January 2000

United States/European Union Trade Relations: The Need for a Solution to the Bovine Trade Disputes

Victoria H. Zerjav

Follow this and additional works at: http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview

Part of the European Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/12
UNITED STATES/EUROPEAN UNION TRADE RELATIONS: THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION TO THE BOVINE TRADE DISPUTES

I. INTRODUCTION

Maintaining stable social and political relations among trading countries presents the global community with an ever increasing challenge. In response to this challenge, nations, both individually and through alliances, have established a system of laws to govern trade disputes. Currently, scholarship on “international economic law” reflects the attitude of business and government toward trade issues. The standards and expectations of alliances, governments and businesses form the basis of the law and, along with arbitration, are useful in dispute resolution without resorting to the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), for assistance. Beyond the economic aspects, social, political and technological factors play influential roles in disputes and dispute settlements. The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate, using bovine trade issues, how all of these factors impact trade disputes and resolutions.

This Note examines the use of the WTO to resolve disputes between the United States and European Union. Part II addresses trade in the United States (“U.S.”) and European Union (“EU”) in the context of the governments’ relations. Part III of this Note is devoted to the history of bovine somatotropin encephalopathy (“BSE”), commonly known as “mad cow disease.” Part IV focuses on an example of the EU bovine legislation’s impact on the U.S.

This Note discusses the reasons for the trade disputes, including the U.S.’s and EU’s positions. Possible explanations for the European Union

legislation, including protectionism, cultural expectations, health and safety concerns and socio-economic power issues are addressed.

Finally, a model for future trade relations, a Trans-Atlantic Agreement, is proposed. This Note does not purport to solve the trade dispute problem. Rather, the purpose herein is to outline the many factors requiring consideration for any solution to the U.S. and EU trade disputes.

II. THE ROLE OF TRADE IN THE U.S./EU RELATIONSHIP

While other economies have been affected recently by the diminishing values of their markets, the U.S. and the EU remain strong economic powers. U.S. exports compose a large percentage of the EU imports, and the EU supplies nearly one third of all imports into the U.S. Clearly, the relationship between the countries remains very important both for the U.S. economy and for the continued growth and success of the EU. Still disputes often arise between friendly governments, however, under the veil of self-preservation. Yet, the preservation of open trade between the U.S. and EU is as important today as ever, especially because the fragile economic framework of the U.S. and EU depends upon the improvement of the relationship.

Trade disputes between the EU and the U.S. have arisen during the last ten years over products such as bananas and beef. When settled, these

5. Japan and Russia have seen substantial economic changes in their markets during 1998. See Heading for a Meltdown?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 13 (addressing the problems in the Russian and Asian economies and examining the effects on the United States markets); Russia Takes the Plunge, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 14 (exploring the attempt to “cajole” Russians into a security program in the wake of their economic despair after the collapse of the Russian economic market); Asia’s Coming Explosion, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1998, at 15 (examining the political breakdown in Asia following the economic crisis).


7. See Trade Hearings, supra note 6, at 2. Representative Barshefsky stated that the United States and European Union’s investment in each other’s countries in 1997 exceeded $750 billion, “almost perfectly balanced.” Id.

8. See Trade Hearings, supra note 6.


disputes have usually been resolved by negotiation between the two countries or by an arbitration panel. More recently, disputes have been submitted to the WTO for a determination of compliance with GATT. When the WTO determines that the measures, sanctions, or legislation of a particular country violate GATT, that country is expected to follow the guidelines of the treaty or the mandate of the WTO.

In the EU specifically, trade has been difficult as the international community has sought to overcome “internal obstacles” to accessing the European market. One example of an internal obstacle to the European Market is the European reaction to technological developments, especially in the area of food products. The EU has been
developing trade policies and regulations to make trade more accessible.\textsuperscript{17} The EU must take further steps, however, to alleviate the tension surrounding trade, including liberalizing their trade legislation.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{A. International Economic Law}

International law has evolved to address economic issues relating to trade and tariff restrictions.\textsuperscript{18} The GATT, a complex multilateral agreement signed in 1947,\textsuperscript{19} is illustrative of twentieth century attempts to establish and enforce a system of rules to help in dispute settlement, with the ultimate purpose of avoiding an international armed conflict.\textsuperscript{20}

Today, the area of international law that deals with business transactions is called “international economic law.”\textsuperscript{21} This term encompasses economic, business, and trade issues in the legal community.\textsuperscript{22} The rules and institutions that affect international economic activity include the WTO, NAFTA,\textsuperscript{23} and other institutions.\textsuperscript{24} Scholars of international economic law suggest this area of the law is very broad and includes many disciplines, affecting law in its development, application and enforcement.\textsuperscript{25} The example of beef trade between the United States and European Union is representative of their commercial relations and illustrates the breadth of complexity of this emerging system of law.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{note1} See Beaudoin, supra note 16.
\bibitem{note19} The traditional role of international law has been to address laws of war and peace and other areas of public law. International economic law impacts the private sector, affecting industries as well as governments and economies.
\bibitem{note20} See supra note 1.
\bibitem{note21} For an examination of the treaty state of the international community after the second World War, see George K. Walker \textit{Anticipatory Collective Self Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties have Said}, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 321.
\bibitem{note22} See Trachtman, supra, note 2 (evaluating the definitions of private and public international law and their application to business goals, and proposing future goals for the area of international economic law).
\bibitem{note23} See id.
\bibitem{note24} See Abbott, supra note 2. There are three identified developments in the “economic” aspect of international economic law. The first is the increased demand for consistency in national regulatory programs for trade and investment (“level playing field”). \textit{Id.} at 508. The second area of development is the convergence of environmental and economic concepts in policy making (sustainable development). \textit{See id.} at 509. The third area is the “linking of economic and social policy.” \textit{Id.} The final area is already an integral part of the European Union. \textit{See id.}
\bibitem{note25} See Abbott, supra note 2.
\end{thebibliography}
B. Bovine Somatotropin Trade Dispute

One bovine trade dispute between the U.S. and the EU has been over U.S. bovine products (milk and beef) containing the genetically engineered hormone bovine somatotropin (BST).\(^26\) Since 1987, the U.S. has been fighting to reopen the doors of the EU to U.S. beef.\(^27\) In 1988, the European Council enacted a directive\(^28\) that banned certain bovine food products, including those containing BST.\(^29\) This directive has been modified several

---

26. For the purposes of this Note, rBST (recombinant bovine somatotropin) and BST (bovine somatotropin) are the same thing, but to preserve the language of certain texts, the rBST reference may be used in footnotes, while BST is used in the text. Not only does this dispute over U.S. bovine products with BST concern the beef that entered the European Market, but the dispute also concerns the use of hormones in dairy products. See Terence P. Stewart, *The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization and the International Trade of Dairy Products*, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 55 (1999).

27. See WTO Decision, supra note 12, at 13. “In March 1987, the United States raised the issue of the EC ban under the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”).” *Id.* The United States advanced “retaliatory” measures on imports from European Union member states in 1989. These measures were not lifted until 1996 when a panel was established to examine the “rights and obligations of Parties deriving from Article 14.25 [of the TBT Agreement].” *Id.* (citing to GATT document TBT/M/Spec/7, p.9, para. 34).

28. The European Council of Ministers enacts directives only in urgent matters. See Emil Noel, *Working Together. The Institutions of the European Community Office for the Publications of the European Community*, in *THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION* 23 (J.D. Dinnage & J.F. Murphy, eds., 1996). The European Union’s legislation is developed by three bodies given power under Article 189 of the EC Treaty. *See id.* The European Commission is responsible for initiating action by proposing legislation. *See id.* at 28. The European Council of Ministers, composed of government heads, then reviews the proposals and chooses to pass the legislation by a majority, turn down the proposal, or amend the proposal by unanimous consent. *See id.* The European Parliament, composed of elected figures from each member state, then reviews the legislation and can submit its evaluations to the Council. *See id.* at 27. The Parliamentary function is not binding, though it remains politically influential. *See id.* at 28.

There are three different types of legislation in addition to the three different bodies that participate in legislative development. See Article 189, Maastricht Treaty, Feb. 7, 1992, which states: In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make reservations or deliver opinions. (1) A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. (2) A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. (3) A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.” For an official interpretation of Article 189, in part, see *Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits a Legumes v. Council*, (1962) ECR 471, (1963) CMLR 160, *in THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION*, 115 (J.D. Dinnage & J.F. Murphy, eds., 1996) (A regulation is of general scope and is directly applicable in all member states, whereas a decision is obligatory only for designated persons.); *Van Dayn v. Home Office*, (1974) ECR 1337, (1975) 1 CMLR 1, *in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION* 19 (J.D. Dinnage & J.F. Murphy, eds., 1996) (Directives may reflect a comprehensive policy in a specific area of law and cannot be invoked before the time limit for state implementation has expired.)

times, but states that no food products with genetically engineered hormone stimulants will be allowed into the EU. The European Community stated that the health and safety of its citizens was the purpose for the regulation. The result, however, is that the enforcement of the directive banned a majority of U.S. beef products. Despite the ban, the use of BST in the U.S. has increased since 1989.

BST is a naturally occurring hormone that stimulates the production of milk in cows. Early in the 1980’s, researchers found that, if injected with the genetically engineered synthetic growth hormone cows could begin producing milk younger and could produce more milk in a shorter period of time. Introduction of BST into the U.S. market spurred a great deal of controversy. Initially, BST was tested in various markets prior to FDA approval and complete investigation.

The EC Council on March 16, 1988, this directive combined previously annulled Directive 85/649/EEC, which banned the use of substances, with a 1984 proposal to control three natural growth hormones. See id. See WTO Decision, supra note 12 (providing an examination of the European Communities’ argument before the WTO); Edmund L. Andrews, In Victory for U.S., Europe Ban on Treated Beef is Ruled Illegal, NY TIMES, May 9, 1997 at A1 (purpose of the restriction in the European Union was to relieve the concern of European consumers over chemicals in food).

In 1988, the European Council measure reduced the annual export of beef and veal to the European Union by $100 million. After 1989, when the measure took effect, the exports were reduced to virtually nothing. See id. The conflict within the U.S. continued

the introduction of BST into the consumer food market. See id. at 621-26.

30. See id. at 606; Emily Marden Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone and the Courts: In Search of Justice, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 617, 619 (1998). The introduction of BST affected the milk industry, driving many smaller milk producers out of business, as they became unable to compete with these new, larger, more efficient producers. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n ’92 F.3d 67, 78 (Leval, J., dissenting).
as at least one state attempted to subtly override the federal approval of BST in the dairy industry. 39 Concern among U.S. consumers grew after FDA approval, when consumers questioned the validity of the measures and decision of the FDA. 40 Both consumers and small dairy farmers resented the swift approval of BST, which they believed to be premature. 41

As conflict grew among the states, the EU decided, without explanation, to reject the importation of hormone treated beef into its market. 42 This action was analogous to the FDA’s usual policy prior to approval of a drug. 43 However, the European Commission had no intention of ever approving BST food products, maintaining instead that health and safety concerns justified the ban. 44 The concern was that the treated animals would be more likely to

39. See, e.g. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n 92 F.3d 67. In this case, the plaintiffs challenged on First Amendment grounds a Vermont statute requiring labeling of dairy products to indicate whether or not the cows had been injected with rBST. The Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating irreparable harm and had a chance of winning on the merits of the case. See id. at 74. The court further noted that Vermont could not reasonably have claimed an interest in protecting public health because the extensive studies and conclusions of the FDA showed that no public health threat existed. See id. at 73. The court held that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate factual statement,” and suggested further that the Vermont statute was probably unconstitutional because no evidence of real harm existed. Id. at 74. The court remanded the case to the district court for entry of a proper injunction. See id.

40. See Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Wis. 1995). In Stauber, the plaintiffs, American consumers of dairy products, challenged the FDA approval of Monsanto’s patent application for a drug called Posilac, a synthetic bovine growth hormone drug. The plaintiffs claimed that the approval was arbitrary and capricious because the FDA failed to properly assess the health and safety risks of the drug, failed to place a mandatory labeling requirement upon manufacturers, and failed to adequately assess the environmental effects of Posilac’s approval. See id. at 1182. The court found that the FDA approved Posilac on November 5, 1993 despite public criticism and despite concerns of possible “negative health effects on human consumers.” Id. at 1183. The court noted, however, that a Congressional task force found the FDA position adequately supported. The court accepted the task force’s finding and concluded that the amount rBST ingested by humans “poses no significant risk to human safety” due to the pasteurizing of milk and cooking of meat that would kill 90% of the rBST, and that the hormone is “orally inactive.” Id. at 1184. The court held that the FDA’s approval did not lack an adequate basis in the records, and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See id. at 1196-97.

Some consumers, as well as scientists and environmentalists, were infuriated by the lack of FDA protection. See Marden, supra note 38, at 623. Such critics claim that FDA review of the bovine growth hormone was flawed and that particular health concerns were not addressed. See id.


43. See WTO Decision, supra note 12. The European Union Regulation 88/146/EEC, published in 1988, bans all BST products. The FDA, prior to approval of products, will normally not allow the product to enter the stream of commerce.

44. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6. Hearing testimony describes United States retaliatory measures against the European Union from 1989 until 1996. The European Council continually refused to revoke the ban on United States bovine growth hormone products, and even implemented additional legislation. See also note 27 (modifications to the initial bovine growth hormone
develop cystitis, which would then have to be treated with antibiotics that would end up in the beef and milk.\textsuperscript{45} Also, the EU defended its directive by claiming that the U.S. bovine industry was not banned from the EU entirely, because the Texas Beef industry sells non-BST beef to the EU.\textsuperscript{46}

C. The WTO Report

After FDA approval of BST, the U.S. tried to recapture the lost EU market by turning to the WTO for support.\textsuperscript{47} The U.S. claimed the European Council’s actions violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)\textsuperscript{48} of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).\textsuperscript{49} The U.S. further argued that the EU’s use of sanitation as the rationale support for the European Council’s measures affected international trade and discriminated against imports.\textsuperscript{50} The WTO formally responded to the U.S. complaint in August of 1997.\textsuperscript{51} In its initial report, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)\textsuperscript{52} clarified the reason for

\textsuperscript{45}. Antibiotics are normally used to treat the cystitis. Large number of cows injected with BST need antibiotics, which build up in the muscle tissue of the animal and are discharged in its milk. Muscle composes the majority of consumable beef. The United States maintained that antibiotics were only found in the beef and milk in “trace” amounts that would not injure the consumer. This health concern is the same which inspires U.S. consumers to purchase organic milk.

\textsuperscript{46}. Texas beef packers refused to use bovine growth hormone and were able to maintain beef trade with the EU. The continuing relationship was exploited by the EU to demonstrate that the entire United States trade market had not been targeted.

\textsuperscript{47}. The WTO Decision, supra note 12, WTO Appellate Decision, supra note 11, and WTO Arbitration Report, supra note 14, have been reviewed in recent publications. See, e.g., Peter V.F. Bos & Marco M. Slotboom, \textit{The EC Technology Transfer Regulation: A Practitioner’s Perspective}, 32 INT’L LAW. 1 (1998); Vern R. Walker, \textit{Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute}, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251 (1998). The primary focus of this Note is of the impact WTO decisions may have on the future of restrictive trade regulations, primarily between the United States and the EU.

\textsuperscript{48}. This section of GATT provides that restraints on trade are allowed if the restraints are for sanitary or phytosanitary purposes that are necessary to preserve the health and safety of the citizens of the member state. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Pmbl., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in \textit{1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION} (1995).


\textsuperscript{50}. See WTO Decision, supra note 12. The U.S. argued that if the EU banned BST products for reasons other than sanitary measures, then EU ban was in violation of the TBT Agreement. See section “Claims of the Parties” for a further description of the arguments made to the WTO.

\textsuperscript{51}. See WTO Decision, supra note 12.

\textsuperscript{52}. The Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization is the body that sits in judgment of all disputes that arise under GATT. After the Dispute Settlement Body files an initial report, the decision can be reviewed by the Appellate Body, as in the BST case, and an Appellate Report will be issued.
the European Commission’s actions. Representatives of the European Commission argued that the hormone-injected animals were not “like” other animals and, even if they were like other animals, there was no unfair bias in favor of domestic animals.\footnote{The EU argued that the BST-injected animals did not meet the requirement of being the same products imported into the EU as those within the EU. See WTO Decision, supra note 12. If the EU succeeded in this argument, then there would not be evidence of discrimination against “like products,” and there would be no violation of GATT.}

In 1997, the WTO’s DSB finally came to a decision in favor of the U.S. and other countries that had joined the complaint in the BST case.\footnote{The EU claimed that Article III(4) of GATT was not violated, and that the measures were justified by Article XX(b) concerning human and animal health. See WTO Decision, supra note 12 at 14.} The DSB found specifically that the EU had acted inconsistently with international agreements, and recommended that the European Commission’s measures be brought in conformity with its international obligations.\footnote{Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada joined the U.S.’s complaint. See Edmund L. Andrews, In Victory for U.S., Europe Ban on Treated Beef is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TIMES May 9, 1997, at A1.} The EU appealed the decision in September of 1997, claiming that the DSB had erred in its interpretation of the SPS Agreement and that risk assessment was not relevant to the trade issue.\footnote{See WTO Appellate Report, supra note 11.} The EU further argued that the desires of its constituency should be a factor considered by the WTO’s DSB.\footnote{See id. at 26-28.}

The U.S., in turn, appealed the WTO’s initial decision, seeking findings of additional violations of the SPS Agreement.\footnote{The EU argued that, as a matter of customary international law, there existed a precautionary}
Appellate Body refused to address the highly debated “precautionary principle,” stating that such an evaluation was irrelevant to the outcome of the case. The Body did conclude that the EU’s measures were not consistent with the SPS Agreement, and mandated that the EU comply with the treaty.

The U.S.’s victory has been curtailed by the EU’s failure to comply and the lack of international resources to enforce the WTO decision. Recently, a Hearing of the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee addressed this issue. In that hearing, Charlene Barshefsky, trade representative, announced that the U.S. will “not tolerate failure to comply with trade agreements or the WTO rules,” even as the U.S. embarks on a Trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership trade agreement with the EU.

Barshefsky also emphasized the importance of the U.S./EU trade relationship and continued cooperation.

III. THE HISTORY OF BOVINE SOMATOTROPIN ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)

When examining the present trade dispute between the U.S. and EU, it is important to note the international foundation for the dispute. Fear of “mad cow disease” was prevalent throughout the international beef market in the 1990’s, when the United Kingdom faced a cumbersome of cow’s brain. The form of the disease that affects humans is called Creutzfeld Jakob Disease.
(“CJD”) and is terminal, working quickly to destroy the brain. The reaction of the EU was to enact legislation that regulated imported and intra-community bovine materials and placed a ban on British beef. The U.S. took similar measures that included a ban on Canadian beef.

A. Mad Cow Disease in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom’s first reported case of BSE was in 1986. From that point on, the United Kingdom took measures to restrict the spread of the disease. These efforts intensified once scientists determined that contaminated feed containing animal parts caused the disease. As scientists learned more about the disease, they discovered a link between BSE and CJD and the European Commission and other non-member states banned the import of United Kingdom beef.

United Kingdom beef has been banned from the EU since 1996. The British beef ban has created tension within the European community, especially since the United Kingdom has complied with EU directives and public health measures. The United Kingdom filed suit against the EU in the European Court of Justice to lift the ban. The most recent decision, on May 5, 1998, dismissed the United Kingdom’s complaint asking that the temporary emergency measures be lifted for policy reasons. The court denied the appeal because of public health concerns.

By contrast, the United Kingdom is largely concerned with its beef industry and the economic welfare of its people. Grazing lands are being

69. See Dolly the Sheep Helps Battle for BSE Cure, BIRMINGHAM POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at 28. The disease is characterized by the mutation of prions, or brain proteins and is called scrapie in sheep. See id. The duration of the illness is six months or less. See generally DONALD VOET & JUDITH G. VOET, BIOCHEMISTRY 1026-28.

70. The United States restricted the importation of Canadian beef because the country received shipments of beef from the United Kingdom. 104 CONG. REC. S3159 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996).


72. See id. at *9.

73. See sources cited supra note 70. By 1996, ten people had died of the human form of BSE, although thousands of cows had been slaughtered because of potential contamination and as of October 1998, 28 people had died of the disease in the United Kingdom.

74. See United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1998 ECLI CLEX LEXIS 4915, at *12.

75. See id. at *14.

76. See id.

77. See id. at *66.

78. See id. at *59-63.

79. As one commentator noted, “the livelihoods of thousands [of farmers] are at stake and their plight could not only affect what we eat but also the look of the British landscape.” James Meikle, Farmers Despair as Livings Collapse with the Crashing Markets, GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 1998, at 4.
converted into crop land, creating new problems for farmers. The rate of suicide among farmers in the United Kingdom has increased since the ban on British beef began in 1996. The devastation of the British beef industry has led to violations of EU law as smugglers have attempted to bring banned beef into the EU market. The United Kingdom claims that the beef is now safe and BSE has been eradicated, but both the EU and the world beef market remain cautious about opening the doors to British beef.

B. The Human Strain of BSE

A motivating factor for the world ban upon British beef was the connection between BSE and Creutzfeld Jakob Disease, a human strain of spongiform encephalopathy. Scientists have discovered BSE is transmissible to humans through certain risk materials in infected cows. The disease’s long incubation period in both humans and animals creates difficulty in researching and identifying the origin of the disease. The progression of the disease is similar in cows and humans. In both cows and humans, the disease causes deterioration of brain tissue, creating holes, leaving the brain looking much like a sponge. Both the human and bovine forms of the disease highly
transmissible.\textsuperscript{87}

Due to the nature of the illness, it is difficult to determine if the British beef ban and the regulation of bovine materials in the EU has been effective in retarding the spread of BSE and CJD. The continued risk of contracting a terminal human disease is, however, a viable health and safety concern. Thus, the international community is not in violation of any treaties in regulating potentially tainted beef or risk materials.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{C. European Union Regulations}

The EU enacted an emergency measure in March 1996 to protect its member countries against BSE from the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{89} This decision banned British beef products from the EU, and was stricter than any prior regulation or decision concerning British beef or bovine materials.\textsuperscript{90} This measure was only the beginning of increased bovine regulations. Fear of the human health repercussions of BSE led to additional legislation, some of which has been followed by the member states, and some of which has not.\textsuperscript{91} The EU has regulated the movement of bovine animals in the community, the marketing and veterinary care of bovine animals, and the trading of bovine products, from ovaries and sperm to gelatins and non-beef products.

\textsuperscript{87} See John Von Radowitz, \textit{Tonsil Test Offers Hope of Early Warning on CJD}, SCOTSMAN, Jan. 15, 1999, at 2, available in 1999 WL 5806464. “[P]roteins that spread the disease cannot be cleaned from surgical instruments no matter how thoroughly they are sterilised.” Id.

\textsuperscript{88} The banning of British beef due to concern about BSE has been upheld in the Court of European Justice. See sources cited supra note 70. Additionally, the issue of banning beef out of concern about BSE has not been contested in the WTO. It appears that health and safety concerns about food products are considered more justifiable when the effect upon human health is clear, as with BSE.

\textsuperscript{89} Commission Directive 96/239, 1996 O.J. (L 78) 47.


\textsuperscript{91} The non-compliance has been largely confined to individuals acting against their own government’s mandates. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
from slaughtered animals.

D. United States’ Reaction to BSE

As in other areas of the world, the U.S. reacted to BSE by banning British beef from the U.S. market. Newspaper articles, talk shows, and trade discussions reflected the U.S.’s fear of BSE. Discussions of whether or not to eat beef accompanied proposed travel to European countries, especially the United Kingdom. The reaction of the domestic beef market soon became a promotion of “BSE free” U.S. beef.

Recently, a popular television program faced a civil lawsuit filed by the Texas beef industry for slander when BSE was mentioned in connection with U.S. beef on the program. On March 28, 1996, the day after the European Commission decided to ban British beef, the U.S.’s Senate proposed a ban on Canadian beef because Canada had received shipments of British beef. This reaction is similar to the EU’s in ban on all British beef from the rest of the member states.

IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S BAN OF COSMETICS DUE TO BSE

In the E.C. directive proposed in March 1998, the EU proposed a ban on cosmetic products containing certain bovine risk materials produced after April 1, 1998 from the European marketplace. This directive bans specified

---

92. Oprah Winfrey, a popular American talk show host, hosted a program titled “Dangerous Food” in which American beef was discussed in relation to BSE. See Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2000).

93. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6.

94. See Texas Beef Group, 201 F.3d 680, 682.

95. 104 CONG. REC. S3159 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996). This measure was proposed in order to retaliate against Canada for banning all U.S. grain, including Midwest grain, from Canada due to karnal bunt found in Arizona.

96. The U.S. claimed that the regulation of bovine products should not apply to them because of the reliability of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) research. However, the U.S. uses the same tactics as the EU. For example, the U.S. banned Canadian beef after Canada banned US. grains. See supra note 95. Both countries justified the bans by noting possible health threats. The Canadian legislation appears to be a retaliatory measure against the U.S., yet the U.S. is not “tolerating” any protectionism on the part of the EU.


“Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the cosmetic products containing the substances set out in the Annex cannot be placed on the Market from 1 April 1998. This does not apply to products produced before 1 April 1998. Member states may retain in force those measures implementing Directive 97/1/EC until 1 April 1998.”

Id.
risk materials (SRMs) including gelatins, tissues and fluids from the encephalon, the spinal cord, and the eyes. These materials, the E.C. suggests, are dangerous due to the potential spread of BSE. However, the EU Farm Council has decided to postpone the ban on SRMs until a further determination can be made as to whether the risk materials actually host BSE. Additionally, the European Council refused to enact the Commission legislation as it was drafted and has yet to approve new legislation proposed by the European Commission. One explanation for this postponement is the ban’s extensive effect on the pharmaceutical, cosmetic, and even tire industries, as well as its potential ill effects on international beef trade.

This delay has given the U.S. a brief period of time to determine what measures must be taken in order to maintain desired relations with the EU. The U.S. has won a preliminary trade dispute with the EU on the use of tallow in cosmetic products. The tallow trade negotiations stopped the EU from halting the U.S.’s one hundred million dollar per year trade in cosmetics with the EU. The dispute is not over, however, because the communities have not come to an agreement as to gelatine materials from cows.

---

98. See Commission Directive 97/1, 1997 O.J. (L 16) 85 (amending Directive 76/786 to prohibit, temporarily, the use of bovine tissues and fluids from the encephalon, the spinal cord and the eyes in cosmetic products in the EU market).
100. See Mad Cow Disease: Farm Council Defies Commission, Delays Ban on SRMs Until 1999, EUROPEAN REPORT, Apr. 4, 1998 (“EU Agricultural Ministers decided on March 31 to postpone a ban on specified risk materials (SRM) from cattle until January 1, 1999.”) [hereinafter Farm Council Defies Commission].
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. “The United States, which has no reported cases of BSE, has complained that the cost of removing SRMs from billions of Dollars (sic) of meat exports every year would be excessive.” Id. See also Trade Hearing, supra note 6
104. See Mad Cow Disease: Tallow Safer than Gelatine, Says Scientific Steering Committee, EUR. REP., Feb. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8800710. Scientists remain cautious of deeming gelatines safe, and consider three issues: the risk of human exposure to BSE from direct consumption of potentially infective material; the risk incurred in being exposed to processed infective material such as tallow (use[d] in making soaps, candles and machinery grease, for example) and gelatine (used in cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and food additives); and the risk of infection through recycling infective material via its use in animal feed. Id.
105. See Beef Export Fraud, supra note 82 at 2.
A. Effects of the European Union’s Legislation on the United States Beef Industry

A EU cosmetics ban would place the U.S. beef industry in a greater uproar than that caused by the BST ban, primarily because the U.S. bovine industry claims that there is no BSE in the U.S. The passing of the EU directive would take away a market for the bovine materials referred to as specified risk materials (SRMs). Some of the E.C. specified products currently move in U.S. trade, originating in the beef industry. The money lost by the beef industry alone would amount to millions of U.S. dollars annually. Small dairy farmers cannot afford to lose the export market in these bovine by-products.

B. Effects of the European Union’s Legislation on the United States’ Pharmaceutical and Cosmetic Industries

The E.C.’s proposed legislation would prohibit billions of dollars worth of U.S. cosmetics from entering the EU market. The EU claims that U.S. cosmetics present a risk of Creutzfeld-Jakob because U.S. cosmetic manufacturers use SRMs in their products. Yet, the U.S. claims that there is no reported BSE in the U.S. If this is true, the ban of U.S. products does not make sense as a protection of human health and is thus an unnecessary restriction on trade. If there is no BSE in the U.S., whether SRMs could harbor BSE is irrelevant because U.S. produced materials are not contaminated.

C. Implications of Postponement for the United States

The U.S. is likely to retaliate if the EU passes the proposed legislation. The U.S.’s response to postponement was evident in a trade subcommittee hearing in the House of Representatives. In her testimony, Charlene

---


107. In light of the financial strain the BST has placed on the smaller milk producers and cattle farmers, the reduction of the market for bovine by-products in the U.S. could prove to be more harmful than some farmers are capable of enduring economically. See Marden, supra note 40.

108. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6.

109. The WTO was formed for the purpose of avoiding unilateral actions to enforce the GATT. See Julie Goldman, Bad Lawyer or Ulterior Motive? Why the United States Lost the Film Case Before the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 417, 417 (1999). The U.S. may take the issue to the WTO (although that is a time consuming prospect) or it may pass equally damaging restrictions on trade with the EU. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6.

110. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6.
Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative, reporting on the WTO’s decision affecting trade relations, stated that the U.S. would take action with respect to the cosmetic ban because such directives “would not be tolerated” by the U.S. During the hearing, a Trans-Atlantic partnership was proposed that would address this trade issue and other concerns about the EU relationship.

The postponement of the enactment of such trade-limiting legislation merely postpones the inevitable trade war. Only by the cooperative efforts of the U.S. and EU governments can a trade war be avoided. The Transatlantic trade agreements may be a solution for the U.S. and EU, providing an opportunity to work together and resolve the bovine disputes.

Most importantly, postponement of the EU legislation restricting cosmetics containing SRMs gives the U.S. time to resolve the situation through negotiation. Should trade negotiation not lead to a solution, the postponement also gives the U.S. an opportunity to prepare a proper response to the legislation, whether through compliance or trade retaliation. These possible responses will be explored in detail below, but cannot be fully understood without consideration of the reasons for the proposed legislation.

V. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COSMETIC LEGISLATION AND OTHER BOVINE TRADE DISPUTES

A. Protectionism

The U.S.’s first reaction to a new trade restriction is to claim that the restriction is a protectionist measure. The restriction in this case affects $4.5 billion in trade of U.S. cosmetics. The U.S.’s contention that there is

---

111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Farm Council Defies Commission, supra note 100. By working together to come to an understanding of trade requirements, the U.S. and EU were able to stop the banning of tallow regulations, and postpone the date of gelatine material regulation. See id.
114. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6.
115. See id. The continued trade discussions are currently taking place, allowing the parties to come to an agreement on gelatine and other materials.
116. See Gary Yerkey & J. Kirwin, U.S. Meet Again in Attempt to Avert Trade War over Farm Products, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. 688 (1997) (explaining that the U.S. threatened to ban over $300 million in EU meat for safety reasons in retaliation for failing to come to an agreement on trade issues); Both compliance and retaliation have been used in the past by the U.S., such as when the U.S. turned to the WTO to resolve the BST trade dispute.
117. See Barry James, A Trans-Atlantic Beef: EU Threatens U.S. Meat Ban Over Inspections, Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 19, 1997, at 1 (Washington described the cosmetics ban by the EU as protectionist).
118. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6.
no BSE in the U.S., if true, would support the theory that the ban is a protectionist, unnecessary restriction on trade. 119

The EU’s traditional response that the measure is equally applicable to member states and third parties has not been accepted by the international community. 120 This argument has been rejected by the EU’s own courts, primarily because protectionism is still discriminatory. 121 The EU courts’ reasoning is analogous to the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause, 122 and its restrictions on states’ unfair trade practices. 123 The basic treaty of the EU 124 provides that the EU member states may not restrict trade between states. 125 Exceptions to this standard rule allow restriction of trade for several specific reasons, most importantly to protect human health. 126 Still, these exceptions to free trade may not be used as “arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.” 127 Similarly, in the U.S., a restriction may be

119. See Tore Wilhelmsen As v. Oslo Kommune, [1997] 3 CMLR 823 at 869 (State monopoly on beer is incompatible with Article 16 of the EEZ; there is no right to discriminate between domestic products and Member States’ products). See also Steven J. Rothberg, Note, From Beer to BST: Circumventing the GATT Standards Code’s Prohibition on Unnecessary Obstacles to Trade, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 505, 511-17 (1990).


121. See id. at 4-5. The EU ruled that certain regulations of German beer were unnecessary restrictions on trade, even though the restriction applies equally to member states and third countries.

122. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause provides: “Congress shall have the Power . . . [3] To regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes.” Id.

123. See Rothberg, supra note 119, at 529. Rothberg examines Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), in which the court held that regardless of the purported health and safety concerns of the City of Madison, there must be legitimate reasons for imposing the standards or requirements. See Sean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354-56. Although the legislation in Dean Milk appeared to be neutral on its face, it discriminated against the movement of interstate commerce. Id. The court further stated that it did not matter that the state of Wisconsin was equally burdened as other states; the issue was the discrimination against other states. Id. This Note will pursue this analysis further with respect to the argument of the EU that its restriction falls equally upon member states and third parties.


127. See id. Article 36 states in whole:

Id.
invalid although it applies equally to the legislating state and other states.128

B. Safeguarding of Cultural Values

The EU argued in its appeal to the WTO that public perception should be a factor in legislative assessment.129 In essence, the EU essentially argued that the public should be able to determine the level of protection from their own governing body. This assertion is a cultural argument as well as a legal one. The members of the EU may have a cultural predisposition towards naturally processed and untainted food products. A recent article examined the cultural aspects of the European BST restrictions,130 focusing on natural food preparation processes that often are considered unsanitary by U.S. standards.131 Standard U.S. food preparation is considered “processing” by EU standards.132 These cultural differences may be the basis for the EU allowing natural and traditional processing techniques and cautioning against technological processes and “novel” foods.133

The cultural differences are not as clear or distinct, however, when applied to the recent cosmetic legislation.134 The relevant difference could be identified as the European distaste for mass production. Today, however, in light of the number of European and international consumers, EU production of items such as cosmetic products needs to progress at high rates to keep up with the market. This high demand within the EU and the cultural expectation of natural items may conflict with each other. It is necessary, in order to meet the demand without imported “processed” items, for the European industries to produce in mass quantities. Thus, the EU cannot reasonably claim that cultural distaste for mass production justifies its ban on U.S. bovine products.

An alternative argument of the EU is the support of European preference for traditional instead of technological methods of processing.135 This is a

128. See supra note 121.
129. See WTO Appellate Decision, supra note 10 at 14.
131. See id. at 531 & n.31.
132. See id. at 531-32 & n.30. The article suggests that the cultural differences between the U.S. and the EU are the reasons for the excessive legislation enacted by the EU. See id.
133. See id. at 543.
134. Professor Echols’s article primarily addressed the cultural aspects of food, not the cultural aspects of cosmetics or other products. See id.
135. The genetic engineering argument is a difficult one to address. The growth of genetically engineered materials is fast-paced and consuming, covering many aspects of trade. See Bill Lambrecht, Critics Vilify New Seed Technology that Monsanto may Soon Control, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1998, at A1 (new genetic technology will render the seeds of crops sterile so
rational basis for disfavoring U.S.’s cosmetic products, but it is less persuasive when the disputed item is a natural substance. Regardless of how a cosmetic is actually produced, when the restriction applies to the ingredients, here the bovine gelatins, only the ingredients are culturally significant. Where the disputed ingredients are not genetically altered or hormone injected bovine products but natural bovine products that have been used for years in the manufacturing of cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, the “natural” cultural argument breaks down. Moreover, it would be difficult to argue that the European Community has a unique cultural predisposition to keep BSE (or SRMs) out of its products, especially since BSE is “an agreed risk.”

Alternatively, the EU or cultural difference supporters might assert that the BSE epidemic is the result of altering nature. The traditional cultural expectations of the European community suggest that the products produced and purchased within the community are natural, meaning untainted. For example, when BSE was first detected in the United Kingdom, the origin was determined to be the mashed sheep parts in the bovine feed. Cows do not normally eat animal parts, so the spread of the disease can be attributed to “unnatural” human interference. This line of reasoning helps explain the EU’s extensive legislation protecting against a repeat of the BSE episode in the United Kingdom. Although the explanation for food product legislation is now clear, there is still no evidence of how the cultural argument applies to cosmetics, or whether such an explanation matters in the world trade community.

Farmers are only able to use genetically engineered seeds. Two specific areas affected by advancements in technology are cosmetics and pharmaceuticals. See Juan Enriquez, Genomics and the World’s Economy; Policy Forum: Genomics, 281 Science 925 (1998). The world is facing a great deal of change, as well as risks, with the development of genetic engineering. See id. Three key risks include the effect of rising and falling technology companies on the international stock market, failure to fully review and test products because of pressure to introduce the products into the economy, and knowledge gaps that could lead to problems such as the recent mad cow disease crisis in the United Kingdom.” See id.

136. See Echols, supra note 130, at 542.
137. Since cows are vegetarians, such an alteration of their food supply appears inconsistent with EU cultural expectations as described in Professor Echols’s article. See supra note 130-134 and accompanying text.
138. See Echols, supra note 130, at 540-43. Altering nature is a prevalent topic in the media today. The EU’s legislation appears to support the theory that European’s prefer natural products, especially since they do not know what the future will bring alterations in nature. An “epidemic” similar to the BSE crisis could happen again in any context, from tainted tomatoes to genetically modified soybeans. See Connor, supra note 84.
139. Echols suggests that the cultural explanation does not satisfy the world trade community, but offers a tangible reasoning. See Echols, supra note 130.
cosmetic legislation because cosmetics are not food products. Additionally, the alternative to the bovine gelatins in the cosmetic products is a bioengineered product called Xgel FS. Without bovine products, cosmetics manufacturers will have to use this synthetic substitute, resulting in cosmetics that are inconsistent with the cultural traditions of the European Union.

C. Health and Safety Concerns

Finally, health and safety may be a legitimate reason for the EU cosmetic legislation if scientific findings support the potential danger of bovine gelatines. Scientific analysis must determine the potential for BSE contamination of the SRMs as well as whether the use of SRMs in pharmaceutical and cosmetic products could actually cause the human form of BSE. The WTO might decide that the concern and the restriction on trade of such products is valid, but only for products whose ingredients or risk ingredients originate in a state that has BSE. The U.S. contention that there is no BSE in the U.S., however, undermines the argument that the restriction is purely not for health and safety concerns.

Additionally, postponement by the European Community is inconsistent with purported health and safety concerns. If it was genuinely concerned about the introduction of contaminated products into the market, the EU would probably not wait to enact the pertinent legislation. Further, the cows that will be used after March 1999 should be healthy BSE-free animals, even if they come from the United Kingdom. These two factors make the EU’s

---

140. See supra note 139. The issue on the cosmetics legislation may boil down to the argument that the total risks from U.S. cosmetics are unknown.

141. See Bioprogress Acquisition of DHA Nutrition Expands Product Line, Adds Distribution, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 11, 1998 (examination of biologically engineered products that replace bovine gelatins in pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, specifically, the XGel FS process for soft capsules).

142. These “ifs” have yet to be resolved by scientists. This is purportedly one of the explanations for the postponement of the enactment of the cosmetic legislation.

143. Although there is no evidence that conflicts with the U.S.’s contention that is it BSE free, CJD and scrapie are not foreign to the U.S. In March 1999, at least two individuals have been diagnosed with CJD, both of whom were deer hunters (one from Missouri and one from Utah). The prion-related diseases have been present for at least 15 years in the U.S. as evidenced by the research of Dr. Prusiner. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

144. It is important to note that one of the European concerns is that the British hid the tainted beef problem in the 1980s and it is not clear whether the United States, or any other nation is doing, or has done, the same. Additionally, the BSE has been found in Switzerland, an unsuspected locale. The EU can dispute the argument that BSE is not presently in the U.S. by emphasizing the lack of knowledge about the disease.

145. The killing of animals in the late 1980s should have removed the risk of BSE from the United Kingdom. All animals under 30 months old (the five year latency period of BSE in cows) were slaughtered. All of the at-risk cows were not slaughtered, however. This could be an explanation for a continued risk in the United Kingdom.
health and safety argument less convincing. The longer the legislation is postponed, the less convinced the world population will be that it is a valid health restriction.

D. Socio-Economic Power

Similar to the protectionism theory, this theory suggests that the EU has an interest in dominating the world market. It is not interested in producing everything; rather, the EU is interested in regulating products to meet the community’s standards. The EU’s extensive and redundant legislation of bovine products supports this theory.

This hypothesis is further supported by the timing of the proposal. Because of the WTO decision of August 1997, and the subsequent “temporary” banning of cosmetics, it is possible that the actions of the European Commission are retaliatory in nature. The Appellate Report of the beef hormone case issued in February of 1998, the same month as the new legislation. The European Commission may be seeking to obtain much greater control in the world marketplace than the Community presently holds. The continual revision of bovine legislation is merely one example of the way in which initially reasonable restrictions on trade are modified and enhanced, subtly, to the point where the restrictions unnecessarily encumber trade. Further, the initial purpose of banning BST products was socio-economic, not health-related. The purpose of the cosmetic legislation may be the same.

VI. FUTURE TRADE IMPLICATIONS

Failing to work together will have repercussions for both the U.S. and the EU. For example, enforcement of the proposed cosmetic legislation may result in U.S.’s retaliation, or may cause the U.S. to seek assistance from the WTO. Since the U.S. and EU depend upon each other for a substantial

146. See WTO Appellate Decision, supra note 11.
147. See Rothberg, supra note 123, at 530-36.
148. See Refusal to Include Hormone in the List of Substances not Subject to MRLs Condemned, EU FOCUS, July 16, 1998, at 13.
149. This prospect seems likely in view of the fact that the U.S. reacted in this did to Canada’s restriction on grains. See, e.g.s Karl Tao Greenfield, Banana Wars, A Trade Fight over Fruit Threatens to Spread to Other Food Groups, Clothes, and even Hobbies, TIME, Feb. 8, 1999, at 42. For more detailed information, see supra notes 95-97.
150. Turning to the WTO for assistance is usually a last resort. See Trade Hearings, supra note 6. Nevertheless, the U.S. may seek WTO intervention as the U.S. did in the BST trade dispute. See WTO Decision, supra note 12.
amount of trade each year, it would be in the economic and diplomatic interests of both communities to reach a compromise on the trade issues. This is particularly important because it is not clear how the WTO would decide this issue.

A. Essential Elements of a Trade Agreement

If the U.S. and EU do choose to work together and enact the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade Agreement, they may be able to come to an understanding beneficial to both governments and their citizens. In order for such a pact to be successful, especially in the case of the bovine regulations, the countries must come to an agreement regarding when a trade issue or dispute poses a genuine health and safety concern. It is important, in order to eliminate the scientific differences and disagreements, that the communities set consistent and equivalent standards of regulation to allow products accepted by the FDA to avoid re-inspection, testing, and additional approval procedures.

Other specific issues that need to be addressed include product standards, pre-dispute procedures, early dispute settlement, and post-dispute resolution. The most controversial of these issues is product standards, because this would require addressing all of the cultural and health concerns, as well as the scientific differences discussed in detail in this Note. But, by establishing minimum standards, both the EU and the U.S. can seek to meet minimum requirements and develop a method for dealing with specific requirements. To avoid extended controversy when a dispute arises, such as the BST dispute over the side effects of BST, in compliance with the product standard the U.S. manufacturer should first meet a minimum research time or quality requirement aligned with the agreement that is specific to “scientific discoveries” for particular end products. That is, the requirement may be specific for food, cosmetics, or the like. As long as the relevant research and

151. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6.
152. See Ryan David Thomas, Note, Where’s the Beef? Mad Cows and the Blight of the SPS Agreement, 32 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 487, 510-16 (1999). This author argues that the WTO would uphold the ban on SRMs would be upheld by the WTO under the SPS agreement. Id. at 510-11. He bases his argument primarily on the identifiable risks of the materials in food products. Id. at 510-13. However, the concern in relation to pharmaceutical products is that they may be far enough removed from “food products.” Additionally, concerns remains about the validity of the scientific research that has been performed to date.
153. To provide a workable model for the Trans-Atlantic Trade Agreement, the U.S. and EU should look to existing trade agreements, such as NAFTA. NAFTA addresses similar trade concerns, providing a model to deal with scientific, cultural, and health concerns. See NAFTA, Chapter seven: Agricultural and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures. See also Part III, Chapter nine: Standards Related Measures.
findings are disclosed upon introduction of the product to the EU market, then the EU’s equivalent to the FDA can review the research. The agreement would outline a maximum time of review after which the product will be introduced to the European market. If the EU objects to the methods or results of the research for health and safety reasons, then the burden should be upon the manufacturer to prove that the product is safe for human consumption. If the EU rejects the product again, then, at the request of either party, the issue should be submitted to an arbitration panel composed of representatives from the U.S., EU, and a neutral third party. The research should then be examined to determine if it meets the standards and requirements of the agreement. If the research meets the standards outlined, and the panel determines that there is no health and safety concern, then the product should be introduced to the EU market. This process should also apply if the U.S. questioned EU products.

The purpose of this method is to decrease, or eliminate, ex post facto product bans and retaliatory tariff increases. The agreement would require the parties to define reasons for rejecting products that are in accordance with the agreement. Also, manufacturers from the EU and from the U.S. will know exactly what “validation requirements” must be met to market the products. This agreement should also include a provision, similar to NAFTA’s, requirement that the review procedure for internal products be the same as that for external products.

The purpose of this agreement differs from that of NAFTA. The EU has different objectives and remains one of the three largest world competitors. This proposed agreement differs from the WTO, also, because it is a supplemental agreement designed to implement a procedure to ultimately avoid trade disputes arising with products. The agreement does allow for restrictions upon market access, but only for valid reasons. And the agreement should be relatively narrow and brief. NAFTA, however, is extensive and took years to implement. The NAFTA discussions began in the 1980’s, yet the treaty was not completed until August, 1993, with supplements in 1995. See The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 1993 W.L. 561124 (N.A.F.T.A.); Nafta Supplemental Agreement, available in 1995 WL 522861 (N.A.F.T.A.).

154. A suggested maximum length of time for review would be under six months. The manufacturer would then have three to six months to introduce further evidence that the product meets certain standards outlined in the agreement.

155. For example, the U.S. should not review European Products more strictly than American products, and the EU should not review American products more strictly than European products. If the standard is high, in general, then there is no unfair trade practices. In contrast, the different standards of review would indicate discrimination, which should be per se unfair and invalid trade practice under the new agreement.

156. The primary purpose of this proposed agreement is to determine standards and methods to avoid trade disputes arising with products. The agreement does allow for restrictions upon market access, but only for valid reasons. And the agreement should be relatively narrow and brief. NAFTA, however, is extensive and took years to implement. The NAFTA discussions began in the 1980’s, yet the treaty was not completed until August, 1993, with supplements in 1995. See The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 1993 W.L. 561124 (N.A.F.T.A.); Nafta Supplemental Agreement, available in 1995 WL 522861 (N.A.F.T.A.). The purpose of NAFTA was to begin “free trade” among the United States, Canada and Mexico. See NAFTA, supra note 4 at Part I, Chapter One: Objectives.
stop the trade disputes before they trigger WTO Dispute Settlement Body interference.\(^\text{157}\) When a settlement is not forthcoming in a dispute, then the WTO would be available to resolve the issue.\(^\text{158}\) That is, when the arbitration panel fails to come to an understanding, or the decision of the arbitrator is not implemented and the agreement is violated, then the party seeking to enforce the agreement could turn to the WTO for assistance.\(^\text{159}\)

**B. Proposed Trans-Atlantic Treaty**

This Note will not set forth specific text for the proposed treaty. However, the text should be taken in part from elements of NAFTA that are familiar to and have been successful for the U.S. The Preamble\(^\text{160}\) of the treaty should introduce the parties to the treaty and define the purposes for entering into the agreement as well as the benefits of entering into the treaty.\(^\text{161}\) The first

---

157. The creation of a basic agreement will assist in minor dispute settlement and address major concerns in an efficient and effective manner. Timeliness is most essential for some of the new products and scientific discoveries. The present situation is not efficient for solving timely issues. See, e.g., *WTO Decision*, supra note 12. The time table demonstrates the 2 years it took to come to a decision which still has not resolved the issue.

158. By entering into this agreement, the U.S. and the EU would not be turning away from the WTO as a dispute settlement body, but would be forming standards and an arbitration Panel, as has often been formed in the past. The difference with this panel is that it will settle multiple disputes under one theme: trade disputes between the U.S. and the EU.

159. For an in depth examination of problems surrounding the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the Appellate Body, especially with regard to the Beef Hormone dispute, see Hughes, *Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormone Decision*, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 915, 1999. Such problems with the WTO Dispute settlement process validate the need for an agreement to solve trade disputes before appealing to the WTO for assistance. See also Joergens, Konstantin J. *True Appellate Procedure or Only a Two-Stage Process? A Comparative View of the Appellate Body under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding*, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 193 (1999).

160. See The NAFTA Supplemental Agreements between the Government of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the Mexican States North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Preamble, *available in* 1993 WL 792463 (N.A.F.T.A.). The language of the treaty has been changed to address the issue present in the agreement proposed here.

161. **PREAMBLE**

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the European Union:

Convinced of the importance of the continued relationship in trade matters and the essential role in cooperation in these areas in achieving sustainable development for the well-being of present and future generations;

Reaffirming the sovereign right of States to protect their citizens from health or physical safety harm pursuant to their own product and scientific requirements and their responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the citizens of other states or of individuals beyond the control of national jurisdiction;

Recognizing the interrelationship of their trade policies;

Acknowledging the growing economic and social links between them;
chapter should set forth the objectives of the agreement.\textsuperscript{162} The second chapter should address “National Treatment and Market Access for Goods,”\textsuperscript{163} defining both scope and coverage (Article I)\textsuperscript{164} and national treatment (Article II).

The third chapter should address the more substantive issues of Standards-Related Measures.\textsuperscript{165} The fourth chapter of the Trans-Atlantic agreement should address “Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures.”\textsuperscript{166} Although this is a skeleton format, these are the areas of greatest concern and impact to be addressed in a Trans-Atlantic Treaty between the U.S. and the EU. By establishing initial standards and

\begin{itemize}
  \item Reaffirming the importance of trade goals and objectives of the GATT and WTO;
  \item Emphasizing the importance of public participation in producing quality and useful products and enhancing the quality of products presently available;
  \item Noting the existence of differences in their respective cultural expectations, and health and safety standards;
  \item Recalling their desire to support and build on international trade agreements and existing policies and laws, in order to promote cooperation between them; and
  \item Convinced of the benefits to be derived from a framework, including an Agreement, a cooperative Commission, and an Arbitration panel, to facilitate effective cooperation on the research and review of trade products, continued preservation of health and safety of its citizens, and enhancement of quality of life in their territories;
\end{itemize}

Have agreed as follows:

\textsuperscript{162.} Chapter 1: Objectives
The objectives of this Agreement are to:
  \begin{itemize}
  \item foster the protection and improvement of trade relations in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations;
  \item promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive trade and regulatory policies and standards;
  \item Support the trade goals and objectives of the GATT.
  \item Avoid creating trade disputes or new trade barriers;
  \item Strengthen the cooperation on the development and improvement of product standards, regulations, procedures, policies and practices;
  \item Enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, trade laws and regulations;
  \item Promote transparency and public and private participation in the development of trade practices, policies and regulations and product standards;
  \item Promote economically efficient review and regulation measures; and
  \item Promote prevention of violation, dispute settlement, and remedial measures.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{164.} See id. at Article 300.
\textsuperscript{165.} See id. at Article 301.
trade requirements, the U.S. and the EU will be able to conform both culturally and in industrial technology and development. Eventually, the standards could become as predictable as the requirements for FDA Approval in the U.S.

The European Commission has already begun a similar, albeit unilateral, process with respect to its member nations. The latest proposed regulation regarding consumer protection from animal diseases attempts to outline regulation guidelines for determinations of potential danger of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). This proposed regulation addresses the important issues underlying these trade disputes. If the U.S. integrates the process already begun in the EU into the proposed treaty, the process of aligning the communities’ interests will commence.

C. Problems with Compromise

The U.S. will have to make concessions in coming to an agreement with the EU on product standards. In turn, the EU would allow FDA approved drugs or food into the EU market. An underlying requirement of this compromise is that the two governments adopt the same objectives. I propose that the objectives should be to protect the physical health of the community while promoting economic growth and scientific truths.

Unfortunately, this type of cooperative trade practice has proven difficult. Although the time may be approaching when the U.S. and EU

---

168. 1999 OJ C 45. The European Commission proposed a regulation entitled “Proposal for European Parliament and Council Regulation laying down rules for the prevention and control of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies.” Id. This regulation attempts to set forth guidelines for determining when a BSE danger exists, identifying BSE free countries and regions, and creating rules for preventing the spread of TSEs. This proposed regulation specifically does not apply to “cosmetic or medicinal products.” See id. at Article 1, paragraph 2(a).

169. See Franz X. Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. INT’L & COMP. L. 515, 582 (1998) (explaining that the United States excludes imports of food products containing more pesticides than tolerated by United States legislation). Similarly, the EU does not allow food products with more maximum residue limits (MRLs) than EU legislation allows. An example of compromise on product standards would be the U.S. allowing cheese considered acceptable by the EU’s health and safety standards into the U.S. market.

170. A genuine concern for the U.S. government and people is whether or not the present issue of the cosmetics regulation is a valid BSE threat. See Barbara McMahon, US Considers Blood Ban over Mad Cow Fears, EVENING STANDARD, Jan. 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL 564666. The U.S. is not accepting blood donations from individuals who are from Britain or visited Britain during the height of the BSE fright. See id. Clearly, the U.S. sees the concern over the BSE epidemic as serious and is now trying to protect its own people. See id. See also Alicia Ault, FDA Urged to Defy Donations by UK Residents, LANCET, Jan. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9762247.

171. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 231, 234 (1997). “Most governments want to be able to ban the importation of goods embodying standards that do not meet their chosen
will adopt uniform requirements and agree to a set of standards for products, determining same requirements will not be simple. The underlying reasons for the current trade problem will not disappear merely because compromise is sought. In forming the agreement the U.S. and the EU will undoubtedly strive to maintain individualized regulation programs. An agreement, however, can bring about the sharing of scientific research and raising of standards by both the U.S. and the EU in such a way as to impose a new, higher duty of care upon manufacturers. Instead of a race to the bottom, perhaps the drafters of the agreement can strive for a race to the top.

level of [health, safety and] environmental protection; at the same time many governments do not want these standards used as a barrier to free trade, especially not as a disguised means of protectionism.”

Id. 172. See Discussion following the remarks of Mr. Wainwright at the Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference: The Impact of Technological Change in the Canada/U.S. Context, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 89 (1999). Mr. Wainwright noted that a balance needs to be struck between the interests of government and citizens in the WTO trade discussions. He further noted that the U.S. and EU were already negotiating “mutual recognition agreements” although such agreements primarily concern industrial products. See id.

173. Protectionism, culture, and reliance on health and safety measures, and socio-economic power

174. Note the argument against the FDA in the BST case. There is no reason for the EU to believe that the FDA is a reliable agency when the citizens of the U.S. question the procedures and actions of the agency. The FDA presented guidelines in October 1998 for the use of gelatins and the risk of BSE. This is after an advisory committee in April 1998 recommended the gelatins were no longer safe.

175. A practical problem not addressed in the proposed agreement is the actions of the individual countries of the EU. If the countries individually seek to refrain from allowing a product into their country, there is no provision of the EU treaty that requires them to follow the agreements with other countries (unless it is in the treaty provisions – making each member state obligated by the treaty of the EU). Thus, the countries could individually ban products from the U.S. although the EU could not. Thus it is not beneficial for the U.S. to subject itself to an agreement to allow all EU products into the U.S. that meet the requirements of the agreement in order to have their products considered in the U.S. under the agreement. Similarly, the language would provide for states in the U.S. that seek to keep out EU products. Under the Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the states would be compelled to comply with the agreement.

176. A race to the top would require an expectation of higher standards. Agreeing to “lower standards, minimally and temporarily would potentially raise expectations of the U.S. and the EU, the manufacturers would then bear the burden of proving the product to be of a quality such that the health and safety of consumers is not compromised. But consider that one of the fundamental differences between the U.S. and the EU is their differing approaches to business. The EU’s highly regulated, socialist practices differs widely from the idea of the “American Dream.” An initial consideration of this idea may create an uproar with the manufacturers and businesses in the U.S. who consider the FDA to be too regulatory already. On the other hand, the FDA and the U.S. government do use other methods to prevent European Products from entering the U.S. market. The manufacturers would need to accept the compromise that in the long run will most benefit them by having high quality products in the European market.
VII. CONCLUSION

The U.S. contends that its country is BSE free and should not be subject to the restricting bovine trade regulations of the European Council. The U.S. contends further that actions of the European Council, i.e., the BST restrictions, amount to protectionism, and are in violation of WTO expectations. The EU, on the other hand, appears to be willing to delay the enforcement of legislation such as the cosmetics ban to further research its position and to avoid a trade disagreement.177 This postponement is not a solution, however, because there is no assurance that the EU will not eventually enforce this legislation and restrict the entry of certain cosmetic products into the member states. This possibility seems greater in light of the EU’s extended time for compliance with the WTO Appellate decision against it.

The result of the legislation and subsequent postponement has been to produce caution in present trade dealings. The governments of the EU and the U.S. need to work together and come to an agreement in order to allow private industries to continue to develop trade relationships with one another. The proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade Agreement presents an opportunity to create a solution to this problem. The minimum result of the agreement should be an understanding that will address future problems, especially those involving health and safety issues, in this era of developing biological engineering industries. The fast pace of scientific discovery often leaves more questions than answers in its wake. As for the future of the cosmetic legislation, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and EU to break the present cycle of trade disputes by seeking compromise instead of retaliatory measures.

Victoria H. Zerjav

---

177. In sharp contrast to its delay in enforcement of the cosmetics ban, the EU has actively enforced its legislation banning contaminated beef. See Suzanne Daley, Mad Cow Disease Panicking Europe as Incidents Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A1 (explaining that the 2000 outbreak of BSE has led to bans on beef in 15 EU countries, with the latest bans targeting contaminated beef from France and Germany).