritized list of ‘My son, my son, / My dear, sweet boy, my dear Antonio,’ attempts to lead the audience to agree with his sense of degree and place. Andrugio’s list, bookended by insistent references to his son, groups together different kinds of losses: country, house, crown, son, imbricating political and familial statuses and possessions. ‘Son’ most obviously refers to a familial relationship. The term ‘house’ covers both ‘household’ as well as familial relationships grouped under a single name (overlapping slightly with the term); ‘household’ can operate in two different senses, as a physical space which is occupied by family members related by blood and marriage, servants, apprentices, and even lodgers, all of whom could be considered part of a family.\(^{59}\) But beyond its familial meanings, ‘house’ could encapsulate Andrugio’s relationship

\(^{58}\) That exchangeability seems forcefully to recall Shylock’s confusion of the material with the emotional, his “O my ducats! O my daughter!” in another version of improperly valuing personal relationships. However, daughters and sons relate to fathers differently; Jessica’s relationship to Shylock is contingent on obedience, not imitation, and her inevitable loss to marriage is expected – Shylock’s main problem is that his daughter disobeyed him, not that she failed to imitate him.

with his country, just as his crown is the metonym for his political, social and economic power; Andrugio’s focus could be on the continuation of his ‘house’ in the sense of his family line, the vital continuation of successive heirs. The troubling nature of the loss of a child might seem obvious to a modern audience. However, while ‘son’ is the most repeated refrain in Andrugio’s list of woes, his refrain “a son, a country, house, crown, son,” it is also part of a larger network of losses. Andrugio’s repeated cry, ‘son,’ embraces or bookends the titles and goods this son should have lived to inherit. Andrugio mourns not simply the loss of a beloved child, but the loss of the patriline, the previously unbroken line of succession inherited from his own father. The ideal underpinning the system of primogeniture is the son’s ability to ensure the earthly immortality of the father by carrying a piece of him into the future; however, with Andrugio’s speech we can see the effect of the lost future on the past, which is also threatened by the loss of Antonio. The son carries not just a piece of his own father, but also the pieces of his ancestors; the capacity of the son to convey the collective identity and honor of his family house renders the system possible, but also fragile. If the son is lost, then the last earthly remnant of those ancestors is also lost. Andrugio’s lament reveals the impact of inheritance structures on his relationship with his son; the ideal of primogeniture affects the meaning he invests in his son, and creates the incredible possibility that the loss of one family member can mean the loss of the family, past and future, as a whole.

Andrugio’s earlier threat emphasizes Antonio’s performance of imitation, while his lament here highlights the importance of his son to the continuation of the corporate family. The two concerns, imitation and generation, bring the issue of the material force of familial resemblance, and a father’s disappointment in his son’s behavior, into sharper focus. One of the grounds of the idea that sons should imitate their fathers is that they resemble their fathers. The
problem of resemblance – why children sometimes look and act like their parents, but not always – fostered multiple explanations in the early modern period, including the theory of maternal impression, the theory that children resembled their parents because they were literally made out of their parents’ blood, and the idea that one’s appearance and behavior could be inherited.\(^6^0\)

The idea that the outer form could tell the truth of one’s parentage and one’s inner character, that imitation ‘is’ resemblance, is at the core of the set of ideals underlying the inheritance pattern of primogeniture: continuity and stability (political and familial) derived through reproduction and from the resemblance of father and son.\(^6^1\)

In a system of primogeniture, eldest sons are most likely to inherit the properties and positions of their fathers, in effect taking the father’s place in that hierarchy. In *Richard III* (~1591), Shakespeare renders the substitution effect extravagant when Richard claims that the sons literally replace the father. When Elizabeth’s mother protests “Yet thou didst kill my children” (4.4.422), Richard replies:

But in your daughter’s womb I bury them,  
Where, in that nest of spicery, they will breed  
Selves of themselves, to your recomforture. (4.4.423-5)


\(^6^1\) Erin Murphy, *Familial Forms: Politics and Genealogy in Seventeenth-Century Literature* (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 18-70, especially 54-57. Crucially this is a physical and behavioral resemblance, as familial virtues were thought to be inherited and proof of legitimate kinship (64-5).
Richard’s argument that the son literally replaces the father, in person and in affection, represents an extreme version of the commonplace ideal that the father lives on in the son. In *The Winter’s Tale* (~1610), Leontes greets Florizel by emphasizing the genealogical replication:

Your mother was most true to wedlock, prince;  
For she did print your royal father off,  
Conceiving you. (5.1.123-5)

Leontes, like Richard, assumes a natural resemblance of child to parent, conflating the behavioral and physical resemblances displayed by Florizel by using a printing metaphor to indicate replication, rather than mere resemblance. However, the common belief that behavior confirms paternity seems most often to be expressed in the negative, in such a way that the behavioral discourse of resemblance becomes a contested ground. For instance, in Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline* (1611), Jachimo exhorts Imogen, “Be reveng’d, / Or she that bore you was no queen, and you / Recoil from your great stock” (1.7.126-8). Lear (*King Lear*, 1604) terms Goneril a “Degenerate bastard” (1.4.251) after she behaves in ways other than he expected, and he tells Regan that if her behavior were to resemble her sister’s, “I would divorce me from thy mother’s tomb, / Sepulchring an adult’ress” (2.4.128-9). The dependence of paternity on behavior renders paternity fragile. With property, personal immortality, and the omnipresent threat of cuckoldry at stake, it is vital that the son be as like the father as possible. Children should resemble their parents, physically or behaviorally, and the possibility that they might not represents a fissure in normative reproductive ideologies. That ideal of (imitative) resemblance is crucial, and its failure, short of the absence of an heir, has the most destructive effect on kin relationships portrayed in Marston’s *Antonio* plays.

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62 As Lisa Hopkins explains, “Nobody, in short, can be sure of who their father was; and yet the identity of the father is the key to all property and inheritance transactions in this patriarchally-oriented society” (104). In *The Shakespearean Marriage: Merry Wives and Heavy Husbands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 104.
Andrugio’s lament and threat highlight the anxieties that can infect a relationship between father and son, and I locate that infection in the inheritance structures underpinning familial relationships. Andrugio’s anxiety that Antonio failed to enact the proper inheritance model, expressed in his determination to ‘mangle’ his son’s face, reveals the problematic nature of the imitative ideal; and his anxiety that his son’s loss means the loss of his larger family project reveals the sheer importance of his son’s role in this inheritance structure. For Andrugio, Antonio is absolutely necessary for the continuation of the corporate family, past and future; however, Andrugio’s willingness to ‘disclaim’ his son’s birth indicates the conditions placed on their relationship. Antonio can fail to carry his family into the future by dying, of course, but also by failing to imitate his father. The statuses and properties connected to Andrugio’s ‘family’ in his lament, the ‘country, house, crown,’ further indicate that Antonio’s failure would destroy not just the family but also the family’s social and economic place in the world. Marston portrays the contingencies, limitations and points of weakness inherent in the inheritance structures underlying family relations. The expectation of a normative father/son relationship is set up only to be undermined, and the inheritance structures underpinning that relationship are finally revealed to be constitutive of those moments of violent emotion.

Marston’s violent portrayal of a moment of failure in a father/son relationship, Andrugio’s threat to disfigure his son’s face, encapsulates the value of the revenge tragedy in highlighting the pressure inheritance structures put on father/son relationships. A salient example from a history play highlights the continuities across genres as well as the excessiveness of revenge tragedy versions. Shakespeare’s use of an imitative discourse to portray father/son relationships in *Henry IV* (1597) is encapsulated by Henry’s fantasy of having Hotspur as a son:

Yea, there thou mak’st me sad, and mak’st me sin
In envy that my lord Northumberland
Should be the father to so blest a son –
A son who is the theme of honour’s tongue,
Amongst a grove the very straightest plant,
Who is sweet Fortune’s minion and her pride –
Whilst I by looking on the praise of him
See riot and dishonor stain the brow
Of my young Harry. O, that it could be proved
That some night-tripping fairy had exchanged
In cradle clothes our children where they lay,
And called mine Percy, his Plantagenet!
Then I would have his Harry, and he mine. (1 Henry IV 1.1.77-89)

While Henry seems resigned to the reality before him, his brief fantasy of supernatural exchange emphasizes the emotional attachment to his heir that Henry desires but, because of Hal’s behavior, lacks. The ideal son and heir should reflect and enact family-specific values – put simply, a prince should act like a prince.63 And because the three men share a name, Henry fantasizes that they are exchangeable, one Harry for another. This small moment in 1 Henry IV reveals the problematic nature of an inheritance structure that assumes the replication of the father through the son. Hal imitates the wrong father, failing in his primary duty of mirroring family traits that would prove himself his father’s son.64 While Harry Plantagenet will inevitably inherit, barring death, and Henry never suggests actually disowning his son, Henry briefly envisions an ideal world in which the best-suited son is also his (inheriting) son. Nevertheless, this fantasy remains hypothetical, and even as a fantasy lacks the violence of Andrugio’s visceral threat.

63 Coppélia Kahn argues in Man’s Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare (Berkley: University of California Press, 1981) that Henry’s first speech before Harfleur (3.1) makes martial virility “a test of legitimacy (they must emulate their fathers in this collective erection, or dishonor their mothers by seeming bastards) as well as of nationality (the virile English as opposed to the effete French)” (80). The use of imitation to confirm paternity is problematic, since one seems to assume only a legitimate son could imitate his father, and Hal’s shifting self-fashioning activities reveal his ability to imitate multiple father figures while maintaining a blood connection to one.

64 However, Hal engages in Machiavellian plotting that ultimately replicates his father’s politics and belies the seemingly straightforward Hal of Henry V. In the end, Hal imitates Henry all too well.
The violence of Andrugio’s reaction to the possibility of his son’s failure stems from the importance placed on the ideal underlying primogeniture – the son’s ability to replicate the father in early modern culture. Fathers expected devotion and obedience in return for their own emotional and material investments in their children. In early modern prescriptive literature the burden of filial devotion was pervasive, inculcated through the official discourses of church, state and school. 65 Many sermons focused on the Fifth Commandment (‘Honor thy father and mother’); Alexander Nowell’s authorized catechism (1563) defines ‘honor’ as a form of filial devotion: “The honour of parents containeth love, fear, and reverence, and consisteth as in the proper work, and duty of it, in obeying them, in saving, helping, and defending them, and also finding and relieving them if ever they be in need.”66 However, sons have a different role than daughters in the domestic hierarchy because sons are most likely to inherit the properties and positions of their fathers, in effect taking the father’s place in that hierarchy. As Cicero argued, sons should use their fathers as models of virtue, “for to you [my son] belong the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating my deeds.”67 Andrugio’s insistence that Antonio should imitate him clearly comes out of this humanist tradition, in which imitation is the foundation of both education and inheritance. Cicero’s statement renders that inheritance a closed system, in which the son inherits the father’s reputation along with the necessity of replicating and maintaining that reputation. That is, the heritable glory is available on the condition that the imitative duty is fulfilled.

65 Tromly, Chapter 1, especially 18-25.
67 Cicero, De officiis, quoted in Tromly, 27.
The ideals underlying primogeniture – the son’s ability to replicate his father by imitating him – became influential through the spread of humanist education, of which imitation was foundational: “Nature has implanted in the youngest child,” Erasmus observed, “an ape-like instinct of imitation.” But the different models to be imitated are specifically located in the father, and the child for whom imitation is most important, most foundational of place and identity, is the son. A broader humanist trend toward a belief in the importance of the education of children for the good ordering of society developed over the course of the fifteenth century in England, and some of the basic tenets underlying arguments for children’s education can be found in humanist treatises such as the newly popular genre of the prince’s mirror, which presented an image which the good ruler is expected to emulate. As Timothy Hampton explains, “the promotion of ancient images of virtue as patterns that aim to form or guide readers is a central feature of almost every major text in the Renaissance … The heroic or virtuous figure offers a model of excellence, an icon after which the reader is to be formed … [who] can be seen as a marked sign that bears the moral and historical authority of antiquity.” This image was meant to be imitated, and Richard Halpern interprets this kind of “mimetic education” as “a set

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69 Popular since the time of Isocrates (436-388 BCE), the prince’s mirror genre experienced a revival in 14th century Italy and 15th century England (Rude, xlv).

70 A few prominent examples include Isocrates’ To Nicoles, Cicero’s De Officiis, Seneca’s De Clementia and De ira, St. Thomas Aquinas’ De regno, ad regem Cypri, John Of Salisbury’s Policraticus, and Erasmus’ The Education of a Christian Prince. List provided by Rude, xlv.

71 Timothy Hampton, Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca: Cornell, 1990), i, xi, s. For more on imitation as the principal method of learning in the Renaissance, see Don Paul Abbot, “Rhetoric and Writing in the Renaissance,” in A Short History of Writing Instruction (2001), 157; Dickson, “’A Pattern, Precedent, and Lively Warrant,’” RQ 62.2 (Summer, 2009), 383; and Thomas M. Greene, The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry. (New Haven, 1982), 1.
of practices that places the subject in an imaginary relation with a governing model.”  

Fifteenth century continental works provided a tradition and some material for the earliest English example of the genre, Sir Thomas Elyot’s *The boke named the Governour* (1531). Consciously modeling himself (and his career) after Erasmus, Elyot uses *The Governour* to express his anxieties over the decline of nobility by describing its proper operation. Elyot adduces three sources of nobility, focusing on personal virtue, Providence, and imitation. Elyot’s etiology of the aristocratic or ‘noble’ class imagines a merit-based system that is then passed down to equally meritorious children through blood that has become noble. This was a common view of how nobility operated, and Elyot’s account doesn’t attempt to challenge the idea that shared cultural ideals inhere in ‘noble blood.’ Eliot produces multiple origins and meanings of the word ‘noble,’ providing a Greek term that locates the value ‘goodness’ in a kind or lineage, implying its heritability, but also states that ‘noble’ and ‘nobility’ are analogies, suggesting the constructedness of social hierarchies and reinforcing the idea that nobility is only metaphorically located in bloodlines. Children ‘receive’ nobility from their parents through “imitation of

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74 For Gail Kern Paster, blood becomes an oversignified metonymy for the hierarchical metaphor of the body politic, of ‘noble blood’ and of concomitant justifications for the aristocracy, and for idealized characteristics that were thought to be ‘passed down’ through family blood lines. The metaphor is taken to be the material (the ideological significance of blood carried in the physical thing that is blood), and in a hereditary culture, the sign of blood becomes a site of “multiple, competing, even self-contradictory discourses” (90), in *The Body Embarrassed* (New York, 1993). The properties associated with blood become the metonymy of social differences, and the attempts to reify hereditary transmission suggests the degree of the culture’s investment in the ideal that blood represents (or materially creates) a continuity. Paster’s understanding of blood as the metonymy of social difference is fascinating, but I disagree with her assertion that using blood as the sign of multiple social ideals and discourses renders those discourses “materially real” (90). I think it is important to retain the knowledge that even the idea of a family’s bloodline is itself a metaphor, not a literal or material sharing of blood. While the metaphor might be materialized in contemporary writing on the matter, which is part of Paster’s point, the degree to which that materialization is itself still metaphoric should be highlighted. Berry and Foyston note the importance of children to aristocratic families, noting that “In families who could name their forbears for more than two preceding generations, a powerful rhetoric surrounded the idea of the continuation of a legitimate bloodline.
virtue.” As Elyot notes, while those of ‘noble blood’ are born, they must also be taught to imitate ideal models of nobility (in an ideal world, their fathers). Some of the possible fissures in that system are illuminated by Andrugio’s despair over Antonio’s failure of imitation, and Marston’s focus on a father’s anxiety puts the burden of imitation entirely on the son. While accessing beliefs found in prescriptive literature, Marston uses Andrugio’s threat and lament speeches to reveal the degree to which inheritance structures impinge upon family relationships. The threat passage quoted above encapsulates Andrugio’s anxiety that a structure of inheritance founded on the ideal that the son will replicate and replace his father always contains the possibility that that replication could fail.

To return to the passage with which this chapter began, Marston further emphasizes the pressure placed upon emotion by inheritance structures in the climactic scene of *Antonio and Mellida*. The full speech actually begins with an expression of mourning that echoes Andrugio’s earlier lament. After apparently converting Piero with his display of valor, Andrugio witnesses the arrival of his son’s body, which, as in his lament, he equates with hope: “Sweet, precious issue of most honored blood, / Rich hope, ripe virtue, O untimely loss!” (*AM* 5.2.191-2).

Andrugio’s initial response in these two sentences seems to set up this passage as a continuation of his earlier lament. Again mourning the loss of his son, Andrugio’s language uses vegetal metaphors to highlight the interruption of the cycle of father/son relationships. ‘Rich’ intensifies ‘hope,’ emphasizing the valuable, precious, highly prized nature of Andrugio’s imagined future, through marriage. As one anonymous author wrote, ‘there are sacred Channels cut, in which one stream of blood perpetually runs, from one Generation to another’” (166), in Helen Berry and Elizabeth Foyster, eds. Intro. The Family in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007). While the quoted author was writing in 1672, Berry and Foyster’s evidence suggests that the attitude prevailed during the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods as well.

75 This passage and all other quotations are taken from A Critical Edition of Sir Thomas Elyot’s The Boke named the Governour. Ed by Donald W. Rude. (New York & London: Grand, 1992), Book 2, 120-1. For more on Elyot, see John M. Major, Sir Thomas Elyot and Renaissance Humanism (Nebraska, 1964).
or perhaps the degree to which Andrugio has invested in that future. Vegetal metaphors do not necessarily imply land ownership. However, followed rapidly by ‘ripe,’ ‘rich’ also takes on agricultural connotations, suggesting the land needed for vegetal growth; the evocation of something that has the properties necessary to produce fertile growth implies the growth itself, or, to extend the metaphor, the next generation. ‘Ripe’ evokes plant-life, growth, summertime.

Marston’s use of ‘ripe,’ coupled with references to the untimely-ness of the loss, echoes, if darkly, the repeated laments in Kyd’s *The Spanish Tragedy* (1582) in which death is compared to an unseasonable destruction of spring vegetation. Hieronimo invokes the vegetal formula when mourning Horatio, “Sweet lovely rose, ill plucked before thy time, / Fair worthy son, not conquered, but betrayed” (2.5.46-7), and then expands on the imagery of untimely death with an invocation of Proserpine:

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Had Proserpine no pity on thy youth?
But suffer’d thy fair crimson-colour’d spring
With withere’d winter to be blasted thus?
Horatio, thou art older than thy father:
Ah ruthless fate, that favour thus transforms!
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(3.13.147-51)

The invocation of Proserpine references her identity in Renaissance mythography as a figure of cyclical replacement of life on earth. The references to plant-life suggest their metaphoric force in signifying generation, continuation, a cyclical view of the hereditary family in which the son should grow and eventually replace the father, becoming a father himself in time and ensuring that the family continues uninterrupted into future generations. The father is renewable through the son. However, Horatio has been blasted before his time, and the plant imagery highlights not only the loss of Horatio himself, but also the loss of the future he would have provided.

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76 Robert Watson, *The Rest Is Silence: Death as Annihilation in the English Renaissance* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 59. While I disagree with Watson’s argument that the entirety of the cyclical figure can be reduced to a compromise with mortality, as I think it also implies the renewability (and replaceability) of family members, I am indebted to his work for highlighting the significance of the allusion.
Hieronimo’s complaint ‘thou art older than thy father’ emphasizes the sense of unnatural time pervading this passage while also suggesting the failure of the inheritance pattern. Hieronimo’s lament suggests that spring promises a fruitful, that is, productive, summer, so that Horatio’s early death becomes in its way a broken promise, interrupted by the winter of death come too early. The compared passages show that Hieronimo and Andrugio are drawing on a shared view of family relationships likely drawn from descriptive as well as prescriptive sources, using a consistent vocabulary to describe an emotionally similar loss. However, Marston’s evocation of harvest-time through a language of ripeness and fruition suggests Andrugio’s different relationship with his own son. The violence inherent in the language of harvesting – that which is “ripe” is ready to be plucked from its live-giving branches and consumed – implies that Andrugio views Antonio in terms of his always-imminent separation from his father, through death or through a failure of imitation. Andrugio’s immediate shift from mourning the “untimely loss” (AM 5.2.192) to worrying whether Antonio “died like my son” (AM 5.2.193) characterizes a relationship that is close and emotional, but more given to an exaggerated, violent concern for imitation and inheritance.

To end this section where we began, Andrugio’s relationship with his son is characterized by the exaggerated violence of Andrugio’s fears about his son’s imitative capabilities. While the death of his son is also a significant fear, as evidenced in Andrugio’s lament, the manner in

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77 A similar metaphor is used in Middleton’s *A Yorkshire Tragedy*: “The springtime of thy youth did fairly promise / Such a most fruitful summer to thy friends / It can scarce enter into men’s beliefs / Such dearth should hang on thee” (Scene 2, 145-8).

78 It was more common for children’s deaths to be mourned as premature, with references to “the sense of promise cut off.” However, the “growth of attachment” over time, as well as the child’s “acquisition of skills and distinctive individual personalities,” could also sharpen grief. “D’Ewes and his wife both found that their sorrow for the loss of their fourth son, on whom they had ‘bestowed so much care and affection’ far surpassed their grief for the deaths of his three elder brothers who had died soon after birth” (Houlbrooke *Death* 234-5). While younger children have more potential to lose, someone like Horatio has years of lost investment in addition to lost potential that increase Hieronimo’s grief.
which his son died is given greater emphasis within the play. The fragility of the father/son relationship – the affective strain adumbrated by the fundamental uncertainty of paternity – and the need continuously to bolster or query such relationships intensifies the potential hazards of the funeral scene as explicated by Andrugio’s obsessive focus on his son’s behavior. The main problem exhibited by this speech is that Antonio has predeceased his father. Andrugio was counting on Antonio to imitate and thereby replicate and replace his father, to maintain the family blood (and all its linked connotations of virtue and dignity) down to the next generation, and the next, allowing Andrugio a kind of immortality on earth through that unbroken line of succession. However, the focus of Andrugio’s lament is on Antonio’s behavior. Andrugio is expressing doubts in Antonio’s imitative skills: if upon his death Antonio proves a poor copy, unworthy of Andrugio’s blood, then all Andrugio’s hopes were for nothing. Even if Antonio had survived, he would have been a wasted opportunity.

In dramatizing the failure of an inheritance pattern, Marston reveals that the imitative system of filial inheritance is fragile and highly contingent on the fulfillment of pre-scripted behaviors. Marston constructs Andrugio’s fears about Antonio’s behavior to reveal that the emotion is linked inextricably to concerns with passing property to the next generation and maintaining family and property into perpetuity. In the end, familial relationships cannot be separated from inheritance, and that structure, at first portrayed as close and affective in the play, is finally shown to create those moments of destructive failure. Andrugio’s emotional relationship with his son is conditioned on his son’s successful imitation of the paternal model, and Marston reveals the anxiety and uncertainty created by that condition: the structures that create normative family relationships also create their failure.
Fathers and Daughters

When publicly renouncing Mellida, Piero cries, “O heaven! O heaven! Were she as near my heart / As is my liver, I would rend her off” (AR 1.4.31-2). Recalling Andrugio’s lament at the end of the last play, Piero’s speech in Act I of *Antonio’s Revenge* emphasizes his investment in his daughter, likening her to a physical part of her body. However, unlike Andrugio’s relationship with his son, Piero’s relationship with Mellida is described as an investment that is ultimately separable from his self. Mellida is not precisely an object to Piero. Rather, Mellida is thought of as an extension of her father, as not so much carrying a literal piece of him within her, as embodying Piero’s will. But as a mere extension, she proves disposable. Her removal is violent and possibly fatal, but rendered necessary by the structures that undergird her relationship with her father. Piero’s use of metaphor constructs a close, emotional relationship with his daughter that is founded on ideals of obedience and incorporation, ideals which create Piero’s perverse reading of their relationship in terms of disposability and amputation.

Where Andrugio expects to act as a mirror, and as an assurance of his father’s immortality, Mellida is thought of merely as a piece or part of her father. The imitative relationship between father and son may be fraught in Marston’s duology, introduced as idealized and revealed to be only ever imperfectly realized. The plays obsess over perfect imitation, but only show failure. The relationships between fathers and daughters demonstrate continuity, but also significant gendered differences. The father/son relationship is cyclical. The son’s value as a mirror of his father’s character and virtues lies in his ability to be similar, and in his ability to ultimately inherit both material goods and behavioral traits so that the son both replaces and replicates the father. The daughter is imagined as incorporated with the father. In a
salient example from *Lear*, in his third confrontation with a betraying daughter, Lear identifies Goneril as a part of himself. However, he claims that she is a diseased part:

> I prithee, daughter, do not make me mad.  
> I will not trouble thee, my child, farewell:  
> We’ll no more meet, no more see one another.  
> But yet thou art my flesh, my blood, my daughter –  
> Or rather a disease that’s in my flesh,  
> Which I must needs call mine: thou art a boil,  
> A plague-sore, or embossed carbuncle,  
> In my corrupted blood.  

*(Lear 2.2.427-34)*

Lear’s final acknowledgment of his daughters’ legitimacy identifies them as a corruption of his blood. As Janet Adelman notes in her groundbreaking *Suffocating Mothers*, Lear’s identification of his daughters as diseased parts of himself locates their “female corruption” within him: “in attempting to disown her, he finds her inside himself.”

That troubling incorporation creates a part of the self that inheres in, but can also infect, the blood. Shakespeare, like Marston, exaggerates early modern commonplaces about the corporate family body; as Lynda Boose notes, “A daughter’s virginity is perceived to ‘belong to’ the blood of – and therefore to – the father.”

Lear acknowledges his daughter is a part of him only to assert that her ‘part-ness’ is capable of reciprocal damage; it is precisely because his daughter is a part of him that she is capable of corrupting his blood. He calls her a “plague-sore,” that is, a visible sign of an interior, fatal illness. Marston adopts the same commonplaces that locate the daughter within the father’s blood, and borrows similar disease metaphors to describe Mellida’s disobedience. However, Marston’s father imagines his daughter, however diseased, can be amputated, and that the corporate family body can be saved. Piero’s conviction that Mellida can be “rent off” gestures

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toward the primary difference between the relationship of father to daughter and the relationship of father to son: where Antonio is thought to act as a mirror, and as an assurance of his father’s immortality, Mellida is thought of as merely a piece or part of her father. Marston moreover alters the metaphor in an arboreal direction, portraying Piero’s view that Mellida is an extension of her father, a limb that occasionally, inconveniently has an opinion of its own, and ultimately a ‘maim’ that must be amputated to ensure Piero’s survival.

The daughter is also imagined as inevitably detachable into a marital body; Marston pushes the image of a divided self further, imagining detachment from the father and reattachment to the husband in startlingly concrete terms, blending the physical and emotional in his metaphors, and making Cordelia’s halved loyalties wholly transferable in Mellida. Inheritance practices and marriage customs create the daughter’s potential for detachment. Religious prescriptions held that for the wife, her husband “is unto her instead of father and mother and all her kin, and that she oweth unto him all the love and charity that were due to them all.”81 The daughter’s loyalty can never be to her father, not entirely, because her loyalty is entirely transferable to the husband. Her transferability is also significant in terms of inheritance practices: as one early modern legal case had it, “for a female by marriage changes her surname into her husband’s name and loses her father’s name … Also by establishing the inheritance in the heir male having the name of Baynton, Andrew would thereby obtain fame and memory with his posterity; and every man has an appetite for fame after his death.”82 A daughter is legally incapable of providing the kind of earthly immortality a son can provide. Rather than replicating and replacing her own father, Mellida will eventually merge with someone else’s son, in effect

82 Sharnington v. Strotton (1565). Qtd. from abstract of the case in Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal History, 488. Qtd. in Spring, 22.
creating or making possible the replacement father of another man’s patriline. Marston portrays the fathers of daughters as always preoccupied with the transfer of ‘daughters as part of the incorporated father’ to ‘daughter as part of the incorporated husband.’

Piero’s fantasies of failed merger rehearse this normal and expected transfer using the violent and grotesque language of amputation. Prescriptive literature commonly uses amputation metaphors to describe the extreme pain that hurting a loved one should cause the self. English Bishop John Jewel, in a 1584 sermon, argued that “Our parentes, and our children are deare un to us. They are our fleshe and bloude, and the chiefe and principal partes of our bodie. Anie part of our bodie can not be cut off, but wee shal feele it. The father if he feele not the death of his sonne: or, the sonne if he feele not the death of his Father, and have not a deepe feeling of it, he is unnatural.” These metaphors are based on the common ideal that family members were a part of the self, merged in a corporate family body. In the opening scene of Antonio’s Revenge, Piero brags to his accomplice, Strozzo: “Then Felice stabbe … / And laid by Mellida, to stop the match / And hale on mischief!” (AR 1.1.75-8), and then makes the nature of his villainy explicit: “Will I not blast my own blood for revenge?” (AR 1.1.86). The ‘own blood’ he is referring to is his daughter, but the phrasing indicates how he views her – as a piece of himself, only coincidentally separate from his physical body. Antonio was also thought of as ‘of his father’s blood,’ but where Andrugio’s language describes Antonio as a whole – “Sweet, precious issue of most honored blood” (AM 5.2.191) – Piero’s language absorbs Mellida into her father and alleges a corporate body made up of father and daughter. While Antonio can carry his father’s blood through imitation, even if Andrugio’s anxieties focus on that capacity, Mellida is merely a part of her father, a piece of his “own blood.” Hamlet uses the commonplace of

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83 John Jewel, An exposition upon the two epistles of the apostle S. Paul to the Thessalonians (1584), 160.
corporate kinship to frustrate Claudius: “My mother. Father and mother is man and wife, man and wife is on flesh; so, my mother” (4.4.54-5). The image was used to explicate an idealized structure of marriage that was both hierarchical and equal, and also to encourage the development of close emotional relationships within these newly created families. Family members, whether by blood or by marriage, are idealized as part of the same body, so that hurting one’s kin is the same as hurting oneself – a corporate family that nevertheless is still hierarchical, if also full of contradictions. Gouge offers the following analogy for wife-beaters:

“The wife is as a mans selfe, They two are one flesh. No man but a franticke, furious, desperate wretch will beat himselfe. … furious, franticke, mad, desperate persons will cut their armes, legs, and other parts, mangle their flesh, hang, drowne, smother, choake, and stab themselves. Even so they are as men out of their wits, who hate, or any way hurt their wives.” While both arguments encourage emotional connections, amputation metaphors create an image of intense and irrecoverable violence to describe the loss or harming of a family member. However, the attempt to construct empathy creates an uneasy sense of the violence inherent to these relationships, as kinds of losses other than death, such as the marriage of a daughter, intrude on the metaphor.

Piero expects Mellida to leave him for another man eventually, but, crucially, in an amputation of his own making. After finally tracking down his daughter, Piero tells her “See’st thou that sprightly youth? / Ere thou canst term tomorrow morning old, / Thou shalt call him thy husband, lord and love” (AM 4.1.253-5). Piero always intended to marry his daughter to the son

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84 Lisa Hopkins (1998) describes Hamlet’s riddle as a “dangerous obliteration of difference” (139).


of an ally, and it is primarily Mellida’s desire to marry Antonio, and therefore her ability to display independent thought and action, that causes Piero’s anxiety. When Piero discovers the lost note that reveals Mellida’s intention to run away with Antonio, Piero quite literally (if linguistically) falls apart: “Stay, run to the gates, stop the gondolets, let none pass the marsh. Do all at once. Antonio—his head, his head! [To Felice] Keep you the court. The rest stand still, or run, or go, or shout, or search, or scud, or call, or hang, or do—do—do, su—su—su, something. I know not wh- wh- wh- what I d- d- do, nor wh- wh- wh- where I am” (AM 3.2.176-85). The collapse into first stuttering and then disorientation suggests that Piero maintains a type of investment in his daughter that nevertheless differs from the relationship modeled by fathers and sons in the play. Mellida’s transfer from the one-flesh of her family to the one-flesh of a husband is expected and planned for throughout the play; however, when she attempts that transfer to an unauthorized husband, her father’s reaction reveals his belief in the danger inherent in transferable properties. Where Antonio is the recipient of property transferred from father to son, Mellida is a property that will be transferred from father to someone else’s son. But when Piero loses control of his daughter’s marital transfer, he loses control over a part of himself – and that loss of control is inevitable.

Piero conceives of his daughter through the lens of domestic ideologies appropriate to a wife than to a daughter, at least partly because he is anxiously imagining her eventual role as a wife and possibly a mother.87 While Piero is accessing ideals about family relationships, his

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deployment of those ideals renders them dark and even perverse. Marston refers to contemporary ideals about parent/child relationships through negative portrayals, using metaphors of amputation to suggest Piero’s perverse relationship with his daughter.

Piero imagines Mellida as a limb, and according to custom, she should be a removable limb, excised from the father and, to extend the botanical metaphor, grafted onto the husband to thrive and reproduce. Like the relationship between father and son, the relationship between father and daughter is essentially cyclical: according to the fantasy of primogeniture, the son replaces and replicates the father so that the family is led by a seamless succession of essentially the same man. The daughter, however, as a piece of her father is detached and reattached to the son of another father, allowing the continuation of another patriline to occur. The daughter lacks the ability to replace and replicate the father, and her merger into another family means that she is always already a detachable member of the father’s body. However, in the end Piero is incapable of contemplating Mellida’s marriage, or successful merger with another man, because she is part of him, and he cannot imagine that a part of him could behave unexpectedly, express an opinion, or shift loyalty to another man.

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As Raymond J. Rice notes, Much Ado About Nothing invokes the “traditional conceit of love as a consumable part of the self, a transcendent synecdoche of the material body” (298), in “Cannibalism and the Act of Revenge in Tudor-Stuart Drama,” Studies in English Literature 44.2 (Spring, 2004), 297-316.
Even the possibility of Mellida’s disobedience drives Piero into a rage, and his public renunciation of his daughter, part of an elaborate plot of revenge and prefaced with Piero’s true intentions, reveals his incapacity to remove her from the family body incorporate. *Antonio’s Revenge* opens on the image of Piero, “unbraced, his arms bare, smeared in blood, a poniard in one hand, bloody, and a torch in the other, Strotzo following him with a cord” (S.D.), having murdered Felice and in the process of implicating Mellida in at least infidelity and possibly murder: “bind Felice’s trunk,” he commands, “Unto the panting side of Mellida” (*AR* 1.1.1-2). However, the binding never happens, and Felice’s body appears hanging in the window. While Piero never actually binds Felice’s trunk to Mellida, the presence of the cord and the use of the term ‘trunk’ allude to botanical grafting practices, in which the cord is used to support the grafted stem and ensure its successful growth; that it is a dead ‘trunk’ signals Piero’s misuse of the metaphor. Piero’s desire to bind Felice’s corpse to Mellida’s sleeping body is just that, an unfulfilled desire. However, that desire itself reveals Piero’s understanding of the effect of normative marriage structures on his relationship with his daughter. Piero is indulging in a fantasy of merger, in which Felice’s body is bound to the extension of his own body incorporate, Mellida. The image of close, but unachieved merger gives a complex literary rendering of the perversion of normative familial relationships in the form of a parody of a marriage night. Piero’s fantasy invests Mellida with feeling, and his attribution of longing, embodied in the verb panting, eroticizes a moment of violation (of self, of reputation, and of space). However, Piero’s fantasy of incomplete merger also reveals the structural flaw in the normative marriage ideal. As a father, Piero should be prepared for his daughter to marry and eventually merge with another father’s son, creating or making possible a new, rival father. Instead, Piero views as impossible the ideal of merging husband and wife into one flesh, as shown in his insistence on binding to
Mellida a trunk, the blasted (family) tree of yet another enemy’s son, incapable of further branching, or reproduction, in a cruelly parodic version of a marriage consummation.

Piero’s choice of a parodic consummation suggests his fixation on his daughter’s sexuality, but that it is a consummation of a marriage suggests the broader social dimensions affecting that fixation. Piero frames his daughter’s betrayal in sexual terms, referencing the belief, still current in early modern England, that his daughter is his property to bestow upon another man. Mellida has defied her father in choosing Antonio; in enacting that betrayal with another man, Piero focuses on his daughter’s uncontrolled sexual behavior: “Think Mellida is not Piero’s blood […] Suppose I saw not that incestuous slave / Clipping the strumpet with luxurious twines!” (AR 1.4.15-18). Piero quickly clarifies the terms of his disapproval:

Her wedding eve, linked to the noble blood
Of my most firmly reconciled friend,
And found even clinged in sensuality! (AR 1.4.28-30)

Piero’s justification of his dramatic outrage clarifies the symbolism of the vignette he created with Felice’s body and his daughter’s (metaphorical) honor. In a reference to Ovid, Marston enacts Tarquin’s threat to rape Lucrece, kill her, and then “kill her honor by placing a dead slave in her bed, accusing her falsely of adultery.” At this point in the play, Piero has publicly declared that his daughter will marry Antonio as part of a gesture toward reconciling with Andrugio; as a complicated part of his revenge plot, Piero then murders Andrugio and frames Mellida for infidelity while publicly decrying her wantonness and referring to Andrugio as his ‘most firmly reconciled friend.’ Piero describes the marriage ceremony as a ritual transference of

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89 Cressey, 256. Cressey does note that parents who forced their children into an unwanted marriage were judged to be “unnatural and cruel” (256), making this moment another chance to emphasize Piero’s villainy by aligning him with non-ideal parenting practices.

90 Chernaik, 48.
daughter from piece-of-father to piece-of-husband, and decries her infidelity as the perversion of that transfer. Continuing with his arboreal metaphor in a deliberate confusion of the physiological and the botanical, Piero frames the embrace as a failed graft from his family tree. Instead of linking with Antonio, Andrugio’s ‘noble blood,’ Mellida has been clipped by the wrong man, wound up in his ‘luxurious twines.’ Felice’s arms are not the sturdy branches to which Mellida should have been grafted, but the “twining or trailing stem or spray of a plant” (*OED* 2a),

91 twisted away from the main family tree and grown lecherous, or even diseased.

92 Piero’s insistence that the normative marriage transfer has been disrupted is meant to reinforce the norm, but read against his own creation of a perverse wedding night serves instead to reveal the grotesque nature of even the normal transfer. Piero intends to remove his daughter and reattach her to another man, though he insists it be the man of his choice, and the continuation of his repudiation speech redoubles and intensifies the violence of that transfer.

Shifting from botanical to medical language in calling his daughter “Yon putrid ulcer of my royal blood,” Piero embarks upon an extended surgical metaphor, fantasizing that his daughter can be amputated from their relationship while he is under anesthesia: “O, numb my sense of anguish, cast my life / In a dead sleep whilst law cuts off yon maim.” Piero is still figuring a loss, but he refigures it as a necessary loss, using the medical metaphors to equate her tainted honor with diseased flesh, and the repudiation of kinship bonds a needed physick.

Suddenly Mellida needs to be cut off to ensure Piero’s very survival, and Piero by calling her

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91 The *OED* cites this quote from Marston in its definition of ‘twine’ as “an embrace, a clasping”; however, Piero’s tendency toward metaphor, especially arboreal metaphor, makes the vegetal connotation of the word difficult to ignore.

92 According to the *OED*, ‘luxurious’ was certainly in common usage as “lascivious, lecherous, unchaste” at this time, but another current definition was in reference to “unhealthy flesh; granulating exuberantly, ‘proud,’” which almost acts as a transition to Piero’s next set of accusations, as if Felice’s diseased arms have twined about Mellida, poisoning her and therefore poisoning that part of Piero.
‘yon maim’ refigures the metaphor as the removal of an already damaged part of the self, recasting his daughter as the limb so damaged it must be lopped off. Mellida’s failure finally renders her removal normative, but in doing so reveals the violence of a normative structure founded on cutting off part of the self and reattaching it to some other man.

However, to return briefly to the quotation with which this section began, I want to note that Piero also asserts that “Were she as near my heart / As is my liver, I would rend her off” (AR 1.4.31-2). Mellida as an ‘unruly limb’ can be trimmed; as a damaged limb, she must be removed. Piero extends the metaphor describing his daughter as a diseased part of his own flesh from his limbs to his organs, suggesting that Mellida’s disobedience has infected something far more vital. His determination to ‘rend’ her off still suggests that he is willingly contemplating his own destruction if that is the cost of her removal. Her disposability in no way elides the violence of her removal. Piero’s simile renders Mellida vital. Piero’s determination to violently ‘rend’ her from his corporate body suggests a fatal wound, a loss that cannot be recovered.

The possessive language used by both Andrugio and Piero asserts power or control over their respective children; however, Piero’s possessiveness is exaggerated and misappropriates contemporary domestic ideologies to demonstrate how different he is from Andrugio. His characterization of fathers streamlines and intensifies the basic idea of inequality while perverting the metaphors used to describe household structures in prescriptive literature. Andrugio expects Antonio to replicate and (eventually) replace him. However, his anxieties

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93 In the humoral economy current in Marston’s time, the liver was the seat of love, produced blood, and was considered one of the most important organs to personality, health, and life. See James M. Bromley, Intimacy and Sexuality in the Age of Shakespeare (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 53, who notes that the liver governs the ‘lower regions’ of the body; Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), especially her chapter “Laudable Blood: Bleeding, Difference, and Humoral Embarrassment.” See also Rice, 301, who notes that the liver is one of the “‘higher’ organs” in a humoural economy, associated with masculinity and rationality.
expressed in the climactic moment of the first play, and his determination to ‘mangle’ his son’s face, reveal the fissures already present in the structures of imitation and inheritance that create the father/son relationship. Conversely, Piero’s relationship with Mellida is founded on ideals of obedience and incorporation. She cannot imitate her father, but instead is a piece of him; an extension, rather than a mirror. When she behaves as Piero expects, her merger with her father is unquestioned and indivisible. However, when Mellida does reveal independence, Piero reveals the capacity to remove her from his corporate body using metaphors of surgery and amputation. In behaving independently, Mellida has become the unruly limb that must be pruned from Piero’s family tree. However, the necessity of that removal is inherent in the structure of marriage transfer. Even a controlled, ordered marriage would lead to the violent rending of this part of the father, and in the end all Piero’s perversions of the marriage ceremony and consummation are dark versions of normative family structures.

The lineally inflected nature of familial bonds is revealed in their focus on dynastic production and in the conditions placed on those bonds. For Marston, familial relationships are hierarchical, and emotions mostly focus on future generations; his specific adoption of cultural idioms for expressing familial emotions focuses on the idea that sons, especially inheriting sons, should imitate their fathers. The centrality of imitative practices renders personal affect, emotional relationships and the devolution of property all determined by or determinative of proscribed behaviors. The key to the mode of kinship found in Marston’s plays lies in the possibilities opened up by imitation, the small gap produced by discrepancies between non-ideal behavior and corrected behavior. That gap suggests the performative quality of imitative kinship, and acknowledges the constructedness of the self resulting from such a system.
Marston’s *Antonio* duology describes a gendered parent-child relationship that is constituted by the inheritance patterns pressuring father-son and father-daughter relationships. In developing his metaphors of extension and amputation, Marston adopts early modern commonplaces about familial structures. He does exaggerate those commonplaces, but that these family ideals are so common should be questioned by critics. Piero represents an extreme version of a father grappling with his daughter’s inevitable detachability, but, while extreme, he is still able to draw on contemporary metaphors of the corporate family body, the ‘family tree,’ and amputation to describe those extreme beliefs. Marston’s portrayal of this extreme father implicates the violence underpinning familial relationships; Andrugio’s own extension into violence confirms that even ‘everyday’ or ‘normal’ relationships contain within them ideologies that, under pressure, create a loving father’s determination to ‘mangle’ his son’s face. That is, the domestic manuals and advice pamphlets that attempt to police violent disruptions of familial harmony actually contain violence in the ideologies underpinning their prescriptions. The ideology under pressure in this chapter is that of imitation; a related ideology, that of resemblance, underpins the relationships examined in the next chapter. The early modern ideal friendship was predicated on equality, which could only be achieved between two friends who resembled one another perfectly. This kind of friendship is justified by fraternal metaphors asserting egalitarian relationships; however, the same violence underpinning parent-child relationships also undergirds fraternal relationships, and that violence consequently infects the discourse of egalitarian friendship.
Chapter Two: “The name of friend”: Appropriated Metaphors of Fraternity, Friendship and Marriage in *The Revenger’s Tragedy* and *The Maid’s Tragedy*

On the seventh of August, 1655, George Sondes was murdered by his younger brother, Freeman, “a sullen youth of eighteen or nineteen” (ODNB), who, while George slept, struck him a fatal blow to the back of the head with a cleaver. Freeman immediately apprised their father of the murder, was arrested, sentenced to death, and hanged at Maidstone on 21 August, evidently meeting his end with resignation. The crime became something of a sensation, provoking both pamphlets and sermons, for instance the rather uncompassionate, and anonymous, *The Devils Reign upon Earth, Being a Relation of several sad and bloody Murthers lately committed, especially that of Sir Geo. Sands his Son, upon his own Brother; set forth that others may be terrified from the like thereby* (1655); and an equally religious response from the elder George Sondes himself, in a *Plaine Narrative to the Word of All Passages Upon the Death of his Two Sonnes* (1655). While quite disparate in viewpoint and the conclusions drawn about the significance of the murder, each pamphlet frames the crime of fratricide in both religious and social terms. By linking the modern crime to the obvious Biblical precedent, Cain’s murder of Abel, each pamphlet variously argues that fratricide threatens social cohesion and the proper functioning of patriarchal hierarchies.

In a brief prefatory statement likening the process of murder to a sort of demonic possession, the anonymous author of *The Devils Reign* opens with the expected reference to the

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94 Other pamphlets relating to the murder include Robert Boreman’s *A mirror of mercy and judgment, or, An exact true narrative of the life and death of Freeman Sands, esq.* (1655); and William Annand, Jr.’s *A Funeral Elegie, Upon the Death of George Sonds, Esq; Who was killed by his brother, Mr. Freeman Sonds, August the 7th. Anno Dom. 1655*. All pamphlets were located using EEBO.

95 “But the Devil fils men with a revengeful spirit, and keeps them ignorant of this, until they have committed their intended murder, and then he leaves them to be punished, either by the Laws of men, or else possesses them with wretched thoughts of destroying themselves” (3).
story of Cain and Abel, along with other Biblical injunctions to love thy brother (2), before
moving on to the story of Freeman’s fratricide.\textsuperscript{96}Attributing Freeman’s motives to jealousy and
ambition, the author connects material goods with emotional favor, stating that “the Knight their
Father is bereaved of both his Children, and no Heir left to inherit his great Estate” (4). His very
practical consideration of what to do with his estate imbricates with the emotional loss of his son
to indicate how closely the two (emotion and economy) are intertwined, and how the issue of
succession is viewed.

In the previous chapter, I argued that Marston’s characterization of parent-child
relationships accesses normative versions of the early modern ideal of the domestic hierarchy
while perverting the metaphors used to describe household structures in prescriptive literature to
reveal the violence inherent in the ideologies of imitation and inheritance underpinning those
norms. The father/son relationship is founded on ideals of reproduction through replication,
which leads to a never-ending series of identical fathers producing identical sons, as instanced in
Andrugio’s repeated fantasies of his son’s resemblance to him, thereby maintaining the family
line into perpetuity. Marston reveals the necessary violence underlying that ideal by putting
pressure on its primary weakness, the survival of a properly imitative son. Andrugio expects
Antonio to replicate and (eventually) replace him. However, his expectations are frustrated, first
by Antonio’s presumed death and then by Antonio’s apparent failure to properly imitate his
father. Andrugio’s determination to ‘mangle’ his son’s face if Antonio has failed to die
‘valiantly’ reveals the intense pressure placed on the structures of imitation and inheritance that
underpin the father/son relationship.

\textsuperscript{96}Mario DiGangi notes that the typical early modern crime pamphlet “relates Satan’s temptations of the weak into
performing wicked deeds, which are eventually brought to light through miraculous or providential means,” in his
\textit{Sexual Types: Embodiment, Agency, and Dramatic Character from Shakespeare to Shirley} (Philadelphia: U of
In this chapter I examine two revenge tragedies that interrogate the relationship between different modes of kinship, friendship and marriage. Revenge tragedies tend to portray familial relationships ‘writ large’; that is, they portray exaggerated versions of kinship represented more subtly in other genres. While fraternity and friendship are represented in a wide range of genres, the revenge tragedy focuses on the relationship under stressful circumstances. The specific plays discussed are especially notable for providing a streamlined version of fraternity, friendship and marriage; while Lear, for instance, features an ambitious younger brother in a subplot, the complication of Edmund’s bastardy would have to be considered, and could obscure the inherent violence in the fraternal ideal that I want to uncover.\textsuperscript{97} Thomas Middleton’s \textit{The Revenger’s Tragedy}, on the other hand, features legitimate brothers, if from different marriages; that slight complication pressures but does not obscure Middleton’s description of the fraternal ideal, or his revelation of its inherent instabilities and competitions. The second play, Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher’s \textit{The Maid’s Tragedy} is especially useful in that the authors explicitly compare fraternity, friendship, and marriage, only to find kinship (fraternal and marital) lacking. Before examining each play, I will briefly describe each discourse (fraternity, friendship, and marriage), and provide a fuller description and history of each in the relevant sections of this chapter. Beginning with the fraternal ideal in \textit{The Revenger’s Tragedy}, I argue that Middleton establishes the fraternal ideal through the interactions of the play’s villainous brothers, though through a lens of dramatic irony, only to reveal the fractures and competitions underlying fraternity. The fraternal ideal is so pervasive in Western culture, certainly a commonplace and perhaps even a cliché, that it becomes difficult to isolate its expression in a particular historical and cultural context. As Cynthia Bannon asks, “to what extent can the relationship between brothers be

\textsuperscript{97} For a brilliant examination of the added complication of bastardy, see Alison Findlay, \textit{Illegitimate Power: Bastards in Renaissance Drama} (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1994).
understood through biological kinship and their roles in the family? Where do our ideas about brothers go beyond kinship, and how do we limit and justify this metaphorical extension of fraternity?

Fraternal ideals tend to be grounded in the belief that “blood kinship” has the “power to generate affection and duty.” The power of the fraternal metaphor rests in the presumed similarity between brothers – because they had the same parents, brothers were expected to be “naturally similar and united in affection.” Because brothers were a “model of the natural identity among kin, the fraternal relationship became a model also for other relationships,” including those between friends, lovers, and soldiers, but also for the “emotional and moral bonds that were the basis of civic society.” The fraternal metaphor was foundational for a range of other discourses, from political equality to ideal forms of commerce.

Friendship and marriage discourses are foregrounded in *The Maid’s Tragedy*, in which Beaumont and Fletcher appropriate fraternal discourses in an attempt to grant legitimacy to the emergent forms of ideal friendship and companionate marriage. In early modern England, the term ‘friend’ had a range of meanings: ‘friend’ could mean ‘kin’; ‘friend’ could also describe ‘lopsided’ patronage relationships based on reciprocity and usefulness; finally, over the course of the sixteenth century, humanist scholars promoted the ideal of friendship between equals based on cerebral and social likeness. This kind of friendship is not new, per se; humanist writers

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99 Bannon, 5.

100 Bannon, 9.

101 Bannon, 5.

102 See, for instance, Appleby (1978), 70; Griffiths et al. (1996), specifically Griffiths, “Disruption in the Well-Ordered Household: Age, Authority and Possessed Young People; Ward (1997); Backschieder and Dykstal (1996); and Traub (2002). All of these critics discuss metaphors of brotherly love as used in a variety of discourses.

103 A fuller discussion of humanist models of friendship is below, but a sampling of critics writing on the subject provide similar definitions of this ‘new,’ ‘equal’ friendship, including Laurie Shannon’s *Sovereign Amity: Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts* (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2002); Eva Österberg also offers a solid
such as Montaigne drew on classical sources to promote the possibility of relationships between equals. As I will discuss more fully in section two, residual ‘lopsided’ friendships were founded on hierarchy and inequality, whereas the humanist model of friendship drew on fraternal ideals to justify and describe a kind of friendship that could be equal. By the time Beaumont and Fletcher write The Maid’s Tragedy, both discourses (‘lopsided’ and ‘equal’ friendships) are in use; the relationship between Melantius and Amintor, the two idealized male friends, imbricates emergent and residual ideologies. Melantius’ attempts to appropriate fraternal ideals to establish an equal relationship with Amintor sit uneasily with the remnants of hierarchical use-structures that haunt their friendship; those ideals of fraternity can, at best, paper over the residual ‘lopsided’ ideologies as the fractures inherent in fraternity sabotage Melantius’ project.

At roughly the same time as friendship discourses were taking on fraternal metaphors, a similar change was occurring in marital discourses in early modern England. However, while a new ideology of equal affection in marriage was being promoted by humanist and Protestant writers, traditionally unequal forms remained unaltered, and the two discourses co-existed

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Keith Thomas notes that ‘equal friendship’ was not a new idea, citing the ideal of friendship based on affection found in ancient Greece. However, he claims that “there was no precedent for the volume of extravagant claims made in the early modern period for the life-enhancing value of ‘perfect’ friendship. There was a torrent of printed literature—sermons, essays, poems, plays, and novels—celebrating the value of ‘perfect’ friendship, elaborating on the duties of friends to each other and (a constant preoccupation) discussing the problem of how true friends could be distinguished from false ones” (192), in The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfillment in Early Modern England (Oxford, 2009). Laurie Shannon also provides a detailed accounting of friendship discourse in early modern plays, sermons, pamphlets, and translations of classical authors in her introduction, especially pages 3-6, and chapter one, pages 17, 23-46. It is also important to note that what Thomas calls a transition is more of an addition of another discourse, rather than the loss of the old to the new. The older discourses of fraternal ideals and use friendships remain current with equal friendships and companionate marriage as the century progresses.
uneasily in the seventeenth-century.\textsuperscript{105} Though laws of coverture remained unaltered, and female inheritance actually declined in this period, sermons and homilies began to suggest that marriage “is instituted of GOD, to the intent that man and woman should live lawfully in a perpetuall friendship, to bring forth fruite, and to avoid fornication.”\textsuperscript{106} The appropriation of friendship ideals to legitimate emerging discourses of companionate marriage can only sit uneasily with the residual hierarchies structuring marriage.\textsuperscript{107}

The issues haunting fraternal relationships introduced in the Sondes pamphlets interrogate the tension between hierarchical and egalitarian versions of fraternity. In Middleton’s Revenger’s Tragedy, the villainous brothers rehearse the language of fraternal ideals, asserting the equality of the relationship between brothers in terms of status and affection. However, Middleton quickly reveals the hierarchical pressure placed upon the fraternal relationship by inheritance structures: as soon as the eldest brother’s position becomes vulnerable, the next in

\textsuperscript{105} The strongest argument for a shift in discourse that radically altered the sex/gender system comes in Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, Abridged Edition (New York: Harper, 1977), 100-02, 217-18. However, Carol Thomas Neely notes that the “Reformation had begun to transform the old ideology without altering the prescribed form of marriage, its traditional functions, or the attitudes that accompanied them. To the two conventional functions of the institution—the accomplishment of legitimate procreation and the avoidance of fornication—the state-and-church sponsored homilie on marriage joined a new one, the loving amity of the couple” (9), in Broken Nuptials in Shakespeare’s Plays (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985). She also notes that both Protestant and humanist writers supported the new idea that “Love, once denounced as a dangerous disrupter of marriage, was now decreed essential to it” (9). Frances Dolan similarly notes that “the transition that some historians locate in the early modern period” never actually happened; rather, “the two models of marriage tended to coexist (as uneasily as spouses) in the same head, heart, or household. Surrendering a developmental model of change,” she argues, “makes it possible to abandon the project of dating a transition that has not yet occurred so as to focus on the continuing conflict between coexisting models” (28), in Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{106} Certaine Sermons or Homilies, facsimile reproduction of 1623 edition, ed. Mary Ellen Rickey and Thomas B. Stroup (Gainesville, FL: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1968), 239, my emphasis. Quoted in Neely, 9. Dolan thoroughly discusses the changes to women’s inheritance rights (and their relation to marital forms) in Chapter 2, especially 75-82.

\textsuperscript{107} Other texts that describe early modern English marriage ideals include Heinrich Bullinger, The Golden Boke of Christen Matrimonye (trans. Theodore Basille; Thomas Becon, 1543), which appears to be the source for many of the pamphlets that follow; Henrie Smith, A Preparativre to Marriage (1591); William Whately, A Bride-Bush or a Wedding Sermon (1608); Robert Snawsel, A Looking Glasse for Married Folkes (1610, 1631); John Dodd and Robert Cleaver, A Godly Forme of Householde Government: For the Ordering of Private Families according to the direction of God’s Word (1614); and of course, William Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties (1622).
line declares, “I am next now; I rise just in that place / Where thou’rt cut off—upon thy neck, kind brother. / The falling of one head lifts up another” (3.1.26-8). The violent competition for limited affective and financial resources created by the pressures of inheritance structures haunts any deployment of the fraternal ideal.

After a brief examination of a different kind of source, murder pamphlets, which encapsulate some of the larger cultural issues surrounding fraternal strife, I will then examine the dramatic representations of fraternal kinship in Middleton’s Revenger’s Tragedy, and friendship and companionate marriage in Beaumont and Fletcher’s The Maid’s Tragedy. Middleton’s play identifies fraternal ideals and then shows their internal competitions and fragilities; Beaumont and Fletcher borrow just those ideal fraternal metaphors to legitimate discourses of friendship, and then metaphors of friendship to legitimate discourses of companionate marriage. Perhaps the most interesting question is why the fraternal ideal of equality had such utility when it also had such a weak historical base. In this attempt to appropriate the authority of fraternal metaphors, I argue, Beaumont and Fletcher’s characterization of the discourses of friendship and marriage only highlight the troubling violence that underlies the norms of fraternal topoi. Each discourse is contaminated by the authority it borrows. Ultimately these plays portray not the dissolution, but the exaggeration of the fissures internal to the fraternal ideals overtaking friendship and marriage discourses.

To return briefly to my discussion of the Sondes pamphlets, I want to note that the murder itself is framed as “unnatural” (4) in The Devil’s Reign, as an attempt to overturn the ‘natural’ hierarchy of birth-order: Freeman’s desire for revenge is prompted by their father commanding him to “submit to his elder Brother” (5). In a colorful narrative, the pamphlet

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108 The birth order is natural, but the hierarchy is a social institution; Sondes’ attempt to conflate the natural with the social reflects the larger tendency in early modern culture to use the ‘naturalness’ of birth order to justify the
describes the inciting incident in which the brothers have been outfitted by their father in “two very rich suits of apparel, both alike” (5). When George soils his own doublet one morning, he takes Freeman’s and leaves him the soiled one. Their father exhorts Freeman to accept the exchange, “command[ing] his younger son to submit to his elder Brother” (5). The author of The Devils Reign notes that the father’s explicit favoring of one son over the other causes Freeman to resent George because he “conceiv[ed] his elder Brother to be more affected by his Father than himself, was greatly moved, and urged upon the same, and so resolved one way or other to be revenged” (5).

The murder is also attributed to the father’s recent alteration of his will, which would have left “the greatest part of the estate upon [George], and to leave but little thereof to his brother, who should be as it were subservient to him” (4). The will is altered because of a single incident, which, the pamphlet implies, increases Freeman’s resentment over the change. The eldest son has married a beautiful gentlewoman “of no great fortune” without his father’s consent. The pamphlet reports that he was persuaded to leave her, “as it is said,” by his father, who alters the will to obtain his son’s obedience by granting him an even larger share of the inheritance, thereby necessarily shrinking Freeman’s allowance. The pamphlet emphasizes the father’s tendency to bestow material goods on the eldest son first, leaving the younger son in a position of subservience. Whether the father feels more for his eldest son is irrelevant to the anonymous author of the pamphlet, since the murderous Freeman assumes that the disproportionate inheritance indicates disproportionate affection. The unnaturalness of fratricide, for this anonymous author, is based on its attempt to circumvent the ‘natural’ hierarchy created

hierarchy of primogeniture. See for instance The Prerogative of Primogeniture (1718), which argues that the “right of succession to an hereditary empire, depends not upon grace, &c. but only upon BIRTH-RIGHT” (1), neatly conflating ‘natural’ birth order with social hierarchy. Pamphlet located using EEBO.
by birth-order, which assumes access to economic and, evidently, emotional advantages. The pamphlet overall attributes fratricide to frustrated ambition, a desire to obtain the goods, titles, and parental affection due his elder brother.

The elder George Sondes’ response is by comparison to *The Devil’s Reign* less emotional, as its first 16 pages of self-justification relate more to his social and economic practices than to the events surrounding the murder itself. The remainder of the pamphlet argues that Freeman’s resentment was unfounded: George claims he educated both alike (16), and that he provided an ideal “example” (16) for both boys, neither gambling nor whoring. In the lengthy discussion of his management of his children’s “Education” (17), George takes pains to establish his own proper modeling of imitable behavior by foregrounding his own role as exemplar, while also naturalizing his eldest son’s proper behavior. But George Sondes ultimately agrees that Freeman killed his brother because of jealousy – not of any actual difference in how the father treated his sons, but because of Freeman’s nature, described as spoiled (27) and as not knowing his place (26, 31). Focused on justifying his treatment of both sons, George argues that Freeman’s envy was for his elder brother’s “vertues, and growing goodnesse, and that he was the Elder” (28), placing birth order as the climactic reason for Freeman’s envy. With an obvious need to manipulate how the murder of one son by another is perceived, George Sondes attempts to redefine the event as a product of some inborn fault in Freeman’s nature, uncorrectable by all George’s efforts at education, preferment, his own example, and his attempts to treat both sons equally in both economic and emotional terms. His repeated attempts to naturalize imitative ideals, so that failures of imitation can be blamed on failures of character, further imbricate the social (the hierarchical relationship caused by the economic practice of primogeniture) in the emotional (the fraternal relationship).
While the anonymous author of the *Devils Reign* attributes the murder to Freeman’s ambition, and George Sondes focuses on refuting accusations directed toward his own moral character, these two pamphlets reveal in common a need to understand a radical event, a type of murder, which, based on the flurry of pamphlet and sermon activity immediately following the event, appears to be highly unusual. As a genteel, landowning family, the Sondeses arguably had more at stake in matters of inheritance than peasant or even merchant or professional families. If heritable goods are easily partible, like money or shares in a business, then the pressure on the inheriting son is less urgent than in cases where inheritable goods are indissoluble, like land or titles. An anxiety about the maintenance of younger sons and of daughters pervades Sondes’ account; a substantial portion of his pamphlet is devoted to defending the amount of support George provided for his myriad half-brothers and half-sisters. While the family estate was indivisible, George alleges that he felt an intense obligation to provide for his father’s other children (from a subsequent marriage) through yearly allowances, preferments, apprenticeships, arranged marriages, and the payment of debts (17-19). His extensive justification of his treatment of his own (half) brothers elucidates his expectation that Freeman rely on his older brother’s good will. Theoretically land could be divided among sons, though partible inheritance was decidedly out of fashion in the 17th century among the gentry and aristocracy. The Sondes pamphlets never consider the option of a partible inheritance; while George Sondes consistently argues that he provided equally for his sons, he also expected Freeman to subordinate himself to his elder brother (31) and publishes letters written to Freeman in prison reminding Freeman that after his father’s death, he would have been dependent on his elder brother’s good will (26). Both

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109 “Below the level of the gentry, primogeniture was weaker, and in some areas of the country custom gave brothers a right to an equal share in a parental holding.” Ralph A. Houlbrooke. *The English Family 1450-1700.* London: Longman, 1984. 43.
pamphlets indicate that the average upper-class family is founded on a rigid hierarchy based on access or potential access to inheritable goods and titles that often controls or elides the expression of emotional bonds.

Critics relying on the evidence of pamphlets like this one, along with sermons, domestic tracts, and court cases, tend to argue either that early modern familial relationships were singularly lacking in affective bonds because kinship structures were fundamentally economic and social, or that these prescriptive sources bely the wealth of wills, family letters, and ecclesiastical court cases testifying to an abundance of familial emotion. Dramatic representations of fraternal conflict, however, move beyond descriptive and prescriptive sources to interrogate the social and economic forces shaping ideals of fraternal love. These ideals have normative force, circumscribing what can and cannot be represented as ‘love’ in regards to a specific familial relationship. Fraternal ideals seem to be especially fruitful sources of metaphor, as these ideals are picked up by discourses of friendship and of companionate marriage. In *The Maid’s Tragedy*, Beaumont and Fletcher attempt to repair the hierarchical and competitive aspects of residual forms of friendship by appropriating fraternal metaphors to grant authority to friendship discourses; that is, equitable friendships are authorized using language that assumes brotherhood is a metonymy for equality. Similarly, companionate marriage then picks up the language of equitable friendship to legitimate its own vision of equality in the marital relationship. The appropriation of fraternal metaphors in discourses of friendship and marriage
should grant each discourse the authority of the fraternal ideal. However, fraternal ideals themselves are far from stable, haunted by the specter of fratricide and violent competition for limited financial and affective resources: for the metaphors of the fraternal relationship to be adopted by friendship discourse, far from uncomplicatedly lending friendship or marriage the authority of fraternity, reveals the instability of that normative force.

I
Brotherhood

Fraternal metaphors are routinely appropriated for political, religious and social purposes in early modern drama, especially the histories, in which familial relationships are routinely subordinated to political concerns. A particularly salient example of this kind of borrowing can be found in Hal’s St. Crispian’s Day speech:

This story shall the good man teach his son,
And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by
From this day to the ending of the world
But we in it shall be remembered,
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
For he today that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition.  
(Henry V 4.3.56-63)\(^{111}\)

The speech does not promise literal brotherhood. Rather, Hal appeals to idealized metaphors of brotherhood. The dual appeals to remembrance and fraternity in Hal’s speech combine and compress the primary concern of inheritance, the immortalization of individuals through the reproduction of the familial whole in explicitly metaphorical language. The ideal of shared blood creating equality and affection constitutes Hal’s figurative appeal to the ideal of martial brotherhood, in which the sharing of blood is predicated on its shedding. While the ideal is

repeatedly betrayed by the plot structures of the play, the appeal of this offer of brotherhood is predicated on its underlying ideology of equality and mutual affection, an ideology which is frequently appropriated to justify other types of relationships. Another kind of borrowing, this time for the purposes of idealizing Christian brotherhood, can be observed in Erasmus, who advises readers in his *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* (1503, 1534 English translation) to “weep with them that weep, to joy with them that joy, yea let him rather take another man’s harm grievouser than his own: and of his brother’s wealth be gladder than of his own.” Appropriating fraternal ideals to justify a broader sense of community, Erasmus “asserts that it does not matter whether a person is a citizen of the same city, a cousin, or a friend; all members of the body of Christ are ‘my flesh … my brother’ (153).” When the model of friendship begins changing around the turn of the century, friendship discourses pick up fraternal ideals to describe, justify, and naturalize the newer ideals of equality and mutuality. However, what is

112 Jonathan Baldo argues that “Henry takes the familial rhetoric of the battle scenes which suggests a democratic brotherhood of Englishmen, akin to that envisioned by the myth of the Norman Yoke, and transfers it onto ‘brother France.’ In Act 5 Henry steals the Crispin’s Day rhetoric of ‘we band of brothers’ (4.3.60) from his soldiers ... [and] bestows the stolen tropes as a royal gift on France’s ruling family. A democratic sense of brotherhood or familial connection across social classes but within national boundaries yields to a rhetoric of family tied to dynastic descent and deployed to foster solidarity within a social class and across national boundaries” (142), in “Wars of Memory in Henry V,” *SQ* 47.2 (Summer, 1996). Even the speech’s promise of remembrance is broken: Joel Altman describes Hal’s Crispin’s Day speech as “an embracing ritual gesture” through which Shakespeare “has joined past to present, audience to soldiery, in an honorably fellowship transcending time and space. Indeed, Harry’s vile participation would seem to have fathered the audience at the Curtain or, perhaps, the new Globe Theatre. They are the lineal descendants of those ‘Whose hearts have left their bodies here in England, / And lie pavilion’d in the fields of France (1.2.128-29), and they are doing it all over again” (16), in “‘Vile Participation’: The Amplification of Violence in the Theater of Henry V,” *SQ* 42.1 (Spring, 1991). Baldo similarly notes that “in light of England’s failure to mark the anniversary of its great victory with a national observance ... it would be as apt to say that the speech marks the discontinuity of past and present. The mnemonic function of the speech in 1599 would most likely have been to remind audiences not of Agincourt ... but of the absence of any national day of remembrance” (138).


114 Quoted in Olmsted, 10.
striking about this series of borrowings is the degree to which each depends on the authority granted by the naturalizing and idealizing power of the originating fraternal discourse. The ideal of fraternal equality on which friendship discourse depends is belied by the inequality of brothers, who are most often portrayed in plays in moments of crisis, when a perceived break to the fraternal norm must be condemned and rectified. This ‘break’ is merely an exaggeration of the ideologies underlying the fraternal ideal, which, as Hal’s ‘band of brothers’ speech displays, are founded on the imbrication of emotion, violence and blood; the Sondes pamphlets reveal the potential consequences of that foundation, the explosion of normative fraternal ideals into fratricide. After demonstrating the fragility of the fraternal metaphor, I will then suggest that friendship discourses, in attempting to appropriate the authority of the fraternal metaphor, actually appropriate its inherent violence and competition.

Thomas Middleton’s *The Revenger’s Tragedy* (1606-7)\(^{115}\) contains two sets of brothers. Vindice and Hippolito never discuss their relationship, but they do constantly reaffirm their relationship by calling each other ‘brother’ in nearly every exchange. Most explicit references to fraternal values occur in the negative, as exemplified by the wrangling of the evil set of brothers: Lussurioso, the eldest and the Duke’s heir; Ambitioso, Supervacuo and Junior Brother, the Duke’s sons with his new wife; and Spurio, the Duke’s bastard. However, dramatic irony covers each brother’s initial appeal to ideal brotherhood’s terms of love and loyalty. Lussurioso, isolated by his status as heir and by his identification with the first, deceased Duchess, claims a closer relationship with his step-brothers. When Junior Brother behaves arrogantly while on trial for raping Antonio’s wife, Lussurioso cautions him: “Though marriage only has made thee my

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\(^{115}\) The question of the play’s authorship is addressed in Chapter Three, footnote 7. To sum up, while traditional attribution of *The Revenger’s Tragedy* has been to Cyril Tourneur, I am persuaded by recent scholarship that Middleton is the play’s author.
brother, / I love thee so far, play not with thy death” (1.2.52-3). Asserting a fraternal bond in spite of the non-natural or instituted character of their fraternity, Lussurioso seems to expand the ideal of ‘natural’ fraternal affection to a ‘brotherhood’ created by marriage bonds. At this point, the fraternal ideal seems flexible, even expansive. Later, when Lussurioso has been accused of trying to kill his father, he relies on that fraternal bond: “Brothers, my best release lies on your tongues; / I pray persuade for me” (2.3.53). Ambitioso and Supervacuo respond in the same vein, reassuring him, “It is our duties; Make yourself sure of us” (2.3.53-4) and “We’ll sweat in pleading” (2.3.54-5). In these early encounters, each brother reassures the other of the validity of their fraternal bond, emphasizing loyalty and solidarity in spite of the fact that Lussurioso shares only marital bond with his brothers. The general assumption revealed by these brief exchanges is that fraternal bonds, even those created by marriage, come with the expectation of mutual support and affection.

The brothers’ assertions of fraternal loyalty are quickly revealed to be false in a series of betrayals that insistently undermine Lussurioso’s expansive version of fraternal affection by asserting that fraternal affection is ‘natural,’ a matter of blood relationship. Brother and half-brother are shown to be equally envious, and the brothers’ early assertions of fraternal affection even in relationships created by marriage are replaced by equally urgent assertions of the difference between son and stepson. As Lussurioso’s position becomes more precarious, the fraternal bonds are revealed to be fragile, even brittle. Immediately after Lussurioso is taken offstage to prison, Ambitioso says in an aside, “No, thy death / Shall thank me better” (2.3.56-7). As his name suggests, Ambitioso is an ambitious younger brother, a type character in early modern tragedies from *Gorboduc* to *Lear*. The ‘aspiring’ brother suddenly reveals a desire to

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circumscribe inheritance practices, to kill his elder brother and become his father’s heir. This desire is quite at odds with the fraternal loyalty Ambitioso has previously expressed, and so exaggerated that the Duke uncovers Ambitioso’s ploy within a few lines. Ambitioso plans to use a similar veneer of love to mask his efforts to convince the Duke to execute his eldest son:

“No, brother, let our hate and love be woven / So subtly together, that in speaking / One word for his life, we may make three for his death” (2.3.60-2). The audience never supposes that Ambitioso loves Lussurioso; when he speaks of ‘love’ here, we understand him to mean ‘insincere, loving words.’ Ambitioso’s imbrication of the fraternal ideal (brotherly love) with violent ambition suggests not that love is alien to his relationship with Lussurioso, but that love is a significant part of that relationship. That is, the violent competition underlies even the most loving fraternal relationship, and, conversely, the language of fraternal love can operate as a cover for that competition.

The fractures that appear in the fraternal relationship are treated by the play as unfortunate but not entirely unexpected. Letting his younger sons believe that he plans to execute Lussurioso, the Duke describes their attempts to condemn their elder brother:

Here’s envy with a poor thin cover o’er’t,
Like scarlet hid in lawn, easily spied through.
This their ambition by the mother’s side
Is dangerous, and for safety must be purged.
I will prevent their envies; sure it was
But some mistaken fury in our son,
Which these aspiring boys would climb upon. (2.3.104-10)

The Duke pathologizes the younger brothers’ ambition in a metaphor that calls for its purgation for a non-specific ‘safety’ that could refer to his sons (their own safety), to his family as a whole, or to a more general society. As Michael Neill argues, “Middleton’s court is merely the mirror of an entire commonwealth where, since ‘farmers’ sons agreed, and met again, / To wash their hands and come up gentlemen’ (II.i.217-8), place is governed by ambition rather than the
proprieties of due succession; and Vindice’s opening soliloquy introduces us to a world of perversely disrupted succession.”\textsuperscript{117} The Duke’s assumption that his younger sons are ‘ambitious’ is quickly confirmed in the play. When Supervacuo informs him that their plan appears to have worked, and Lussurioso will be executed, Ambitioso declares “Excellent! / Then I am heir—duke in a minute” (3.1.12-3). Making explicit the violence of his ambition, Ambitioso elaborates on his desire to usurp Lussurioso: “I am next now; I rise just in that place / Where thou’rt cut off—upon thy neck, kind brother. / The falling of one head lifts up another” (3.1.26-8). Ambitioso makes explicit the murder that will have to occur to fulfill his ambitions, playing with the kin/kind formulation he will use sarcastically when delivering the order for his brother’s execution: “We are sorry / That we are so unnaturally employed / In such an unkind office, fitter far / For enemies than brothers” (3.2.5-8). Ambitioso’s repeated appeals to the fraternal ideal highlight the perversity of his misappropriation of fraternal discourse to disguise his ambitions.

Displaying his own ambition in an aside, Supervacuo counters, “Nay, / An he were once puffed out, here is a pin / Should quickly prick your bladder” (3.1.13-5). Grasping his blade in an illustrative gesture, Supervacuo condemns his elder brother’s ambition while promoting his own, proving further that the play is not weighing types of blood relationships. That is, the brothers are equally loyal, or disloyal, to brothers sharing one or both parents. The amount of blood shared seems to have little impact on the amount of blood spilled. However, family lines are somewhat delimited. Ambitioso and Supervacuo plan and scheme to save their younger brother, insisting that “The duchess’ sons are too proud to bleed” (3.1.21). However, the key to their decision seems to be their inability to view Junior Brother as a rival for their father’s title and position. While rivalry produces violence and violent affects, the absence of rivalry appears

\textsuperscript{117} Michael Neill, “Bastardy, Counterfeiting, and Misogyny in The Revenger’s Tragedy,” in Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 36.2 (Spring, 1996), 410.
to promote a less compromised fraternal relationship. The degree of blood shared is less important than the lack of rivalry.

That rivalry, however, causes Lussurioso to redraw his family lines. Once he discovers his younger brothers’ plans to have him executed, and Spurio’s affair with his step-mother, Lussurioso condemns everyone involved in terms that link their betrayal with their foreign blood:

That foul, incontinent duchess we have banished;
The bastard shall not live. After these revels,
I’l begin strange ones; he and the stepsons
Shall pay their lives for the first subsidies. (5.3.7-10)

While the degree of blood shared appears to be unimportant throughout most of the play, it provides a convenient marker of difference that allows Lussurioso to distance himself from his kin by emphasizing their Otherness of blood. Rather than emphasizing their fraternal bond, as earlier in the play, Lussurioso focuses on the ways in which that bond is partial, and on the fractures that render it easily broken.

The story of the brothers ends in a “knockabout farce of false succession and disinheritance.”118 After Lussurioso is murdered, the remaining sons of the Duchess fight over which of them will be heir:

Ambitioso: Here’s a labor served.
I thought to have sped him. ’Sblood, how came this?
Supervacuo: Then I proclaim myself. Now I am duke.
Ambitioso: Thou duke! brother thou liest.
[Stabs SUPERVACUO.]
Spurio: Slave! So dost thou!
[Stabs AMBITIOSO.]
Fourth Man: Base villain, hast thou slain my lord and master?
[Stabs SPURIO.]

Spurio’s final attempt to circumvent lineal inheritance structures prompts the play’s final fratricide, and the subsequent murder of the rest of the Duke’s sons, legitimate and not, dramatizes the destruction caused by attempts to overturn hierarchy in fast forward. In writing this play, Middleton “subverts an established mode and develops a dialectic within the genre, which he both satirizes and parodies before dismissing.”\footnote{Brian Jay Corrigan, “Middleton, The Revenger’s Tragedy, and Crisis Literature,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 38.2 (Spring 1998), 289.} However, while the play parodies the revenge tragedy genre, and its characters are in the parodic mode, Middleton’s parody of fraternal relationships nevertheless draws on the fraternal ideal in order to demonstrate the destruction of idealized brotherhood caused by inheritance rivalries. Like the anonymous writer(s) of the Sondes pamphlet, Middleton ascribes motives of ambition, jealousy and anti-hierarchicalism to his murderous younger brothers. The ‘unnatural’ attempt to overthrow the ‘natural’ birth-order leads to the deaths of all involved. However, Ambitioso’s appeals to the fraternal ideal highlight the discrepancy between the expressed ideal and the murderous reality of fraternity in the play. That even the most ambitious younger brother can assert his adherence to the fraternal ideal suggests that the ideal can never be relied upon, and, moreover, that its invocation can be a counterfeit cover for something truly dangerous.

The inability to truly know another person, even a brother, proves especially problematic to the emergent discourse of equal friendship, which is predicated upon the likeness of two friends. Beaumont and Fletcher’s The Maid’s Tragedy, discussed in the next section, centers on visions of ideal friendship between two men; that ideal friendship is contrasted throughout to the relative inferiority of blood kinship between two brothers and between a brother and sister. While gender differences affect how fraternal and brother-sister relationships are described, the primary difference that Beaumont and Fletcher assert in the play is between ideal friendship and
degraded kinship. However, because Beaumont and Fletcher use the language of ideal fraternity (likeness and equality) to describe that ideal friendship, Melantius’ assertions that friendship is superior to kinship actually reveal the ideological similarity of each kind of relationship.

II

Male Friends

In Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher’s *The Maid’s Tragedy* (written 1610-11, published 1619), Melantius avenges a wrong done to Amintor, his new brother-in-law and best friend. Newly returned from the wars, Melantius is excited to witness the marriage of Amintor and Aspatia, only to discover that Amintor has already married his sister, Evadne. Melantius is overjoyed by the alteration, and states, “Sister, I joy to see you and your choice. / You looked with my eyes when you took that man; / Be happy in him” (1.2.112-14). However, he is quickly dismayed to learn that the marriage is a sham arranged by the King to hide his affair with Evadne. Swearing vengeance, Melantius declares that “The name of friend is more than family / Or all the world besides” (3.2.167-8). Ostensibly he is also avenging a wrong done to his sister's honor, but the play establishes a much closer relationship between Melantius and Amintor than between Melantius and Evadne. Beaumont and Fletcher seem to be constructing a kinship narrative that places greater importance on relationships between friends than between kin. As Melantius assures Amintor, “to me the name / Of brother is too distant: we are friends, / And that is nearer” (3.1.41-3). Beaumont and Fletcher elevate friendship at the expense of kin relationships; however, their descriptions of ideal friendship sometimes participate in the practice of appropriating kinship metaphors in ways that undermine their idealizations.

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The type of friendship described by Beaumont and Fletcher should be specified. In early modern England, ‘friend’ had a range of meanings. The conflation of friend and kin was perhaps the most common; in early modern England the term ‘friend’ commonly signified kinship.\textsuperscript{121} While the relationships were not seen as identical (a friend is not literally a brother), friendship was often delimited to kin circles; as the historian Marc Bloch observes, “the general assumption was that there was no real friendship save between persons united in blood.”\textsuperscript{122} However, ‘friends’ could also be “allies, backers, associates”; they could be “clients and inferiors, like the ‘King’s friends’ of Hanoverian politics. Or they might be superiors, that is to say patrons or protectors.”\textsuperscript{123} This last kind of friendship, ‘social friendship,’ is based on reciprocity and usefulness, making it “one of the many forms of alliance into which individuals might voluntarily enter for the sake of mutual self-interest: lord and retainer, landlord and tenant, patron and client, master and apprentice, employer and servant.”\textsuperscript{124} In the model of social friendship, friends are “ideally expected to provide each other with mutual help and support, lending goods, labour, or money.”\textsuperscript{125} These ‘lopsided friendships’\textsuperscript{126} were not necessarily based on calculation or a lack of emotion. A lament at the separation of patron and client in Aemilia Lanyer’s \textit{The Description of Cooke-ham} writes of her “great friends we cannot dayly see, / So great a difference is there in degree (lines 106-7). The ‘great friends’ are actually her patrons,


\textsuperscript{122} Quoted in Thomas, 190. Marc Bloch, \textit{Feudal Society}, trans. L.A. Manyon, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn (1962), i. 124.

\textsuperscript{123} Thomas, 190.


\textsuperscript{125} Thomas, 191.

\textsuperscript{126} Quoted in Thomas, 190. Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, \textit{The People of the Sierra}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition (Chicago, 1971), 140.
and Ann Margaret Lange notes that Lanyer is “alluding to an Aristotelian idea that those lower in the social order ‘alwayes’ (line 110) have greater love for their socially superior friends than is returned.”\(^{127}\) This kind of relationship can become affectionate, though its foundational topos is that of ‘use’; however, while all affection can be reduced to a foundation in utility, it is against this context of ‘practical’ or ‘expedient’ friendship, however emotional it might have been, that Beaumont and Fletcher oppose their version of ideal friendship between equals.

The relatively new, humanist model of friendship offered “a nearly utopian site where one friend appeals reasonably to the heart of the other.”\(^{128}\) As with many humanist ideals, this model of friendship drew on classical sources for its authority: Aristotle notes, “all the proverbs agree in this; for example, ‘Friends have one soul between them’ [and] ‘Amity is equality.’”\(^{129}\) As Montaigne writes, friendship “is a matter of the mind.”\(^{130}\) Melantius describes friendship as an entirely cerebral relationship between equals, but while Melantius and Amintor at least appear to be of similar social ranks, Melantius is much older, and experienced in war. Any disparity, even in age, would be troubling for Renaissance humanist ideals of friendship, which held that equality was necessary for the kind of friendship described by Aristotle. For instance, Montaigne argues that inequality of ages is an impediment to friendship, because love of a younger man “could not have been based on the mind, which had yet to show itself, which was even then


\(^{128}\) Olmsted, 5. Interestingly enough, Christopher Marlow notes that this model of friendship is relatively short-lived, and is already being replaced in the 1630s by a “more pragmatic view of friendship that recognizes the importance of strategic alliances and the significance of the group” (54), in “A Crisis of Friendship?: Representation and Experience in Two Late University Plays,” Shakespeare Studies 37 (2009).


being born, too young to sprout.”\textsuperscript{131} While Melantius does acknowledge the common assumption that friends of unequal ages and dissimilar experiences could not be equal friends, he rejects the idea that his friendship with Amintor must therefore follow the older model of ‘lopsided friendship,’ and asserts that equality can be created through imitation and virtue:

Wonder not that I call a man so young my friend:  
His worth is great; valiant he is and temperate,  
And one that never thinks his life his own  
If his friend need it. When he was a boy,  
As oft as I returned (as, without boast,  
I brought home conquest) he would gaze upon me  
And view me round, to find in what one limb  
The virtue lay to do those things he heard;  
Then would he wish to see my sword, and feel  
The quickness of the edge, and in his hand  
Weigh it; he oft would make me smile at this.  
His youth did promise much, and his ripe years  
Will see it all performed. \textsuperscript{(1.1.46-58)}

Melantius’ speech ultimately demonstrates the overlapping of emergent and residual ideologies; in the opening line, he calls attention to the model of unequal friendship even as he defends against it, borrowing the language of use (‘worth’) while claiming something more emotional and, above all, equal. Keith Thomas notes that this point in the early modern period marked the transition to idealized friendships based “wholly on mutual sympathy,” defined at the time as “A (real or supposed) affinity between certain things, by virtue of which they are similarly or correspondingly affected by the same influence,” but also as “Conformity of feelings, inclinations, or temperament, which makes persons agreeable to each other; community of feeling; harmony of disposition.”\textsuperscript{132} While there is a homoerotic subtext to the passage (the

\textsuperscript{131} Montaigne, 210.  
\textsuperscript{132} Thomas, 193. See, for instance, Richard Braithwait, \textit{The English Gentleman: Containing Sundry excellent Rules or exquisite Observations, tending to Direction of every Gentleman, of selecter ranke and qualitie; Hoe to demeane or accommodate himself in the manage of publike or private affaires} (London, 1630), which defines friendship as a relationship in which “two hearts are so individually united, as neither from other can be severed” (243); a friend is
phallic innuendo of Amintor’s desire to “see,” “feel,” and “in his hand / Weigh” Melantius’ sword), I want to focus on the doubled sense of similarity (of influence and of affect) that appears in Melantius’ description of Amintor as the younger man’s virtue as well as Amintor’s desire for virtue. Amintor’s ‘worth is great,’ he is ‘valiant’ and ‘temperate,’ fulfilling every virtue upheld by friendship ideals.  

Amintor is also anxious to learn about the martial valor displayed by Melantius, examining his older friend’s musculature and taking practice swings with his sword. Melantius paints for us a portrait of a young man eagerly greeting a returned warrior honored for his martial valor, admiring the instruments of war, and evidently showing much ‘promise’ that Melantius believes will be ‘performed.’ Melantius could be describing a sort of warrior bond popularized in chivalric romances, which “abounded in tales of the close relationships forged by Roland and...

“nothing else than a second selfe, and therefore as individuate as a man from himself” (293). OED, 1a notes usage in 1579, and 3a. notes usage in 1596.

133 Drawing on Montaigne’s essay “Of Friendship,” Jeffrey Masten notes that “sexual relations between men are incompatible with friendship not because they are sexual per se, but because, in the only precedent example (Greek pederasty), they included ‘disparity’ and ‘difference’ – whereas [Montaigne] would require ‘conference and communication’” (34), in Textual intercourse: Collaboration, authorship, and sexualities in Renaissance drama (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997); however, he also notes that the homoeroticism of male friendship was sanctioned in early modern culture, unlike the condemned discourses of sodomy and pederasty (because both imply disparity and social disruption) in chapter 2, “Between gentlemen: homoeroticism, collaboration, and the discourse of friendship” (36-7). There is a significant body of literature dealing with the early modern male friendship in homoerotic terms, perhaps most significantly in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Between Men, which established the idea that women were ancillary to the real concerns of male relationships. See also Renaissance Discourses of Desire Edited by Claude J. Summers and Ted-Larry Pebworth (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1993); Queering the Renaissance Edited by Jonathan Goldberg (Durham and London: Duke UP, 1994), especially Alan Bray, “Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship in Elizabethan England,” which examines the overlap of the admired masculine friend and the feared sodomite; Forrest Tyler Stevens, “Erasmus’s ‘Tigress’: The Language of Friendship, Pleasure, and the Renaissance Letter,” which suggests that the apparent homoeroticism in Erasmus’ letters was merely conventional in the epistolary genre (though that conventionality itself poses interesting questions); Donald N. Mager, “John Bale and Early Tudor Sodomy Discourse,” which looks at the radical Reformation discourse about sodomy which lay behind Henry VIII’s anti-sodomy statute of 1533; and Jeff Masten, “My Two Dads: Collaboration and the Reproduction of Beaumont and Fletcher,” which demonstrates the conjunction of friendship, eroticism, and collaboration in Montaigne’s Of Friendship.’ See also Mario DiGangi, The homoerotics of early modern drama (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), especially his chapter on friendship, “The homoerotics of favoritism in tragedy,” which examines the dangers surrounding the unequal friendships between monarch and favorite; and Shakesqueer: A Queer Companion to the Complete Works of Shakespeare Edited by Madhavi Menon (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2011).
Oliver, Amis and Amiloun, and similar brothers-in-arms.” However, Melantius specifically focuses on the attention paid to him by his eager young friend, and he casts this focus in terms of imitation. Amintor’s fixation upon the arms of battle reads as a boy attempting to imitate a returning war hero, which for Melantius is a key foundation of their friendship. Aristotle taught that a friend “could be a second self, a mirror into which one might look so as to enhance one’s own self-knowledge.” Melantius explicates the markers of asymmetry, acknowledging the difference in their ages and Amintor’s hero worship, but then asserts that Amintor’s virtue, and desire to emulate Melantius’ virtue, made them equals.

The idea that a friend could be a ‘second self’ produced certain expectations about what that friendship would entail, and out of these two friends, Melantius is the one who sets expectations for how this ideal friendship is supposed to work. After Amintor realizes his wedding is a sham, he becomes despondent though he presents a brave front. Melantius realizes something is wrong (“The distracted carriage of mine Amintor / Takes deeply on me” [3.2.43-44]), and confronts his friend. When Amintor tries to distract him with a compliment (“Are not you, / Which is above all joys, my constant friend? / What sadness can I have?” [3.2.78-79]), Melantius retorts that friendship “is all withered here,” when “secret sins” are hidden by “compliment” and unshared (3.2.91-97). As portrayed in early modern English literature, “perfect friendship was a spiritual union of two persons: ‘one soul in bodies twain.’ It was not a physical relationship, but ‘love refin’d and purg’d of all its dross.’” For Cicero, “the most complete agreement in wills, in pursuits, and in opinions” is the “whole essence of

134 Thomas, 192. See also Laurens Mill’s encyclopedic account of ideal friendship’s literary appearances in One Soul in Bodies Twain: Friendship in Tudor and Stuart Literature (Bloomington, Ind.: The Principia Press, 1937).
135 Thomas, 194.
friendship.”¹³⁷ For Montaigne, true friendship was above “heterosexuality, pederasty, commercial relations, and biological relatedness.”¹³⁸ Melantius elevates friendship above kinship in just these terms, defining friendship so that it requires the ultimate, intimate access to inner thoughts and feelings; the metaphor of spiritual union required such sharing to maintain its viability. When friends keep secrets, Melantius argues that union is damaged or even destroyed. Laurie Shannon demonstrates that frank speech is the sign of a true friend in Plutarch, Erasmus, Elyot, Bacon, and others, all of whom agreed with Cicero that “nothing is to be considered a greater bane of friendship than fawning, cajolery, or flattery … hypocrisy is not only wicked under all circumstances, because it pollutes truth and takes away the power to discern it, but also because it is especially inimical to friendship.”¹³⁹ An early modern text, Francis Lenton’s *Characterismi* (1631), describes the True Friend in similar terms: “Love and amity hath so knit him to you, that ‘tis a question whether you be two or one, reciprocally answering each other in affection, and are equally sensible of each others defects or disturbances.”¹⁴⁰ Melantius’ failure to discern his friend’s disturbance is troubling enough, as it challenges the unity of selves upon which their ideal friendship is founded. The compliment used to disguise Amintor’s sorrow is particularly dangerous to the sympathy carefully cultivated over the course of this friendship, since flattery would be especially corrosive to a model of friendship founded on truthful sharing.

Melantius consistently speaks to Amintor using complaints that access these idealized terms, for instance reproaching him, “we have not enjoyed our friendship of late, / For we were wont to change our souls in talk” (3.2.43-44, 54-55). The idea of exchanging souls by sharing one’s innermost thoughts and feelings refers to these idealized, humanist conceptions of

¹³⁷ Quoted in Olmsted, 34.
¹³⁸ Shannon, 33.
¹³⁹ Shannon, 47. For her larger argument about the necessity of frank speech to ‘true friendship,’ see 46-53.
¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Mario DiGangi’s *Sexual Types* (2011), 32-3.
friendship. Melantius’ language (‘change our souls’) reflects the friendship of David and Jonathan, “whose souls, according to the first book of Samuel (18:1), were ‘knit together,’ an ideal shared by the author of Deuteronomy, who alludes (13:6) to ‘thy friend, which is as thy own soul.’” Friendship was idealized as the only unconditional form of love; as Solomon said, “a friend loveth at all times and a friend is born for adversity.” However, Melantius’ demand that Amintor share his troubles freely identifies one of the few conditions which were thought corrosive to friendship. Wendy Olmsted highlights Elyot’s claim that “a flatter ‘is always pleasaunt and without sharpnes, inclunynge to inordinate favour and affection,’ thus betraying himself for what he is. But admonitions, which Montaigne calls ‘the chiefest offices of friendship,’ assure that friends’ likeness to one another springs from their virtue.” In trying to protect his friend from a painful truth, Amintor nearly destroys the basis of their friendship; the episode identifies the foundational characteristics of idealized friendship, and emphasizes its mental quality.

Early modern conceptions of friendship were in flux at this time, with multiple discourses in simultaneous and competing usage. Melantius expresses a preference for idealized, affective friendship over ‘lopsided friendships.’ In the process of justifying one discourse over another, Melantius also denigrates relationships based on blood while lionizing those based on likeness, mutual admiration, and equality. Even when dealing with his brother, Diphilus, and his sister, Evadne, Melantius criticizes the ideal of ‘blood bonds’ in favor of the affective ideals of resemblance or imitation, loyalty, and love. After learning of Evadne’s affair with the king,

141 Thomas, 194.
142 William Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties (1621), 246.
143 Olmsted, 14. See also Olmstead’s chapter in Discourses and Representations of Friendship, “‘To plainness is honour bound’: Deceptive Friendship in King Lear.”
Melantius questions whose side he will take, asking “shall the name of friend / Blot all our family?” (3.2.134-5). That he asks the question at all is significant, making explicit a debate between loyalty toward kin and loyalty toward friends. The friendship is briefly threatened by swordplay in a scene that reveals the tensions and contingencies that can cause even an idealized friendship to degenerate into a near-farcical “quarrel scene.” Staging a series of abortive duels, Beaumont and Fletcher recast the battle between friendship and kinship in terms of reputation and honor, aligning ‘honor’ with kinship ties so that ‘friend’ must battle the enormous potential for emotional as well as political loss. Amintor appeals to their friendship, reproaching Melantius, “it was base in you / To urge a weighty secret from your friend / And then rage at it” (3.2.162-4). Recalling the foundational characteristic of friendship on which Melantius had extracted the secret, the honest sharing of souls, Melantius declares “The name of friend is more than family” (3.2.167). Further establishing his prioritization of friend over family, Melantius attempts to prevent another duel by reassuring Amintor “I do believe my sister is a whore, / A leprous one. Put up thy sword” (3.2.177-8). Melantius’ willingness to believe his friend without ever questioning his sister indicates the higher esteem in which he holds male honesty, but also indicates his tendency to favor friendship over those bonds created by shared blood.

Melantius’ brother, too, privileges friendship by claiming “People hereafter shall not say there passed / A bond more than our loves to tie our lives / And deaths together” (3.2.273-5). Diphilus replicates Melantius’ privileging of friendship over their literal kinship, claiming that mental compatibility, not physical blood, is the foundation of their bond. When Melantius reproaches his sister about her affair, his anger leads him to threaten the king’s life. Evadne

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144 Shannon notes that representations of male-male friendship are often triangulated, not with a woman, but with a king (9).
145 The term ‘quarrel scene’ comes from Craik, 16.
privileges the kinship bond, offering to protect him from the charge of treason: “you are my brother, that’s your safety” (4.1.58). However, Melantius replies, “I’ll be a wolf first. ‘Tis, to be thy brother, / An infamy below the sin of coward. / I am as far from being part of thee / As thou art from thy virtue. Seek a kindred / ‘Mongst sensual beasts, and make a goat thy brother: / A goat is cooler” (4.1.59-64). Evadne seems to subscribe to common cultural understandings of kinship, associating virtues such as loyalty and affection with the familial blood tie; however, Melantius associates that blood with zoological metaphors such as ‘wolf,’ ‘sensual beasts,’ and ‘goat,’ utterly repudiating the kinship bond as merely animal.

The final scene of *The Maid’s Tragedy* reifies the difference between idealized friend and debased kin. While Amintor is dying, Melantius embraces him, and cries, “Eyes, call up your tears: / This is Amintor! Heart, he was my friend: / Melt! Now it flows” (5.3.251-3). The need to ‘call up’ tears reinforces Melantius’ characterization as an ideal soldier, but perhaps also speaks to the depth of feeling he experiences for his friend. This is no shallow acquaintance, but a friendship rooted so deeply it needs to be called up to the surface before it can be expressed, a friendship so interior that it becomes difficult to bring the emotions associated with that friendship to the exterior. However, when his sister’s body is revealed, Melantius says “it is / A thing to laugh at in respect of this: / Here was my sister, father, brother, son, / All that I had” (5.3.263-6). Melantius continues to borrow terms from kinship to express an idealized form of friendship, and the climax of that borrowing is his assertion that a single true friend can replace all kinship ties.
III

Companionate Marriage

Beaumont and Fletcher only deal with the companionate marriage ideal in Melantius’ repudiation of its validity. While an alternate means of reading Melantius’ descriptions of his relationship with Amintor would negate any need to justify their friendship, Melantius is at pains to avoid remembering that they are brothers-in-law. Specifically, Melantius’ terms of replacement and completion could also refer to the popular belief, derived from biblical interpretation, that marriage made man and wife ‘one flesh.’ Though expressed in the negative, Adriana in The Comedy of Errors explicates the companionate marriage ideal:

How comes it now, my husband, O how comes it,
That thou art then estrangèd from thyself? –
Thy ‘self’ I call it, being strange to me
That, undividable, incorporate,
Am better than thy dear self’s better part.
Ah, do not tear away thyself from me;
For know, my love, as easy mayst thou fall
A drop of water in the breaking gulf,
And take unmingled thence that same drop again
Without addition or diminishing,
As take from me thyself, and not me too. (2.2.119-129)

Derived from the doctrine of marriage as ‘one flesh’ as articulated in Genesis 2:3-24, and in Paul’s mystical view of the church as wedded to God in Ephesians 5:28-33, Adriana appeals to her husband in terms that insist on their corporeal unity. The ‘incorporate’ self created by marriage is an echo of similar beliefs about the unification of selves familiar from friendship discourse. Melantius and Amintor are united in kinship by Amintor’s marriage to Evadne, which through the curious alchemy of marriage has made them blood relations. Melantius’ assertion that friendship is superior to kinship echoes marriage metaphors that borrow from but assert superiority to friendship discourse. For instance, Protestant minister Robert Cleaver argues that “the classical understanding of friends as one soul in two bodies is perfected in the theological
conception of husband and wife as one flesh: ‘If it be true … that friendship make one heart out of two, much more truly and effectually ought wedlock to do the same, which far surpasses all manner of both friendship and kindred.’”

At approximately the same time that friendship discourses were gaining idealized forms, marriage was also being popularly idealized as the most complete possible union. The ideal of the companionate marriage borrows metaphors from friendship, just as friendship borrows metaphors from kinship, and each attempts to prove its superiority over the others. The primary grounds of superiority chosen by proponents of marriage was its ability to combine the pleasures of sharing both mind and body, an ideal Montaigne thought impossibly beyond reach due to the imperfections of women. As Keith Thomas notes, there were social impediments to the idealization of marriage that made appropriations of friendship metaphors complicated and tentative: “true friendship required equality; and the sexes were not equal … it thus became common to assert that male friendship was superior to sexual love between men and women. As a character in one of George Chapman’s Jacobean plays remarked, ‘what excite[d] the bed’s desire’ was inferior to ‘friendship chaste and masculine.’” Nevertheless, the ideal of companionate marriage was beginning to be popularized by Protestant theologians, based on the argument that since “Friendship was a relationship of souls, not bodies, and souls were neither

146 Quoted in McQuade, 418.
147 Jeffrey Masten notes that “the male homoerotic friendship I have briefly described was increasingly coincident with an idea of companionate marriage that had begun to be articulated in remarkably similar terms” (281), in Textual Intercourse: collaboration, authorship, and sexualities in Renaissance drama (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997).
149 Thomas, 209.
male nor female,” equal friendship between the sexes was possible.\textsuperscript{150} For instance, John Donne rejected “this forward heresy / that women can no parts of friendship be.”\textsuperscript{151} Humanist texts also championed companionate marriage: in his \textit{The Book of the Courtier}, Castiglione claims that women’s “conversation ennobles the men who seek their society, and friendship becomes a model not only for same-sex intercourse but also for opposite-sex interchanges.”\textsuperscript{152} In early modern England, the ideal of companionate marriage was endorsed by humanists based on the argument made by “the first-century Greek philosopher Plutarch that marriage was the most pleasurable form of love and the most beneficial form of friendship.”\textsuperscript{153} Companionate marriage discourse tended to borrow metaphors from friendship, which in turn borrowed metaphors from kinship, creating tight linkages between all three forms of love that render arguments over superiority always provisional and pitched to meet local rhetorical needs.

Protestant theologians attempted to legitimate companionate marriage by “describing it as a type of friendship.”\textsuperscript{154} Drama picks up the appropriation of friendship and kinship discourses to portray this new kind of marital relationship. In Shakespeare’s \textit{Julius Caesar}, Portia powerfully critiques the limits residual forms of marriage place on companionship:

\begin{quote}
Within the bond of marriage, tell me, Brutus, 
Is it excepted I should know no secrets
That appertain to you? Am I your self
But, as it were, in sort or limitation,
To keep with you at meals, comfort your bed,
And talk to you sometimes? Dwell I but in the suburbs
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{150} Thomas, 209. However, Kathleen M. Davies notes that while “Pre-Reformation works of moral theology addressed to priests stressed the virtue of celibacy[,] ... advice to the laity on domestic problems is remarkably similar in tone to that given by Puritan writers” (564), in “The sacred condition of equality – how original were Puritan doctrines of marriage?” \textit{Social History} 2.5 (May 1977), 563-580.

\textsuperscript{151} Thomas, 209.

\textsuperscript{152} Olmsted, 34.

\textsuperscript{153} Thomas, 215.

\textsuperscript{154} McQuade, 418.
Of your good pleasure? If it be no more,  
Portia is Brutus’ harlot, not his wife.  

Portia demands an equality of honest sharing that insistently recalls Melantius’ denunciation of Amintor’s attempt to mask his despair. While the “masculinist tradition of ‘fraternity’ that lies at the center of traditional friendship discourses” actively denies women access to the “exclusive ‘brotherhood’ of friends,” Portia asserts her right to a marriage that follows companionate ideals remarkably similar to those of ideal friendships. Adopting language familiar from friendship and fraternal discourses, Portia explicates a view of marriage that expects resemblance, reciprocation, and the construction of a unified self from two disparate others. Most of the appeal of the companionate marriage ideal rests in its ability to expand the limits of marriage, so that within the marital union husband and wife can also form a perfect friendship, thus consolidating a man’s requirements for friendship, love, sex, and mental union within his marital family.

The companionate marriage ideal is one about which Beaumont and Fletcher are deeply skeptical. Though the ideal that man and wife became one flesh also meant that Amintor became Melantius’ brother in an almost literal sense, the play insistently denigrates kinship, including relationships that create kin. The marriage of his sister to his best friend should have expanded his family and tied him to his best friend with that “inexplicable band” (Spanish Tragedy 3.12.46) of kinship, “for ever knit together” (Antony and Cleopatra 2.6.112). In terms of social relationships, as opposed to personal, marriage was needed for male alliance, and marriage to a man’s sister was said “To hold you in perpetual amity, / To make you brothers, / and to knit your hearts / With an unslipping knot” (Antony and Cleopatra 2.2.125-8), a form of bond that sits uneasily with Melantius’ conviction that blood relations are ‘merely animal.’ Lisa Hopkins, in

155 Schalkwyk, 141.
her chapter on *Julius Caesar*, argues that the insistent use of the term ‘brother’ by Brutus and Cassius records not merely “a mutual affection” but specifically the fact that Cassius was married to Brutus’ sister, Junia.\(^{156}\) As Hopkins notes, “the marital relationship, emotionally unimportant though it seems to be, radically structures and informs the homosocial bonding with Brutus in which so much of [Cassius’] energy and affection are invested.”\(^{157}\) The marriage enables, not a close affective bond between husband and wife, but the closer homosocial bond of the two male friends.

That close affective bond, already present between Melantius and Amintor, could as easily be justified by the kinship created by Amintor’s marriage to Melantius’ sister as by friendship ideals. As Keith Thomas notes, “Marriage was a recognized way of establishing friendship between two groups of kin … Links of this kind could often generate amicable, even affectionate, relationships, but that was incidental to their main purpose. Essentially, they were all ways of artificially enlarging the unit of kindred for the sake of mutual advantage.”\(^{158}\) While this sort of “artificial” kinship, to borrow Thomas’ term, seems to have little place in the world of the play, it does render Melantius’ final assertion of friendship over kinship complicated, and even a little perverse. In contrast to his denigration of kinship as basely physical, Melantius claims that friendship is a cerebral union of compatible souls, a moral and emotional fusion limited to men capable of that kind of deep resemblance. However, while Amintor is friend he is also kin by marriage, and Melantius’ argument has to be made constantly and always against those kinship ties. Fighting against the use model of friendship makes denying the use model of marriage a necessity, and leads to Melantius ignoring and even actively suppressing the kin bond

\(^{156}\) Lisa Hopkins, *The Shakespearean Marriage: Merry Wives and Heavy Husbands* (Macmillan, 1998), 122. She also notes that the marriage is recorded in Plutarch.

\(^{157}\) Hopkins (1998), 122.

\(^{158}\) Thomas, 191-2.
that would have made his attachment to Amintor easily explicable, or rather not in need of explanation.

While, in Francis Bacon’s words, “it is friendship, when a man can say to himself, I love this man without respect of his utility,” Bacon also tells us that the relations of selflessness and selfishness in friendship felt like a problem. There is an ideal friendship, but it can never be experienced as unchallenged. In their dynamic ranking of relationships, Beaumont and Fletcher portray an idealized friendship that places friend before life, love, king and family. However, this is no unconditional relationship. Even idealized friendship has its prerequisites and conditions, and while Melantius idealizes their friendship as ‘of the mind’ as opposed to the ‘merely animal’ connection created by blood kinship, that cerebral quality renders friendship fragile to failures of communication. By placing honesty in intimacy above all other qualities of friendship, Beaumont and Fletcher identify the inherent weaknesses of idealized friendship. The act of sharing that creates the ‘unity of souls’ of idealized friendship also reveals the ultimately separate nature of the two friends. That separation could be bridged by an appeal to the early modern conviction that marriage created new blood-based kinship bonds; however, Melantius’ belief in idealized friendship, in combination with his denigration of blood ties, renders that source of justification at best untenable.

The Sondes pamphlet discussed at the beginning of this chapter takes pains to describe fratricide as unnatural, and as an attempt to overthrow the ‘natural’ hierarchy of birth order. Fratricide is only the most obvious problem troubling the fraternal ideal, which is founded on values of equality, loyalty, and mutual affection; those values, when expressed or explicated, are routinely revealed to be empty, counterfeit, or at best partially sustained in dramatic portrayals of brotherhood. The brotherhood that is never described, that is taken for granted and not

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159 Qtd in Thomas, 193.
questioned, seems to be the only form of fraternity that adheres to the ideal. Authors appropriate fraternal metaphors to legitimate late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth developments in discourses of friendship and marriage; however, that appropriation infects each succeeding discourse with the violence inherent to those fraternal values. That is, because the underlying ideologies of friendship and marriage discourses are borrowed from fraternal ideals, the instabilities in those ideologies pressure fraternity, friendship, and marriage, if in ways particular to each relationship. The pressure placed on each brother to compete for limited financial and affective resources clashes with the expectation of financial and emotional support prompted by the fraternal ideal. The humanist idealization of friendship, founded on appropriations of fraternal ideals adopted from their classical sources, supported the clash of the affective and the financial. In imitating fraternal norms, friendship is implicated in a similar imbrication of affective and material concerns, and while Beaumont and Fletcher emphasize the emotional, *The Maid’s Tragedy* nevertheless reveals the incompatibility of friendship with kinship. That is, the attempt to elevate friendship above ‘mere animal’ kinship leads to a clash with the legal structures of primogeniture and of the family as firm. Marriage would seem to bridge friendship and kinship, with earlier use models of marriage explicitly directed toward creating new bonds of kinship between male friends. However, the ideal that marriage creates kin clashes with newer ideals of companionate marriage that place affective above social bonds. *The Maid’s Tragedy* contains only a potential companionate marriage, and the failure of that relationship is implicated in Aspatia’s death. For Amintor, the social impinges on the affective, destroying his relationship with his friend as well as his former fiancé.

Beaumont and Fletcher’s dramatization of the competition between residual and emergent discourses of friendship and marriage suggests the multiplicity of discourses that could
shape relationships in early modern England. Those discourses emerge from pamphlets, dramatic
exempla, humanist educational practices and scholarship, and sermons, all of which compete to
describe the ‘right’ kind of friendship or marriage. Competing religious discourses also impinge
on how relationships are constituted. Returning to the father-son relationship, in chapter three I
examine the impact of religious beliefs on the values of imitation and inheritance in early
modern culture. Cyril Tourneur’s *The Atheist’s Tragedy* (1611) contains multiple sets of fathers
and sons in relationships overtly constructed by earthly forms of imitation and inheritance.
Tourneur portrays the repeated failures of both imitation and inheritance structures as faulty,
earthly, incorrect alternatives to proper, Godly imitation and inheritance as finally modeled by
his ‘philosopher-hero’ Charlemont. Tourneur’s religious intervention in imitation and inheritance
structures redefines kinship using a discourse that reveals the violence underpinning earthly
kinship norms but that also sets impossible standards that leave the subject incapable of true
imitation.
Chapter Three: “There’s my eternity”: Imitation, Inheritance, and Immortality in *The Atheist’s Tragedy*

The previous two chapters examine how structures of imitation and inheritance pressure family relationships, friendships and marriages. In Chapters Three and Four, I examine how relationships founded on ideals of imitation and replication are pressured by the larger social influences of religious and political controversies. This chapter focuses on one author’s Protestant intervention into mainstream humanist ideologies of imitation; while *The Atheist’s Tragedy* has been read as a Christian tragedy in its injunction to leave revenge to God, it is also Christian in its attempt to replace the ideal of earthly imitation with a model in which the spiritual supersedes the earthly. Tourneur portrays the villainous father, D’Amville, as an atheist in order to foreground an extreme version of the desire to live through one’s posterity. Atheism usefully illustrates the problems inherent in imitating the patriarch, which might not be as obvious in the early modern period if the patriarch is a believer. The problem with opposing human and divine imitation is that the patriarch—as head of the household, and a link in the Golden Chain of being—is the conduit through which other others may be said to approach God; as Milton has it, “Hee for God only, shee for God in him.”  

Tourneur intervenes in imitative ideologies to argue that the father is not always the correct model for imitation.

Discussed in criticism as an anti-revenge revenge tragedy, *The Atheist’s Tragedy* is one of a very small number of plays that argues vengeance should be left to God.  The play is also

\[160\] *Paradise Lost* Book 4, line 299.

an anti-imitation imitation play, that is, one of the only extant early modern plays to focus on sons imitating fathers only to propose that, like revenge, modeling ‘proper’ behavior should be left to God. The play focuses on a younger brother’s complicated, ongoing attempts to gain his nephew’s rightful inheritance. D’Amville, the younger brother in question, is also the play’s titular atheist, and his attempts to supplant his nephew, Charlemont, are explicitly linked to his intellectual, reasoned denial of an afterlife.\footnote{Benjamin Bertram notes that “the word ‘atheism’ had a broader meaning than it does today. It was often used to attack people who held unorthodox Christian ideas. The accusation of unbelief often reflected the fear of attackers that the person charged would eventually move from heterodoxy to unbelief” (Chapter 2, footnote 8), in \textit{The Time is Out of Joint: Skepticism in Shakespeare’s England} (University of Delaware Press, 2005). However, as I will show, D’Amville is an atheist in our more modern sense of the rejection of the existence of a higher power. Richard Sugg, writing on \textit{The Atheist’s Tragedy}, notes that “the very word ‘atheist’ was at this time still relatively novel and uncommon. ... Tourneur’s choice therefore shows us that a certain version of atheism was recognized widely enough to form the subject of a popular play” (144), in \textit{Murder After Death: Literature and Anatomy in Early Modern England} (Cornell University Press, 2007) 162} That is, D’Amville takes the idea that his children are his immortality to an extreme not found in other plays possibly because they are an atheist’s only chance at life after death:

Here are my sons—
There’s my eternity. My life in them
And their succession shall forever live,
And in my reason dwells the providence
To add to life as much of happiness.

\textit{Includes Hamlet, Marston’s Antonio} plays, and \textit{The Revenge of Bussy D’Ambois}—these plays share a focus on Stoic thought, though Higgins notes that Tourneur’s use of stoicism is religious and didactic in intention (255). Each play in this group ‘leaves revenge to God’ with varying degrees of success, of course. Thomas Rist similarly notes that “it has been recognized that The significance of \textit{The Atheist’s Tragedy} in the tradition of Elizabethan revenge plays lies in the fact that it is the first play in which a revenger is specifically forbidden to take revenge” (107), though his main argument is about Tourneur’s adherence to traditional funerary remembrances, in \textit{Revenge Tragedy and the Drama of Commemoration in Reforming England} (London: Ashgate, 2008). Rist is citing Brian Morris and Roma Gill’s edition of the play (London: A. & C. Black, 1989), xxii. I agree somewhat with Peter Murray, who argues that Charlemont is not a Stoic at all, and Tourneur is writing a corrective to the \textit{Bussy} plays by asserting the superiority of Christian values, in Peter B. Murray, \textit{A Study of Cyril Tourneur} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1964), 99. Murray also discusses Tourneur’s parody of puritan values in the character of Snuffe, (1965, 142), as does Samuel Schuman, who claims that Tourneur skewers the “precisionist, middle-class Puritan[‘s]” extreme drive toward personal spiritual life and behavior, in \textit{Cyril Tourneur} (Twayne, 1977), 120. While I do think Tourneur reads earthly Stoic values as the best a man can do without God, as demonstrated by Sebastian’s character arc, I want to make the slight distinction that Tourneur is not denigrating the Stoic man but asserting the need for further divine intervention. Interestingly enough, similar emphases on the imitation of God (instead of the imitation of an earthly father) were also current in Catholic circles, \textit{pace} Craig A. Monson, in “Preaching to the Choir: Arts of Persuasion in the Convents of Italy” (12) from his forthcoming article.
Let all men lose, so I increase my gain:
I have no feeling of another’s pain.  

D’Amville appears in this moment to be assured of his own immortality through the succession of his multiple sons. D’Amville imagines descendants stretching into an unimaginably distant future in which some part of him still survives in those living heirs. This is a more extravagant version of fatherhood than that outlined in Chapter One – for D’Amville, his sons are not merely representative of him, or capable of replicating him through imitation; rather, D’Amville imagines that he will literally live in his sons and their succeeding generations. That part of the father carried by the son is here materialized insistently, locating the living father (or at least a part of him) in the living son. D’Amville imagines he is connected to sons who are actually, materially a part of him; in his metaphor, discussed more fully below, D’Amville figures himself as a tree and his children as branches that “from my substance … receive the sap / Whereby they live and flourish” (1.1.57-8). D’Amville imagines their dependence on his substance (sap or property, to use the metaphor or the economic connotation) as perpetual.

While the play offers a religious corrective to revenge, it also contains a spiritual disruption of two much older normative family topoi: the ideal that the father lives on in his sons, and the corresponding idea that the son must therefore imitate, and thereby replicate, his father. Drawing on sections from the gospels, Tourneur argues that spiritual concerns should supersede earthly concerns, especially when it comes to imitating one’s father. A significant tenet of Christianity, based on these sections of the New Testament, is the opposition of earthly and spiritual families. According to Matthew, Christ proclaims, “For I am come to set a man at variance against his father … And a mans enemies shall be they of his owne household”
(Matthew 10:34-38). The radical dissolution of earthly kin ties is countered by a reconstituted spiritual family: “And [Jesus] stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, Behold my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall doe my Fathers will which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother” (Matthew 12:49-50). Tomson’s notes to the Geneva text indicate the importance granted this promise: “None are more near unto us than they that are of the household of faith.” The recreation of kinship through obedience to a heavenly father’s edicts depends on proper imitation of spiritual ideals and is founded on the promise not just of an inheritance, but of an increased inheritance superior to any earthly heritable good. Tourneur could also be appealing to the doctrine of right resistance, a “staple of Elizabethan and early Stuart political orthodoxy and moral homily which held that Christians were obliged to obey their rulers in all things, except where their commands contravened the laws of God and nature.” Tourneur’s appeal to the commonplace that the demands of earthly concerns “should always bow to the demands of natural, divine and human law was anything but controversial.” This aspect of Tourneur’s play is so overt that it can be taken for granted; I want to argue that the use Tourneur makes of these commonplaces is worth examining. Tourneur’s focus on proving the efficacy of spiritual approaches to kinship reveals curious fissures in both spiritual and earthly versions of imitation ideals.

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163 All quotations taken from the Geneva Bible including the Marginal Notes of the Reformers (1587). The Geneva Bible was immensely popular, and probably the edition with which Tourneur was most familiar. While the King James version was published just a year before the play, it was unpopular with Protestant readers who liked the insight provided by the marginalia in the Geneva edition. It is also doubtful that a new version of the Bible could entirely replace the old within such a short time of publication.

164 Tomson’s marginal note to Matthew 12:49.


166 Lake (Anti-Christ), 85.
Tourneur criticizes a model of filial imitation that places physical and behavioral likeness (instead of virtue) as a goal in itself. The humanist versions of the imitative ideal, as described in Chapter 1, drew on classical authors; to return to an earlier quotation, Cicero argued that sons should use their fathers as models of virtue: “for to you [my son] belong the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating my deeds.” Tourneur directly counters this focus on imitating and replicating the glory of the earthly father with the possibility of imitating the mercy of a heavenly father. In a scene following Charlemont’s transformation into the ideally imitative son, Castabella gives the clearest statement of Tourneur’s dominant message in *The Atheist’s Tragedy*, placing the imitation of spiritual above earthly things: “And, methinks, man should love to imitate / His mercy” (3.4.7-8). Echoing the injunction in Philippians to “bee followers of me, and looke on them, which walke so, as ye have us for an ensample” (3:17), Castabella draws on the biblical topos of imitation as a corrective to ‘natural’ behavior to oppose earthly justice to heavenly mediation. Tourneur constructs D’Amville’s atheism to foreground an extreme version of the desire to live through one’s posterity that is opposed to the exemplars of the apparently normative version of this truism, Montferrers and Charlemont.

I argue that Tourneur uses D’Amville’s excesses and Montferrers’ adherence to earthly norms to criticize both fathers, not just his villainous atheist, for their focus on material concerns. Tourneur explicates and revises his version of ideal imitation through Charlemont, whose groping attempts to imitate male kin (his father, uncle, and more distant, unnamed ancestors)

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167 Cicero, *De officiis*, quoted in Tromly, 27.
168 Tomson uses ‘To follow’ as a version of ‘to imitate,’ as in “we must follow Christ’s example” (notes to Romans 14:15); this sense of the word could be directly from the Aramaic (“Be ye imitators of me; μιμηται, from which we have our word mimic, which, though now used only in a bad or ludicrous sense, simply signifies an imitator of another person, whether in speech, manner, habit, or otherwise. As children should imitate their parents in preference to all others, he calls on them to imitate him, as he claims them for his children” (commentary on 1 Corinthians 4:16), from Adam Clarke, *Commentary on the Bible* (1831). Text Courtesy of Internet Sacred Texts Archive <http://www.sacred-texts.com/bib/cmt/clarke/index.htm>. But it is difficult to know whether Tomson had access to the Aramaic.
eventually lead to his final, idealized imitation of his father-as-ghost. Charlemont’s transformation is prefigured by Sebastian’s ethical decision to disobey D’Amville; however, because his decision to not imitate his father is made for rational and ethical reasons, his redemption plot is subordinated to Charlemont’s spiritual transformation. Throughout the play, Tourneur opposes a series of ‘ideal’ earthly men (Montferrers and Sebastian) against the true ‘ideal’ of the godly man (Charlemont). Tourneur’s contrast of banal and extreme versions of filial imitation and of the commonplace desire to live through one’s posterity creates disturbing parallels between each father/son relationship. As D’Amville becomes increasingly perverse in his flouting of both natural and moral laws (the murder of his brother and the attempted rape of his daughter-in-law encompassing both), Charlemont becomes increasingly imitative of his father’s ghost as a spiritual model. Through Charlemont’s continual revision of imitation

169 Huston Diehl, in “‘Reduce Thy Understanding to Thine Eye’: Seeing and Interpreting in ‘The Atheist’s Tragedy.’” Studies in Philology. 78.1 (Winter, 1981), notes that the characters in the play “disagree on how to ‘read’ the world around them, often explaining physical phenomena in contradictory ways, and they are continual vulnerable to misinterpreting their world” (48). I like the framework of confusion to describe Charlemont’s early imitative mistakes, though I do not adopt Diehl’s terminology for my argument.

170 Murray proposes that Charlemont’s change of character is purposeful, and not “merely inconsistent” as claimed by Una Ellis-Fermor in The Jacobean Drama, p166 (100). Whether Charlemont’s character arc is purposeful or the work of a lesser dramatist has been at the core of the primary question surrounding the play until the early 1990s, which involved its authorship, specifically whether Thomas Middleton or Cyril Tourneur wrote both The Revenger’s Tragedy and The Atheist’s Tragedy. The debate is irrelevant to my concerns, but preoccupied critics of the play for most of the last century. Critics arguing for Middleton’s authorship of both plays tend to be apologists of the style of The Atheist’s Tragedy, while critics arguing that Tourneur wrote only The Atheist’s Tragedy tend to do so on the grounds that this clumsy play could not possibly be the work of Middleton. See Maus, xxxiv. See for instance U.M Ellis-Fermor, ‘The Imagery of The Revenger’s Tragedy and The Atheist’s Tragedy’, MLR xxx (1935), 289-301; M.K. Mincoff, “The Authorship of The Revenger’s Tragedy,” Studia Historico-Philologica Serdicensia, II (1939), 1-87; R.A. Foakes, “On the Authorship of The Revenger’s Tragedy.” Modern Language Review 48.2 (April 1953), 129-138; Inga-Stina Ekeblad, ‘An Approach to Tourneur’s Imagery’, MLA 54.4 (Oct 1959), 489-498; and J.L. Simmons, “The Tongue and Its Office in The Revenger’s Tragedy,” PMLA 92.1 (Jan 1977), 56-68, which confidently assumes Tourneur’s authorship of Middleton’s play, though the debate appears to have been resolved in Peter B. Murray’s A Study of Cyril Tourneur. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P; London: Oxford UP, 1964, which utilizes statistical analysis to persuasively attribute The Revenger’s Tragedy to Middleton – his evidence is said to be “to strong to be resisted” in G.R. Hibbard’s 1966 review (MLR 320-1). Michael Neill says it best in his discussion of The Revenger’s Tragedy: “By a weird irony, given its preoccupations, circumstances have conspired to visit a kind of disinheriance upon it,” in “Bastardy, counterfeiting, and misogyny in The Revenger’s Tragedy” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 (Spring 1996), 397.
practices, Tourneur argues that divine and natural laws can always suprervene on demands of 
honor; that heavenly rules supersede social norms; and that the son should be imitative of his 
spiritual, not his earthly, father.

Tourneur’s ‘Earthly’ Men

Charlemont is generally discussed in terms of his Christian-stoic values, his embodiment 
of “the stoic virtues of resignation, patience, indifference to ills, contempt of death joined to the 
meditative habit of the philosopher-hero.”171 Charlemont is not a classical stoic in the tradition of 
Clermont D’Ambois, Pandulpho, or Brutus. His faith is not pantheistic, and his continued 
resistance to revenge has been called “an expression of his confidence in the immutable decrees 
of God.”172 However, while I agree that Charlemont embodies Christian-stoic values, I want to 
note that he fails to do so until the last act of the play: the Charlemont we meet in Act I is 
significantly more concerned with earthly reputation and material goods than the Charlemont of 
Act V. The Atheist’s Tragedy opens with Charlemont’s attempts to go to war in order to imitate 
his family’s “ancient worth” (1.1.70). He then spends much of the play viewing his father as “my 
example” (1.2.18). Charlemont’s return from the wars, however, marks a distinctive shift toward 
a sort of spiritual Stoicism: “My passions are / My subjects” (3.3.45-6), he declares, and resolves 
to imitate the heavenly edicts of his father’s ghost. Over the course of the play, Charlemont

171 Higgins, 259; he goes on to note that Charlemont’s “patience is an expression of his confidence in the 
immutable decrees of God” (269). Combining classical and Christian tropes was relatively common among 
Protestant poets. For instance, Aemilia Lanyer “appropriates and melds classical/mythological and Christian 
discourse to assert her poetic authority” (Lange 75). However, Murray argues that Charlemont is “mistakenly 
described by critics as a Stoic or Senecal man,” claiming instead that “The Atheist’s Tragedy is an orthodox 
Christian reaction against the Stoic teaching of Epictetus and Seneca that the virtuous man’s reason is a valid guide 
to proper action” (99).

172 Higgins, 259. Tourneur’s insistence on providential intervention, Higgins argues, comes out of his Calvinist belief 
in the “utter depravity of human nature” (256). As Harold Jenkins notes, “From the very beginning D’Amville’s faith 
in ‘Nature’ is set against the belief in a world designed and ordered by a benevolent deity,” in his “Cyril Tourneur.” 
The Review of English Studies 17.65 (Jan 1941), 31. For a nuanced reading of exegetical debates on the Protestant 
side of things, see Peter Lake, Moderate puritans and the Elizabethan church. (Cambridge, 1982); see also Paul 
Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge, 2004), 1-46
demonstrates a process of trying and failing to imitate various idealized earthly models, and finally realizing that ‘proper’ imitation is of his spiritual father. While his initial desire to go to war establishes him as the play’s hero, Charlemont’s opening argument with his father also sets the terms of the play’s condemnation of normative, earthly kin relationships.

Charlemont enters the first scene as an outwardly obedient, if dejected, son. His father has forbidden him to go to war, and his uncle at first accuses him of cowardice. However, Charlemont claims his spirit is “free enough” (1.1.82), and that, to reinforce the command, Montferrers has denied his son the necessary funds: “To curb me,” Charlemont complains, “he denies me maintenance / To put me in the habit of my rank” (1.1.83-4). Without the required funds to buy the rank (and the proper accoutrements) suitable for someone of his status, Charlemont protests, he is incapable of going to war. In his attempt to convince his nephew to disobey his father (by going to war), D’Amville opens with an argument based on honor and blood, which Charlemont counters with an argument based on financial necessity.

Acknowledging his duty to imitate his family’s martial valor, Charlemont nevertheless asserts the commonplace that he is trapped by the inability to purchase the armor and horse necessary for a young nobleman going to war, the ‘habit’ of his ‘rank.’ According to the normative logic of earthly honor, Charlemont regards himself as literally unable to be a young nobleman at war without his father’s financial support. He appeals to the common topoi of battle preparation, especially the expectation that the ‘habit’ of his ‘rank’ will create or recreate him as a warlike

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173 Lorna Hutson notes the contingency of honor upon “what we would now call ‘capital,’ [that is, what Pierre Bourdieu defines as] ‘the prestige and renown attached to a family and a name’ which is ‘readily converted back into economic capital’” (52). Charlemont’s social status is constituted by the imbrication of reputation- and economic-based ‘capital,’ or ‘credit’ in early modern terms. Lorna Hutson, The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth-Century England (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). Keith Thomas also notes that “a reputation for financial probity and honest dealing was essential to an individual’s economic standing” (165), emphasizing the economic pressure of reputation. Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfillment in Early Modern England (Oxford, 2009).
subject, in a dialogue that crucially links expectations of normative earthly honor and reputation with their material or financial bases.

D’Amville uses the conventional ‘blood’ and ‘house’ metaphors to encourage, and exhibit his apparent support for, Charlemont’s martial and financial ambitions. While these metaphors so pervade the language that they are almost invisible as metaphors, it is important to treat them as metaphors, and to note the underlying ideologies accessed by D’Amville’s manipulation of these metaphors. Coming as it does immediately after his agreement that “wealth is lord” (1.1.30), D’Amville’s appropriation of the ‘house’ and ‘blood’ metaphors is transparently insincere to the audience. In a moment of dramatic irony, D’Amville states that “noble war” is the “first original / Of all man’s honour!” (1.1.67-8); in a perverse manipulation of imitative discourses, D’Amville appeals to the early modern commonplace that nobility originated in noble behavior, and only later was transmitted through blood. Stating further that he would “disinherit my posterity / To purchase honor” (1.1.88-9) and that Charlemont is “the honour of our blood” (1.1.76), D’Amville further pushes the language of earthly imitative virtue to encourage Charlemont to disobey his father’s wishes. Referencing the cyclical implications of the imitative ideal, D’Amville tells Charlemont “you are the honour of our blood. / The troop of gentry, whose inferior worth / Should second your example” (1.1.76-8). That is, the play’s villain encourages Charlemont to imitate distant forebears, and uphold not the father, but the family as a whole in order to model the family’s “ancient worth” (1.1.70) before the “troop of gentry” he should be leading into battle. D’Amville is able to circumvent Montferrers as an imitable figure by appealing to the “ancient worth” of the family’s collective, genealogical reputation. D’Amville persuades Charlemont that to prove himself worthy of his name (encompassing all

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174 D’Amville’s use of architectural metaphors is discussed in Murray, 126-129, and Schuman, 122-124.
the connotations of reputation as well as both abstract and concrete inheritances), he must be an “example” of his ancestors in front of the men he should command. In D’Amville’s professed view, at least, imitation confirms worth, and a failure of imitation indicates the degeneration of the bloodline; D’Amville references the collective forefathers “from whose noble deeds / Ignobly we derive our pedigrees” (1.1.71-2) to convince Charlemont that he must perform “noble deeds” in order to earn or deserve his place in the family. However, Tourneur is at pains to counter the force of D’Amville’s heritage- and imitation-based argument. Charlemont espouses similar ideals in Act I, as his character is being established as the play’s hero; as one critic would have it, “the most definitely soldierly of all Elizabethan heroes.”175 However, his drastic change in character upon his return in Act IV represents Tourneur’s support of a very different ideal of imitation, one that looks to a spiritual rather than an earthly father.

While the most important factor in his decision is D’Amville’s offer of a loan, Charlemont, at this point in the play unreformed, almost fully adopts D’Amville’s imitative perspective when convincing his father:

But my affection to the war
Is as hereditary as my blood
To ev’ry life of all my ancestry.
Your predecessors were your precedents,
And you are my example. Shall I serve
For nothing but a vain parenthesis
I’ th’honoured story of your family,
Or hang but like an empty scutcheon
Between the trophies of my predecessors
And the rich arms of my posterity? (1.2.14-24)

Charlemont attempts to define proper imitation for a good Christian son by using traditional markers of honor and martial valor. To persuade his father, Charlemont appeals to both heredity

175 M.C. Bradbrook, Themes and Conventions of Elizabethan Tragedy (1935; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 183.
and imitation, arguing that his nature is inclined to war because of his ancestor’s blood, and that he has an obligation to prove himself worthy of that blood by going to war. While D’Amville attempts to bypass Montferrers as an imitable figure, Charlemont specifically reminds his father that “Your predecessors were your precedents, / And you are my example,” emphasizing the cyclical nature of familial inheritance – son imitates father and is then imitated by his own son. However, Charlemont then clarifies that the son’s imitation of his father has corollary effects on a family’s reputation by expressing his worry that, of his lineage, he will be the only one who fails to add to the family’s “story.” Charlemont is concerned to manage how he is remembered, that his contribution to the family’s “story” forwards and reinforces his (familial) identity, and that, therefore, he is remembered as a proper “example” for his own posterity. 176 Charlemont suggests that “to act unheroically means to create a flawed narrative, a story with pauses, gaps – parentheses.”177 He approaches this concern from vertical and horizontal directions, referring to the family’s reputation in terms of historical continuity (“predecessors” and “posterity”) and contemporary reputation (“There’s not a Frenchman of good blood and youth / But either out of spirit or example / Is turned a soldier” [1.2.23-5, my emphasis]), while also referring to the material signs of the family’s reputation, the “empty scutcheon,” or shield, that should contain his coat of arms. Those coats of arms were often used to decorate family trees, providing a wealth of information beyond the individual’s name and kin relationships. Each family’s coat of arms was more like a template, to which the individual’s feats were then added; therefore each

176 Remembrance both constitutes and reaffirms a family’s collective narrative; as a tool of specific ambitions or agendas, remembrance is vital to the creation of a specific family member as an exemplar of family values. See Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr., Memory and Forgetting in English Renaissance Drama: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Webster (Cambridge, 2005), Chapter 4, specifically 94, 96, 100. Sullivan further notes that we can distinguish self-recollection as a subjective process and as a social process (requiring the validation of others) (94). Charlemont seems to combine the two as if they were the same thing; his argument elides any difference between subjective and social processes as if his subjective self-recollection will become the social recollection of his deeds.

scutcheon drew upon and added to the family’s overall reputation. Charlemont is expressing a very specific fear that he will miss out on the chance to add his own personal honor to the family tree. It is striking that Charlemont assumes his posterity will also be glorious, even if he himself never goes to war – his ignoble life would affect only himself, and the family as a whole could continue on unblemished.

Charlemont’s highly individualized argument runs counter to the more common fear that a lineage might disappear. Honor runs in the family; so does dishonor, and both are “passed on to the nobleman’s issue. The father’s infamy thus descends upon his issue, just as his honor would have.” This is partly an economic, material fear, for, as Margreta de Grazia argues, “if honor does not descend from father to son, title and estate cannot either.” While she is making a claim about Hamlet, de Grazia is drawing on sources that apply to Tourneur’s play as well; specifically, she cites Sir William Segar’s Honor Military, and Civil (1602), in which the official instructions for the burial of noblemen specify that without the ceremonial transfer of ancestral arms, the nobleman’s honor beyond death cannot survive. A slightly fuller quotation reveals the perceived purpose of the survival of honor, the continuation of the corporate family. Segar notes the function of an honorable burial:

that the defunct may be known to all men to have died [without] disworship to his Name, Blood, & Family … his heir, if he have any, or next of whole blood, or some one for him … may publikely receive in the presence of all the mourners, the Coate armor, Helme, Creast, and other Atchievements of honour belonging to the defunct … whereof the King of Armes of the Province is to make record, with the defuncts match, issue and decease for the benefit of posterity.”

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179 de Grazia, 96. See also Keith Thomas (Ends, 2009), who notes that the “importance of leaving behind a good name was repeatedly stressed in the advice literature of the time” (237).
180 de Grazia, 96.
The terms of Segar’s instructions suggest that the specific heir can be replaced by a more distant blood relation, or even a stand-in – the specific heir is less important than the survival of the family’s honor through a ritual transference. The structure is more important than the individual, and the emphasis is on the survival of that reputation after death for the sake of a corporate family, the deceased’s ‘posterity.’ However, Charlemont insists on his individual importance to the family’s “honoured story,” and yet elides the possibility of passing on dishonor to one’s own children from his argument. Charlemont presumes a “posterity” that will easily gain the honor already established by his “predecessors,” and his concern for his own place in an unbreakable chain of descent suggests his slightly perverse understanding of normative ideologies underpinning familial descent.

Montferrers’ desire for earthly immortality through the continuation of his family line is similarly askew from normative imitative ideals, though Charlemont’s view that imitation is necessary to confirm the individual’s place in a family line is carefully opposed to Montferrers’ view of heritable nobility.182 Faced with his only son’s desire to go to war, Montferrers expresses his own set of concerns:

For all of my children thou art only left
To promise a succession to my house,
And all the honour thou canst get by arms
Will give but vain addition to thy name,
Since from thy ancestors thou dost derive
A dignity sufficient, and as great
As thou hast substance to maintain and bear. (1.2.3-9)

(London, 1602), 238. Partially quoted in de Grazia, 96. See also Ralph Houlbrook (Death, 1998), who notes that the dead man’s arms “were delivered to the senior officiating priest, who gave them to the heir, thus symbolically investing him with his predecessor’s dignities” (260), in Death, Religion, and the Family in England, 1480-1750 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998). Segar also notes the importance of monuments as exempla: “they were made to retaine in memory, the excellent Actions of such men, as had lived honorably, and died vertuously” (238).

182 The two brothers’ actions actually derive from very similar ideologies and, as I will demonstrate in the next section, from common discourses as well.
Montferrers’ focus on the material, earthly concerns of imitation and inheritance prevents him from being a proper, spiritual exemplar for Charlemont in terms of Tourneur’s overarching support of conscience over reputation. Montferrers’ concerns are very much focused on the material; in contrast to his son, Montferrers is worried that the line of descent will be broken. As an old man, “ready ev’n / To drop into his grave” (1.1.113-4), Montferrers is facing a potential crisis at the generational turning point should his only son die in the war. Tourneur also uses Montferrers’ speech to implicate the honor system, which demands the creation of reputation through ‘incorrect’ or earthly imitation, in his criticism of the imitative values underpinning honor-based reputation. Montferrers counters his son’s argument on two fronts, emphasizing the importance of lineal inheritance and arguing that his son has no need to add to the family’s reputation. Montferrers foregrounds lineage and inheritance in his use of the terms of inheritance: ‘succession,’ ‘honor,’ ‘ancestors’; he also uses the terms ‘addition,’ ‘sufficient,’ ‘substance,’ and ‘maintain,’ to emphasize the material costs of getting and propagating a family, or of getting and supporting ‘honors,’ which require an appropriate lifestyle. Montferrers claims that honor comes from the family’s collective ancestors, but that (somehow) Charlemont has an equivalent material substance. The vague quantification of honor as ‘sufficient’ discounts the primary drive of the imitative ideal – the replication of the father’s ethos by the son. Montferrers proposes that Charlemont already has all the honor he can obtain, and any further honor gained would be in excess, a “vain addition” to his (family) name. In a massive departure from the other plays I discuss, Montferrers is concerned that he has a son, not that his son imitate him accurately or add to the family’s collective honor.
Montferrers’ concern that only Charlemont is left to “promise a succession to my house” is linked to his focus on earthly concerns, which is ultimately ‘corrected’ by the plot device of his death and return as a spirit no longer bound by material considerations. The desire for worldly immortality is coded as positive in other contexts, and had significant cachet in early modern beliefs about familial continuity. As Patricia Crawford notes, “A man valued his children as a form of immortality. He hoped that his ‘name’ and his ‘blood’ would live on in his descendants. ‘Let my son be thy beloved,’ wrote Sir Walter Ralegh in farewell to his wife, ‘for he is parte of me, and I live in him.’” However, the location of a father’s immortality in his sons rendered that immortality fragile; Crawford notes that “In 1664 the Earl of Warwick’s chaplain, Anthony Walker, lamented the death of the Earl’s only son as a blow to his immortality: ‘But now the Family is dead, and fallen with Him, and the Line, and Name, will fayle, by his dying childless.’” As Keith Thomas notes, this kind of earthly remembrance, the continuation of one’s blood through one’s successive children, was “an alternative to heaven as a way of overcoming mortality.” Thomas also notes the incompatibility of this desire with Christian tenets: “To Sir Thomas Browne, it was ‘a contradiction to our beliefs’ for men to pray earnestly for the coming of Christ, while simultaneously attempting to prolong their earthly memory.” Montferrers’ speeches and behaviors display his overt focus on his son’s survival, that is, the survival of his only chance for earthly immortality; his fixation on that chance overrides concerns that his son will replicate him through proper imitation of family honor. For Montferrers, the important thing is the survival of the family’s “house” and “name.” Montferrers appears on the surface to be a foil for D’Amville; however, his lack of emphasis on spiritual

184 Thomas (Ends, 2009), 235
185 Thomas (Ends, 2009), 241.
imitation is enough to condemn Montferrers’ as too earthly to provide an appropriate role model to his son.

The main target of Tourneur’s spiritual criticism is the play’s titular atheist, D’Amville, who follows the careers of most stage atheists in his mis-oriented focus on earthly, familial continuation; like Montferrers, D’Amville is focused on his ability to gain earthly immortality through the survival of his sons. Unlike Montferrers, D’Amville is also focused on an ambitious determination to overturn the ‘natural’ order of inheritance. D’Amville takes an extreme view of the earthly values of imitation and inheritance espoused by Montferrers, but this atheist is not significantly different from his worldly Christian brother.

When D’Amville first appears in the opening scene of the play, it is in a dialogue with Borachio, his “instrument,” in which both agree that “death casts up,” or calculates, “Our total

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186 ‘Ambition’ is a key term for stage atheism. Tamburlaine, as written by the alleged atheist Marlowe, expounds his philosophy: “Nature, that framed us of four elements / Warring within our breasts for regiment, / Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds” (Part One, 2.7.18-20). Daniel J. Vitkus notes that Robert Greene’s Selimus features “an Ottoman sultan whose tyranny and atheism comprise an ‘admirable’ example of power pursued and attained without moral constraint” (44), in Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England (Columbia UP, 2000), a description that could as easily apply to D’Amville. Tobias Döring, on the other hand, claims that religious habits of thought were so pervasive in early modern England that “fundamental opposition to [religion], attractive though it might be to imagine, proved impossible to articulate. Atheism, as a categorical denial of all notions of the sacred, had no voice except as echo of some other voices. The constant references to atheist dangers of the time, which we find in religious and political controversies, never converged on a speaking subject that might have answered to such claims. Instead, as Manfred Pfister shows, they condensed in spectres of sedition and subversion that were frequently projected onto stage characters or foreign figures like the notorious ‘Machiavel.’ But no English writer of the period ever authorized unbelief and argued for rejections of the sacred. Such notions were just copiously quoted” (16), in Performances of the Sacred in Late Medieval and Early Modern England, edited by Susanne Rupp and Tobias Döring (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005). Similarly, Alexandra Walsham notes that ‘atheism’ “was a label contemporaries applied liberally and with a high level of imprecision ... it was a blanket term of abuse covering a broad spectrum of phenomena, an inclusive concept encapsulating a wide range of clerical anxieties. Genuine philosophical doubt was repeatedly confounded with practical godlessness and inveterate impiety” (30), in Providence in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999). Contrasting Tourneur’s atheist to earlier ambitious figures such as Faustus, Sugg (2007) argues that D’Amville is actually novel in representing this modern sense of ‘atheism’ as ‘unbelief’ rather than heresy: “What is important about the atheist is that he does not seek divine or demonic aid for his ambitions. Instead ... he fells his own strenuous will and ingenuity to be all that he can rely on. To be a little more precise: he is made, as a kind of scapegoat, to effectively claim this arrogant role, thereby distilling and limiting a sense of ‘atheism’ ... Tourneur’s atheist, D’Amville, is therefore identified by an open and systematic impiety founded on excessive faith in natural philosophy and purely natural reason” (145).

187 Dramatis Personae, Maus, 250.
sum of joy and happiness” (1.1.17-18). D’Amville’s insistence that death is the end-point, that only this life matters, establishes his genuine atheistical beliefs. With no heaven to anticipate, D’Amville determines that only his actions in this life matter, and, with no God to fear, that the morality of those actions is based on his own perception of right or wrong, or, rather, on what is in his best interests. D’Amville and Borachio also agree that “Wealth is lord / Of all felicity” (1.1.30-1). To put it simply, this life is all we have, and money is what makes it worth living. However, in two speeches in Act I, scene 1, D’Amville qualifies the immediate, personal economic concern. As the target of Tourneur’s primary criticisms, D’Amville exemplifies the most extreme version of a focus on ideals of earthly imitation. The first speech in this scene establishes D’Amville’s conviction that, as an atheist, his sons are his route to immortality. This is an entirely conventional concern: as Thomas Becon notes in his *Catechism,* “Though the father die, yet he is as though he were not dead; for he hath left one behind him that is like him.” The very conventionality of D’Amville’s conviction is striking, and this speech encapsulates Tourneur’s criticism of precisely that conventional desire to survive in some form through one’s posterity. Though D’Amville exaggerates this conviction almost to the point of absurdity, Montferrers (the good Christian father) and D’Amville (the atheist) both rely on the survival of their sons for their own earthly form of immortality:

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188 Higgins argues that D’Amville is a means to embody an idea, and his version of atheism exists in a Calvinist schema, which includes “a sort of disgust at what might loosely be called ‘natural’ man, that is the part of humanity which rejected Manichaean restrictions on the use of the senses, and continued to lead a ‘normal’ life” (Higgins 257). And D’Amville is certainly an embodiment of a ‘natural’ man in this negative sense, “an intellectual synthesis of all the imagined evil available to the Jacobean mind” (258). Similarly, Schuman argues that D’Amville represents a “particular class of atheism” (106) comprised of people who believe in a mechanized ‘nature’ and rely on reason. This reading of D’Amville is particularly convincing because, as Walsham notes, “The average rural vicar had to labour hard to replace his parishioners’ materialistic, almost animistic trust in a self-evolving universe with due and grateful respect for the dispensation of providence” (23). D’Amville’s faith in Nature and his providential punishment convey Tourneur’s portrayal of just this opposition between providence and Nature.

But what doth this touch me
That seem to have enough? Thanks industry,
‘Tis true. Had not my body spread itself
Into posterity, perhaps I should
Desire no more increase of substance than
Would hold proportion with mine own dimensions.
Yet even in that sufficiency of state
A man has reason to provide and add.
For what is he hath such a present eye
And so prepared a strength, that can foresee
And fortify his substance and himself
Against those accidents, the least whereof
May rob him of an age’s husbandry?
And for my children, they are as near to me
As branches to the tree whereon they grow,
And may as numerously be multiplied.
As they increase, so should my providence,
For from my substance they receive the sap
Whereby they live and flourish. (1.1.39-58)

D’Amville’s focus is extremely overt in this passage, and he uses metaphors so common they are often viewed as literal. But it is the very overtness of D’Amville’s focus that lays bare the material concerns of conventional imitation and inheritance ideals. This passage contains a dense figurative play on the central idea of progeny as an extension of one’s own body, a spreading of bodily substance that requires an increase in economic substance. The density of this variously ‘materialist’ joke is itself increased when new registers are added – the arboreal and the metaphysical. The arboreal metaphor figures D’Amville’s children as extensions of their father; D’Amville’s two sons are figured as limbs on their father’s trunk, a metaphor that extends nicely from tree to human body, as D’Amville’s economic resources become both his substance and the sap (or blood, in the body metaphor) sustaining his children. He begins this speech imagining that his “body spread itself / Into posterity” (1.1.41-2), an image which illustrates his view that his children are part of him in a very literal way. That concreteness is figured through his use of the common arboreal metaphor of kinship which renders his children a physical part of his ‘substance.’ D’Amville is initially worried that his children will multiply beyond his ability to
provide for them, and posits this as the motive for expanding his holdings. As he explains, he desires ‘no more increase of substance than / Would hold proportion with mine own dimensions,’ had not his body ‘spread itself’ into ‘posterity.’ While D’Amville does mention “accidents” that might “rob him of an age’s husbandry,” the specific fear is focused on himself, how he will sustain his old age, and his family’s future. When he begins to refer to his children, in the next line, his fear shifts to a fantasy of plenitude, and he pictures an overly-fertile tree producing myriad branches which his careful providence will be able to support.190 At this early point in the play, D’Amville cannot imagine that his careful “husbandry” could fail to produce reliable results, or that his branches could be lopped off.

D’Amville’s ironic references to providence in both speeches outlining his understanding of his relationship with his sons sets up his material rather than spiritual focus, and also foreshadows the providential nature of his final ‘punishment’ in the play’s climax. Having already argued that money rules over ‘felicity,’ D’Amville states that he has the “providence / To add to life as much of happiness,” extending the fantasy of plenitude to both life and economic gain. That is, D’Amville believes that his sons are necessary because some part of him will survive in them; his determination that his sons and their succession “shall forever live,” and that his reason will enable him to gather ‘substance,’ suggests the economic pressure to support that eternal line of descendants, without which he will disappear from the earth. The phrase ‘as much’ connects his progeny with the happiness he will add to their lives: both succession and happiness “shall forever live.” In these two speeches, D’Amville combines ideas of life and money in the term ‘substance,’ unfolding meanings of the word covering both property

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190 When Rousard and Sebastian die, D’Amville mourns, “O there expires the date / Of my posterity!” (5.1.99-100), again explicitly defining his relationship with his sons in terms of his dynastic ambitions. He is one of the dynastic-minded land owners, more concerned with the continuation of his line than with the continuation of individual members of that line.
="increase of substance," "fortify his substance and himself") and self ("from my substance they receive the sap"). While the last quotation also refers to D’Amville’s property, the arboreal metaphor locates that property within D’Amville. His property flows through the family tree as blood flows through veins. Montferrers and D’Amville both view their sons as routes to immortality, but D’Amville exaggerates the commonplace of the ‘family tree’ to the point of perversity. In the scenes in which he describes his relationship with his sons, D’Amville literalizes immortality discourses, stating that he will live in his sons; his faith in Nature to ensure his immortality is the core of Tourneur’s understanding of atheism, which replaces spiritual with rational motivations and goals. Expressing peculiar notions of how his sons relate to him, how earthly immortality works, and how imitation should be directed, D’Amville represents the extreme form of the worldly norms Tourneur criticizes in the figure of Montferrers.

D’Amville’s atheistical reliance on his own reason is evident in his repeated references to ‘industry,’ ‘proportion,’ ‘reason,’ ‘foresee,’ and ‘providence,’ terms that contain material as well as spiritual resonances. While, as Katharine Eisaman Maus notes in her excellent edition of the play, D’Amville consistently materializes spiritual terminology, his use of the term ‘providence’ along with the terms ‘increase’ and ‘multiply,’ misappropriated from Genesis, actually seems to indicate a larger tendency to use these terms in an earthly way that is blind to the spiritual subtext. His use of ‘providence’ ironically foreshadows his own providential self-murder. D’Amville substitutes for Christian values the “acquisition of material wealth (and its accompanying power) while he lives, and the founding of a dynasty which will constitute a sort

191 Maus, note to 1.1.56. Sugg (2007) similarly notes “D’Amville’s parodic failure to distinguish between the ‘spirit of courage’ and its material basis” (145), and goes on to describe the play as a whole as “Tourneur’s satire, with its highly topical attack on those who grotesquely confuse material essences and essential spiritual values” (145-6)
Particularly notable in this speech is a vocabulary that echoes Montferrers’ arguments against Charlemont’s determination to go to war. In justifying his scheme to murder his brother and steal his nephew’s inheritance, D’Amville uses rational and economic terms, like ‘substance,’ ‘add,’ and ‘sufficiency,’ to describe his relationship with his sons. Tourneur is creating a common, shared vocabulary of succession-based familial relationships, in which the father’s relationship with his son(s) is described in terms that convey its material focus. While D’Amville attempts to appropriate the spiritual discourse into a material discourse, the economic and rational connotations align his speech more insistently with his brother’s, further portraying the insistent materiality of worldly fathers. The worldly focus of the two fathers is punished by the plot structures of the play, and their language reveals their underlying similarities, which makes the imitation of any earthly father, according to this play, a fatal mistake.

D’Amville’s atheism itself models improper imitation. The climax of the play features its titular atheist admitting the existence of a higher power, though D’Amville never actually repents his own earthly focus. Charlemont is about to be unjustly executed for killing a man who was trying to murder him, and Castabella successfully argues that she should be executed with him. While awaiting the executioner, their display of courage and Christian patience overwhelms D’Amville, who attempts to convince the judges that Charlemont’s blood is too noble to be killed by someone of a lower class. When the judges refuse to alter their sentence, D’Amville takes up the axe himself, and in attempting to execute his nephew and daughter-in-law, dashes out his own brains. His final words explicitly connect his atheism with his faith in reason and

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192 Schuman, 108.
with his patrilineal project. After admitting to the Judge that he attempted to have Castabella and Charlemont killed for his own crimes, he proclaims his acknowledgment of a higher power:

There was the strength of natural understanding.
But Nature is a fool. There is a power
Above her that hath overthrown the pride
Of all my projects and posterity,
For whose surviving blood I had erected
This proud monument, and struck ‘em dead
Before me, for whose deaths I called to thee
For judgement. Thou didst want discretion for
The sentence, but yond power that struck me knew
The judgement I deserved, and gave it. (5.2.255-264)

The overt focus of this passage is on D’Amville’s earthly projects: the misappropriation of his brother’s heritable goods, and the survival of his sons. The very obviousness of his focus reinforces D’Amville’s lack of repentance – and, in the structures of the play, the impossibility of his redemption. Unlike Charlemont, D’Amville can never transform himself into a properly (spiritually) imitative son. D’Amville’s use of the term ‘posterity’ here could be as a metonymy for his sons, reducing them to their role as carrying their piece of him forward into future generations. However, D’Amville could also be using ‘posterity’ as a mass noun referring to all the future generations descended from him, redirecting the passage toward D’Amville as a common ancestor, and separating his sons from the posterity whose survival is threatened by Sebastian’s death. If the ‘surviving blood’ refers to something other than his dead sons, D’Amville’s use of the term ‘monument’ here is interesting. A monument is a structure of remembrance, something physical that is meant to preserve a familial identity and set of ideals; what the monument is, here, remains unclear. D’Amville seems to be musing abstractly on the role of remembrance in ensuring the continuation of one’s family. Perhaps representative of D’Amville’s patrilineal goals, the ‘proud monument’ has been rendered empty and futile by the death of his sons; this visible remembrance of his family’s identity is finally powerless to ensure
anything more than the memory that there ever was a family. D’Amville’s ‘projects’ are now explicitly referred to in terms of his atheistical ambition; that it is the ‘pride’ of his projects and posterity which is overthrown indicates the focus of Tourneur’s criticism: the desire for earthly immortality which underlies normative inheritance systems.

D’Amville admits to the sin of pride, acknowledging a power above Nature, immediately preceding his death; unlike Charlemont’s improper imitation, D’Amville’s atheism cannot be ‘corrected’ within the structure of the play. In the climactic moment of the play, D’Amville brains himself with the very axe he raises to murder his nephew. Huston Diehl argues that D’Amville’s self-inflicted axe blow “is rich in symbolic associations … Since the axe is traditionally an iconographic symbol of death, D’Amville’s desire to use it may associate him and his atheism with death, with what is life-denying.” Diehl further explains the Christian symbolism of D’Amville’s final act, noting that the axe is “an attribute of divine retribution in Cesare Ripa’s influential *Iconologia* (1603), [and] may also suggest God’s final vengeance on the atheist at the Last Judgment.” The fact that D’Amville’s blow ‘strikes out his own brains’ could represent the “conventional belief that the atheist in his denial of God murders his own God-given reason.”

While D’Amville’s self-murder has been read traditionally as a

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193 Huston Diehl, "‘Reduce Thy Understanding to Thine Eye,’” 55. Jonathan Sawday similarly notes that “the moral, of course, is that D’Amville’s contempt for the divine order of the universe will be punished” (83), in *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture* (London: Routledge, 1996). Writing about providential punishments in Marlowe’s *Tamburlaine*, Johannes H. Birringer tweaks Greenblatt’s idea of ‘self-fashioning’ by noting that “the mythical image of Timur’s lifelong career of conquest was inextricably bound up with the Christian and humanist ethos that ruled historiographical and literary depictions of princes and conquerors and provided the values we find reflected in the didactic tradition of Boccaccio’s *De casibus virorum illustrium* and the English ‘mirror’ literature. The concepts of Fortune and divine retributive justice granted readily available models of explanation with which even a fascinating and alien career such as Timur’s could be curtailed and subjected to ethicopolitical judgments. Greenblatt’s idea of self-fashioning is defined in relation to the authority of such judgments; the question is, therefore, how Marlowe would respond to the ethically inspired ambivalence that was built into the received portrait of a heroic figure of both princely ambition and barbaric cruelty” (225), in “Marlowe’s Violent Stage: ‘Mirrors’ of Honor in *Tamburlaine*” *ELH* 51.2 (Summer, 1984).
manifestation of God’s direct intervention in Charlemont’s fate, his death also signals Tourner’s primary argument against worldly imitation.

Tourner’s incredible finale irresistibly recalls the stories and rumors surrounding the death of perhaps the most famous atheist of early modern England, Christopher Marlowe. The varying details in the different stories about his death perhaps reveal the equally varying ideological uses to which it was put.¹⁹⁴ In 1597, Dr. Thomas Beard published The Theatre of God’s Judgements, a collection of ‘true histories’ that purported to illustrate “God’s punishment of the ‘transgressors of His commandments.’”¹⁹⁵ In his chapter on Epicures and Atheists (XXIII), Beard invites us to “see what a hook the Lord put in the nostrils of this barking dog.”¹⁹⁶ In addition to describing Marlowe’s “atheism and impiety,”¹⁹⁷ Beard describes in gleeful detail the manner of Marlowe’s death:

It so fell out that in London streets, as he purported to stab one whom he ought a grudge unto with his dagger, the other party perceiving, so avoided the stroke that withal catching hold of his wrist, he stabbed his own dagger into his own head, in such sort that notwithstanding all the means of surgery that could be wrought, he shortly after died thereof.¹⁹⁸

The account of Marlowe’s self-murder is graphically descriptive, and contains the key detail that Marlowe stabbed himself in the head, just as D’Amville dashed out his own brains with his

¹⁹⁴ Marlowe was accused of questioning Biblical chronology, translating banned elegies, and of dying in the street in a fight over a rent-boy. Charles Nicholl, The Reckoning: The Murder of Christopher Marlowe (Harcourt, 1992), 74, 75, 68. While Nicholl’s work is not definitive, I am indebted to him for putting in relation the differing accounts of Marlowe’s death.

¹⁹⁵ Nicholl, 65. Peter Lake notes that “the narrative structure of the murder pamphlets” tend to note the “imminence of providential punishment” (Anti-Christ 81).

¹⁹⁶ Thomas Beard, The Theatre of Gods Judgements (London, 1631), 150. Sourced from EEBO. My knowledge of Beard’s work is indebted to Nicholl.

¹⁹⁷ Beard, 149.

¹⁹⁸ Beard, 150.
axe. The importance of that oft-reported detail lies in Beard’s interpretation that Marlowe’s death “was not only a manifest signe of Gods judgement … in that hee compelled his owne hand which had written those blasphemies, to bee the instrument to punish him, and that in his braine, which had devised the same.” Another popular account of Marlowe’s death can be found in William Vaughan’s *The Golden Grove* (1600), which is concerned to show God’s punishments as wrought on the heads of atheists: “Thus did God, the true executioner of divine justice, work the ende of impious Atheists.” D’Amville’s self-inflicted head wound is precisely the kind of injury associated with the Providential judgment of atheists, especially as seen in the accounts of Marlowe’s death, and emphasizes the role of the play’s finale in administering divine justice. While Charlemont portrays the progression of a good Christian son from improper to proper imitation, with a few stumbles along the way, D’Amville portrays the too-late realization of a confirmed atheist that his focus on earthly imitation has been flawed all along.

While D’Amville’s own immortality appears assured through the production of multiple heirs, over the course of the play he begins to doubt that his sons will live to carry a piece of him.

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199 The graphic nature of this description does not stand out from the rest of the text, which is full of equally gruesome punishments.

200 Beard, 150.

201 William Vaughan, *The Golden-grove moralized in three Bookes: A worke very necessary for all such, as would know how to governe themselves, their houses, or their country. Made by W. Vaughan, Master of Artes, and Graduate in the Civil Law* (London, 1608), *Of Atheists* Book 1, chapter 3. Quoted in Nicholl, 77. Vaughan provides less analysis of Marlowe’s death, and notes that one of the other men stabbed Marlowe in the eye so that “his braynes coming out at the daggers point, hee shortly after dyed.” That is, that the injury is to the head is more important for Vaughan’s purposes than the idea that it was self-inflicted. Robert Zaller argues that “Calvinist theology had a sufficient framework for characterological evil – reprobation – but it could not subsist without an appeal to the invincibility of grace in the elect. Characters exhibiting virtue and rectitude continued to appear on the English stage, but they were more and more likely to meet untoward ends and less and less likely to prevail without assuming the protean devices of their adversaries. In this rather than in any overtly expressed skepticism lay the basis of the charge of ‘atheism’ that clung to the new theater and whose first targets were Marlowe and Kyd. A conditional good might survive in a world of moral relativism, but invincible grace could hardly be preached in it. For the godly, that was the irremediable flaw of the public stage” (395), in *The Discourse of Legitimacy in Early Modern England* (Standford University Press, 2007). Tourneur seems almost to be writing in response to this charge, emphasizing the moral qualities of the stage and portraying the divine retributive justice necessary to counter the charge that theater is ‘fallen.’
As events unfold, we discover that D’Amville’s eldest son is “sick” (1.3.3), and even when married to Castabella in Charlemont’s place he is incapable of consummating the match – she “wants desire,” and he “ability” (2.3.39). It becomes increasingly clear that an heir is not forthcoming. D’Amville’s younger son has already engaged in at least one duel, a display of risk-taking behavior that in combination with his disobedience makes him an inappropriate replacement for his father. The failure is again couched in economic terms:

But let me call my project to account:
For what effect and end I have engaged
Myself in all this blood. To leave a state
To the succession of my proper blood.
But how shall that succession be continued?
Not in my elder son, I fear. Disease
And weakness have disabled him for issue.
For th’ t’other, his loose humour will endure
No bond of marriage—and I doubt his life,
His spirit is so boldly dangerous.
O pity that the profitable end
Of such a prosp’rous murder should be lost!
Nature forbid. (4.2.29-32)

D’Amville emphasizes the economic motive for killing Montferrers (“a prosp’rous murder”), and reiterates the idea that his sons are part of him in a way that uneasily connects his lineal concerns of succession and property transmission to what he has done to assure both. In linking the materiality of inheritance and the continuation of the family through its children so explicitly with violence, D’Amville exposes the perverse ideologies that underpin even normative familial relationships. The language of ‘project’ and ‘account’ sit uneasily with the repetitions of ‘blood’ that refer to both murders and progeny. Dwelling on the potential loss of the “profitable end / Of such a prosp’rous murder” (4.2.38-9), D’Amville exclaims “Nature forbid” (4.2.40), and connects his “issue” with his “labor” (4.2.42, 41) in terms that make explicit the importance of his efforts to maintain the corporate family fortune, not specifically his sons. Their particularity means little in a system in which each son is merely the guarantor of his father’s immortality.
The uneasy repetitions of ‘blood’ (the violent and the lineal), demonstrate D’Amville’s belief that property cannot be obtained, and retained for future heirs, except through bloodshed. Though expressed by and associated with the atheist of the play’s title, D’Amville’s focus on material terms aligns his concerns with Montferrers’; while the two fathers seem like foils for one another, both are deemed ‘inappropriate’ models for imitation, though they are distinguished by the level of emotion Tourneur attributes to Montferrers. Both fathers are more concerned with dynastic survival than with their sons’ characters; Montferrers’ conditions on his son’s behavior are fairly liberal (Charlemont can be an ‘empty scutcheon’ so long as he survives), and D’Amville demands obedience but is more concerned with mere survival of a son – not a specific son, just a son in general – in order to ensure his own immortality through the survival of his posterity.

When D’Amville finally learns of his sons’ deaths, his reaction prompts the play’s most explicit condemnation of the desire for worldly immortality. After his plan to gain a replacement son by raping Castabella fails, and D’Amville finds her with Charlemont asleep in the graveyard, D’Amville contrives to have Charlemont executed to salvage some part of his plans. With Charlemont in prison, D’Amville learns that his sons have both died, one of illness and the other in a duel, and seems to go mad. In the courtroom, after the First Judge attempts to claim that D’Amville is distracted, D’Amville retorts:

How? Distracted? Then
You ha’ no judgment, I can give you sense
And solid reason for the very least
Distinguishable syllable I speak.
Since my thrift was more charitable, more
Judicious than your grandsire’s, why, I would
Fain know why your lordship lives to make
A second generation from your father,
And the whole fry of my posterity
Extinguished in a moment, not a brat
Positing a merit-based system of generation, D’Amville reiterates his belief in the power of rationality (‘judgment’) in a move that simultaneously insults the judge (who, D’Amville claims, ironically lacks ‘judgment’) by questioning why he is able to procreate when D’Amville himself was the more careful in husbanding his resources. The insult is formed around the complicated juxtaposition of economic and lineal language. The judge’s ability to produce a ‘second generation’ is expressed through the economic term “thrift,” which is then linked to the suggestion of lineal production by the suggestion that a father can “make” the next generation. The economic and lineal connections are made more specific as D’Amville’s refers to his own children as his “fry,” or his seed. By using the metonym of seed for the product of the seed, his children, D’Amville adopts a metaphor that likens maintaining lineal continuity to careful husbandry. D’Amville is in effect expressing a fantasy about the judge’s own patrilineal abundance which reveals his bitterness that other men are producing children when his own children are dead. D’Amville has lost access to his immortality, his driving motive throughout the play. In writing an anti-revenge revenge tragedy, Tourneur uses his villain-character to criticize multiple aspects of hereditary culture, and in these scenes especially the earthly focus of familial relationships. By consistently associating D’Amville’s villainy with his materially-based relationship with his sons, by portraying that relationship as focused more on his own access to immortality than on even a conditional emotional connection, Tourneur exposes the violent aspects of the dominant ‘blood’ metaphors. The desire for worldly immortality, largely coded as positive in Marston, Shakespeare, and Kyd, becomes explicitly villainous for Tourneur, especially in terms of the play’s religious milieu. Tourneur’s portrayal of Montferrers establishes that even the normal version of familial relationships is mis-focused on earthly concerns; his
portrayal of D’Amville as an exaggerated version of his brother, entirely focused on earthly concerns, confirms the perversity of the (earthly) normative familial values.

Tourneur’ Versions of Virtue

Tourneur does offer models of good men for the audience to imitate. The two sons that demonstrate imitative transformation, Sebastian and Charlemont, together demonstrate the dangers of imitating the earthly father. However, as a non-spiritual character, Sebastian cannot achieve Charlemont’s full transformation, and his ignominious death confirms that his version of earthly morality is not endorsed by the play.

While incapable of replicating Charlemont’s transformation into the exemplar of correct imitation, Sebastian is marked as one of the play’s few sympathetic characters by his decision not to imitate his father. 202 Sebastian’s failure to imitate his father is initially linked to the play’s heroine, Castabella; along with the humor in his responses, his connection with Castabella makes his disobedience more sympathetic. When Sebastian requests his “annuity” (3.2.3), D’Amville denies the request because Sebastian spoke against his older brother’s marriage to Charlemont’s fiancée, Castabella. D’Amville and Belforest (Castabella’s father) work together to forcibly persuade Castabella to marry Rousard against her will; the act is witnessed by Sebastian, who cries “A rape, a rape, a rape!” (1.4.123). He then argues, “Why, what is’t but a rape to force a

202 Richard Levin, in his “The Subplot of ‘The Atheist’s Tragedy,’” Huntington Library Quarterly 29.1 (November, 1965), notes that Sebastian is presented sympathetically by the play: “he is a generous, good-natured, brave, and completely honest man, whose basic decency emerges very clearly in his two interventions in the main plot” (22). However, argues that Sebastian acts “not on the basis of an articulated ethical system but on an emotional impulse, a spontaneous, almost physical reflex of the sort that characterizes his behavior throughout the play, whereas all of Charlemont’s actions are determined by explicit moral and religious principles which, typically, restrain his impulses” (23). While I like the dichotomy of impulse and restraint created by argument, my reading of Sebastian’s central soliloquy will show that his actions are based on a complex system of ethics that is relentlessly cerebral, even though it is deemed earthly by the play and therefore inferior to Charlemont’s religious, moral system. The central opposition here is not ‘emotion versus restraint,’ but ‘earthly ethics versus spiritual morality.’
wench to marry, since it forces her to lie with him she would not?” (1.4.126-7). This unusual level of attention paid to Castabella’s wishes is met with reproach from his father, with D’Amville exclaiming, “Thou disobedient villain, get thee out of my sight!” (1.4.132). This is the first of only three instances of the use of ‘villain’ as an insult in the play, all of which are directed at Sebastian, and in this case the term marks the beginning of Sebastian’s character arc.
As I will show in the following section, Sebastian, a progressively disobedient son, ultimately reclaims the term ‘villain’ to implicate the imitative ideal.

For D’Amville, obedience is expressed through proper imitation of specifically those traits he wants his son to imitate; when Sebastian contradicts his father in front of another father, a clergyman, and two women who would be expected to view D’Amville as a source of authority, Sebastian makes public what should be a private disagreement, revealing a failure of imitation that raises questions about his father’s authority and, by extension, his own. D’Amville does not forget the slight. Sebastian does not confront his father again until Act III scene ii, when he arrives for what seems like an appointment to ask his father for his annuity. When D’Amville refuses to pay him, Sebastian attempts to appeal to some family feeling, asking “How would you have me live?” (3.2.3). D’Amville suggests that he turn “turn crier” since he is “excellent at crying of a rape” (3.2.4-5). Sebastian has interfered directly with his father’s only route to earthly immortality by attempting to deprive him of the further progeny (Rousard’s sons) that would assure the continuation of his patriline, however wrongfully secured. Given his earlier emphasis on his sons as the primary motive for needing that inheritance, D’Amville’s repudiation of even his younger son seems perverse. D’Amville’s absolute focus on his sons as his route to earthly immortality clashes uneasily with his eagerness to discard the disobedient son; because he is focused on the survival of generic sons, rather than specific sons, D’Amville views Sebastian as
expendable; once it becomes apparent that Rousard’s illness will prevent him from siring children, even his eldest son becomes replaceable.

Sebastian’s response focuses not on his own disobedience, precisely, instead emphasizing the imitative failure at the root of their disagreement in kind: “Sir, I confess in particular respect to yourself I was somewhat forgetful. General honesty possessed me” (3.2.6-7). While an acknowledgment that Sebastian should not have contradicted his father in public, Sebastian’s statement asserts that he is more rather than less honest in failing to imitate his father. D’Amville is enraged at the implication, and cries, “Go, th’art the base corruption of my blood, / And like a fetter grow’st unto my flesh” (3.2.8-9). While still claiming that his son is a part of him, D’Amville now claims that Sebastian is a disease of the blood, and while still a part of his father, he is now infecting him, and must be removed. D’Amville’s sons might be his eternity, but the medical language of ‘corruption’ and ‘fetter’ reminds us that while Sebastian is part of his father, he can be redefined as a disease and purged.203

In a deliberate rejection of D’Amville’s behavior and expectations for his son’s behavior, Sebastian demonstrates his determination not to imitate his father by supporting Charlemont’s endeavors. As I will outline in the following section, Tourneur deploys the very specific insult ‘villain’ at key points in Sebastian’s development; the insult is key in establishing Sebastian’s refusal of the imitative ideal, and in elucidating D’Amville’s anxious response to his son’s failure to imitate. When Charlemont says to Sebastian, “Th’art a villain and the son of a villain” (3.2.28), Sebastian does not disagree that his father is a villain but takes offense at the implication that he himself is one, marking a deliberate failure, or even defiance, of the imitative

203 ‘Fetter’ is probably ‘feto’/’foetor,’ an offensive smell; a stench, as in Mirour Saluaicioun (1450), “Filles a man at eende with rotynnesse and fetoure” (416), which makes more sense in context of the metaphor of blood disease that D’Amville employs. A blood disease causing shackles to grow upon one’s flesh makes little sense.
ideal. The two men duel briefly, with Charlemont winning when he decides to spare Sebastian’s life. D’Amville takes the opportunity to have Charlemont arrested for assault and debt: having stolen Charlemont’s inheritance, D’Amville is well aware that Charlemont cannot repay the thousand crowns D’Amville loaned him at the beginning of the play. D’Amville then gives his son the thousand crowns previously mentioned in the context of Charlemont’s debt, as D’Amville sees some sort of balance in rewarding a son who defended him with the money his nephew owed him.

D’Amville emphasizes the connection between his approval and his son’s obedience, saying that he approves his son’s behavior, “when ‘tis worthily employed,” giving him “the full scope / Of gen’rous liberty,” as long as his son’s behavior does not “spend itself in courses of / Unbounded license” (3.2.52-7). D’Amville translates Sebastian’s obedience through the economic language of the passage (“employed,” “spend itself”) in a material argument regarding the object of imitate, while again using religious language to serve his own ends. D’Amville’s acknowledgment and money are conditional upon his approval of his son’s actions, and he reaffirms his son’s conflation of liberty and a full purse, reiterating his policy that his approval comes with material rewards, his disapproval with penury.

Sebastian does not contradict his father until D’Amville exits, at which point, left alone on stage, Sebastian again asserts his own identity apart from his father’s, scoffing “‘Gen’rous liberty’—that is to say, freely to bestow my abilities to honest purposes. Methinks I should not follow that instruction now if, having the means to do an honest office for an honest fellow, I should neglect it” (3.2.59-62). Sebastian takes his father’s money and uses it to free Charlemont from prison, actively reinterpreting or misappropriating his father’s instructions and further distancing his own actions from his father’s.
Sebastian takes Charlemont directly to his father, and tells D’Amville that he freed Charlemont from prison, again openly defying his father, this time in front of Charlemont and Castabella. D’Amville responds with the third and last use of this insult in the play:

D’Amville: [aside to Sebastian] You are a villain.
Sebastian: [aside to D’Amville] Y’are my father.

Exit Sebastian. (3.4.32-3)

Villain is an insult that bears quite distinctly on D’Amville’s lineal program. Originally the term ‘villain’ was defined as “a low-born, base-minded rustic, a man of ignoble ideas or instincts” (OED); the term is related to criminal behavior, but is based on the idea that birth produces behavior. Sebastian is reclaiming the kin bond by highlighting D’Amville’s own ignoble ideas, and then states that if he is a villain (criminal), it is because he was born of a villain (base). “Both senses of the word stem from villein, the term used in the Domesday Book for persons bound to the soil, like serfs or churls.”204 Rather than learning virtue from his father’s example, Sebastian claims he has learned villainy, and repudiates the basis of dynastic motives in a startling move that suggests the son should not necessarily imitate the father. Tourneur’s targeted use of the very specific insult ‘villain,’ encapsulates the play’s primary debate about when or whom to obey. While Sebastian’s protest marks him as a failure at imitative kinship, his failure is deemed ethical, if not moral, in religious terms.

While Sebastian does save Charlemont, his actions become a foil to Charlemont’s spiritual version of imitation. The major difference between them is revealed through the juxtaposition of soliloquies at the end of Act III, scene ii and the beginning of Act III, scene iii. Both sons face a moral problem, and both arrive at the right conclusion; however, their method of reasoning is compared, and Sebastian’s is found wanting. Faced with a very practical question

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204 De Grazia, 186.
requiring immediate action, Sebastian looks at his options, weighs the pros and cons, and makes his decision based on a heady combination of emotion and logic. Sebastian begins by re-appropriating his father’s phrase, ‘gen’rous liberty,’ redefining the phrase as “freely to bestow my abilities to honest purposes” (3.2.59) to support his own ideas of honor and duty. In a deliberate misreading of his father’s use of the phrase, Sebastian muses, “I should not follow that instruction now if, having the means to do an honest office for an honest fellow, I should neglect it” (3.2.60) This assertion of difference against an expectation of imitation sets up the argument that follows, in which Sebastian measures his actions against a series of cultural standards in order to decide what to do on a practical level, but also to help define himself against his father. He begins with happy coincidence, noting the financial propinquity of his father’s reward: “Charlemont lies in prison for a thousand crowns, and here I have a thousand crowns” (3.2.61) Noting first that “Honesty tells me ‘twere well done to release Charlemont” (3.2.61-2), Sebastian counters with the concerns of practicality: “But discretion says I had much ado to come by this, and when this shall be gone I know not where to finger any more” (3.2.63). The appeal to discretion is actually his most explicit reference to his own failure of imitation; noting that “if I employ it to this use, which is like to endanger me into my father’s perpetual displeasure” (3.2.64), Sebastian acknowledges the financial limitations placed on him by his father’s expectations. Behaving like D’Amville would gain Sebastian further monetary reward; failing to behave like his father might as well be suicide: “And then I may go hang myself, or be forced to do that will make another save me the labour” (3.2.65). In spite of the rewards of imitation, and the dangers of imitative failure, Sebastian decides, quite decisively, that he has an obligation to Charlemont and must repay it: “Charlemont, thou gav’st me my life, and that’s somewhat of a purer earth than gold, as fine as it is. ‘Tis no courtesy I do thee, but thankfulness. I owe thee and
I’ll pay it” (3.2.66). Sebastian is appealing to the higher imitative obligations of an honor-based economy, in which failing to repay such a financial- and honor-based debt could destroy his reputation; while his concern is with the rightness of the act, not with the danger to his reputation, it is important to note that Sebastian accesses honor-based discourses to justify his decision. Moreover, Sebastian strengthens the connection to honor discourses with his final justification: “He fought bravely, but the officers dragged him villainously. Arrant naves!” (3.2.67). Noting that the officers used him “villainously,” Sebastian emphasizes bravery and its connection to status, connecting his obligation to Charlemont at least partly to the obligations of shared status concerns. Richard Levin argues that Sebastian’s argument is really the “convergence of different emotions” deliberately opposed to Charlemont’s “complex theological debate”; however, his argument that Tourneur makes a distinction “between true virtue, grounded in rational conviction, and mere good nature,” overlooks the rational conviction underlying Sebastian’s choice. Sebastian’s language is less emotional than relentlessly earthly in its concerns; while he looks beyond his father for imitative models, Sebastian appeals to honor discourses that conflate economic- and reputation-based credit.

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205 Levin, 23. However, Levin does note that Sebastian is described as “spirited” in 2.3.73, 3.2.74, and 4.2.44 as the “embodiment of what Plato calls the ‘spirited’ part of the soul, which tends to produce noble action” when allied with reason (24). He also notes that Plato regards the soul “as the seat of the emotions (righteous indignation, shame, etc.) that are the natural allies of reason and are associated with courage and honor,” as in the myth of the chariot in Phaedrus (the white horse representing the rational soul) (24, footnote 6).

206 The classic statement of the early modern view of credit as tied up in reputation and affluence is C. Muldrew, Economy of Obligation: the Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 1998). J.A. Sharpe similarly notes the relationship between “honor, good name, credit, reputation and glory” (2) in “Defamation and Sexual Slander in Early Modern England: The Church Courts at York,” Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, Borthwick Papers, No. 58 (University of York, 1980). Theodore B. Leinwand figures the relationship as one of dependence: “credit customarily entails honor, trust, and reputation” (6), also noting that credit began to develop two increasingly separate meanings: “trustworthiness (one’s worth in the realm of belief) and solvency (one’s worth in the realm of finance). The sometime congruence, sometime friction, registered in these distinct senses of credit is readily felt in dramatic texts” (13), in Theatre, Finance and Society in Early Modern England (Cambridge UP, 1999).
Sebastian has failed to imitate the titular atheist of a revenge tragedy, and Tourneur steers the audience’s sympathies toward Sebastian’s choices; while protesting Castabella’s wedding could demonstrate Sebastian’s sinful disobedience of his father, Castabella’s own protests remind us that she loves Charlemont, who is an even more suitable match and the romantic hero of the play. Sebastian’s behavior in his duel with Charlemont, defending his father and later freeing Charlemont from prison, proves that he is as honest as our philosopher hero, and as honorable. Tourneur exaggerates D’Amville’s “abuse of [the] legitimate, divinely ordained powers” of a patriarch to make Sebastian’s disobedience unquestionably right. Sebastian is a good example of ‘right disobedience,’ though his deliberately failed imitation is based on ethics rather than religion. For Tourneur, Sebastian is the best that man can do on his own, without spiritual guidance, and Tourneur contrasts Sebastian to Charlemont to highlight the possibilities and failures of Sebastian’s reasoning.

Charlemont’s own transformation is explicitly spiritual, and ‘rewarded’ by the plot structures of the play. The worldly Charlemont of the early portions of the play must be transformed into its ideal Christian hero by the last act, and part of that transformation is effected by demonstrations of Charlemont’s attempts to define the ‘proper’ object of imitation. The practice of imitation undergoes perpetual relocation and repair throughout the play, and several different objects are mimicked (his warlike ancestors, the living Montferrers) before Charlemont discovers the ‘proper’ object of imitation (his father’s ghost).

Charlemont leaves in the first Act in defiance of his father’s wishes, using his uncle’s loan to finance his martial needs. At this point in the play, Charlemont is definitely not an ideal

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Lake (Anti-Christ), 78. Lake notes that “such breakdowns in the natural workings of the patriarchal order appeared particularly serious and threatening, since ... these infractions of the moral order stemmed from the abuse of legitimate, divinely ordained powers, deemed essential for the maintenance of order in a fallen world” (78). While I am borrowing Lake’s idea of a ‘patriarch run amok,’ applying this concept specifically to D’Amville, my overall argument is that Tourneur critiques even normative versions of earthly fatherhood.
Christian, and Tourneur marks him as clearly incorrect in imitating those more martial, less pious ancestors. Charlemont splits reputation from conscience by fixating upon the material concerns of honor. His insistent questioning of Castabella’s honor (or chastity) and his fixation on his lost inheritance in the third Act of the play confirm the violence of that split. Upon his return, Charlemont and Castabella are reunited, but unhappily – Castabella immediately tells Charlemont that she has been married to D’Amville’s eldest son, Rousard. Far from displaying Christian virtues of mercy and forgiveness, Charlemont accuses her of “incontinence” (3.1.114). Charlemont’s appeal to commonplaces about women’s lust is met by Castabella insistence that she was married against her will, forced to do so by “Your uncle D’Amville. / And he that dispossessed my love of you / Hath disinherited you of possession” (3.1.121-3).

Charlemont responds to the doubled loss of fiancé and inheritance with the slightly strange outburst, “Disinherited? Wherein have I deserved / To be deprived of my dear father’s love?” (3.1.124-5). His conflation of love and money (or inheritance) reflects Montferrers’ references to ‘substance’ as honor, bodily matter, true self, and possessions. Charlemont is the Christian hero of this play, and we are never meant to associate his earthly behavior with D’Amville’s atheism. Nevertheless, Charlemont returns from the war still bound up in the earthly concerns of inheritance and filial imitation that Tourneur criticizes.

Charlemont’s fixation on the material concerns of honor only changes into a focus on spiritual concerns (that is, he only becomes the play’s Christian philosopher-hero), because he is influenced by his father’s ghost. It is worth noting that the traditional function of the ghost in the

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208 Cefalu, 32, describes the separation of reputation and conscience in Augustine and in early modern Puritans such as Richard Greenham.

209 In, for instance, Hic mulier: or, The man-woman: being a medicine to cure the coltish disease of the staggers in the masculine-feminines of our times (London, 1620), or Joseph Swetnam’s The Arraignment of Lewd, Idle, Froward, and Unconstant Women (London, 1615). These works post-date Tourneur’s play, but encapsulate centuries-old misogynistic beliefs.
revenge tragedy genre is to encourage the surviving party toward revenge. Tourneur uses his ghost for a significantly different purpose: Charlemont’s redemption. The ghost is actually introduced in a dream that prompts Charlemont to return to France, but with the caveat that he “Attend with patience the success of things; / But leave revenge unto the King of kings” (2.6.26-7). Charlemont at first tries to rationalize away seeing the spirit, identifying it as a “fantas[y] of terror” (2.6.35) or an echo of the horrors of war mixed with remembrance of his father so that “presented all together seem / Incorporate, as if his body were / The owner of that blood, the subject of / That death, when he’s at Paris and that blood / Shed here” (2.6.56-60). As if to discount this psychologically convincing reading, the ghost appears before Charlemont’s waking eyes, and its approach, though silent, convinces Charlemont that his “doubtful heart was slow / To credit that which I did fear to know” (2.6.69-70). Reassuring the audience that this ghost is a true messenger of God’s anti-revenge word, Tourneur’s plot supports the ghost’s actions while portraying the ghost’s behavior as a significant break from the living Montferrers’ actions.

The affirmation of the ghost does not change Charlemont’s behavior immediately; the slow and difficult transformation emphasizes that imitation in this play is a process. Charlemont is still trying out different modes of behavior at this point in Act 3, and only partly follows the ghost’s example. Though charged with patience, Charlemont confronts Castabella, and then D’Amville and his younger son Sebastian, and begins to fight with the latter. Charlemont is winning and about to strike the killing blow when his father’s ghost appears, and rebukes him:

210 For Charles and Elaine Hallett, in their The Revenger’s Madness (1980), the ghost, as one of the earliest symbols of the revenge tragedy, clearly represents the supernatural forces that drive the revenger to his revenge. Authoritative, but not associated with the sort of Christianity defined principally by mercy and forgiveness, the ghost exerts irresistible pressures upon the revenger to enact a revenge figured in terms of the natural order. Hallett and Hallett, The Revenger’s Madness (1980), 8-10. Higgins also notes that the ghost is expected to demand revenge, to chide the “tardy human agent of divine vengeance” (260); Tourneur’s use of the ghost to counsel patience, instead, is a significant departure from generic conventions. Diehl also notes that the ghost represents one of the play’s central examples of the problem of interpreting phenomena: “Characters encounter many different versions of the ghost and offer as many interpretations” (50).
Hold, Charlemont!
Let him revenge my murder, and thy wrongs
To whom the Justice of Revenge belongs.  

(3.2.45-47)

Charlemont holds, finally following the ghost’s example. However, this is not the end of his transformation. Protesting that the ghost “torture[s] me between the passion of / My blood, and the religion of my soul” (3.2.34-5), Charlemont allows himself to be led to prison, where he works through his final character change in a lengthy soliloquy that immediately follows Sebastian’s rational and ethical decision to aid Charlemont against his father’s wishes. Tourneur’s juxtaposition of the two methods of working out a moral quandary contrasts Charlemont’s spiritual morality with Sebastian’s earthly ethics. In the major turning point of his character, Charlemont finally places himself and the duty to avenge his father in God’s hands. His transformation takes the form of a theological discourse, beginning with the role of suffering in faith:

I grant thee, Heaven, thy goodness doth command
Our punishments, but yet no further than
The measure of our sins. How should they else
Be just?  

(3.3.1-4).

His initial faith in the justness of heaven relies on the equity of punishment for sin; however, his thinking evolves as he considers exceptions to that ideal of equitable punishment:

Or how should that good purpose of
Thy justice take effect by bounding men
Within the confines of humanity,
When our afflictions do exceed our crimes?  

(3.3.4-7)

Considering his own situation, jailed unfairly for a crime he did not commit, Charlemont questions the justice of a heaven that punishes men by making them human, that is, inclined toward sin. Accounting for the complex idea that heaven is just even when the punishment exceeds the crime, Charlemont dwells on language of weights and measures, equity and excess. His own counterargument leads to a moment of excess, when Charlemont considers the
consequences of punishing men more than they deserve: “Then they do rather teach the
barb’rous world / Examples that extend her cruelties / Beyond their own dimensions, and instruct
/ Our actions to be more, more barbarous” (3.3.8-11). Acknowledging that unfair afflictions can
lead to an excess of violent behavior rather than repentance, Charlemont retreats from this
realization, recanting the near-blasphemy: “O my afflicted soul, how torment swells / Thy
apprehension with profane conceit / Against the sacred justice of my God!” (3.3.12-14). Blaming
the momentary faltering of his faith on the torment of his unfair imprisonment, Charlemont then
retreats into a conventional Christian patience discourse, consoling himself, “Our own
constructions are the authors of / Our misery” (3.3.15-16). However, he then continues on this
theme by looking specifically at material conditions, noting, “We never measure our / Conditions
but with men above us in / Estate, so while our spirits labour to / Be higher than our fortunes,
th’are more base” (3.3.16-19). The aspiration to material goods appropriate to a status above
one’s own, Charlemont states, has the effect of degrading one’s soul. Tourneur’s main theme,
that spiritual concerns should override earthly concerns, is encapsulated in Charlemont’s final
revelation: “Since all those attributes which make men seem / Superior to us are man’s subjects
and / Were made to serve him, the repining man / Is of a servile spirit to deject / The value of
himself below their estimation” (3.3.20-24). Expanding on his earlier statement that too great a
focus on material goods degrades the spirit, Charlemont further notes that the very material
goods that constitute a man’s superior status can become idols; material goods, he claims, are
made to serve men, and to reverse that relationship, to focus on the material goods themselves
and “repine” against the lack of them, causes a man to place the value of his own spirit below the
value of those goods. Echoing 1 Timothy, “But godliness is great gain, if a man be content with
that he hath” (6:6), Charlemont finally realizes that the expression of dissatisfaction with one’s
lot in life actually diminishes one’s status, rendering the “repining” man “servile.” This soliloquy, in answer to Sebastian’s, dramatizes the role of religious faith in moral reasoning in a scene that contains Tourneur’s strongest statement of man’s need to focus on spiritual, not earthly, concerns. Working through the usual objections to the apparent unfairness of God’s judgment, Charlemont reconciles himself, quite forcefully, to patient suffering of God’s will. Setting the materialistic language of ‘conditions,’ ‘estate,’ and so forth, against a new strand of submission, Charlemont is shown to free himself from earthly constraints.

In contrast to Charlemont’s transformation, D’Amville’s confrontation with Montferrers’ ghost merely provides another opportunity for the play’s atheist to express his defiance to heaven. The ghost appears in a dream to warn D’Amville that his patrilineal project is about to fail; D’Amville wakes and immediately denies the dream’s validity, arguing that his project is impervious to accident: “How can that be, since / My purposes have hitherto been borne / With prosp’rous judgment to secure success?” (5.1.33-35). Reasserting his reliance on his own reason and judgment, D’Amville begins to account for the only possible threat to his project: “Which nothing lives to dispossess me of / But apprehended Charlemont, and him / This brain has made the happy instrument / To free suspicion, to annihilate / All interest and title of his own, / To seal up my assurance and confirm / My absolute possession by the law” (5.1.36-42). Placing all possible hazards in the figure of Charlemont, D’Amville is able to reassure himself that his project is entirely secure, and that it has been secured by his own judgment, which enables him to displace blame for his murders onto Charlemont. He ends with a last dig at Charlemont’s faith in heaven as inferior to his own faith in Nature: “Thus while the simple, honest worshipper / Of a fantastic providence groans under / The burden of neglected misery, / My real wisdom has raised up a state / That shall eternize my posterity” (5.1.42-46). Setting the fanciful, imaginary promises
of heaven against his own practical reliance on reason, D’Amville reiterates the purpose of his project, to ensure his own immortality through the eternal survival of his posterity; as if in answer to D’Amville’s words, servants carry in the body of Sebastian, killed in a duel with Belforest, as the first groans of Rousard’s death begin to echo offstage. The timing, and the sheer rapid pace of D’Amville’s losses (within eight lines of Sebastian’s death, Rousard’s fatal illness is revealed) emphasize the providential nature of his punishments; his failure to heed the ghost’s early warning leads immediately to the beginning of his end.

Tourneur sets Charlemont’s turn from reason to faith directly after Sebastian’s reliance on reason to come to a ‘correct’ response, bailing Charlemont out of jail. The juxtaposition is meant to show that while worldly reason can be right, it can never be enough. Charlemont’s revelation in the jail enables him to claim the following:

> I was a baron; that thy father has
> Deprived me of. Instead of that, I am
> Created king. I’ve lost a signory
> That was confined within a piece of earth,
> A wart upon the body of the world.
> But now I am an emp’ror of a world,
> This little world of man. My passions are
> My subjects, and I can command them laugh.
> Whilst thou dost tickle ’em to death with misery.  (3.3.39-47)

Asserting a new source of positions that are traditionally heritable, Charlemont locates his heavenly inheritance in his imitation of his spiritual father. Explicating the benefits of “lay[ing] up treasures for yourself in heaven” (Matthew 6:20), Charlemont resolves not to ‘repine’ for his lost earthly goods. Instead, Charlemont appeals to Jesus’ promise, “And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name’s sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall inherit everlasting life” (Matthew 19:29). Charlemont’s earthly wealth, lost by his earthly father, is replaced by spiritual wealth, and the protection of a spiritual father, in an echo of the gospels: “Fear not, little flock, for it is your
Father’s pleasure to give you the kingdom” (Luke 12:32). Charlemont’s unjust imprisonment enables him to claim a “meek” identity, in spite of the advantages bestowed by his status; nevertheless, Charlemont still focuses on the heritable goods mentioned by the sermon, asserting that his suffering gains him an even higher status, his mastery over the earthly world and over his passions. While Charlemont’s reference to his passions could be read as an appeal to Stoic ideals, the Protestant context of the remainder of the passage indicates an attempt to create a spiritual version of “stoic calm.” That is, Charlemont’s shift in focus from earthly to spiritual things enables his elevation above “little” earthly matters like his own imprisonment. Setting earthly inheritance (“I was a baron”) against heavenly inheritance (“I am created king”), Tourneur presents the proper imitation of his spiritual father as the only means of escaping the relentlessly violent, materialistic ideologies underlying earthly discourses of inheritance, imitation, and immortality.

These three scenes, Sebastian’s soliloquy, and Charlemont’s two prison soliloquies, depict sons attempting to imitate their fathers: the first attempts fail, and a prison revelation is necessary to completely alter Charlemont’s behavior. Finally, Charlemont learns that proper imitation is of spiritual, not earthly, things. Charlemont rejects the material-, inheritance- and honor-based discourses used by his living father, and adopts the spiritual discourse used by his father’s ghost. It is crucial for the play’s message that it is not his father that Charlemont learns to imitate, precisely, but his father’s ghost. The role of the ghost as God’s messenger is made apparent through his few lines, which consistently support the Christian ideal that vengeance belongs to God. Montferrers, the living father, is punished by the play’s constructions of divine vengeance: he is murdered by his brother beneath a starless sky, and his son goes to war against
his wishes. Tourneur criticizes Montferrers’ initial fixation on earthly material values, and only
d endorses Charlemont’s imitation of his father when that father is the ghostly messenger of God.

Tourneur’s insistence on a religious version of imitation mirrors, if darkly, Shakespeare’s
portrayal of politics’ effect on structures of imitation to be discussed in Chapter Four. I argue
that, in a crucial justification for primogeniture, inheritance in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus
(1594) is figured as resemblance. Titus is portrayed as particularly Roman in his adherence to
romanitas, virtus, and pietas, which ideals are affected by the political debate over inherited rule,
represented by primogeniture in this play, versus republicanism. Titus insists his sons be Roman
in the same ways he is Roman because that resemblance would ratify their paternity, confirm his
own immortality, and justify his belief in the capacity of reproduction to provide political and
personal stability. Tourneur’s insistence that religious concerns should supersede earthly
concerns is mirrored by Shakespeare’s apprehension that political concerns could override
familial concerns, but where Tourneur advocates the intervention of the religious into the
familial, Shakespeare uses the role of familial inheritance in structuring political conversations
that pit monarchy against republicanism to suggest the pressures placed on kinship by political
structures.
Tourneur’s criticism of the practice and ideology of imitation discussed in the last chapter focused on a Protestant disruption of two values that underpin normative familial inheritance structures: the ideal that the father lives on in his sons; and the ideal that the son imitates, and thereby replicates, his father. Tourneur criticizes a model of filial imitation that places resemblance, instead of virtue, as a goal in itself, and attempts to replace an earthly with a spiritual father as the proper object of imitation. Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus* (1588-93) creates similarly disturbing parallels in two apparently different forms of political impingement upon the structure of familial imitation. This chapter examines the impact of politics on the familial, but also the impact of the familial on politics; the commonplace that the family is the ‘natural’ metaphor for the state elides the violence placed by political pressures on familial emotions. Shakespeare exaggerates the familial metaphor through his portrayal of Titus’ excessive *romanitas* to note the extent to which the claims of duty transume the claims of the family.

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211 There is a Catholic version of this argument (see footnote 1 in Chapter 3), but Tourneur overtly appeals to Calvinist doctrine in his portrayal of Providence.

212 As Peter Lake notes, what we terms the ‘public’ and ‘private’ are anachronistic. Early modern pamphlets “envisage the world as a unified social, moral, and theological field, in which a unitary notion of (social, religious, household and wider political) order is threatened by sin and the devil” (100) in *The Anti-Christ’s Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). As “Orlin, among others, has argued, such hard and fast distinctions between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ ... do violence to the ways in which the original audiences conceived of order and disorder in a fallen world ... Thus, Gowing notes, ‘public’ events might take place in private places” (Lake 101).
The play opens with the late Emperor’s two sons, Saturninus and Bassianus, engaging in a debate in which each asserts rival claims to the throne. The arguments presented by each brother are founded on opposed social-cultural systems for the transmission of power or authority: the eldest son, Saturninus, argues for his right to inherit his father’s power based on the system of primogeniture, while Bassianus argues for an electoral system based on an individual’s merits. That it is the form of government that is up for debate is unusual: each brother seems to embody different points in Rome’s history (Republican Rome and Imperial Rome) in a clash of systems rather than persons. Shakespeare’s counterfactual combination of different periods of Roman history, and of the systems of government distinct to each period, highlights the visibility and importance of the succession debate settled by the play’s titular military hero. Titus chooses Saturninus because he is the former emperor’s eldest son, and Titus makes explicit his belief that Saturninus’ birth order will make him the best ruler, that is, the ruler most like the last ruler. Titus believes in continuity and stability through the inheritance of the son who is best able to replicate the father, and because of that belief, he insists that sons resemble fathers, that his own sons be Roman in the same ways that he is Roman. That idealized Roman-ness is characterized by his adherence to romanitas (characterized by the values of virtus and pietas, as discussed more fully below); however, Shakespeare quickly implies that Titus’ adherence to romanitas is excessive, and that excessive Roman-ness infects the political debate on inherited rule versus republicanism. Titus’ exaggerated version of romanitas, an ideology

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213 It is almost a commonplace of Titus criticism that Saturninus and Bassianus are ‘besieging the city with words,’ as for instance in Robert S. Miola, Shakespeare’s Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983), 44; Gail Kern Paster, The Idea of the City in the Age of Shakespeare (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 59. However, the problem is that this division is coming from within.

214 The relevance of a patriarchal discourse to a discussion of Elizabeth’s succession might seem out of place, since a daughter cannot inherit in a system that follows primogeniture. I am not arguing that Shakespeare is attempting a direct match between inheritance systems, and indeed a little distance would only help his play slip past the censors. However, when Elizabeth took the throne, she was heralded as a ‘prince’ and treated like a ‘female king’
that demands he murder sons in the name of *pietas*, and daughters in the name of *virtus*, reveals
the inherently violent ideologies underlying normative political and familial bonds. That is, the
pressure placed on the familial by the political reveals the interconnectedness of what we would
call the public and private spheres; the play represents the historical competition of the ‘public’
world of political succession and social duty with the ‘private’ realm of the family.

Succession Crises

The succession crisis with which *Titus Andronicus* begins clearly echoes one of the most
pressing political and social concerns of the time, Elizabeth’s lack of an heir. The 1590s saw an
intensification of the succession crisis that had been brewing since Elizabeth’s serious illness in
1563, signaling that the continuance of a stable state through the production of a suitable heir
might be impossible.\(^{215}\) By the time Shakespeare writes *Titus Andronicus*, two issues have
moved to the forefront of the intensified crisis: a proliferating number of possible heirs, and a

\(^{215}\) Hadfield (2004), 19. The years leading up to *Titus Andronicus* saw renewed bouts of plague between 1585 and
1587, and threatened renewal of the war with Spain after the failure of the Drake Norris Expedition in 1589.
Perhaps more worryingly, “Elizabeth’s accelerating decline combined with the fact that James had married and
was starting to produce children” (Hopkins 2011 7), suggested the increasingly possible succession of a foreign
king, Scottish being only somewhat less threatening than Spanish thanks to James’ “known autocratic political
opinions” (Hadfield 2004 134). Susan Doran suggests that “the number of succession tracts produced during this
period is powerful evidence of the urgency of the debate,” (Qtd in Hopkins [2011], 7), such as the “hugely
provocative” (Hopkins [2011], 3) *A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crown of England* by the Jesuit
Robert Persons. Susan Doran, “Three Late-Elizabethan Succession Tracts,” in *The Struggle for the Succession in Late
Elizabethan England*, edited by Jean-Christophe Mayer (Montpellier: Institut de Recherche sur la Renaissance,
2004), 91-117, 115. Cited in Hopkins (2011), 7. “It was in quest of a male heir that Henry VIII broke with Rome,
divorced two wives, and executed two more ... Above all, it was this question which, throughout her reign,
haunted Elizabeth I” (Hopkins, 2011), 11.

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series of political and social setbacks.\textsuperscript{216} Joel Hurtsfield notes that “There were, in effect, about a dozen people who in the 1590s could present themselves, with varying degrees of optimism, as the future occupants of Elizabeth’s throne.”\textsuperscript{217} While an ever increasing number of potential heirs might seem like a good thing, several potential heirs were extremely threatening to ideas of religious and political stability. Leanda de Lisle notes that “in February 1593 … the Puritan MP Peter Wentworth petitioned Elizabeth to name her successor. Her reply was to put him in the Tower.”\textsuperscript{218} Wentworth’s petition was based on the fear of a return to Catholic rule, and his willingness to speak out reveals the insistent connection of the political with the religious.\textsuperscript{219} The proliferation of possible heirs, and the possibility of the ‘wrong’ heir succeeding to the throne, is precisely the nightmare that the inheritance system of primogeniture (tries to) solve. The destructive nature of a failed or ‘incorrect’ inheritance made debates about the best means of ensuring political continuity and stability much more urgent at a time when questioning any aspect of the succession could lead to incarceration or mutilation.\textsuperscript{220} In spite of such dangers, oblique comments on the succession were made through drama, which could use distancing

\textsuperscript{216} bubonic plague was busy in numerous places in England in the years from 1585 to 1587 inclusively\textsuperscript{[4:237].} List compiled by Brian Williams in 1996 as part of ‘The Cycles of Plague’, dissertation for a BA (Hons) degree at the University of Hull, England.

\textsuperscript{217} Quoted in Hopkins (2011), 2.

\textsuperscript{218} De Lisle, \textit{After Elizabeth} (London: HarperCollins, 2006), 29. When John Stubbs opposed the potential French Marriage, in his bold \textit{The Gaping Gulf} (1579), he and his distributor lost their right hands, according to Patrick Collinson, \textit{Elizabethans} (Hambledon and London, 2003), 21, 37.

\textsuperscript{219} The tension caused by this crisis can be adduced from Elizabeth’s Statute of Silence (1571), which prohibited discussion of the succession (Murphy 44).

\textsuperscript{220} Susan Doran suggests that “the number of succession tracts produced during this period is powerful evidence of the urgency of the debate,” (Qtd in Hopkins [2011], 7), such as the “hugely provocative” (Hopkins [2011], 3) A \textit{Conference about the Next Succession to the Crown of England} by the Jesuit Robert Persons. Susan Doran, “Three Late-Elizabethan Succession Tracts,” in \textit{The Struggle for the Succession in Late Elizabethan England}, edited by Jean-Christophe Mayer (Montpellier: Institut de Recherche sur la Renaissance, 2004), 91-117, 115. Cited in Hopkins (2011), 7. “It was in quest of a male heir that Henry VIII broke with Rome, divorced two wives, and executed two more … Above all, it was this question which, throughout her reign, haunted Elizabeth I” (Hopkins, 2011), 11.
elements such as foreign location and historical timeframe to comment on current events.\textsuperscript{221} Shakespeare further displaces the debate into a dispute between two brothers, which both intensifies concerns of competition and asserts a near-equality, or at least a likeness, lacking in the other candidates to the throne.\textsuperscript{222} Because brothers are thought to resemble one another, and because fraternal metaphors are founded on ideals of resemblance and equality,\textsuperscript{223} the opening debate between Saturninus and Bassianus raises the stakes of the debate between primogeniture and election by merit.

When Shakespeare was writing \textit{Titus}, monarchy has been revealed to be a system which has the potential to \textit{fail}. In the lifetimes of many pondering this question during the succession crisis, the monarchy had produced sons that did not resemble their fathers, daughters that resembled their fathers but were unfruitful, or no sons at all. This context of failure and potential failure makes the ideal of stability through continuity, and continuity through reproduction, an extremely appealing ideal as well as a potentially fragile reality. The focus on stability represents one of the key ideals underpinning primogeniture. In his first appearance, Titus upholds the virtues of primogeniture in a short speech that reveals his assumption that the son will resemble the father (1.1.224-7). That assumption is almost immediately proven false when Marcus, one of Titus’ sons, fails to support Titus’ decision to marry Lavinia to Saturninus. The play features repeated failures of resemblance, and, from the first, these failures prompt in Titus an excessive form of \textit{pietas} that demands the destruction of, to borrow a term from Sara Ahmed, the ‘unhappy

\textsuperscript{221} “From the 1560s onwards, plays performed at court, in public theatres, and at the Inns of Court, commented, albeit often obliquely, on the Queen’s marriage plans and her provision for her succession.” (Hadfield 2004 21). As Louis Montrose suggests, “Perhaps one reason for Shakespeare’s fascination with kingship as a dramatic subject is that it provides a paradigm for patriarchy and succession” (37n21) in Louis Adrian Montrose, “‘The Place of a Brother’ in \textit{As You Like It}: Social Process and Comic Form,” \textit{Shakespeare Quarterly} 32.1 (Spring 1981), 28-54. Quoted in Hopkins (2011), 11.

\textsuperscript{222} The other potential heirs were foreign, distant cousins, or descended from the female line.

\textsuperscript{223} As discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3.
That is, the *impia* child becomes an obstacle to Titus’ ability to think about his own *pietas* unproblematically. Mutius disrupts Titus’s attempt to create peace, and in doing so inadvertently casts himself in the “determinately un-Roman role of the Rutulians, Rome’s first enemies.”225 In failing to behave according to Roman precedents, Mutius also fails to resemble his father. Titus’ response to obstacles is to decide that the obstacle, even if it is his own son, must then be destroyed. This overreaction to the ‘unhappy object’ reveals that Titus’ enactment of *pietas* is excessive, an exaggeration of an already violent normative virtue. Shakespeare makes explicit the ways in which *pietas* underpins both republican and imperial models of government by criticizing both of those ideal models in the play’s repeated succession debates.

The play opens with the last emperor’s two sons, a “latter-day Romulus and Remus,” debating the proper system of inheritance, and thereby government, in language that reveals the slippages and corruptions inherent in the metaphors that construct each system.226 As portrayed in *Titus Andronicus*, both systems, inherited rule and republicanism, are potentially dangerous, but also potentially ideal. Shakespeare’s choice of a Roman setting for this very political play

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224 Sara Ahmed, “Happy Objects,” *The Affect Theory Reader* Edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Duke UP, 2010). Ahmed redefines objects: “Objects would not refer only to physical or material things, but also to anything that we imagine might lead us to happiness, including objects in the sense of values, practice, and styles, as well as aspirations. ... the queer child is an unhappy object for many parents” (41-2). Her argument criticizes heteronormative values, especially the ideal that the family is a primary shaping orientation. That is, the idea that “we share an orientation toward the family as being good, as being what promises happiness in return for loyalty” means that family “shapes what we do; you have to ‘make’ and ‘keep’ the family, which directs how you spend your time, energy, and resources” (38). Titus’ maintenance of what he counts as ‘family’ manifests in the violent removal of ‘affect aliens’ (39), the figures that do not share his orientation toward this specific ‘family.’ Ahmed points out the everyday manifestation of this ‘not fitting in,’ or of the attribution of bad feeling to the person who introduces that feeling: “To create awkwardness is to be read as being awkward ... To refuse to be placed would mean to be seen as trouble, as causing discomfort for others” (39). While I do not address affect theory as a whole in this argument, I find Ahmed’s critique of affective attribution strikingly relevant to Titus’ behavior in the scenes in which he decides which children count as belonging to this family. For a thorough discussion of my intervention in affect theory, see the Introduction.

225 Danielle A. St. Hilaire, “Allusion and Sacrifice in *Titus Andronicus.*” *SEL* 49.2 (Spring 2009), 320.

echoes contemporary political thinking. Most theories of government articulated in Tudor and
Stuart England “were derived from a mixture of Greek and Roman writings, the most important
probably being Aristotle’s Politics, Polybius’ history of the rise of Rome and Cicero’s orations
on the forms and varieties of active life available for the good citizen.”227 Andrew Hadfield
notes, in his groundbreaking Shakespeare and Renaissance Politics, that while definitions of
early modern republican ideals are hard to establish, most writers on republican themes seemed
to take a monarchical context for granted, and focus on the role of citizen and ruler in ensuring
the best possible commonwealth. A few themes can be identified. The first questioned the
guarantee provided by inherited power, which led directly to interrogations of the ideals of
resemblance and imitation.228 In stressing the need for virtue in government officials, this strand
of republicanism suggested that hereditary monarchy was not the ideal form of government
because the heir’s virtue could not be guaranteed. A second theme is the reliance of humanist
learning on the study of the classics, which “led to a select group of highly educated men
possessing the means and confidence to understand different constitutions in the ancient world
and contemporary Europe and so debate alternative forms of government.”229 The act of debating
alternative forms of government necessarily leads to “the idea that the rule of a particular
territory might at certain times change from one form to another, as it had done when ancient
Rome emerged first from monarchy to republic and then from republic to empire.”230 The danger
of this debate was that it encompassed the death of the current form of government. Therefore,
while Shakespeare participates in the debate on alternate forms of government, he does so

228 Hadfield (2004), 9.
obliquely, through a historical and geographical distance that nevertheless suggests that
primogeniture as a system must fail because the best cannot be guaranteed to inherit the throne.
While Hadfield explicates the political argument fully, I extend his critique by applying the
ideologies underlying both republican and monarchical political structures to my reading of
Titus. Both structures adopt kinship metaphors in attempts to gain legitimacy; both also impinge
upon familial relationships by opposing duty to one’s family and duty to one’s state.

Saturninus literally gets the first word in Titus with an argument for primogeniture
reinforced by invoking the (predictable) ideal of hereditary nobility, in a move that plays to
dramatic and cultural expectations. Saturninus, after all, is the first born son, and his position as
first speaker seems to reinforce hereditary as well as dramatic expectations:

Noble patricians, patrons of my right,
Defend the justice of my cause with arms.
And countrymen, my loving followers,
Plead my successive title with your swords.
I am his first-born son that was the last
That ware the imperial diadem of Rome.
Then let my father’s honours live in me,
Nor wrong mine age with this indignity. (1.1.2-8)

Saturninus claims an hereditary right to rule. Addressing his appeal first to ‘noble patricians,’
Saturninus establishes their mutual investment in a hereditary system. Saturninus appeals to “the
code of honour, asking them to defend one of their own.” Satuninus’ next appeals are to those
patricians as the ‘patrons of my right,’ shifting the terms of support slightly. The alteration of
address enters him into the system of patronage in a way that at first reinforces his hereditary
argument. The right for which he requires their patronage is the right to rule them, after all,

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231 Hadfield (2004), 133.
232 As Ann Margaret Lange and Robert Evans point out, “patronage system” is a convenient but misleading term
that elides the truth of how patronage worked. Lange argues that there were two versions of patronage: the ideal,
“grounded in perfect reciprocity and noblesse oblige, that existed mostly in the minds and imaginations of the
writers; and the often imperfect, inadequate, frustrating, or uncertain arrangements they encountered in everyday
and describing it as a ‘right’ supports his central argument that his birth (and more importantly, the order of his birth) makes him the ‘natural’ ruler. However, he nevertheless enters the patronage system as the submissive or supplicating party, not from a position of power. He specifically asks these patrons to ‘defend the justice’ of his cause, invoking in a complex metaphor the context of an advocate in a court of justice, and casting Saturninus in the subordinate position of defendant or plaintiff. His is a just cause, he claims, but one that he cannot defend himself. The relevance of the judicial metaphor becomes clearer when Saturninus mentions the martial support he expects these patrons to supply, since this will be no court trial but a trial by combat. His self-positioning in the submissive role in a patronage system is striking when read against Titus as “patron of virtue” (1.1.68), an epithet that enters Titus into the dominant position of the patronage system. While he never explicitly offers deference in return for that patronage, Saturninus’ invocation of relationships based on the patronage system at least suggests that he is offering reciprocating favors. The appeal to ‘patrons’ is followed immediately by dual references to ‘arms’ and ‘swords,’ speaking to an assumption that his claim will need to be supported with violence, an assumption that reinforces the vulnerability revealed by Saturninus in how he positions himself as a supplicant within a system of patronage.

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233 As Robert Evans notes of Elizabethan patronage, “no person in the culture could be wholly independent of the larger patronage system. ... none of these could be entirely untouched by the psychology of a culture grounded in assumptions of theoretical hierarchy and practical subordination” (Quoted in Lange, 46). While it might seem strange to implicate Saturninus in a subordinate position when he is about to become emperor, the immanence of his status is important – that is, he needs their patronage to attain this exalted position from which he would no longer need patronage.
The ‘arms’ of his patrons are followed by the ‘swords’ of his ‘countrymen,’ as Saturninus recoups any lost ground by repositioning himself in a more dominant role than the supplicant of the previous lines. The heavy implication that violence might be necessary to ensure Saturninus’ succession actually suggests that Saturninus’ claim is “insubstantial and can succeed only through military might,”234 ultimately undercutting his claim to the throne. Separated from both patricians and patrons by a final, divisive ‘And,’ Saturninus’ ‘followers’ could represent popular support.235 However, Saturninus is appealing to the ideal of inherited followers. James I would later explicate this ideal in his Trew Lawe: “the duty and allegiance, which the people sweareth to their prince, is not only bound to themselves, but likewise to their lawfull heires and posterity, the lineall succession of crowns being begun among the people of God.”236 James I is appealing to a popular trope to buttress his own position as Elizabeth’s heir, but his use of the trope to argue that oaths are inherited also suggests the loyalty owed to that heir by her followers.237 Saturninus attempts to appeal to this same trope to argue that his father’s followers should also follow him, as his father’s ‘natural’ heir. Saturninus’ reference to his ‘successive title’ emphasizes that his argument is based on the idea that his rule would represent sequence and continuity. Saturninus’ association of ‘loving followers’ with heritable loyalty reinforces his

234 Hadfield (2004), 40. He is discussing 2 Henry VI, but the necessity of violence to buttress a weak hereditary claim works nicely here as well. Saturninus’ insistent attempts to naturalize his claim to the throne sit uneasily with his repeated allusions to violent usurpation.

235 Andrew Hadfield (2004) identifies this second group of supporters as “the people” and argues that they are asked to “support the more general principle of primogeniture” (133). Whether or not this would constitute popular support (republicanism) of inherited monarchy is not discussed. McDiarmid argues that republican values were not incompatible with monarchy, since “One thing the people can do with their power is hand it to a monarch” (“Common Consent” 65), in The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson, edited by John F. McDiarmid (Ashgate, 2007).

236 James I, The Trew Lawe of Free Monarchies (1603), 82.

237 James’ positioning of his monarchy within tropes of patriarchy and genealogy is discussed in Murphy, 50-61, especially 54.
argument for primogeniture and suggests that the ideals underlying primogeniture will promote and maintain stability through a period of change.

However, Saturninus’ justification of the system of primogeniture as explicated by the remainder of the speech instead reveals its limitations: “I am his first-born son that was the last / That ware the imperial diadem of Rome. / Then let my father’s honours live in me” (1.1.5-6). Shakespeare’s reference to an ‘imperial’ diadem establishes his inclusive attitude toward historical context in the play as a whole. Saturninus seems to be introducing a situation in which primogeniture would be the natural rule of law – an empire. His brother’s rebuttal will make the republican context clear. Even this early in Saturninus’ speech, however, the fact that the last emperor’s eldest son finds it necessary to argue for hereditary rule strongly implies that the two systems of government, monarchy and republicanism, are in transition or conflict.

Saturninus’ argument for hereditary monarchy reaches its climax in his claim that his first-born status makes him uniquely suited to wearing his father’s diadem and honors. The diadem, which is no longer visibly displayed on a living monarch’s head, is the display of honors which, Saturninus argues, gives way to incarnation, the father living in the heir. Saturninus locates the honors symbolized by this diadem in his father’s possession, in an attempt to rewrite this transmission of power as suited to the system of primogeniture. That is, Saturninus is arguing that as his father’s first-born son, he should inherit his father’s honors. However, this Rome, as it turns out, is not an empire, and these honors are not heritable. Saturninus attempts to claim these honors as heritable by stating that rejection would “wrong mine age with this indignity” (1.1.8). The implication that the election of a different ruler would constitute an ‘indignity’ represents a further appeal to the “cult of honor” embodied by the ‘noble

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238 Hadfield (2004), 133.
patricians’ to whom Saturninus directs his speech, an attempt to reinforce the ‘naturalness’ of inherited rule. However, these honours are extrinsic, not biological, which is why Saturninus is obliged to use the jussive: ‘let his honors live in me.’ The ‘honours’ can now only be alleged to be living, invisibly, in Saturninus. Saturninus’ recourse to exhortation reveals the tension between the ‘artificial,’ social immortality created by the reproduction of the emperor’s honors, and the ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ immortality created by the survival of the father’s son, which Saturninus tries to collapse into one.

Saturninus’ appeal hinges on a particular aspect of the ideals underlying primogeniture: his ‘natural’ resemblance to his father, as represented by his ability to let his father’s honors live in him. The resemblance ideal underpins Saturninus’ appeal, which Shakespeare divides between two possible sources of political advancement: powerful patronage and popular support. That appeal to ‘patronage’ and ‘support’ is an appeal to the value of inherited succession, with which Saturninus expects these supporters to agree. Saturninus asserts the inheritance of social honors that might be passed down to a son; however, the son must in a sense earn those honors by successfully imitating the father, which imitation may or may not succeed. The assertion of ‘natural’ resemblance can lead to significant disconnect between claim and reality should that imitation fail. When combined with his repeated calls for violence from his supporters, Saturninus’ assertion of resemblance reveals the instability and potential for slippage inherent in the metaphors that construct his position.

After Saturninus’ argument is complete, Bassianus is given an immediate rebuttal in which he argues for the superiority of a merit-based government. Andrew Hadfield argues that Shakespeare “pointedly juxtaposes hereditary and republican arguments” to show hereditary monarchy “to be the most unsuitable and dangerous form of government, one that immediately
produces tyranny.” However, Bassianus’ argument for republican values suggests the violent nature of the ideologies underlying both systems. In an apparently egalitarian speech, Bassianus counters Saturninus’ claim that honor is related to hereditary right by arguing that honor is linked to virtue. He then divides ‘virtue’ into “justice, continence and nobility”:

Romans, friends, followers, favourers of my right,
If ever Bassianus, Caesar’s son,
Were gracious in the eyes of royal Rome,
Keep then this passage to the Capitol,
And suffer not dishonor to approach
The imperial seat, to virtue consecrate,
To justice, continence and nobility;
But let desert in pure election shine,
And, Romans, fight for freedom in your choice. (1.1.9-17)

Bassianus relies on an argument that uses the language of merit to garner support for his cause. His target audience is described as ‘friends, followers, favourers,’ terms that evoke more of a sense of equality than the hierarchical connotations in Saturninus’ ‘noble patricians’ and ‘loving followers.’ While both brothers use the term ‘followers,’ Bassainus pairs ‘followers’ with ‘favourers’ and ‘friends’ instead of opposing the term to ‘noble patricians.’ The association of ‘follower’ with ‘friend’ is explicated by an early modern sermon that describes “many fellowes, many followers and partners,” clearly placing these ‘followers’ on equal footing with ‘partners’ and ‘fellowes.’ The repeated use of words associated with friendship suggests that Bassianus is indeed making an egalitarian argument, asserting an essential equality in his appeal to

239 Hadfield (2004), 134.
240 Described as “more obviously populist” (133) by Andrew Hadfield (2004).
241 This opposition is neatly framed by Andrew Hadfield (2004), 134.
243 Huffman notes that “the words ‘grace’ and ‘gracious,’ like ‘pity’ and ‘mercy,’ recur ironically to suggest qualities absent in Rome” (739).
‘friends.’ Idealized, affective friendships were becoming more popular in this period, and while Bassianus’ terminology contains ambiguous meanings, he could be appealing to a genuine, affective relationship when he appeals to the support of ‘friends.’

Further relying on the support of those friends, Bassianus begins “If ever Bassianus, Caesar’s son, / Were gracious in the eyes of royal Rome …” The condition set by Bassianus’ ‘if’ apparently puts power in the hands of his ‘friends, followers and favourers,’ certainly implying that Bassianus assumes or is concerned for a reciprocal credit relationship. This potential meaning could also confer power on Bassianus’ friends, but the assumption of authority retrospectively shades the connotation of ‘followers’ away from ‘friends.’ ‘Gracious’ could refer to a general sense of popularity, of being in favor, but the term could also be used as a courteous epithet for aristocrats. ‘Grace’ was a multi-valenced term that could accommodate Bassianus’ surface meaning while also containing undertones of class and privilege. The terms used by each brother, in support of seemingly opposite causes, prove strikingly similar upon closer examination. While Bassianus’ argument for elected rule seems egalitarian, some of his metaphors connote ideals underlying his brother’s argument for primogeniture, with ‘friends,’ ‘followers’ and even ‘grace’ accessing both egalitarian and hierarchical meanings that undermine his apparently meritocratic project.

The debate that opens the play is enabled and contextualized by Shakespeare’s counterfactual account of Rome’s history, mixing periods of republic and empire. As Terence

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245 A brief history of friendship in early modern England is given in Chapter Two. In short, Keith Thomas claims that “The novelty of the early modern period is that it witnessed the emergence into public view of a type of relationship which differed from these older kinds of alliance in purporting to be based wholly on mutual sympathy, and cherished for its own sake rather than for its practical advantages. ... In Francis Bacon’s words, ‘it is friendship, when a man can say to himself, I love this man without respect of his utility’” (193). Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfillment in Early Modern England (Oxford, 2009).
Spencer famously said, Shakespeare was anxious “not to get it all right, but to get it all in.”

This fragmentary approach might actually have been an asset. Andrew Hadfield sees a close congruence between “transitional Rome, caught between empire and republic, and dying Elizabethan England, about to be ruled by a new, unknown dynasty.” Shakespeare’s tweaking of Roman history enables him to embody the shift from republic to empire in the figures of Saturninus and Bassianus, especially in their opening debate. While Bassianus’ argument for merit seems to rule the day, Titus chooses to rely on primogeniture and give the city to Saturninus. Failures of republican ideals plague the play, as characters continually reassert primogeniture above election even when, or especially when, election is the method used. The play begins and ends with an Andronici given control of the city by the will of the people, only for that choice to be given to the son of the former emperor, or to the son of the former elected emperor, Titus. The transformation of election into inherited succession recalls the fall of the republic, presaging the civil wars and the rise of Augustus and his dynasty. Moreover, the play ends with Lucius ousting Saturninus in a moment that recalls the fall of Tarquin and the rise of the republic. Shakespeare’s apparent reversal of historical momentum is inherently challenging.

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246 T.J.B. Spencer, “Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Romans,” ShS 10 (1957), 32. I argue that Titus’ Roman context is important, though the Signet edition includes Germaine Greer’s assertion that the play “found its way into the Stratford Roman series under false pretenses [it] is no more a play about history or politics than Measure for Measure is a play about Vienna,” ed. Sylvan Barnet and Maurice Charney (1963, 1989), 175. As Lukas Erne notes, Titus Andronicus “does not deal with a specific, well-defined portion of Roman history. Rather, it unfolds in what seems an amalgamation of historical moments, early and late, Rome at the moment of military expansion and Rome at the moment of near collapse,” in Lukas Erne, “‘Popish Tricks’ and ‘a Ruinous Monastery’: Titus Andronicus and the Question of Shakespeare’s Catholicism,” in The Limits of Textuality, edited by Lukas Erne and Guillelmette Bolens (Tubingen: Narr, 2000), 144. Coppélia Kahn claims that uniquely among his Roman plays, all of which have single historical sources, Shakespeare used primarily literary sources, as well as Plutarch’s Lives, to construct a coherent play-world for Titus out of the fragmented, incomplete historical and literary information available to him (Kahn 10). In spite of this claim, Loewenstein notes that Coriolanus also has multiple sources. Hopkins (2008) also notes that Shakespeare demonstrates significant debts to Virgil and Ovid (16-7), in Lisa Hopkins, The Cultural Uses of the Caesars on the English Renaissance Stage (Ashgate, Aldershot, Hampshire; Burlington, VT, 2008).

to the ideals of patriarchal imitation, which are meant to ensure political stability through the succession of like heirs; this reversal enables him to argue that the ideals underlying primogeniture contain the potential for Rome’s salvation, but also its destruction.\textsuperscript{248} The extremity of Titus’ belief in primogeniture reveals stresses inherent to the underlying ideals of replication and imitation.

Shakespeare portrays Titus as a believer in the ideal of stability through continuity, and continuity through reproduction. Titus first appears in mourning; in the funeral scene, discussed more fully below, he is a figure of death and failure, and his ‘triumphant’ return to Rome is haunted by the loss of twenty-one of his sons. Titus’ insistence in retaining his belief in the ideologies underlying primogeniture seems like a cruel irony as his speech in support of Saturninus and his burial of his sons occupy the same scene and stage. Shakespeare reveals Titus’ support of those beliefs by concentrating on Titus’ extreme Roman-ness, which might seem like an odd choice, as \textit{romanitas} and primogeniture are hardly identical, or even compatible. However, Titus’ Roman-ness, as discussed by many critics,\textsuperscript{249} is central to his political and familial projects. Titus insists his sons be Roman in the same ways he is Roman

\textsuperscript{248} Shakespeare is also speaking to his English context. Through to popularity of the ideas of \textit{translatio imperii} and of London as New Troy, Shakespeare could convey ideas about London while talking about Rome. His reliance on the \textit{Aeneid} furthers the England/Rome connection, thanks to the popularity of the idea that Brutus, son of Aeneas, founded Britain. Chernaik, 4-6. As Hopkins claims, this also gives Titus a connection to a British past, for “the descendants of Aeneas famously came to Britain, and \textit{Titus Andronicus} can be seen as alluding to Britain almost as much as to Rome” (Hopkins 17).

\textsuperscript{249} For more on foreignness in the revenge tragedy, see Bowers, 47-61; Emily C Bartels, \textit{Speaking of the Moor: from Alcazar to Othello} (U of Pennsylvania P, 2008); Lara Bovilsky, \textit{Barbarous play: race on the English Renaissance stage} (U of Minnesota P, 2008); Joyce Green MacDonald, ed., \textit{Race, ethnicity, and power in the Renaissance} (Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 1997); Edward Muir, \textit{Mad blood stirring: vendetta & factions in Friuli during the Renaissance} (Johns Hopkins UP, 1993); Glyn Redworth, \textit{The prince and the Infanta: the cultural politics of the Spanish match} (Yale UP, 2003); Molly Smith, \textit{Breaking boundaries: politics and play in the drama of Shakespeare and his contemporaries} (Ashgate, c1998); Robert N. Watson, \textit{The Rest is Silence: Death as Annihilation in the English Renaissance} (U of California P, 1994). For a more detailed reading of the parallels with Virgil’s \textit{Aeneid} in the plot of \textit{Titus}, see Kahn, who notes that Shakespeare is “Weaving an Ovidian tale into a Senecan revenge tragedy, seeding allusions to the \textit{Aeneid} in nearly every scene” (46, also 51-2) and Miola (45, 55).
because that resemblance would ratify their paternity, confirm his own immortality through the
continuation of his image and ideals through his posterity, and justify his belief in the ability of
reproduction to provide political and personal stability. Shakespeare uses the role of familial
inheritance in structuring political conversations about hereditary versus republican systems of
political succession to suggest the reciprocal impact of political structures on kinship. Titus’
exaggerated romanitas makes visible his complete adoption of political ideals, and his support of
primogeniture in the debate between merit- and filial-based succession both stems from and
exaggerates his understanding of romanitas.

Shakespeare, in his portrayal of kinship in Titus Andronicus, is interested in how the
political and domestic collide, and how kinship is affected by the ideologies underlying
romanitas.\textsuperscript{250} Considering the concept of romanitas, so exhaustively analyzed by critics, clarifies
how early modern conceptions of Roman ideals as models to be imitated affected early modern
kinship structures. While ‘romanitas’ itself was not current in early modern England, I follow
recent critics in using the term to describe the range of practices and beliefs ascribed to ‘Romans’
by early moderns.\textsuperscript{251} Warren Chernaik calls that ascription the Elizabethan ‘myth of Rome’;

\textsuperscript{250} Romanitas was not a term in use in ancient Rome, or in early modern England, but invented fairly recently to
describe “the spirit or ideals of ancient Rome” (OED). The OED locates romanitas in the late nineteenth century,
noting however the early Romanism that would have been in use roughly around the time when Shakespeare was
writing, 1603 in the earliest quotation.

\textsuperscript{251} Though the genre of the ‘Roman play’ was first identified by Mungo MacCallum in Shakespeare’s Roman Plays
and Their Background (1910), MacCallum, like many critics who would follow, excluded Titus from his definition of
‘Roman-ness.’ Other critics who excluded Titus include Philips (1940); Charney (1961); Traversi (1963); Simmons
(1973); Cantor (1976); and Platt (1983); Maurice Charney in Shakespeare’s Roman Plays: The Function of Imagery
in the Drama (Harvard: Harvard UP, 1961), develops three criteria for Roman-ness: use of Roman costume, praise
of suicide, source in North’s Plutarch (207). Robert S. Miola is the first to include Titus, seeing the Roman plays,
including Lucrece and Cymbeline, as connected by the ideals of “constancy, honor, and pietas” (17). The debate
over Titus’ status is also carried out in Carolyn Sale, “Black Aeneas: Race, English Literary History, and the
‘Barbarous’ Poetics of Titus Andronicus.” Shakespeare Quarterly … Interestingly enough, the play’s status as a
revenge tragedy is also in doubt on the grounds that the play “does not develop a situation in which duty to
revenge conflicts with a society that deprives the injured one of justice” in Fredson Bowers, Elizabethan Revenge
Tragedy: 1587-1642 (Princeton, NJ, 1940), 110-18. See also Eugene Waith, “The Metamorphosis of Violence in
Titus Andronicus SP, 40 (1943), 145-53 and Clifford Chalmers Huffman, “Titus Andronicus: Metamorphosis and
Robert S. Miola describes the early modern concept of *romanitas* as a “military code of honor that encompasses the virtues of pride, courage, constancy, integrity, discipline, service, and self-sacrifice.” Writing about *Titus*, Miola argues that Titus attempts to “identify personal and civil welfare”; that identification causes the violent collision of competing values as elements of the political and the domestic fail to behave in ways explicable to Titus. Titus’ status as the most Roman of the Romans is established very quickly in the play, and the context of the establishing lines emphasizes Titus’ attempt to be a proper model for imitation, that is, to embody an imitable space. As G.K. Hunter critically noted, *romanitas* was a set of ideals transmitted to the Tudors “in a series of images of virtue held up as models or secular *mirabilia.*” Starting from the realization that Titus’ Roman-ness appeals to a larger cultural tendency to see Roman-ness as ideal and imitable, I argue that Shakespeare creates the model Roman in Titus in order to demonstrate the dangers of systems of imitation while also critiquing Roman ideologies and their reception in early modern England. One of the key virtues comprising *romanitas* was *pietas,* conveyed to England primarily through the figure of Aeneas. Titus’ identification with Aeneas establishes his suitability for imitation; however, further investigation of Titus’ model reveals the violent complications in Titus’ piety.


252 Miola, 45.


254 While I agree with Coppélia Kahn (1997) that Shakespeare engages in a “serious critique of Roman ideology” (47) and with Warren Chernaik (2011) that Shakespeare engages in significant imitation of his Roman sources, especially Livy and Ovid (Chapter 1), I argue that Shakespeare is not passively relying upon received models that he imitates in order to construct his critiques.
Titus’ role as a model of Roman ideals is founded on his identification with Pius Aeneas, an identification that is actually established shortly before his entrance, when his brother, Marcus, interrupts the succession argument between the emperor’s two sons with the news that “Andronicus, surnamèd Pius” (1.1.33) had been chosen as the next emperor. Titus evidently earned his new name in battle, having returned as “Renownèd Titus, flourishing in arms” (1.1.41), but the reference to his surname opens up a range of allusions which emphasize Titus’ role as a model of Roman virtue. The Captain introducing Titus identifies him as

The good Andronicus,
Patron of virtue, Rome’s best champion,
Successful in the battles that he fights,
With honour and with fortune is returned
From where he circumscribed with his sword
And brought to yoke the enemies of Rome. (1.1.67-72)

This introduction establishes Titus as the ideal Roman, the embodiment of martial honor, moral virtue, and well-deserved fame. Paired with this description, the pointed reference to his surname “Pius” identifies him as a character devoted to higher ideals. Shakespeare accesses commonplace understandings of Aeneas as a model of virtue derived from early modern humanist educational practices, which emphasized the imitation of these noble Romans. As

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255 ‘Pius’ was “the honorary epithet bestowed by Vergil on Aeneas, and by Aeneas on his deserving successors. Titus himself, by virtue of his ten-year defense of Rome against the Goths ... proclaims his descent from that heroic ancestry” (Berthoud 27). Also noted in Kahn, 48; Jonathan Bate, Introduction, Titus Andronicus Arden Third Series (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1995), 18; and Heather James, who interprets the play in terms of “a discourse of cultural disintegration” in which “Shakespeare first invokes the Aeneid as the epic of empire-building, order, and pietas, and then allows Ovid’s Metamorphoses to invade, interpreting the fundamental impulses of Vergil’s poem as chaotic, even apocalyptic” (123), in “Cultural Disintegration in Titus Andronicus: Mutilating Titus, Vergil and Rome” (reprint) Themes In Drama (Vol. NA) (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991). However, pietas in the Aeneid is not a straightforwardly positive tool of empire only disrupted by Ovidian interventions. Most critics read Titus as Ovidian; the classic essay is E.M. Waith, “The Metamorphosis of Violence in Titus Andronicus,” ShS 10 (1957), 39-49. See also Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare and Ovid (Oxford, 1993), 100-17.

256 See especially Lynn Enterline’s Shakespeare’s Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2012), especially Chapter 1, in which she argues that humanist scholars engaged in a “widespread institutional effort to teach Latin as a means to uphold—indeed, inculcate—the categories most important to the period’s explicit formulations about a properly functioning social order” (13).
Charles Martindale notes, “To the humanists the Aeneid was a guide to right living, and pious Aeneas a prime exemplary hero … in Jonson’s words, ‘the reading of Homer and Virgil is counseled by Quintilian as the best way of informing youth, and confirming man’ (Discoveries 2240).” The exemplarity of Aeneas, especially in terms of his association with pietas, elucidates Shakespeare’s choice to create his own model of the ideal Roman, Titus, in Aeneas’ image.

Shakespeare’s ideal Roman is designed as a critique of Roman and Elizabethan English values, constructed to highlight the violent exaggerations within the norms of pietas and virtus as received and understood by early moderns. The relationship between Titus’ familial violence and his identification with Aeneas has been misunderstood by critics, who note that Titus does not seem to behave with piety. James, who calls the sacrifice of Alarbus a “dubious act of piety,” though an act of pietas nonetheless, argues that “In Titus’ practices, Roman institutions pervert the virtues they were designed to protect” because “In the name of pietas, Titus commits the act

257 Charles Martindale, “Shakespeare and Virgil,” Shakespeare and the Classics, edited by Charles Martindale and Albert Booth Taylor (Cambridge UP, 2004), 95. Coppélia Kahn notes that “though many in the [play’s] audience must have recognized and appreciated the quotations, allusions, appropriations and parodies of specific Latin authors that might pop up in any play, many more knew little or no Latin and were acquainted with Roman history only in a rudimentary way … through a select group of famed ‘noble Romans’ … allow[ing] Shakespeare wide latitude in refashioning Romanness” (8-9). Nevertheless, looking at what Shakespeare is refashioning seems worthwhile, if only to see what he changed, and what spin he put on the original. In terms of other contexts, Anna Swardh and Lukas Erne argue that ‘Pius’ not only refers to Aeneas, but also to Pope Pius V, who excommunicated Elizabeth, as does John Klaus, who points out that “Like Titus, [Pope] Pius was at his election offered (but, unlike Titus, did not reject) the white pallium (Shakespeare’s ‘palliament’ [1.1.182]), which popes had come to wear in imitation of the Roman emperors” (Swardh 118-19 and 82-3; Erne 148; Klaus 219-40, 234). Anna Swardh, Rape and Religion in English Renaissance Literature: A Topical Study of Four Texts by Shakespeare, Drayton, and Middleton (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Anglistica Upsaliensia 124, 2003); John Klaus, “Politics, Heresy, and Martyrdom in Shakespeare’s Sonnet 124 and Titus Andronicus,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, edited by James Schiffer (London: Garland, 1999). As in Raymond J. Rice, “Cannibalism and the Act of Revenge in Tudor-Stuart Drama.” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 11.2 (2001), 297-316. A reason for this positive view of Shakespeare’s reading of Roman culture could be, as Loomba suggests, that “countries such as England looked towards Rome to establish their own genealogy as imperial nations” (46). However, the commonality of the Brutus myth does not mean that the English necessarily accepted this genealogy uncritically. See Richard Helgerson, “Language Lessons: Linguistic Colonialism, Linguistic Postcolonialism, and the Early Modern English Nation,” Yale Journal of Criticism 11 (1998): 289-99.
unthinkable in the *Aeneid.*” She does, however, note that Aeneas “calls upon the memory of
Pallas to ratify human sacrifice,” without noting the exceptional nature of that scene separating
it from the rest of the poem. Far from ratifying human sacrifice, Aeneas’ final actions are an
exaggerated version of *pietas* that strengthens Titus’ association with him. Shakespeare is using
all of Aeneas’ complicated, contradictory character to describe Titus’ *pietas* and its inherent
destructiveness. Berthoud, Sale, Dickson, James, Kahn, Chernaik and others emphasize that
Titus, the embodiment of Roman virtue, kills not one but two of his children: “Mutius, in the
name of absolute paternal authority … and Lavinia, in the name of female chastity.”
Titus’ indifference to ‘natural’ blood ties is further emphasized when, ignoring Tamora’s impassioned
pleas, Titus orders the sacrifice of her eldest son and heir. Tamora, captured queen of the Goths,
presumably a barbarian and Other to Rome’s civilized virtues of *pietas* and *virtus,* responds to
Titus’ lack of mercy by clearly identifying his major fault: “O cruel irreligious piety!” (1.1.130).
The phrase has been read in terms of its foreshadowing of the downfall of Rome, with many
critics identifying this moment as leading to, even causing, Rome to become a “wilderness of
tigers” (3.1.54). While earlier critical readings identified this moment as the crucial abandonment
of civilized Roman values that cause the downfall of the civilization, more recent critics
complicate Shakespeare’s relationship with Roman cultural capital by noting that this moment is
a critique of both systems, reading both Roman *romanitas* and English appropriations as corrupt

258 James (1997), 80, 52-3.
argues that “it is because Titus regards Lavinia as irretreviably altered, and reduced, by what has been done to her
that he feels compelled to murder her, or ritualistically sacrifice her, in the play’s closing act” (47), in “Black
Aeneas: Race, English Literary History, and the ‘Barbarous’ Poetics of *Titus Andronicus,*” *SQ* 62.1 (Spring, 2011);
Vernon Guy Dickson, who argues that Titus’ tragedy is in his “rote following of [the] precedent” (395) of *pietas,* in
“A pattern, precedent, and lively warrant’: Emulation, Rhetoric, and Cruel Propriety in *Titus Andronicus.*”
*Renaissance Quarterly* 62.2 (Summer, 2009).
claimants to a perverse normativity. However, critics supporting both arguments tend to claim that Titus’ understanding of *pietas* is flawed in some way, and that his claim to embody *pietas* is contradicted by his killing Mutius, demanding the blood sacrifice, or ignoring a mother’s plea.

In a departure from this critical consensus, I examine Shakespeare’s use of Virgil’s *Aeneid* to construct Titus’s understanding of *pietas*, which reveals that Mutius’ murder in the name of *pietas* is not so incongruous as it appears. As St. Hillaire notes (uniquely among

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260 For Jacques Berthoud, Tamora’s passionate maternal plea “makes any identification of Titus’s perspective with Shakespeare’s impossible to sustain. The sacrifice of Alarbus marks the limiting point of the lineage-family because to that family it is the fulfillment of its identity (the link between the dead and the living is preserved) while representing its contradiction (one family’s piety is another’s atrocity)” (Berthoud 33). Andrew Hadfield similarly reads this moment as a failure of *pietas*, stating that “had Titus not insisted on the ancient rites of blood sacrifice, the renewed conflict with the Goths might have been avoided. Hadfield (2004), 136. Coppélia Kahn likewise argues that Titus’ failures derive “from his over-zealous (and in the killing of his son Mutius, self-contradictory) commitment to those forms of *pietas* specifically involving men” (Kahn 51). The quotation continues to list those forms of *pietas*: “dedicating all of his many sons to the service of the state, insisting on the strict observance of blood sacrifice to their spirits despite a mother’s plea for mercy, opting for primogeniture without considering a rival claim, and defending imperial power even to the point of slaying his own son.” In regards to the seemingly contradictory killing of Mutius, Heather James notes that Titus is recalling “Rome’s most uncompromising father, Malius Torquatius: while consul in 340 BC, this exacting Roman executed his own son for disobeying orders not to engage the enemy forces” (234, footnote 19). However, she fails to explain how Shakespeare would have heard about this father’s sacrifice of his son. As Carolyn Sale argues, Shakespeare’s presentation of barbarous Romans and vengeful Goths seems to criticize Roman imperial dogma as a “dehumanizing code” (45). Vernon Guy Dickson similarly argues that *Titus* “criticizes Roman exemplarity” in a move that, “given Elizabethan England’s own social constructions in terms of Roman precedence,” has “astonishing implications for the period” (379). For more on early modern understandings of Roman precedent, see Margaret Tudeau-Clayton, *Jonson, Shakespeare and Early Modern Virgil* (Cambridge UP, 1998), which has a section on “schoolboy’s Virgil” that would be very interesting in the context of *Hamlet*. By portraying Tamora’s violence as “a response to Roman barbarity and the violence of the Roman response as excessive,” the play “pushes back against unquestioning veneration of ancient Rome or its culture so that audience members might reject, once and for all, Roman constructions of their [British] ancestors as ‘barbarous’” (Sale 43). Grace Starry West makes a similar argument, stating “The juxtaposition of delicately allusive speech and villainous action in a play about Rome at the twilight of its greatness suggests that Shakespeare is exploring the relationship between Roman education—the source of all the bookish allusions—and the disintegration of the magnificent city which produced that education. … Roman education, which seems to stand for Roman tradition in general, has been twisted to become the teacher and rationalizer of heinous deeds,” in her “Going by the Book: Classical Allusions in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*.” *Philology* 79.1 (Winter, 1982), 65. In her reading, *Titus* is “essentially postcolonial” (Sale 46). Sale is challenging Liebler’s reading that the play makes the audience “‘see’ the consequences of abandoning cultural definitions,’ by which she means *romanitas*, that which makes Rome, Rome, and (in her argument) England, England” (Sale, footnote 72). Sean Keilen similarly argues that *Titus* “cast[s] England and English writing as the fortunate victims of a Roman conquest” in *Vulgar Eloquence: On the Renaissance Invention of English Literature* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006), 93.

261 Scholarly examinations of Shakespeare’s use of classical sources tend to address Ovid and Seneca, mostly regarding “allusions to other Roman authorities, such as Vergil and Horace, and local embroidery on the wholecloth of Ovid” (James, 1997 42). James argues that Ovid’s stature as Shakespeare’s primary source is “at a direct cost to Vergil as a source of cultural decorum” (42). However, she also reads Shakespeare’s use of Virgil as a relatively simple attempt to install cultural authority “through the ritual events and ceremonious speeches of the

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literary critics), the problem is not that “Titus’s behavior is inconsistent with Rome’s historical practices but rather that Titus’s sacrifice is entirely consistent with a similarly appalling scene in a Roman text.” That is, the *pietas* displayed by Titus is consistent with the *pietas* displayed by Aeneas, in that both versions of *pietas* portray ideal and excessive moments that reveal the violent currents beneath English and Roman norms.

In the very first scene of the play, Titus’s portrayal of *pietas* seems counter to traditional humanist and critical understandings of the virtue. During Lavinia’s first rape, when Bassianus absconds with his covert bride, Mutius, one of Titus’ many sons, bars his father’s way. When Titus is faced with his sons’ disobedience, he responds by denying the familial bond in an act of non-recognition: “Nor thou nor he are any sons of mine. / My sons would never so dishonor me” (1.1.290-1). That is, these could not be his sons, because his sons would never disobey him.

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262 St. Hillaire, 314. She is countering Jonathan Bate, *Titus*, 135 n. 127.

263 For various reasons, critics argue that Titus shows little evidence of *pietas*. Dickson argues that Titus misunderstands *pietas*, and his “(in)ability to judge, understand, and apply proper precedents” is part of the play’s message (380). However, Dickson also argues that the “allusion to Virgil’s ‘pius Aeneus’ links Titus to Rome’s lauded founder, while Titus’s reference to his own children as half of King Priam’s recalls Priam’s sacrifices for Troy and links Titus to one of the greatest tragic figures of Rome. In each case, Titus is compared positively to these popular ancient models of leadership, action, sacrifice, service, and goodness, thus increasing his own social place and identity within Rome” (393).
Moreover, Titus strengthens his non-recognition claim when denying Mutius a place in the family tomb:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Traitors, away, he rests not in this tomb.} \\
\text{This monument five hundred years hath stood,} \\
\text{Which I have sumptuously re-edified.} \\
\text{Here none but soldiers and Rome's servitors} \\
\text{Repose in fame, none basely slain in brawls.} \\
\text{Bury him where you can; he comes not here.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(1.1.346-51)

This speech encapsulates the play’s focus on familial resemblance as a political issue. Titus does not recognize Mutius as his son because Mutius does not fit the very specific criteria associated with the right to be buried in the family tomb. This is an exclusive monument, dedicated only to ‘soldiers and Rome’s servitors.’ Mutius, classified as ‘basely slain in brawls,’ need not apply. As Coppélia Kahn, in her *Roman Shakespeare* (1997), notes, “The two filicides [Alarbus and Mutius] are paralleled: both sons are sacrificed in the names of the fathers, according to a piety that seems not only cruel and irreligious but also a perversion of *virtus*.”

However, because Titus enters the play as the victorious Roman general, and is consistently associated with the martial values of honor and service, Titus’ speech contains the assumption that he belongs to this kin group of soldiers and servitors, faithful citizens who put the city before themselves and their families. Titus enters the play having won fame as a soldier of Rome, and his martial- and honor-based criteria for disinheriting (and perhaps dis-intering) Mutius suggest that his problem is that Mutius does not resemble his father’s martial prowess or familial honor. Having died in what Titus calls a ‘brawl,’ Mutius has failed to imitate the family’s ‘honorable’ tradition of dying in military combat for the protection of the city and the family name. Titus is the family’s representative of those martial- and honor-based virtues; Mutius’ failure of imitation is an indictment of his father’s ability to inculcate his children with the family’s values, and Titus’

only available response is to deny that Mutius was ever his son, lest his own culpability in
Mutius’ actions receive too much attention. Because Titus is consistently associated with pietas,
his deadly reaction to Mutius’ failure of resemblance encapsulates the play’s critique of both
aspects of romanitas: virtus and pietas. The apparent contradiction of this scene, Titus’ tendency
toward sacrificing sons in the name of a virtue that should logically support the preservation of
his sons, is actually the key to understanding Shakespeare’s purpose in identifying Titus with
Aeneas.

In the act of not just killing Mutius, but denying their kinship, Titus establishes an
understanding of pietas in which the claims of duty transume the claims of emotion. Titus
exaggerates the necessity of putting duty before emotions in ways that intensify his identification
with Pius Aeneas. While pietas is the structuring virtue of the Aeneid, Aeneas’ embodiment of
that virtue seems to disintegrate in the second half. Aeneas is not uncritically praised, and his
actions toward the end of Book 10 emphasize not his devotion to duty but his savagery in
revenge. Upon hearing of the death of Pallas, Aeneas captures “four sons of Sulmo, / fighters all,
and the same number reared by Ufens: / Aeneas takes them alive to offer Pallas’ shade / and soak
his flaming pyre with captive blood” (10: 613-16). Nicholas R. Moschovakis claims that “It is
in part because of his insistence on such rites that Titus has earned Aeneas’s own epithet, ‘Pius’
(1.1.23).” This understanding of Virgil’s portrayal of pietas reads the devotion as well as the
vengeance as aspects of the virtue; for instance, St. Hillaire reads Titus’ sacrifice of Alarbus as
“not a falling away from or perversion of Vergilian piety but the fulfillment of it.” However, I
want to modify St. Hillaire’s claim slightly to note that this moment is an exception in Aeneas’

266 Nicholas R. Moschovakis, “‘Irreligious Piety’ and Christian History: Persecution as Pagan Anachronism in Titus
267 St. Hillaire, 314.
usual behavior. Far from “depict[ing] human sacrifice as an element in the cult of Rome’s heroic founders,” Virgil portrays Aeneas’ perversion of ideal pietas. By rendering Aeneas’ pietas violent and vengeful, Virgil creates a vision of pietas in decline, and Shakespeare’s sensitive reading recognizes that this is not the ideal pietas of most of the poem, but pietas at its most extreme and most perverse. Identifying Pius Titus with Pius Aeneas is a deliberate appropriation of exactly the extreme, grotesque reading of pietas at the heart of Books 10 and 11 of the Aeneid. Titus’ role as model of Roman virtues emphasizes the cyclical nature of the imitative ideal – as son becomes father, imitator becomes imitated – but his role as imitator of Aeneas’ exaggerated pietas implicates the structure of imitation in the play’s critique of received values. Powell’s important new reading of the Aeneid argues that Aeneas acts in the name of pietas when avenging Pallas, which, he notes, highlights the “fact that filial loyalty in [them] conflicted spectacularly with the claims of filial virtue in other Romans.” When Aeneas is faced with a severe blow to his own pietas, he responds by “mocking the pietas of others.” Applying Powell’s insight to my reading of Titus, I argue that while Titus does imitate Aeneas’ version of

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268 Moschovakis, 464. Martindale similarly misreads Aeneas’ murder spree as a “precedent” (96) and not the exception it is. Danielle A. St. Hilaire also reads the sacrifice as “the fulfillment of [pietas], insofar as the sacrifice takes for its authority Aeneid 12” (314), in “Allusion and Sacrifice in Titus Andronicus,” SEL 49.2 (Spring 2009), 311-331. I argue that the violent version is in continuity with the ‘normal’ version, but that the pietas on display in books 11 and 12 is the exaggerated, violent extreme of pietas, which Virgil critiques. This is clearly pietas in crisis. James does note Ronald Broude’s article on Elizabethan perceptions of Romans as pagans who believed “that the spirits of the violently slain need to be appeased with the blood of their slayers lest they return to haunt their relatives who had been remiss in performing their duties (30)” (James 235, endnote 20). However, Broude also locates the source of that knowledge in the Aeneid, again assuming that Aeneas’ acts of atrocity are simply aspects of pietas, and not exaggerated versions of the ideal.

269 Anton Powell, Virgil the Partisan: a Study in the Re-Integration of Classics (Swansea, Wales: Classical Press, 2008), 67. The critical consensus has been to ignore most aspects of Octavian’s reputation among his contemporaries; winner of the 2011 McKay Prize for Vergilian Studies, Powell’s text makes the compelling argument that the triumviral period is as important to Virgil’s poems as the Augustan Rome toward which they look.

270 Powell, 66.
pietas, it is the extreme, perverse pietas that turns on itself with savage mockery and brutal violence.

Tamora questions her sons’ sacrifice, attributing to their actions in war the same pietas for which they are murdered:

But must my sons be slaughtered in the streets
For valiant doings in their country’s cause?
O, if to fight for king and commonweal
Were piety in thine, it is in these.
Andronicus, stain not thy tomb with this blood. (1.1.115–19).

Dickson argues that “Titus, in this formulation, should live up to his emulation of Roman virtues and show mercy and honor to the warrior Alarbus.” However, I would argue that in the context of Book 10, pietas is associated with just this kind of pitiless revenge. Titus’ response to Tamora’s plea would seem to argue that Roman familial values are more important than the familial values of foreigners and enemies of the state, reaffirming his dedication to the city rather than to attempting to establish his own hereditary monarchy. Titus’ insistence on the sacrifice of Tamora’s son in exchange for his own makes him a closer model to Aeneas. However, Shakespeare by no means intends the comparison to reflect favorably on Titus, or, for that matter, on Aeneas. Shakespeare rather uses Virgil’s portrait of Aeneas to portray an exaggeration

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271 Dickson, 397.

272 Dickson, 398. Heather James argues that “when Shakespeare selects multiple authorities and highlights the differences among them, he repudiates the kind of imitation that honors its model and hopes to transport some essential value from the original. His Aeneas is not only Vergil’s duty-bound hero, but also Cymbeline’s ‘false Aeneas’ and Titus Andronicus’ ‘wandering prince,’ who is hardly to be distinguished from Spenser’s Paridell” (31). While Titus could be modeling several different versions of Aeneas, I am concentrating on Shakespeare’s appropriation of these specific moments in Virgil. One of the few critics not to conflate Titus’ sacrifice with normative pietas, Jonathan Bate notes in his Arden edition that “Rome prided itself on not allowing human sacrifice; this is a first sign that the city is becoming barbaric in its practices” (Bate 135, footnote 127). See also West, who claims that “Lucius’ gloating insistence on human sacrifice ad manes fratrum” is “tied to Roman tradition” (75).
of pietas caused by vengeance, a morbid pietas that leads to increasing levels of violence, and ultimately to the destruction of the very values that lead these men to seek revenge.273

Shakespeare uses Aeneas as a model for Titus, and it is crucial that he uses all of Aeneas, following Virgil’s attempts to reconcile the contradictory pious and impious actions of his founding hero.274 However, Shakespeare uses that attempt at reconciliation to suggest that the contradictions are inherent to pietas itself.275 That is, Shakespeare repeatedly portrays a character insistently associated with pietas performing impious acts in the name of piety. ‘Pius’ Titus sacrifices his enemy’s eldest son to balance the martial deaths of his own sons; murders one of his own sons for disobeying him; and murders his daughter because she has been raped and mutilated. Lavinia’s murder has been amply discussed by critics.276 What I want to emphasize is that these killings have in common a perversion or exaggeration of pietas: Tamora’s son is killed to put his own sons’ souls to rest in a scene that strikingly recalls Aeneas’ revenge for Pallas’ death in Book 10 of the Aeneid; Mutius is killed because he failed to uphold the pious value of filial obedience; and Lavinia is killed to restore the family’s honor in fine Roman tradition.

Titus’ tendency toward impious sacrifices in the name of pietas may not have been common

273 Powell describes Virgil’s portrait of Octavian-as-Aeneas, 49-51.
274 Cora Fox notes that Renaissance readers would have come to the poem with knowledge of its Augustan context, able to understand the “critique of abuses of power to which the poem obsessively returns” (12), in Ovid and the Politics of Emotion in Elizabethan England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
275 St. Hillaire notes that the “sacrifice of Alarbus is thus not a break from Roman tradition but rather is rooted deeply in that tradition, in Rome’s foundational text” (315). However, my argument is slightly different from St. Hillaire’s in that I identify the continuities in the underlying ideologies that create both ideal and violent versions of pietas, rather than taking Aeneas’ violence as simply the norm itself.
practice in Rome, but Virgil attributes the practice to the founder of Rome. The association of his sacrificial pietas with revenge strips some of the ritualistic logic from the play’s opening scene, turning a society-mending funeral into a destructive sacrifice.

Titus’ return to Rome is triumphant; his murdered sons are another visible sign of his virtue carried onto the stage for a very pointedly public funeral. Titus’ support of romanitas is not just established, but exaggerated from his first appearance. Newly returned from the wars that have been threatening Rome for at least forty years, bearing home 21 of his 25 sons to be buried in the family tomb, bearing the scars of his service to Rome that, unlike Coriolanus’ wounds, do not seem to need to speak for him, Titus establishes pietas as a value that underpins political maneuvers:

Stand gracious to the rights that we intend.
Romans, of five—and—twenty valiant sons,
Half of the number that King Priam had.
Behold the poor remains, alive and dead:
These that survive, let Rome reward with love;
These that I bring unto their latest home,
With burial amongst their ancestors.

... Titus, unkind and careless of thine own,
Why suffer’st thou thy sons unburied yet
To hover on the dreadful shore of Styx?
Make way to lay them by their brethren.
There greet in silence, as the dead are wont,
And sleep in peace, slain in your country’s wars.
O sacred receptacle of my joys,

277 Discussed above, see also M. Owen Lee, Fathers and Sons in Virgil’s Aeneid: Tum Genitor Natum (New York: SUNY Press, 1979), 85 15, 85, 185.

278 The relative triumph of this entrance is debated among critics. Heather James argues that Titus’ appearance and opening speech “seems to restore his city’s equilibrium with the breath of authority and order ... transform[ing] the political scene from chaos to stately triumph. Indirectly, he has the effect of Vergil’s Neptune as he calms the sea-storm in Aeneid 1” (48-9). However, Gary Kuchar argues (60-7) that the combination of triumphal procession and funeral march represents the first of the many indecorums of the play, noting that Titus “enters as both victorious general and grief-stricken father” (61) in only the first instance of a confusion of personal and political in the play, in “Decorum and the Politics of Ceremony in Titus Andronicus,” in Shakespeare and Religion: Early Modern and Postmodern Perspectives, edited by Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011).
Sweet cell of virtue and nobility,
How many sons hast thou of mine in store
That thou wilt never render to me more! 

This speech encapsulates Shakespeare’s thinking about how familial relationships, and inheritance systems, structure political conversations about the transmission of rule. In setting out the terms of his procession-cum-funeral, Titus attempts to establish himself as the ideal Roman in a political setting by highlighting the magnitude of his personal sacrifice to Rome’s wars. The sacrifice of his sons is a sacrifice of parts of himself, and of potential guarantors of his own immortality. With so few sons remaining, the succession of his house is imperiled. As St. Hillaire argues, “the loss of twenty-one sons is immense, and suggests the vulnerability of Titus’s Rome at the play’s outset.”

To further mark himself as avatar of virtus and pietas, Titus also aligns himself with the Trojan king and patriarch Priam, perhaps best known for retrieving Hector’s mistreated body through an appeal to pietas. However, the allusion to Priam must also invoke stories that he witnessed the murder of another of his sons before the family altar, before being murdered himself in a particularly graphic scene in the Aeneid featuring the failure of an appeal to pietas.

In spite of its ambivalent associations, the reference to Priam could represent a conflation of obedience to father and to state: Priam is specifically the Trojan king and patriarch, as famous for his fatherhood as for his kingliness. Titus embraces this conflation in his assumption that

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279 St. Hillaire, 312.
280 Hopkins, 18-19, notes that Titus “is aligned with the defeated Trojan king Priam, except that he is, it seems, only half the man that Priam was,” at least in number of sons. Hopkins goes on to state that “This seems quite suggestive of a diminution and a falling-off of the Trojan heritage of which Rome was so proud,” though it is interesting that she places the attribution in the passive, not noting that Titus compares himself to Priam. James, conversely, argues that the allusion to Priam suggests that Titus “begets sons according to epic precedent and sacrifices them to the state” (50).

281 Lee, 38-40. Lee notes that Achilles’ son Pyrrhus kills Priam in an ironic moment: “The difference between the father who once treated Priam with an unexpected tenderness and the son who now fastens brutally on the same Priam is altogether striking” (39).
authority resides in the father; in requiring his children’s obedience, he draws on the received idea that his own authority is natural by using paternalistic terms. But also like Priam, Titus survives his children; that survival further cements his association with the broader version of pietas as exemplified by a patriarch from a different tradition: the paternal and the violent Aeneas. Aeneas abandons his efforts to fight the Greeks, his beloved wife, his new love Dido, and several men he thinks of as sons in order to establish Rome. Every sacrifice was for the future of his lineage. The point of sacrificing self and certain family members to duty is to preserve the family line as a whole. As Robert Miola notes, Rome’s inhabitants “often live and die according to [the city’s] dictates for the approval of its future generations.” In spite of its profound lack of pity, pietas is essentially a preservative virtue; pietas ascribes the responsibility to preserve sons’ heritages to the men who adhere to the ideal form of the virtue. Titus, however, sacrifices the future of his lineage to preserve its past.

When he first appears on stage, Titus takes a moment in his triumphal speech to reprimand himself for not immediately burying his sons, calling himself “Titus unkind” (1.1.86), that is, devoid of natural feeling or undutiful. The term ‘unkind’ also indicates a breakage of family ties – as Hamlet sarcastically notes, the terms ‘kin’ and ‘kind’ should be, but are not always, closely related. Titus seems to be calling himself back from service to the city to a broken or unfulfilled loyalty to kin. The exaggerated pietas portrayed by Titus and by Aeneas in Book 10 involves a fixation on the proper burial of family members, and the most impia actions in the Aeneid make some aspect of that burial impossible. When Aeneas is on his quest for vengeance, and actively mocking the pietas of others, he tells one of his victims, “Now lie there,

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282 Lee, 32, notes that Virgil calls the men Aeneidae.
283 Miola, 17.
284 Lee, 52.
you great horrific sight! / No loving mother will bury you in the ground / or weight your body
down with your fathers’ tomb. / You’ll be abandoned now to carrion birds or plunged / in the
deep sea and swept away by the waves and / ravening fish will dart and lick your wounds!”
(10:660-5). 285 Killing one brother, he says to the other who pleads for his life, “die! No brother
deserts a brother here!” (10:708). All of his victims in this section are not random, but
“unfortunates who appeal to him in the name of pietas.”286 His revenge takes the form of
denying proper burial, preventing that particular expression of pietas. However, Aeneas is
recalled to himself upon witnessing the sacrifice of a son for his father: “this picture of love for a
father pierced his heart,” causing him to once again respect another family’s pietas, stating “I
give you back to your fathers’ ash and shades” (10:74, 79). Aeneas’ momentary exaggeration of
pietas into murder and vengeance is portrayed as an aberration brought on by grief, even
madness. Titus begins the play in a similar state of grief, having lost most of his sons; however,
as a virtue in Titus, pietas is exaggerated in every character. Lucius responds to his father’s grief
by calling for Alarbus’ sacrifice. Tamora pleads with Titus to respect her own family’s pietas;
when he does not, when he murders her eldest son in a ritual of “cruel, irreligious piety”
(1.1.133), she determines to “raze their faction and their family” (1.1.455). Titus recognizes his
own unstable relationship to his family, and especially to his family tomb, but in a passing aside
(“Titus unkind”) that seems incapable of affecting his responses to Mutius’ disobedience, or
Tamora’s plea. That relationship to family is consistently set aside, while the relationship to the
family tomb is pushed to the forefront.

Many feminist critics have noted Titus’ apparent obsession with his family tomb, and by
extension proper familial burial, which dominates the stage, physically and symbolically, during

285 Irresistibly recalls Tamora’s fate, which is discussed below.
286 Lee, 85.
his first scene. Coppélia Kahn describes Titus’ obsession as an “exaggerated investment in the patriarchal order … The tomb thus represents not simply the continuity of the family so much as the subordination of the family to the military needs of the state – the original and hallowed medium of virtus.” Kahn reads Titus’ devotion to virtus as merely part of his extreme romanitas, but it is worth teasing out the subtleties of this scene. Titus does indeed value virtus over ideal pietas, and in doing so misunderstands one vital aspect of Virgil’s pietas: in the Aeneid, pietas is consistently treated as more important than virtus, or martial valor. However, Titus focuses on his martial duty to Rome above all else. The claims of the city transume the claims of the family, as Titus overemphasizes the necessity of putting duty before emotions. Titus does not just put the cause first; he actively sacrifices most of his sons.

Shakespeare repeatedly reminds the audience of Titus’ emotional losses, juxtaposing them against his intensified devotion to duty. Shakespeare focuses on the family’s faltering future generations in Titus’ first scene, establishing the very emotional cost of Rome’s wars – Titus’ “five-and-twenty valiant sons” (1.1.82) – and making their “poor remains, alive and dead” (1.1.84) the central issue of his hero’s return. Titus refers to “thine own” and “thy sons” (1.1.89, 90), his “joys” (1.1.95), and his “sons” (1.1.97) again, returning continually to his family’s sacrifices for (or to) the war effort. The effect of repeated emotional appeals cast as appeals to duty serves to emphasize Titus’ focus on city above family. What should be an emotional issue, the loss of his sons, is redirected toward his duty to Rome.

While the loss of his sons is redirected toward his devotion to duty, the emotional core to the scene, for Titus, is his family’s past. Titus refers to “their ancestors” (84), “their brethren”

287 Kahn, 52.
288 Powell, 32-33.
289 A ‘joy’ or ‘my joy’ (noun) is a term most often used to describe children, especially inheriting children, as discussed in Chapter 1 (pgs ...)
(1.1.92), “the dead” (1.1.93), and the other sons “in store” (1.1.97), that is, in the family tomb, establishing a link to the family’s past generations. The grave becomes a site of values, a concrete ‘cell of virtue and nobility’ that materializes his family’s reputation and makes enduringly visible the worth of his lineage. The tomb is also capable of housing Titus’ emotional response to the loss of his sons. It is only the buried sons Titus refers to as his ‘joys,’ restricting emotion to the dead and duty to the living. In Titus’ view, the family as an institution is focused on maintaining ties to the valorized past through the effective burial of the dead. As Paul Kottman proposes, each family member is entombed so that the connection to both past and future generations is made visible and concrete.\textsuperscript{290} The “continuity of their [family] history”\textsuperscript{291} creates and ratifies Titus’ authority with each funeral.

However, the opening scene reveals that because the burial ritual is susceptible to ‘indecorum’ and interruption, its power is fragile; it sometimes fails to bind, and can become incapable of knitting the scattered corn of Rome into “one mutual sheaf” (5.3.69-70). Titus’ murder of his son Mutius and denial of his place in the family tomb reveals an inherent instability in this symbol of familial unity and continuity. If sons can be denied a place in the family tomb,\textsuperscript{292} the family itself is revealed as a contingent and potentially brittle institution. The family is denaturalized, though paternal authority over the constitution of the family is thereby enhanced.

Titus’ obsession with the tomb materializes his excessive, morbid \textit{pietas}. What should be Titus’ emotional losses are actually registered numerically – we never learn the names of the

\textsuperscript{290} Kottman, 60.
\textsuperscript{291} Berthoud, 23.
\textsuperscript{292} Bannon, 27.
twenty-one (1.1.195) or twenty-two (3.1.10) sons²⁹³ out of twenty-five lost to the wars, and Titus seems more emotionally affected by Mutius disobeying him (1.1.380-3) than by his own filicide and the deaths of nearly two dozen other sons.²⁹⁴ And Titus confirms, “For two-and-twenty sons I never wept, / Because they died in honour’s lofty bed” (2.3.10-11). After Titus refuses to bury Mutius in the family tomb, Marcus recalls Tamora’s accusation of “irreligious piety,” stating “My lord, this is impiety in you” (1.1.352), noting again the incompatibility of the institution of pietas as practiced by Titus and the ‘natural’ kinship bond. Mutius goes on to make the case overtly that blood ties are natural, and should therefore supersede the ideals that comprise romanitas, especially pietas: “Brother, for in that name doth nature plead—”, and Quintus continues, “Father, and in that name doth nature speak—” (1.1.367-8). Both republican and imperial Romans in this play, and people in early modern England, “distinguished those who

²⁹³ It has been suggested that the discrepancies in Titus’ count come out of collaborative work between Shakespeare and Peele. However, critical opinion is divided on whether the play is actually collaborative. Brian Boyd’s ‘Common Words in Titus Andronicus: The Presence of Peele’, N&Q, cccxx (1995), 300-7, initially made the argument at 301. A case for Peele’s involvement in Titus Andronicus is also made by MacD. P. Jackson, ‘Stage Directions and Speech Headings in Act 1 of Titus Andronicus Q (1594): Shakespeare or Peele?’, Studies in Bibliography, xlix (1996), 134-48, and the Boyd article was published in a collection dedicated to MacDonald (Words That Count, 2004) who himself supported and furthered the theory (“Shakespeare’s brothers and Peele’s brethren: Titus Andronicus again.” Notes and Queries, December 01, 1997). However, while the theory that Peele co-wrote Titus appears to have been popular for a few years (Jonathan Bate in his intro to the play, for instance), the idea was somewhat debunked in 1998 by Thomas Merriam (“Influence Alone?”, Notes and Queries) who claimed the research was flawed (supported by research from Andrew Morton, in Metz, “Disputed Shakespearean texts and stylometric analysis”, TEXT: Transactions of the Society for Textual Scholarship, ii (1985), 149-71. On the whole, criticism has moved away from the idea that Peele was a collaborator in Titus, though the idea was revisited briefly around 2002-4 with Brian Vickers’ Shakespeare, Co-Author: A Historical Study of Five Collaborative Plays (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 2002), and the collection dedicated to MacDonald. While subsequent citations of Vickers’ work have been split between negative and positive reactions, Vickers’ research is reliable, and seems to indicate a collaborative effort. However, while the play might indeed have been written collaboratively, that wouldn’t impact audience perception of Titus’ character. While Titus’ characterization may have been the result of a mistake, he nevertheless refers to varying numbers of lost children rather than their names, overall giving an impression of a ‘by the numbers’ relationship with his sons.

²⁹⁴ Titus states that he had “five-and-twenty valiant sons, / Half the number that King Priam had” (1.1.79-80); alternatively, changing the count of dead sons from 21 to 22 could indicate his reacceptance of Mutius, earlier repudiated and murdered for his disobedience. If Titus is using the altered count to indicate his forgiveness of his son, then the mistake is no mistake at all, and actually a means of apologizing without ever acknowledging his own mistake aloud.
were related by blood and ascribed to them a deep sense of identity,” and idealized blood kinship and “its power to generate affection and duty.”\footnote{Bannon, 62, 5.} The ideal of pietas was often cast against duty to the state in other Roman authors critical of Augustus’s disregard of familial relationships.\footnote{Powell, Chapter 2: “The theft of pietas,” especially 64-75.} Shakespeare uses Virgil’s portrayal of Aeneas’ vengeful pietas to criticize early modern arguments about the role of kinship in the state. The necessity of violence to buttress political action casts pietas, and a particularly early modern model of kinship, as endangered by a predatory political system in spite of its adoption of kinship metaphors to describe political actions and actors.

Titus’s adoption of kinship metaphors to justify his selection of Saturninus reveals some of the problems that come of using a familial metaphor to construct a political ideal:

\begin{quote}
Tribune, I thank you, and this suit I make:  
That you create our emperor’s eldest son  
Lord Saturnine, whose virtues will, I hope,  
Reflect on Rome as Titan’s rays on earth,  
And ripen justice in this commonweal.  
\end{quote}

(1.1.224-7)

Implicit in the speech is an assumption that Saturninus represents the ideal candidate to prove the validity of primogeniture as a system of inheritance, and therefore monarchy as a system of government. Saturninus is the last emperor’s eldest son, and, conveniently, also endowed with virtues capable of restoring justice to Rome. While Titus’ core assumption (that Saturninus is virtuous) is quickly proven disastrously wrong, the strain in the lines already reveals the incompatibility of the two systems, electoral and hereditary, that Titus is attempting to combine. Titus asks the tribune to create Lord Saturnine even though he is the emperor’s eldest son. The metaphor insists on the tension: Titus describes virtues reflecting on Rome as if the light originated elsewhere as Titan’s rays, but the light of the sun is not reflected but originates in the
sun. Saturninus’ virtue becomes original and reflected in this odd figure. However, the ‘gloomy’ connotations of ‘Saturnine’ further undercut Saturninus’ ability to reflect his father’s virtue. The succession crisis prompted creative attempts to meld hereditary and electoral systems echoed in Titus’ attempted resolution of the play’s crisis. Titus appears to be modeling the ideal of hereditary succession, the successful attainment of the throne of a legitimate eldest son who is also the most virtuous and best candidate for rule. However, the slippages in the metaphor reveal the problematic potentialities inherent to the hereditary ideal.

Arguing for primogeniture, Saturninus attempts to naturalize the transmission of both power and merit, claiming that he is best suited to rule Rome because he is closest to the late Emperor. That is, Saturninus posits a correlation between kinship and continuity common to arguments of the period supporting primogeniture, asserting his suitability to rule based on the ideal that the resemblance of son to father will create a stable transfer of power. While Bassianus appears to argue for the opposite, that the election should be decided by merit alone, the terms of his argument replicate the ideals to which Saturninus also appeals, and create a remarkable similarity between their positions. Saturninus’ argument is initially ineffective, and the Tribunes and Senators adhere to Bassianus’ electoral ideal without actually selecting Bassianus.

297 William Cecil, for instance, proposed multiple times legislation that would create an elected hereditary monarchy (in 1563 with a clause on a bill for succession that would have established ‘a council of estate’ to rule England temporarily and select a new heir, and 1584/5 with the ‘Bill for the Queen’s Safety,’ which would have set up a ‘great council’ in the event of her death to rule England without the threat of a foreign or Catholic monarch). See The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson, edited by John F. McDiarmid (Ashgate, 2007), especially Ethan Shagan’s “The Two Republics,” for an account of local versus centralized government and the effect of that opposition on republican ideas; Dale Hoak’s “Sir William Cecil, Sir Thomas Smith,” for an account of his career and influences; John McDiarmid’s “Common Consent,” for the combination of humanist and neo-Roman ideals in quasi-republican thought; Stephen Alford’s “The Political Creed of William Cecil,” for a thorough account of his years at Grey’s Inn; and Scott Lucas’ “Let none such office take,’” for his argument that A Mirror for Magistrates is actually a quasi-republican document in its insistence on the personal responsibility of citizens to curb the monarch’s behavior.

298 Dickson notes that “through Titus each brother’s claim is, in a certain way, simultaneously achieved. While Titus has the election of the people and embodies the Roman virtue Bassianus called for, he chooses Saturninus as emperor, supporting primogeniture” (394).
However, Titus’ attempt to justify using election to choose heritable succession (that is, he elects the emperor’s heir) reveals the same problematic fissures in the metaphors and allusions used to construct either system of power. The Roman-ness of Titus’ dedication to primogeniture draws on multi-valenced allusions that can be applied equally to egalitarian or hierarchical arguments, and that promiscuity of connotation reveals the continuity of ideals underlying each system of inheritance. In the context of the succession crisis, the play’s interrogation of those systems reveals a worrying lack of viable options for the stable transfer of a continuous power.

Shakespeare intensifies and complicates the monarchical/electoral struggle in a parallel argument between parallel brothers. Tamora’s surviving sons, Demetrius and Chiron, perversely reprise the argument for primogeniture, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages allocated by birth order in a low sexual parody of the high political bickering that opens the play. In their argument over who should seduce Lavinia, Demetrius argues that as firstborn he has priority: “Chiron, thy years want wit, thy wits want edge / And manners to intrude where I am graced / And may, for aught thou knowest, affected be” (1.1.525-7). Demetrius is oldest, and therefore, his argument suggests, is also wittiest and worthiest. Chiron puts forth the common argument of the younger brother: “Demetrius, thou dost overween in all, / And so in this, to bear me down with braves. / ‘Tis not the difference of a year or two / Makes me less gracious, or thee more fortunate: / I am as able and as fit as thou / To serve, and to deserve my mistress’ grace” (1.1.528-33). This set of brothers adds another layer of complexity to the use of the term ‘grace’ in the play. Demetrius accesses class-based connotations of ‘grace,’ while Chiron equates ‘grace’ and ‘fortune,’ claiming that both are independent of years or priority. The argument between Tamora’s barbarian cubs replicates in perverse form the argument between Saturninus and Bassianus, parodying any lingering mystique surrounding both primogeniture and election.
Parodying the debate between hereditary and electoral systems exposes both as the product of corrupt ideologies, casting a different light on the third iteration of this argument at the end of the play. Titus’ eldest son and heir, Lucius, is named the elected Emperor of the city he would need to restore. However, if Lucius is meant to be the play’s hero, then Shakespeare’s condemnation of both systems is only intensified. The same Lucius that demands the barbarous sacrifice of Alarbus restores justice and peace to Rome, an almost ludicrous solution to the play’s dilemma. The play ends by returning to the *Aeneid*:

> as erst our ancestor,
> When with his solemn tongue he did discourse
> To love-sick Dido’s sad-attending ear
> The story of that baleful burning night,

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299 Whether Lucius’ accession to the throne represents a positive ending to the play, enabling a restoration or re-founding of a dismembered Rome, is hotly debated among critics. Frances Yates hopes that Lucius’ return at the end of the play is an “apotheosis” which “perhaps represents the Return of the Virgin – the return of the just empire and the golden age,” arguing that “the good empire returns with Lucius. He is the just man who in the end assumes the purple, and his reign will ‘heal Rome’s harms, and wipe away her woe’” (75), in Frances A. Yates, *Astrea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (Routledge, 1975, reprint 1999). Clifford Huffman argues that Lucius is a figure of renewal; “the justice he brings will restore personal purity to Lavinia and political purity to the city” (733). His “evocation of ‘love’ paves the way for his returns and future happy rule” (735). Grace West argues that Lucius, in Marcus’ speech at the end of the play, is the play’s model of “our ancestor” Aeneas, “specifically the Vergilian Aeneas who tells Dido the tale of Troy’s destruction” (75). Lucius also models Aeneas in that his succession marks him as indicated in another Virgilian allusion to triumvirate politics: “Julius Caesar, like Anchises, had made a somewhat erratic start, flawed both in calculation and in morality. In each case it was the son who would transcend the father’s virtues and would found (or re-found) gloriously and to last” (Powell 76). For the Goths and Marcus in this scene, Lucius is certainly cast as a great re-founder of Rome’s glory. However, as Vernon Guy Dickson notes, “Lucius’s final acts of judgment reify the accepted cultural stereotypes of the play, especially in the pitiless treatment of Aaron and Tamora ... [and his] judgments programmatically replicate Roman tradition, following Titus’s example at the play’s beginning” (Dickson 404). Nicholas R. Moschovakis notes that while some critics align Lucius with the English Protestant point of view, assuming that his name is an allusion to the apocryphal King Lucius of Britain, “whom contemporary Protestant sources credited with the importation of Christianity and the establishment of an apostolic church” (466). Bate makes a similar point in his introduction, stating that the “Goths who accompany Lucius, we may then say, are there to secure the Protestant succession” (21). Brower observes that “the saving of Rome by Lucius, traditionally first of the British kings and descended from their ‘ancestor’ Aeneas, or from his brother Brute” could have been associated for Shakespeare’s audience with “the restoration of peace and order under Lucius, the ‘first Christian king of England,’ as he ‘was presented’ in Foxe’s *Book of Martyrs*” (194), in Reuben Arthur Brower, *Hero & Saint: Shakespeare and the Graeco-Roman heroic tradition* (Oxford, 1971). However, Moschovakis also notes the difficulty of regarding “Lucius Andronicus, a ritual butcher, as a magnet for the nostalgia of Protestants hoping to Restore the English rite to its primitive state” (Moschovakis 466).

300 James reads this moment as the Senate placing “its hope in the healing powers of the *Aeneid*, master code of the Roman empire, [though] Vergil can do no more than bandage the civil wound” (80).
When subtle Greeks surprised King Priam’s Troy.
Tell us what Sinon hath bewitched our ears,
Or who hath brought the fatal engine in
That gives our Troy, our Rome, the civil wound.  
(5.3.79-86)

The allusive request for elucidation only increases the negative foreboding that attends Lucius’ rise to power: if Lucius has taken his father’s place as the play’s avatar of Aeneas, then the reference to Dido recalls her abandonment and suicide in terms that preclude us from viewing Lucius as the unproblematic savior of the play. The reference to Priam reminds us of Lucius’ father, body still warm, destroyed by his dedication to Roman values. If the ‘fatal engine’ has been brought in, no matter by whom, it is already too late for the characters and for the city.

While presented as Titus’ heir, Lucius is elected to the throne after Saturninus, “thereby acceding to the position to which Bassianus’ merit entitled him, and thus also in a sense succeeding and replacing him.” However, Lucius is also replacing Saturninus, and either replacement foils the purpose of primogeniture as an inheritance structure: the replication and replacement of his father. Lucius is replacing the wrong man.

In the quotation from which the title of this chapter is taken, Tamora asserts that her marriage to Saturninus has made her “incorporate in Rome, / A Roman now adopted happily” (1.1.465). In an act of purgation, the Goth that has been taken into the city is cast out in the play’s final denial of another family’s pietas. While Lucius honors Aaron’s request to preserve his son’s life (5.1.69), Tamora, “that ravenous tiger,” is denied the burial that would appease her spirit and honor her kin: “No funeral rite, nor man in mourning weed, / No mournful bell shall ring her burial, / But throw her forth to beasts and birds of prey” (5.3.194, 195-7). Jonathan Bate notes that this was the fate of executed felons in Elizabethan England, and therefore an accurate punishment for her crimes within the play; this moment also irresistibly recalls Aeneas’

301 Huffman, 740.
refusal of burial rites to his enemies in the moments after Pallas’ death. His refusal to allow his victims proper burial in their “fathers’ tomb” (10:664) is part of his program of vengeance; while Lucius is meting out justice for Tamora’s crimes in this scene, he is also denying her family the rites and respect he demands for his own. Aeneas’ exaggeration of pietas into violence was the momentary lapse of a grief-stricken father; the one moment in which Lucius respects another family’s pietas, however, is equally temporary, and he ends the play as he began, demanding the fulfillment of his own family’s pietas at the expense of another’s.

The fragility of inheritance systems, whether blood- or merit-based, revealed by the play, suggests a corresponding fragility in kinship itself. The repeated failures of imitation and inheritance in the play – Lucius’ replacement of the wrong father, Saturninus’ inability to replicate the former emperor, and Chiron’s parodical reenactment of that failure – together portray the impossibility of realizing the inheritance ideal in any form. Blood is fragile, its shedding easily justified on ideological grounds, and merit is equally unreliable, its ability to replicate a meritorious ruler easily subverted (or perverted) by even the smallest failure of imitation, or the mistaken imitation of the wrong man. Titus’ obsessive exaggeration of the primary values of romanitas – pietas and virtus – demonstrates the destructive effect of political and ideological interventions on familial relationships, but also the ability of those relationships to undermine political institutions and pervert ideologies. Titus’ exaggerated romanitas makes visible his complete adoption of political ideals, but the completeness of that adoption destroys the very institutions he supports, suggesting that the instability revealed by his actions is inherent to politics and family alike.

302 Bate, 277, ft. 197.
Conclusion: “Then must my sea be moved by her sighs”: Contagious Affect and Revenge

The source of my title is Titus’ assertion that the sight of Lavinia’s distress moves him, or causes him to feel what she feels. My project as a whole has shown that the ideologies underpinning inheritance patterns pressure familial emotions, creating both ‘everyday’ and ‘extreme’ versions of normative family relationships. Those extreme versions are readily apparent in revenge tragedies, which reveal the broader effects of cultural and social structures on emotional expressions and experiences. To approach the representation of emotions in revenge tragedies from a slightly different direction, I want to explore, briefly, the limits of ‘emotions’ to name or justify feelings, or to persuade people.303

The family tragedies at the heart of the ‘revenge tragedy’ genre can be read as stemming from the pressure placed on those relationships by the ideologies underlying inheritance practices; these tragedies can also be read as catastrophic failures of “emotional contagion.” The most basic component of what we call ‘empathy,’ “emotional contagion” is “a shared affective state: you feel what another person is feeling.”304 But what happens when one person’s emotion fails to infect another? In a revenge tragedy, the failure to infect the right person with the right emotion leads to the terrible destruction of revenge:

Lucius: My gracious lord, no tribune hears you speak.
Titus: Why, ‘tis no matter, man: if they did hear,
They would not mark me, or if they did mark,
They would not pity me; yet plead I must,
[And bootless unto them.]
Therefore I tell my sorrows to the stones,
Who, though they cannot answer my distress,

303 I am picking this language up from my discussion of Lutz’s Unnatural Emotion in my introduction, pages 10-11.
304 Protevi, 27.
Yet in some sort they are better than the tribunes
For that they will not intercept my tale.
When I do weep, they humbly at my feet
Receive my tears and seem to weep with me,
And were they but attired in grave weeds
Rome could afford no tribunes like to these.
A stone is soft as wax, tribunes more hard than stones

(3.1.32-45)

Titus’s failure to affect the senators, to make his grief known in a meaningful way to the right people, demonstrates precisely a failure of empathy and a lack of “primary corporeal intersubjectivity in which body expressions of the other are immediately felt as meaningful.”

Empathy is “most easily triggered by those in the in-group; its extension to others is thus fairly fragile and can be overridden.” The failure of empathy within the in-group plays as more grotesque because unexpected, but it is played against the failure of empathy for Others (Titus’ refusal to hear Tamora’s pleas) to highlight the fragility and manipulability of empathic identification, or “emotional contagion.”

The climax of The Spanish Tragedy features an even more dramatic failure of emotional contagion: Hieronimo has enacted his revenge, murdering the men who murdered his son. In a savage mockery of another family’s pietas that might be familiar from Titus, Hieronimo murders Lorenzo, and Bel-Imperia murders Balthazar, in front of their uncle and father, respectively, replicating precisely Hieronimo’s own loss and pain. Rather, he is attempting to force these other fathers to feel his pain. In an extended speech, Hieronimo explains to the King and Viceroy his motives and actions; the speech is eighty lines long, but a few excerpts convey Hieronimo’s

305 Protevi, 27.
306 Protevi, xvi.
307 Bel-Imperia also kills herself on stage, before her father, but her death is little discussed in the play’s final lines. The Viceroy exposes her as Hieronimo’s confederate (4.4.177), and Hieronimo mentions her as part of the motive for their vengeance, but specifically identifies her love for Horatio (4.4.99), nothing more. When the King’s brother is also killed, he becomes the focus of the King’s grief: “My brother, and the whole succeeding hope / That Spain expected after my decease! / Go bear his body hence, that we may mourn / The loss of our beloved brother’s death, / That he may be entombed whate’er befall, / I am the next, the nearest, last of all” (4.4.203-208).
purpose. In the first, he identifies himself, asserting that his position as a father makes him similar to the King and Viceroy as fathers: “know I am Hieronimo, / The hopeless father of a hapless son … Behold the reason urging me to do this!” (4.4.82-3, 86). The stage directions suggest that he shows Horatio’s body, Hieronimo’s pain embodied and made visible. The spectacle of his pain is followed by an attempt to explain his emotions to his audience:

See here my show, look on this spectacle!
Here lay my hope, and here my hope hath end;
Here lay my heart, and here my heart was slain;
Here lay my treasure, here my treasure lost;
Here lay my bliss, and here my bliss bereft;
But hope, heart, treasure, joy, and bliss,
All fled, failed, died, yes, all decayed with this. (4.4.88-94)

In describing Horatio as his hope, heart, treasure and bliss (4.4.89-92), Hieronimo connects his happiness with his son’s potential future, his ‘hope’; the emotional force of the speech is derived from the complete loss of that future. Horatio was Hieronimo’s only son, and his death means the death of the corporate family. While Hieronimo’s reference to his family’s hope links at least one of Hieronimo’s persistently repeated feelings toward his son to an expected continuation of his bloodline, the weight of the speech is tilted toward intense familial emotion. Hieronimo refers to his son metonymically as his heart, treasure, bliss and joy; in embodying these abstracts, however, Hieronimo renders them vulnerable to failure, death, and decay. Because Horatio represented everything to his father, Horatio’s death is utterly devastating. Hieronimo then tries to assert a resemblance of emotional experience between sets of grieving fathers:

And grieved I, think you, at this spectacle?
Speak, Portuguese, whose loss resembles mine;
If thou canst weep upon thy Balthazar,
‘Tis like I wailed for my Horatio. (4.4.113-16)

Hieronimo’s attempt fails. Empathic identification, or emotional contagion, requires a degree of likeness: Hieronimo asserts his resemblance to two aristocratic fathers in an attempt to make
them feel what he feels, but this assertion would be a radical disruption of status barriers if it had worked. As Katharine Maus notes, Hieronimo “defiantly insists upon the similarities between king and subject, aristocrat and commoner. To prove that identical losses produce identical grief he uses theatre, the most powerful tool the Renaissance had to assert the resemblances among human beings, and to induce empathetic identification.” However, the King and Viceroy seem to look past Hieronimo. In spite of Hieronimo’s lengthy explanation, the Viceroy demands to know why Hieronimo murdered his son; Hieronimo runs to hang himself, but the Viceroy orders the guards to “save” him, and attempts a bargain: “Do but inform the king of these events; / Upon my honour thou shalt have no harm” (4.4.158-9). The Viceroy is incapable of understanding Hieronimo’s actions, and all of Hieronimo’s explanations have fallen on deaf ears. The King similarly demands, “Speak, traitor! … Why has thou done this undeserving deed?” (4.4.163, 5). Again Hieronimo explains,

As dear to me was my Horatio  
As yours, or yours, or yours, my lord, to you.  
My guiltless son was by Lorenzo slain,  
And by Lorenzo and that Balthazar  
Am I at last revenged thoroughly. (4.4.167-173).

Hieronimo again asserts the similarity of the loss suffered by each father, and again the aristocratic men fail to hear him. After Hieronimo bites out his own tongue, the King cries, “O monstrous resolution of a wretch! / See, viceroy, he hath bitten forth his tongue, / Rather than to reveal what we required” (4.4.192-194). While Philip Edwards reads the doubled information as a publication error, “elements of a revised and abridged version of the play,” I argue for accepting the repeated speeches as an audience watching this play would see them, as

309 Philip Edwards, ed. The Spanish Tragedy. The Revels Plays (London: Methuen, 1959), xl. Edwards dismisses the scene as “crude aesthetically” and notes that “there is also an inner inconsistency in the fact that even in stressing his new role of saying nothing, Hieronimo twice avows that Lorenzo murdered his son” (xxxv).
discontinuities, as failures of connection, as a king’s refusal or outright inability to empathize with his subject’s loss. Maus argues that Hieronimo “uses his power over his enemies to force them, or their surviving kin, to see things from his perspective.” But this exertion of theatrical power fails, and Hieronimo’s enemies never seem to see his perspective, much less understand it. This kind of emotional non-recognition would seem to be at the heart of the revenge tragedy genre. Clermont breaks the wrong heart; Titus shoots his messages to the sky, knowing they will never be understood; D’Amville is never quite able to grasp Charlemont’s stoical resolve; Hamlet is stifled by incommunicable emotion, and while he offers Laertes the empathy he never received, the offer comes far too late to prevent the tragic consequences. The inability to convey emotions, to ‘infect’ others, is read as catastrophic, as constitutive of vengeance itself. Hieronimo’s inability to infect the King and Viceroy with his own feeling of loss suggests that the failure of contagious emotion is the result of the conditions placed on familial relationships; that is, the ideologies undergirding inheritance practices also create the social hierarchy that renders Hieronimo’s emotions inexplicable. While emotions should be infectious, these plays demonstrate that social and political structures impinge upon the transmission of affect, and render empathy an ‘in-group’ practice that makes the pain of others illegible.

310 Maus, xvii.


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“Conditional Love: Imitation, Inheritance and Violent Relations in Early Modern Revenge Tragedies”  
Director: Joseph Loewenstein  
Readers: Musa Gurnis, Derek Hirst, Vivian Pollak, Jennifer Rust, Harriet Stone, Steven Zwicker.

In “Conditional Love” I examine moments in drama that have been read as breaks in the norms of family relationships – Titus murdering his own son, Lorenzo silencing Bel-Imperia – to argue that the structures underlying those norms themselves contain violent features that cause the excesses and perversions seen in tragic portrayals of the family. Looking at this question through plays by William Shakespeare, John Marston, Thomas Middleton, and Cyril Tourneur, I argue that the way relationships are expressed through metaphor reveals the problems inherent to those normative structures, such as inheritance practices, genealogical theories, and rhetorical contexts, undergirding familial relationships.

Teaching Positions

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Fall 2012  English Composition 100, Writing 1
Fall 2011  English Composition 100, Writing 1: "Writing Culture"
Spring 2011  Section Lecturer, English 365, “The Bible as Literature” (Prof. David Lawton)
2007-2010  English Composition 100, Writing 1: "Writing Culture"
2006-2007  Women and Gender Studies 214, “Introduction to Women’s Texts”
2005-2006  English Composition 100, Writing 1: "Writing Culture"

Publications

“Worthy my blood”: Inheritance, Imitation, and Gendered Familial Emotions in John Marston’s Antonio Plays, under review
Conferences

“As near my heart”: Father-Daughter Relationships in Marston's Antonio and Mellida,” Gender Matters Conference, Governors State University (April 2012)
“Dramatic Relations: Emotional Inheritance in Early Modern Drama,” Early Modern Reading Group, Washington University in St Louis (January 2012)
“Where's thy father's spirit': Identity, Remembrance and Revenge in Shakespeare and Marston,” Graduate Student Colloquium, Washington University in St Louis (November 2010)
“Conditional Love: Primogeniture and Affective Kinship in Marston's Antonio Duology,” Early Modern Reading Group, Washington University in St Louis (2010)

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2011 Mellon Dissertation Seminar, "The Early Modern Period: Archives and Arguments"
2005-2011 Teaching Assistant Fellowship, Washington University in St Louis
2004-2005 University Fellowship, Washington University in St Louis

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2010-present Founder, Renaissance Criticism Reading Group
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