The U.S. and The ICC: No More Excuses

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INTRODUCTION

More than fourteen years after its creation and twelve years after it began to function, the International Criminal Court ("ICC") still does not have direct support from the United States as a party to its constitutive instrument. There had been prior excuses for the U.S. not becoming a party to the Rome Statute. For example, it had been claimed that there might be unfounded or politicized prosecutions involving unprofessional prosecutors and judges and that a new definition of aggression that could later be created might prevent the United States from using armed force that is permissible under the United Nations Charter. Others had thought that by not becoming a party to the treaty, the U.S. could assure that U.S. nationals would not be prosecuted before the ICC. Are any of these excuses valid today, whether or not they had been previously?

I. PRIOR EXCUSES

A. Previously Stated Concerns

1. Unfounded Prosecutions

One of the stated reasons for U.S. concern had been that the ICC might engage in “unfounded charges” against U.S. officials,1 despite obvious limitations of its jurisdiction that are set forth in the Rome Statute of the ICC2 with respect to the types of crimes that can be prosecuted before the ICC.3 For example, in December 2000 President Clinton expressed this concern but added that the U.S. had “worked effectively to develop procedures that limit the likelihood of politicized prosecutions,”4 which had been an additional and related concern of the United States. Giving an example, President Clinton then stated that “U.S. civilian and military

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3. See id. arts. 5–8.
negotiators helped to ensure greater precision in the definitions of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction."

With more precise definitions appearing in the Rome Statute of the ICC and the subsequent creation of the Elements of Crimes, one would assume that ICC use of “unfounded” charges had become most unlikely. Nonetheless, in subsequent years the Bush Administration also expressed concern that ICC jurisdictional provisions left U.S. officials “subject to ‘an unaccountable prosecutor’ and ‘unchecked judicial power.’” This is especially true since the United States had been unsuccessful in limiting all prosecutions before the ICC to those authorized by the United Nations Security Council and, therefore, a U.S. control available through exercise of its veto power. Contrary to stated fears of rogue prosecutors, it is obvious that prosecutors would be “accountable” before Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appellate Chambers of the ICC if they tried to deviate from the definitions set forth in the Rome Statute of the ICC or the Elements of Crimes. With respect to “unchecked judicial power,” it may be noted that

5. Id.; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443, 457 (1999) (stating that “the articles dealing with procedure and with the definition of crimes were substantially as the United States wanted”).


the Supreme Court of the United States is seemingly more unchecked, but no one would seriously argue that its judicial power and independence should be subject to political control, the very circumstance associated with unacceptable “politicized” prosecutions and institutions.

2. Politicized Prosecutions

Another stated concern of the United States had been the fear that the ICC might permit “politicized” prosecutions of U.S. officials, but President Clinton noted that this was far less likely after efforts to provide greater precision with respect to definitions of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC had been successful. Moreover, as noted above, ICC prosecutors are accountable in several ways to an independent judiciary that is itself subject to policing for improper judicial conduct and politicized prosecutions. For these reasons, prior fears of unfounded charges and politicized prosecutions have themselves become unfounded.

Commentators have also noted that actual practice before the ICC during the last ten years should allay any lingering fears of politicized prosecutions. As U.S. Ambassador Stephen Rapp noted in 2010 with

Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 128–29 (2001) (the Prosecutor “will have no independent power to issue legal process or to open an investigation. Instead, he must secure the agreement of the three-member pretrial chamber before he can even begin an investigation or issue legal process. Moreover, when he applies to the pretrial chamber for authorization, he must notify all other parties to the statute and all states that ‘would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.’ This latter phase includes both the territorial state and the state of nationality of the accused.”).

10. U.S. Supreme Court Justices are not elected, might someday be impeached, but otherwise serve for life or until resignation. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Judges of the ICC are elected by the Assembly of States Parties for a term of years, see Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, arts. 36(6)(a), (9)(b), are subject to rules concerning their required judicial independence, see id. art. 40, can be excused from a case or disqualified as a judge, see id. art. 41, and can be removed from office, see id. art. 46.

11. See van der Vyver, supra note 8, at 799–800 (rightly noting “[t]he paradox of submitting, on the one hand, that the ICC will inevitably (or may) become politicized or might not act impartially, and on the other hand, proposing that a Security Council veto of ICC actions is an appropriate remedy”) (citations omitted).


14. See, e.g., Fairlie, supra note 7, at 548 n.119, 549 (noting what should be “the positive perception . . . that the ICC judiciary stands ready to ensure a fair trial”), 559, 573; Sabharwal, supra note 7, at 325–26 (noting that “the Prosecutor has demonstrated a rather cautious and measured approach toward opening investigations,” only one out of seven then current cases was initiated by the
respect to a prior U.S. concern about politicized prosecutions, “[t]hus far, the Court has been appropriately focused.” There is no reason why the Court will not continue to focus on the crimes and procedures set forth in the Rome Statute that necessarily limit its jurisdiction and proceedings.

3. The Crime of Aggression

One stated worry of the United States was whether the crime of aggression that would be prosecutable before the ICC might limit permissible use of armed force under the United Nations Charter. This might have been possible if the definition of aggression encompassed the use of armed force that is not prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter or that is permissible as Security Council authorized enforcement action under Article 42, individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, or regional action under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter. Because there has not always been agreement concerning what constitutes an act of aggression, there was a danger that a new definition of the crime of aggression for ICC prosecution might deviate from the law of the Charter.

Prosecutor, “he also refrained from charging excessively expansive counts,” and “judges and staff have displayed exceptional professionalism”; Smith, supra note 9, at 178–80 (demonstrating why politicized prosecution is now “even more improbable”); see also Judge Richard Goldstone, The Future of International Criminal Justice: The Crucial Role of the United States, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 615, 623 (2012) (explaining that “a professional office such as the Office of the Prosecutor would not be able to get away with . . . [unprofessional] bias”).


16. See, e.g., David, supra note 12, at 355, 359–61; Fairlie, supra note 7, at 551–53; Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Dep’t of State Legal Advisor, The U.S. and the International Criminal Court: Report From the Kampala Review Conference, at 4 (June 16, 2010) [hereinafter ASIL discussion] (one of the U.S. objectives at Kampala was the ensure that “those lawful uses of force remain acts that we are able to do, particularly in situations such as humanitarian intervention”), available at http://www.asil.org/files/Transcript_ICC_Koh_Rapp_Bellinger.pdf.


20. See U.N. Charter art. 52; Paust, supra note 17, at 545–47.

This danger of deviation is no longer present. First, the definition of the crime of aggression adopted during the Review Conference in Kampala in June 2010 is unavoidably tied to a requirement that “an act of aggression” constitute a “violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” Second, the act must be a “manifest” violation of the Charter, thereby leaving aside conduct that is not in obvious violation. Third, the act must be manifestly in violation because of “its character, gravity and scale.” Within the definitional amendment to the Rome Statute, there is also an express reference to the 1974 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression. The 1974 Definition expressly affirmed in its preamble “that nothing in this Definition shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and powers of the organs of the United Nations,” and declared in Article 2 that “[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall

22. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 8 bis, para 1 (“crime of aggression’ means the planning, initiation or execution . . . of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’); see Surendran Koran, The International Criminal Court and Crimes of Aggression Beyond the Kampala Convention, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 231, 253 (2012).

23. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 8 bis, para. 1; see Koran, supra note 22, at 253; Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1179, 1193 (language that finally appears in art. 8 bis, para. 1 limits the reach of U.N. G.A. Res. 3314), 1200 (“the objective requirement of manifest illegality . . . has the effect of excluding from the state conduct element any use of armed force that falls into the ‘grey area’ of the prohibition of the use of force”), 1211 (“the requirement of ‘manifest illegality’ takes due regard of the fact that regrettably, the primary norm of the prohibition of the use of force suffers from considerable ambiguity”); Beth Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law: The Crime of Aggression, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 506, 522–23 (2011).

24. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 8 bis, para. 1; id. Annex III, para. 7 (“It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter . . . the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself”); see also Kress & von Holtzendorff, supra note 23, at 1193 (“the criterion of ‘character’ (mainly) refers to the problem of the ‘grey area’”), 1206 (the U.S. submitted the “no one component” sentence quoted above), 1207 (“the first sentence of the Understanding makes it plain that the Court must always look at all three components, although they need not all be present to the same degree,” and, regarding the “character” criterion, “[j]udges will thus always have to ascertain that the state use of armed force is of a character that makes its illegality reasonably uncontroversial’); Stephen J. Rapp, ASIL discussion, supra note 16, at 9 (“We, in terms of character, gravity, and scale, said . . . it had to be a combination of them, and then, significantly, that it had to be the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force’); Koran, supra note 22, at 253–54. Of course, the ICC must address more generally whether a case is “of sufficient gravity.” Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(d); see also Margarete M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1400 (2009).


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constitute *prima facie* evidence of aggression,"26 thereby limiting aggression to armed force “in contravention” of the Charter. It also declared in Article 3 that the list of acts set forth therein might qualify as acts of aggression “subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2,”27 thereby affirming the limitation in Article 2 to use of armed force “in contravention” of the Charter.28

Additionally, a state like the United States can become a party to the Rome Statute and opt out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.29 For this reason, among others, Legal Adviser Harold Koh declared that the Amendments to the Rome Statute adopted at Kampala “ensure total protection for U.S. armed forces and other nationals going forward.”30 In view of the fact that crimes of aggression before the ICC must be manifest violations of the Charter and that the U.S. can opt out of ICC coverage of alleged acts of aggression by the United States, there is no longer a valid reason for the U.S. to refuse to become a party to the treaty. Certainly the U.S. should no longer worry that the crime of aggression will inhibit use of armed force by the United States that is permissible under the United Nations Charter.

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27. *1974 Definition, supra note 24*, art. 3; see also *Koran, supra note 22*, at 253.

28. See *1974 Definition, supra note 24*, art. 6 (“Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”).

29. *Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2*, art. 15 bis, para. 4 (the ICC cannot “exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression committed by a State Party . . . if that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar”); *Fairlie, supra note 7*, at 557; *Koh, supra note 16*, at 5; cf. Van Schaack, *supra note 23*, at 584–89 (addressing issues concerning interpretation and future application of the opt out provision).

30. *Koh, supra note 16*, at 5. With respect to the role of the U.N. Security Council, Koh added: One channel goes through an exclusive Security Council trigger, which the U.S. has been urging. The second goes through a prior Security Council review with three conditions. If the Security Council doesn’t make a determination that aggression occurs, the prosecutor has to offer a reasonable basis for proceeding. That decision would require a majority vote of six judges, and the Security Council would still have the authority to stop the prosecution with a red light, Chapter 7 resolution.

*Id.*
B. The Seeming Real Preference of Some Within the United States

Although some have expressed concern about unfounded or politicized prosecutions of U.S. nationals and whether or not the definition of the crime of aggression that will be prosecutable before the ICC will deviate from what are permissible uses of force under the United Nations Charter, I suspect that for some, the real reason for early opposition to U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute was a preference for a functional immunity of U.S. nationals from prosecution. This preference is sometimes hidden in an effort to achieve a primacy for national jurisdiction over that of the ICC in a context when U.S. prosecutions had been notably absent with respect to crimes against humanity and, at best, quite rare with respect to war crimes. Writing in January 2001, Ruth Wedgwood, Harold Jacobson, and Monroe Leigh noted that “[t]he principal objection raised by the [Clinton] administration . . . was that American nationals . . . could in certain contingencies be subjected to trial in the new court without the specific consent of the United States.”

As they pointed out:

From the point of view of our European allies, it is bad enough that the exemption [of non-party state nationals proposed by the U.S.] has sometimes come as a rather strident demand for American exceptionalism, which reinforces their innate suspicion that the United States is giving way to hegemonic ambitions. They find it the more objectionable because it virtually guarantees that the court would be unable to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of rogue states who, through lack of caution or otherwise, happen to come into the custody of the court and are unlikely in any event to belong to a state that is party to the Rome Statute.

In 1999, U.S. legislation contained a section that had been created in an attempt to assure that there would be no extradition or transfer of a U.S. citizen from any foreign country to the ICC. Over several years, the U.S.

31. See Fairlie, supra note 7, at 572 n.256 (also noting a declared U.S. preference for “national” prosecutions); Scheffer, supra note 6, at 64–65.
32. Wedgwood, Jacobson & Leigh, supra note 9, at 126.
33. Id. at 126. Wedgwood, Jacobson & Leigh add that a “main purpose . . . [of the ICC jurisdictional provisions is] to deprive war criminals of the impunity they have heretofore enjoyed by virtue of the protection of their states of nationality.” Id. at 127.
Executive also entered into a large number of “Article 98” bilateral agreements with foreign countries in an effort to exempt U.S. persons from transfer to the ICC and had used economic sanctions against countries that refused to enter into such agreements.\textsuperscript{35} Curiously, by following the strictures of such a mixture of legislation and Article 98 agreements, and thereby seeking to deny the possibility of ICC prosecution, U.S. nationals who are reasonably accused of having participated in certain international crimes could be left in the courts or military commissions of foreign countries that exercise territorial or universal jurisdiction\textsuperscript{36} and do not provide important due process safeguards that must be complied with during prosecution before the ICC.

Foreclosing an ICC option would not be in the best interests of U.S. nationals or the United States. As I have written previously,

The United States may wish to strengthen the primacy of ICC jurisdiction so that a U.S. national can at least be transferred to the ICC and enjoy a panoply of due process guarantees in a neutral forum. Adherence to the Rome treaty could provide greater options for protection of U.S. nationals than nonadherence. It could also provide the United States flexibility with respect to prosecution or extradition of foreign nationals accused of international crimes committed outside the United States.\textsuperscript{37}

Wedgwood, Jacobson, and Leigh had noted similarly that it would be preferable for a state to have the option of transferring an accused to the ICC where he might receive a fairer trial than in the courts of the country where the offense was committed. Indeed, that is clearly one of the principal advantages to be derived from becoming a party to the international criminal court. After all, the proposed court would be

\textsuperscript{35} See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 8, at 557; Leila Nadya Sadat, An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (International) Law Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 329, 336–37 (2005); Cline, supra note 7, at 117–18; Fairlie, supra note 7, at 538; Sabharwal, supra note 7, at 321; Sadat, supra note 6, at 558–60.

\textsuperscript{36} Professor van der Vyver has rightly noted that, despite the existence of the ICC and whether or not the U.S. becomes a party, all states retain a competence to prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC under the customary principle of universal jurisdiction. See van der Vyver, supra note 8, at 811–16. Regarding universal jurisdiction, see for example, PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 8, at 155–211. This competence is also implicitly recognized in the preamble to the Rome Statute, which affirms the concomitant “duty of every state to exercise its jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, pmbl.

obliged to respect the due-process protections that, largely at American insistence, were written into the Statute of Rome and that will be reinforced by the Rule of Evidence and Procedure, which will apply to the ICC’s proceedings. With few exceptions, international, treaty-bound due-process protections are likely to be more extensive in an ICC trial. . . .

Today, if a U.S. pilot is captured in Iran and is accused of having committed war crimes in Afghanistan (a party to the Rome Statute), would it be useful for both Iran and the U.S. to agree to Iran’s rendering of the pilot to the ICC for investigation by the ICC Prosecutor?

During the Bush-Cheney era, outright hostility to ICC jurisdiction became the policy. For example, Under Secretary John Bolton announced that “[w]e will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts . . . to protect Americans [and that “our global security commitments”] . . . are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction [allegedly] does not extend to Americans.” As Professor Leila Sadat noted in 2003, the Bush Administration made significant efforts to assure that U.S. nationals enjoyed “impunity from the ICC.” Perhaps of great concern to those reasonably accused of participation in international crimes was the statement of ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo in March 2007 that George W. Bush and others might face war crimes investigations with respect to unlawful conduct of coalition forces in Iraq.

38. Wedgwood, Jacobson & Leigh, supra note 9, at 127.
39. Since Afghanistan is a party, one of the alternative circumstances set forth in Article 12 would be satisfied if alleged crimes took place at least partly within Afghanistan. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 12(2)(a). Since Iran is not a party, Iran technically cannot refer a situation to the ICC under Article 14(1), but the Prosecutor could proceed under Articles 13(c) and 15. See id. arts. 12–15.
40. Fairlie, supra note 7, at 537 n.58 (quoting John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., Remarks to the Am. Enter. Inst.: American Justice and the Int’l Crim. Ct. (Nov. 3, 2003)); see also Cline, supra note 7, at 112 (claiming that ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals “threatens the sovereignty of the United States”); Smith, supra note 9, at 167; van der Vyver, supra note 8, at 804 (a main purpose of the U.S. had been to seek a “dispensation” of international criminal law for U.S. citizens); Washburn, supra note 12, at 878–79 (addressing U.S. demands for total exemption of U.S. nationals from prosecution).
41. Sadat, supra note 6, at 558; see also id. at 557 n.3 (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld), 584–86 (regarding fear of jurisdiction over U.S. nationals that can obtain without U.S. “consent”), 593 n.131 (providing apt recognition that this type of opposition may have been tied to a realization that conduct of various U.S. nationals during the Bush-Cheney era could be prosecuted as war crimes).
Fear of prosecution before the ICC was not the Bush Administration’s only worry. There were also efforts to prosecute former members of the administration in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland that were mostly unsuccessful due to significant political pressure from the U.S. Executive.\(^{43}\) Quite clearly, the U.S. Executive was not merely seeking impunity for U.S. nationals before the ICC, but also impunity before national courts. Subsequently, the Obama Administration generally abandoned the rule of law by refusing to faithfully execute the law and engage in good faith prosecution of various members of the Bush-Cheney era who are reasonably accused of having international criminal responsibility arising out of their participation in President Bush’s admitted “program” of secret detention (or forced disappearance) and coercive interrogation.\(^{44}\) The failure of the Obama Administration to initiate prosecution of those who are reasonably accused has resulted in a situation where, because there had been and will be no national U.S. efforts to prosecute, potential ICC jurisdiction over some of the accused is even stronger.

II. ADDITIONAL CONTEXTUAL REALITIES

A. Changes Regarding the Article 12 Circumstance

Today, there are 121 parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC.\(^{45}\) One of the circumstances listed in Article 12 of the Rome Statute that can allow the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over nationals of non-parties to the treaty is met if “[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred” is a party to the treaty.\(^{46}\) Afghanistan is a party. If conduct relevant to a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC has allegedly been committed by a U.S. national in Afghanistan, therefore, any party to the treaty who gains custody of the U.S. national can refer the matter to the Prosecutor under Articles 13, paragraph a, and 14, paragraph 1 of the treaty, or the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation under Articles 13,


\(^{44}\) See generally Jordan J. Paust, Ending the U.S. Program of Torture and Impunity: President Obama’s First Steps and the Path Forward, 19 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. L. 151, 160–62 (2010); Paust, supra note 43, at 81 n.102, 84–85; see also infra notes 55–56.


\(^{46}\) See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 12(2)(a).
paragraph c, and 15 of the treaty. Because there are 121 parties to the

treaty who might gain custody of a U.S. national accused, the chances of

this circumstance occurring with respect to alleged criminal conduct in

Afghanistan have increased over the years whether or not the U.S.

becomes a party. Additionally, the chances of a U.S. national being

reasonably accused of having committed an international crime in the

future within the territory of any other party to the treaty have increased

markedly. Because the circumstance listed in Article 12(2)(a) of the treaty

can be met in some cases and because there is no immunity from ICC

jurisdiction merely because the United States has not ratified the treaty,

a desire to protect U.S. nationals from prosecution before the ICC is not a

valid or viable reason for not becoming a party to the treaty.

B. The Reality Regarding Complimentarity

Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, “a case is inadmissible where,”

for example,

(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which

has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable

genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; [or]

(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction

over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person

concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or

inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.

Text writers have generalized that in view of Article 17 and the principle

of complimentarity, which involves deference in certain specific instances

to viable and genuine national jurisdiction, the ICC should accept cases

“only where national authorities are unwilling or unable [genuinely] to

handle them.” However, the ICC was created with a determination “to

put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of “the most serious crimes of

47. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 26 (1999); Paust, supra note 36, at 1–3, 5–7; see also supra note 32.

48. See supra note 47.

49. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a)–(b) (emphasis added).


1, 6 (2005); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J.

INT’L L. 269, 287 (2010); William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complimentarity: The International

Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.

J. 53, 64–65, 77–79, 87–88 (2008); Philippe Kirsh, Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the

International Criminal Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 501, 505 (2007); Fairlie, supra note

7, at 560–63.
concern to the international community” and to assure that such crimes “must not go unpunished,” but because “their effective prosecution must be ensured,” national courts would recognizably play an important role in prosecuting the most serious crimes of concern to the community in view of the unavoidable customary “duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”

Deference to national prosecutions of such crimes is clearly not the only policy at stake, and it is not the primary purpose of the Rome Statute, which is to create a permanent International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the specific provisions of Article 17 necessarily limit complimentarity.

In any event, Article 17 of the Rome Statute cannot preclude admissibility of cases involving alleged criminal conduct of various members of the former Bush Administration who authorized and/or abetted crimes that took place at least partly in Afghanistan. Article 17 is no obstacle because (1) those reasonably accused have not been prosecuted and, as explained below, the United States is “unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” of alleged crimes against

51. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, pmbl.

52. Id. This duty has been recognized especially in modern international criminal law treaties and has long been part of customary international law expressed, for example, as the duty aut dedere aut judicare (i.e., to either hand over or initiate prosecution). See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 8, at 10 (noting that the duty “aut dedere . . . aut punire” was addressed by Hugo Grotius in 1624), 12, 17–19, 27, 131–32, 134–35, 138–41, 143–44, 155, 169, 452; Paust, supra note 43, at 63–69.

In the 1700s, Blackstone had early recognized that “where the individuals of any state violate” the law of nations, “it is then . . . the duty of the government under which they live to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity” and, if individuals are not punished, the state becomes an “accomplice or abettor.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1765); see also United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 147–48 (1820) (piracy “is an offense against all. It is punishable in the Courts of all . . . [and our courts] are authorized and bound to punish”); Ex parte dos Santos, 17 F. Cas. 949, 953 (C.C.D. Va. 1835) (quoting Emerich de Vattel: “duty to punish or surrender”); Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (Jay, C.J.) (ought also to prosecute and punish them for an international crime); id. at 1108 (Wilson, J.) (alternative duty to punish an international crime); Respública v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 117 (1784) (“it is now the interest as well as the duty of every government to punish with becoming severity all the individuals . . . who commit this offence” against the law of nations); Territorial Rights-Florida, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) (“it is the interest as well as the duty of every government to punish” customary international crimes).

53. But see Michael A. Newton, The Complimentarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 120 (claiming that complimentarity should not merely override a limited deference but also “prioritizes the authority of domestic forums to prosecute the crimes defined in Article 5”), 133 (“to preserve the primacy of domestic jurisdictions”); 137 (claiming rather remarkably that “the clear preference of the ICC is to maintain the sovereign authority of states”) (2010).

54. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a). The definite article “the” instead of the indefinite “an” in the phrase “the investigation or prosecution” (emphasis added) emphasizes that reference is made to the same case that is before the ICC, and so does use of the definitive article “the” in the phrase “the case” in Article 17(1)(a) and (b). Id. art. 17(1)(a)–(b) (emphasis added). “The case”
humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICC, such as the secret detention or forced disappearance of persons,\(^{55}\) and (2) the Obama Administration is

is necessarily the same case that is before the ICC, which would also be “the case” or crime identified as such in Articles 6–8. See id. art. 18(1) (the Prosecutor will notify States that “would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned”) (emphasis added); Linda A. Keller, The Practice of the International Criminal Court: Comments on the Complimentarity Conundrum, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 207, 207–36 (2010) (“the crime” in such a circumstance might allow the ICC to declare that the state’s legal system will not allow such a prosecution. . . . For example, where a national has committed genocide but the domestic forum has not criminalize genocide, the state may either refrain from prosecution, or may choose to prosecute the person for murder or another inferior crime. In either situation, the ICC Prosecutor may arguably be permitted to step in an prosecute that state’s national due to the inablity of the state to prosecute the full conduct under its criminal system.

Id.; Xavier Philippe, The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complimentarity: How Do the Two Principles Interact?, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 390 (2006) (“an obvious requirement is that the definition of international crimes in domestic legislation . . . be in line with their definition at the international level”); Dawn Sedman, Should the Prosecution of Ordinary Crimes in Domestic Jurisdictions Satisfy the Complimentarity Principle?, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 259, 266 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., 2010) (“complimentarity is not satisfied” if a state is “prosecuting for an ordinary crime”); see also supra note 51; infra notes 61, 67. But see generally Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complimentarity, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85 (2012) (arguing for a relaxation of “the hard mirror” approach to complimentarity, that results in denial if domestic prosecution is for an “ordinary” crime, in favor of a same or greater sentence approach).

Importantly, Article 17(1)(c) is quite different because it addresses a special circumstance where an accused “has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3.” Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art 17(1)(c) (emphasis added). The focus on “conduct” in such a circumstance might allow the ICC to declare that a complaint is inadmissible where the accused has already been tried for an “ordinary” domestic crime covering the “same conduct” if the domestic trial was not “for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility” or otherwise runs afoul of Article 20, paragraph 3(b). See id. arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3)(b); Linda A. Carter, The Principle of Complimentarity and the International Criminal Court: The Role of Ne Bis in Idem, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 165, 167–68, 176–80 n.40, nn.44–47, 185 (2010) (“same facts” but “different crimes” should not preclude ICC prosecution) (citing WARD N. FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 205 (2006); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 192–93 (3d ed. 2007)); see also Heller, supra, at 89, 91 (focusing on Articles 17(1)(c) and 20(3)). But see Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17 Issues of Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES 605, 617 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) (same conduct approach may not serve goals of complimentarity process).

55. Concerning the crime of secret detention or forced disappearance, see, for example, Rome
either unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution of war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.56 With respect to alleged war crime responsibility, (1) no such case is currently “being investigated or prosecuted” within the meaning of Article 17(1)(a), and (2) only rare cases have “been investigated” within the meaning of Article 17(1)(b).57 Further, the shameful decision of the Obama Administration to end criminal investigations may have “resulted from the unwillingness or inability”58 of the U.S. “genuinely to prosecute” within the meaning of the same provision of the treaty. In any event, with respect to the vast majority of former members of the Bush Administration who are reasonably accused, there is obvious inaction and, as the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has ruled, “inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction (that is, the fact that a State is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not done so) renders a case admissible before the Court.”59 In each


57. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Judgment, ¶ 78 (Sept. 25, 2009). The Appeals Chamber also noted that one of the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute, to put an end to impunity, must be considered when interpreting the treaty. Id. ¶ 79; see also Thomas Obel Hansen, A Critical Review of the ICC’s Recent Practice Concerning Admissibility Challenges and Complimentarity, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 217, 220–21 nn.8–12 (2012) (“Markus Benzing . . . argues that the [m]ere inaction of a state in the face of crimes having been or being committed thus leads to admissibility. . . .” This interpretation, which appears widely
such circumstance, the cases remain admissible before the ICC and the principle of complementarity set forth in Article 17 does not stand in the way of ICC investigation and prosecution of former members of the Bush Administration who are reasonably accused of having authorized, abetted, or perpetrated relevant crimes against humanity and war crimes.\footnote{60}

With respect to two core crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, genocide and other crimes against humanity, it is evident that the United States is basically unable to prosecute them. The United States has no federal statute authorizing the prosecution of crimes against humanity as such, and the present statute regarding genocide is one that nearly guarantees that the United States cannot prosecute a person reasonably accused of genocide.\footnote{61} Therefore, neither core crime can be prosecuted as

accepted in contemporary accounts of the complimentarity principle, has consistently been endorsed by the ICC\footnote{60}. International interest in possible prosecution with regard to detention and interrogation practices is evidenced by the recent request of a U.N. special rapporteur for the Obama administration to turn over the results of a U.S. Senate investigation into alleged torture of detainees. Colum Lynch, \textit{U.N. rights advocate seeks release of findings on CIA detention}, \textit{WASH. POST} (Mar. 04, 2013), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-04/world/37439427_1_rights-advocate-human-rights-council-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms.

\footnote{61. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, \textit{The Need for New U.S. Legislation for Prosecution of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity}, 33 VT. L. REV. 717, 719, 723–27 (2009) (also offering draft legislation regarding customary crimes against humanity beyond those covered in the Rome Statute); Newton, \textit{supra} note 53, at 146–48 (quoted \textit{supra} note 54); Paust, \textit{supra} note 43, at 163; Scheffer, \textit{supra} note 6, at 87–88 (identifying the need to amend U.S. criminal legislation in order “to track thoroughly all of the specific crimes in Articles 5–8 of the ICC Treaty” and noting that if this does not occur a claim “could be raised that a gap in U.S. law renders the United States ‘unable’ to investigate and prosecute the specific crime”) (citing Douglass Cassel, \textit{Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court}, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 428–35 (2001)); see also Edoardo Greppi, \textit{Inability to Investigate and Prosecute Under Article 17}, in \textit{THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS} 63, 66 (“inability” applies when there is an “existence of legislative impediments, such as an amnesty law, or a statute of limitations, making it impossible for the national judge to start proceedings”), 67 (when domestic “‘criminal laws do not adequately proscribe war crimes and crimes against humanity’”), 69 (“[i]t appears reasonable that complimentarity . . . [applies] only for States complying with their international obligations, that is, having adopted an implementation legislation which enables them to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of international crimes”) (MAURO POLITI & FEDERICA GIOIA eds., 2008); deGuzman, \textit{supra} note 24, at 1407 (“[f]or genocide and crimes against humanity, the contextual aspects of the definitions seek to distinguish these crimes from ‘ordinary’ crimes as least in part through elements suggesting gravity”); Mark S. Ellis, \textit{The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building}, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 224–25 (2002–2003) (states “must . . . ensure that all ICC crimes are incorporated into national legislation” and “the crime of murder found in national law is not the same as a crime against humanity”); Matt Halling, \textit{Push the Envelope—Watch It Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement and Extending Crimes Against Humanity}, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 827, 839 (2010) (“Complimentarity requires that states prosecute crimes as they are spelled out in the Rome Statute; the prosecutions have to be for ‘crimes against humanity,’ not the murders, rapes, and so on” in domestic law); see also \textit{supra} note 54. Because the genocide legislation is inadequate, the United States also remains in material breach of the Genocide Convention. \textit{See} Paust, \textit{supra}, at 722, 724, 728.}
such by the United States unless adequate legislation is created or it is recognized, contrary to the general assumption, that legislation is not actually needed in the U.S. for prosecution of customary international crimes, as had been the case in the past. In any event, for several decades, adequate legislation has not been created and there has been no attempt to prosecute U.S. or foreign persons for genocide or crimes against humanity as such, even though several lawsuits have been successfully brought in federal district courts for civil sanctions against several perpetrators of such crimes. Most notably, lawsuits in the U.S. with respect to genocide, war crimes, and other criminal conduct were successful against Radovan Karadzic, who is presently being prosecuted before the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and was not prosecuted by the United States. For these reasons, it is likely that the United States remains unable to prosecute genocide or other crimes against humanity that are otherwise properly prosecutable before the ICC, whether or not the United States will also remain unwilling. Therefore, Article 17 presently poses no barrier to ICC prosecution of U.S. nationals for genocide or other crimes against humanity.

With respect to war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the United States has two sets of legislation that would allow prosecution of persons accused of war crimes. However, there have been no prosecutions of any person for war crimes in U.S. federal district courts for at least the last several decades, despite the fact that there have been

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67. See also Paust, Bassiouni, et al., supra note 8, at 152–53, 247; Paust, supra note 43, at 85; Jordan J. Paust, US Inaction: Aiding and Abetting Nazis After the Fact, JURIST (Nov. 19, 2010), http://jurist.org/forum/2010/11/us-inaction-aiding-and-abetting-nazis-after-the-fact.php (noting a disclosure in a redacted 2006 Department of Justice report that the U.S. has been a safe haven state for certain alleged Nazi accused); Tung Yin, Eric Holder: Prosecutorial Discretion and Extrajudicial Deaths, JURIST (Sept. 26, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/09/tung-yin-holder-discretion.php (questioning the lack of prosecution of alleged CIA persons with respect to the deaths of two detainees in 2002 and 2003). The U.S. has prosecuted some persons in military courts-martial for conduct that could have been charged as war crimes, but mostly merely for violations of domestic military law as such. See, e.g.,
several successful civil cases brought in U.S. courts against violators of the laws of war. The United States seems, therefore, to be generally unwilling to prosecute any person of any nationality in its federal district courts for war crimes, and Article 17 of the Rome Statute will predictably continue to pose no barrier to ICC prosecution of U.S. nationals for war crimes.

Of course, a viable and policy-serving complimentarity is within the control of the United States and could operate if the U.S. creates adequate legislation for prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity and is genuinely willing to prosecute U.S. nationals for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. New legislation and a new willingness to end impunity and abide by the rule of law would clearly be transformative. In any event, the failure to do so has clearly not protected U.S. nationals from possible jurisdiction before the International Criminal Court.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the degree of validity of prior excuses for not ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC, with the articulation of core crimes prosecutable before the ICC in Articles 6–8 of the Rome Statute and creation of the Elements of Crimes, the ten-year record of ICC practice, the creation of

PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 291–305. However, where persons have not been tried for conduct that would constitute a war crime and the U.S. has merely investigated or is investigating or prosecuting violations of domestic military law, this does not comply with ICC complimentarity set forth in Article 17(1)(a)-(b) of the Rome Statute because “the case” charged cannot be “the case” before the ICC unless it is for the same “war crime” as such. See supra note 54; see also Burke-White, supra note 50, at 78 (the case against a particular accused must involve at least “the same underlying factual events” and complimentary is inoperative if proceedings have been merely against “certain groups of suspects (such as lower level perpetrators)”; Carter, supra note 54, at 181 (“presumably the ICC would not be barred by Article 20 because the prosecution for such a minor crime of assault could be shielding the person where murder is demonstrated); Fairlie, supra note 7, at 568–69 n.240 (noting that in view of ICC practice the domestic charges must be for “precisely the same conduct that is the focus of the ICC charges.”); see also supra note 61. Moreover, use of the U.S. military justice system is “susceptible to many . . . criticisms” more generally, because the process is “focused largely on concerns of efficiency and necessity. Military LOAC [law of armed conflict] investigations are likely best understood primarily as tools to ensure good order and discipline as means to the end of military mission accomplishment rather than as means to justice, humane warfare, or even international legal compliance.” Sean Watts, Domestic Investigation of Suspected Law of Armed Conflict Violations: United States Procedures, Policies, and Practices, in 14 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 85, 104 (2012). Concerning difficulties involved in connection with military prosecutions and consequential failures to prosecute certain persons, see, e.g., Major Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Non-Deployable: The Court-Martial System in Combat from 2001 to 2009, ARMY LAW, Sept. 2010, at 12; Major John M. Hackel, Planning for the Strategic Case: A Proposal to Allow the Handling of Marine Corps War Crimes Prosecutions with Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 57 NAVAL L. REV. 239, 241–44, 248–58, 268–79 (2009).

68. See, e.g., PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 63, at 25–26, 475–76.
the Kampala definition of aggression that requires a manifest violation of
the U.N. Charter, and creation of an opt out provision with respect to the
crime of aggression that the U.S. can take advantage of, the prior excuses
have become unfounded. The fact that there are now 121 parties to the
treaty and that Article 12(2)(a) of the treaty assures that there is no
immunity of U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction over crimes covered in
Articles 6–8 that occur at least partly in the territory of one or more of 121
countries underscores the fact that a desire to protect U.S. nationals from
ICC prosecution is not a viable reason for not becoming a party to the
treaty. In reality, there are no longer any meaningful excuses.