Durational Residency Requirements and the Equal Protection Clause: Zobel v. Williams {102 S. Ct. 2309}

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DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: ZOBEL v. WILLIAMS

The right to migrate\(^1\) often clashes with state regulation, especially

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1 The Articles of Confederation explicitly recognized the right to migrate by granting a citizen the right of “free ingress to and from any other state,” yet the Constitution contains no such provision. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, sec. 2, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States”). Nevertheless, courts recognize the right to migrate. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).

The potential for a court to invoke the right to migrate and strike down state legislation illustrates the power of judicial review. In short, the right to migrate acts as a sword which a court can unsheath when necessary to trim the legislative power of states. The sharpness of the sword depends on the applicable constitutional provision governing judicial review, whether the court invokes the privileges and immunities clause in article IV, the commerce clause, or the fourteenth amendment.

Under the Constitution, courts first examined the right to migrate in the context of state discrimination against non-residents. Early cases suggested that discrimination against non-residents contravened the privileges and immunities clause in article IV. See Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 288, 293 (Md. 1797) (required treating similarly the property of a non-resident with that of a resident). In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), Justice Bushrod Washington read the privileges and immunities clause as securing “the right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in, any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise.” Id. at 552. Additionally, some courts read the clause as only preventing a state from discriminating in favor of its own citizens and imposing a burden on citizens of other states. See Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627, 629 (1848); Douglas v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 472-73 (1821).

Even in Corfield, however, Justice Washington added an important caveat when he noted that a state could, in furtherance of the general welfare, regulate immigration. 6 F. Cas. at 552. Justice Washington’s caveat in Corfield reflected a tradition of allowing communities to exclude paupers. See Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 855-56 (1981). Fourteen years after Corfield, the Supreme Court in New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837), recognized New York’s right to fence out unwanted aliens. See also Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (while health laws excluding criminals, vagabonds, and paupers might pass constitutional muster as valid public welfare regulations, such laws implicate the commerce clause); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842) (dicta that states may exclude paupers). Dissenting in the Passenger Cases, Chief Justice Taney agreed that states could close off their borders.

The several States have a right to remove from among their people, and to
when that regulation distinguishes among citizens according to the

prevent from entering the State, any person, or class or description of persons, whom it may deem dangerous or injurious to the interests and welfare of its citizens; and that the State has the exclusive right to determine, in its sound discretion, whether the danger does or does not exist, free from the control of the general government.

48 U.S. (7 How.) at 467. But Chief Justice Taney added that a state could not enact a tax on American citizens migrating into the state. *Id.* at 492.

These cases, however, only illustrate the Court's reliance on the commerce clause. Specifically, the Court asked whether migrating people constituted commerce. *Id.* at 476-77. After the Court resolved the question affirmatively, the commerce clause proved a potent weapon for protecting the right to travel. *See Edwards v. California,* 314 U.S. 160 (1941); *Colgate v. Harvey,* 296 U.S. 404, 436 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting); *Helson v. Kentucky,* 279 U.S. 245, 251 (1929); *Henderson v. Mayor of New York,* 92 U.S. 259 (1875); *The Case of the State Freight Tax* 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873); the License cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); *Erie Railway Co. v. State,* 31 N.J. 531 (1864); *Lin Sing v. Washburn,* 20 Cal. 534 (1862).

In 1868, the Supreme Court adopted an alternate rationale for protecting the right to travel. *Crandall v. Nevada,* 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). In place of the commerce clause, the *Crandall* Court revitalized the earlier individual rights argument under the privileges and immunities clause. *Id.* at 40-44. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Wheeler,* 254 U.S. 281, 296 (1920) (privileges and immunities clause in article IV is similar to provision in the Articles of Confederation); *Williams v. Fears,* 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) ("undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of a free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Constitution"); *Blake v. McClung,* 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898) ("The Constitution forbids only such legislation affecting citizens of the respective States as will substantially or practically put a citizen of one State in a condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to another State, or when asserting in another State the right that commonly appertains to those who are part of the political community."); *Morris v. Gilmer,* 129 U.S. 315 (1889) (privilege of a United States citizen to transfer his citizenship from one state to another); *Ward v. Maryland,* 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871) (right to travel found in the privileges and immunities clause in article IV); *Paul v. Virginia,* 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869) (right to travel in privileges and immunities clause in article IV). *But cf.* *Railroad Co. v. Husen,* 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 465, 470 (1877) (apparently construing the taxation of persons interstate as a burden on commerce). *See generally C. Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888* 1302-07 (1971).

Although not tied to a single provision in the Constitution, freedom to travel received increasing support during the twentieth century. *See Zobel v. Williams,* 102 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 n.6 (1982) (although repeatedly recognized, the source of the right to travel is obscure); *Jones v. Helms,* 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (found only a "qualified" right to travel once an individual commits a certain crime); *California v. Torres,* 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978) (recognized that the denial of vital benefits unconstitutionally burdened the right of interstate travel); *Mathews v. Diaz,* 426 U.S. 67, 86 n.26 (1976) (while states may not burden a citizen's right to travel interstate, Congress may deter the travel of aliens into the United States); *Shapiro v. Thompson,* 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (the right to travel need not be limited to a particular constitutional provision). For a

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/10
length of their residency. Quite often states impose durational residency requirements on newly arrived migrants. These requirements

discussion of Shapiro and similar cases, see infra notes 22-91 and accompanying text. For additional cases prior to Shapiro, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966) (freedom to travel a fundamental right); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (freedom to travel abroad is a fundamental right protected by the due process clause in the fifth amendment); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964) (freedom to travel abroad); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 25-26 (1958) (freedom to travel abroad); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (commerce clause prohibits California from closing its borders to indigents). In short, the Supreme Court has read into the rights of United States citizenship the freedom to travel. See generally Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (1956); J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978); A. LIEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967); Berger, supra; Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Is Hour Come Round at Last?", 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405; Meyers, Federal Privileges and Immunities: Application to Ingress and Egress, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 489 (1944); Roback, Legal Barriers to Interstate Migration, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 286 (1943); Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1975).

2. For some recent examples, see In re United States ex rel. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982) (one-year residency requirement under the student athlete transfer eligibility rule); Akron v. Bell, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1981) (one-year residency requirement for city councilman); Walsh v. Louisiana High School Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980) (student transfer rule); Joseph v. Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (one-year residency requirement for city commissioner). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-21-3 (Burns 1982) (residency requirement for individuals or corporations applying for a permit to sell alcoholic beverages); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 243.105-243.107 (1980) (residency requirements for wholesalers of an alcoholic beverage). Additionally, legislation can distinguish among citizens on the basis of a specific date of residency. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978) (change from current value system of taxation to acquisition value method of taxation—new residents pay a greater property tax than do old residents).

3. Simple residency requirements differ from durational residency requirements. In the former, a state requires only actual residency; in the latter, a state requires the resident to wait a specified period before receiving certain public benefits. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (simple residency requirements are constitutional).

Both types of requirements, however, may have the same practical effect on individuals. For instance, a simple residency requirement for admission to the bar places the same burden on the non-resident seeking to practice law in the state as does a durational residency requirement. In both cases, the lawyer must overcome an obstacle before practicing his profession in the state. Because simple residency requirements distinguish non-residents from residents, while durational residency requirements differentiate among residents based on the time of their arrival in the state, courts sometimes employ different constitutional provisions. Compare Stalland
create a waiting period before newcomers receive the full panoply of state benefits. As states begin to play a more active role in providing benefits and services, the requirements—classifications between recent migrants and others—take on added significance. Reviewing a novel type of durational residency requirement, the Supreme Court in Zobel v. Williams displayed its dislike for certain durational residency requirements when it seemingly applied a new standard of review and struck down an Alaska statute as violative of the equal protection clause.

In Zobel, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Alaska's permanent fund income distribution statute. Unparalleled in the American tradition, the Alaska statute provided for the distribution


4. On January 26, 1982, President Reagan delivered his State of the Union Address in which he outlined a new era of federal-state relations. Reagan, State of the Union Address, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Feb. 15, 1982, at 258. Initially, President Reagan proposed transferring such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps to the state level. Id. at 260, 262. While Congress has thus far balked at such transfers, the executive policy foreshadows the prominent role the states may play in providing benefits and services.

5. 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).


of earnings from the fund to residents based on their length of residency since statehood. The Zobels, recent migrants to Alaska, alleged that the state plan denied equal treatment to bona fide citizens because it treated newcomers differently than long-term residents.

previously controlled by the public sector. Yet privatization is more than a grandiose giveaway scheme. Rather, it is a philosophy of political economy that uses a broad range of measures to enhance the private sector’s role through minimal governmental presence.” Note, supra note 6, at 971. Privatization can take many forms. For instance, “a state may simply forego tax collection or reduce tax rates, and use resource rents to purchase public goods and services normally funded by tax levies. Alternatively, a mineral-rich state like Alaska may transfer excess income and rents directly to state residents.” Id. In a less drastic form, privatization may entail governmental divestiture of governmental operations. Id. Whatever form it takes, privatization theory “rests upon an unquestioned faith in free enterprise.” Id. at 972. A key problem with privatization plans, however, comes during the distribution stage—just who gets how much? A state must account for the possible massive immigration which could occur if the benefits are distributed equally to old and new residents. Id. at 972-73.


The statute at issue in Zobel v. Williams distributes a percentage of the interest from the permanent fund to Alaska residents, eighteen years or older, and “state resident[s] during all or part of the year for which the permanent fund dividend is paid.” ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.23.010-100, 43.23.020 (Supp. 1980). Each eligible person receives “one permanent fund dividend for each full year that the individual is a state resident after January 1, 1959.” Id. Additionally, the plan provides for distributing funds to residents of less than a year on a prorated basis. Id. § 43.23.010(8). For the 1979 fiscal year, each dividend was worth fifty dollars. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2311.

While the constitutionality of Alaska’s distribution scheme was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the Alaska legislature passed a new act in the event the Court declared the initial plan unconstitutional. The Governor signed the new act on June 16, 1982, two days after Zobel was handed down. Alaska’s new plan provides for equal dividends to all State residents who have been a resident for the immediately preceding six months. 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 102 §§ 1-30.

9. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2312. Appellant’s brief argued, inter alia, that recent mi-
Furthermore, they claimed that the statute penalized their exercise of the right to travel. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected these arguments, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, declaring the grants belong to a “suspect” class. Brief for Appellants at 18-20, 46, Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309. See McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions—Fundamental Right to Travel or “Newcomers” as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 1007 (1975). Language in the opinions prior to Zobel suggests that recent migrants may comprise a suspect class. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 64. But cf. infra note 56. If the Court views recent migrants as a suspect class, explaining why penalties imposed on recent migrants might not trigger strict scrutiny poses a problem. Id.

10. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2311.

11. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980) (Zobel II), rev’d, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982). Zobel II was an appeal from the summary judgment of a superior court. Id. at 450. The superior court declared the plan a denial of equal protection of the laws and an infringement on the right to interstate migration. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and upheld the statute under a balancing test. Id.

The Zobels also challenged Alaska’s tax exemption statute. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980) (Zobel I). The Alaska legislature passed the tax exemption statute during the same session as the permanent fund income distribution statute. Id. at 423-24. The exemption “completely exempts from taxation the income of those individuals who have filed an Alaska income tax return and reported gross income from sources within Alaska for three or more years.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]hose who have filed tax returns in two previous years are exempt from two-thirds of the tax that would ordinarily be levied under the existing structure, and those that have filed in one previous year are exempt from one-third of their tax.” Id. at 424. The Zobels argued that the statute denied them equal treatment under the Alaska Constitution. Id.

In striking down the exemption, the Alaska Supreme Court analogized the tax exemption to a durational residency requirement: “[D]iscrimination against new residents created by the series of exemptions is apparent from the statute. Therefore, the legal question presented is whether Alaska may selectively impose an income tax on new residents.” Id. at 425. Quite aptly, the court drew the connection between the equal protection clause and the right to travel.

The relationship between these two constitutional protections, which may not be immediately clear, is that a durational residency requirement does not treat equally those individuals who have recently exercised their constitutional right to travel and those who have not. Individuals who belong to that class of people who have recently migrated to a state are denied certain rights and benefits granted to other residents. In effect, the argument is that a durational residency requirement impermissibly penalizes those who have exercised a constitutional right.

Id.

The Zobel I court found no federally protected fundamental right and therefore applied a balancing test to the exemption. Id. at 427. Under this test, the court held that the statute violated the state constitution. Id. at 429. For commentary on the case, see Note, Balancing Test in Durational Residence Equal Protection Analysis, 56 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1981); Note, supra note 6.

As in Zobel I, the Alaska Supreme Court in Zobel II measured the permanent
distribution scheme a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.\textsuperscript{12}

When Congress drafted the fourteenth amendment,\textsuperscript{13} the amend-

fund income distribution statute against a balancing test. In previous cases, the Alaska court had interpreted United States Supreme Court decisions as mandating the application of strict scrutiny analysis when the state imposes a durational residency requirement. \textit{Zobel II}, 619 P.2d at 452. Subsequently, however, the Alaska Supreme Court abandoned the old two-tier approach to equal protection analysis and adopted a balancing test. \textit{Id.} at 452.

The \textit{Zobel II} court began by noting that the United States Supreme Court recognized that not all durational residency requirements penalized the exercise of the right to interstate migration. \textit{Id.} at 454. Absent such a penalty, strict scrutiny analysis was inapplicable. \textit{Id.} After concluding that the statute—though a multi-stage durational residency requirement—fell within the principles governing two-stage durational residency requirements, the \textit{Zobel II} court considered whether the statute operated as a penalty triggering strict scrutiny. \textit{Id.} at 454-55. The \textit{Zobel II} court measured the penalty indirectly by examining four factors which the United States Supreme Court indicated might trigger strict scrutiny: 1) state justification of administrative convenience; 2) benefit denied considered a basic necessity; 3) state merely delaying receipt of benefit; and 4) state denies fundamental right to new resident. \textit{Id.} at 455-57. The court held that the distribution plan fell outside each factor. \textit{Id.} Finding the balancing approach applicable, the court then examined the objectives of the distribution plan and sustained the act.


\textit{13. At first, the passage of the fourteenth amendment meant little in the development of securing more rights. The amendment merely broadened the class of effected individuals and did not interfere with the well established triparte classification of rights: 1) civil rights which the amendment covered; 2) social rights which the amendment did not cover; and 3) political rights which the amendment did not reach. See R. Berger, \textit{Government by the Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment} (1977). The amendment, by making national citizenship independent from state citizenship, secured the pre-existing rights of national citizenship against state attack. See Graham, \textit{Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment}, 7 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1954). For a general survey of the literature on the history of the fourteenth amendment, see R. Berger, \textit{supra}; R. Cover, \textit{Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process} (1975); C. Fairman, \textit{supra} note 1; H. Flack, \textit{The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment} (1908); R. Harris, \textit{The Quest for Equality} (1960); J. James, \textit{The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment} (1956); B. Kendrick, \textit{Journal of Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction} (1914); R. Kluger, \textit{Simple Justice} (1976); L. Lusky, \textit{By What Right?}: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Power to Revise the Constitution (1975); J. Tenbroek, \textit{Equal Under Law} (1965); Benedict, \textit{Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court}, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39; Benedict, \textit{Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction}, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65 (1974); Bickel, \textit{The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision}, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Boudin, \textit{Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment}, 16 N.Y.U. L. Q. 19 (1938); Fairman, \textit{Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding}, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). Currently, some scholars are engaged in re-examining history. See, e.g., Curtis, \textit{The Bill of Rights as a
ment scarcely embraced the corpus of meaning engrafted into the provision by subsequent generations. In particular, the equal protection clause served only a secondary purpose until the demise of substantive due process. During the Stone and Vincent Courts,


15. Following the Civil War, and until the middle 1930's, the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment overshadowed the equal protection clause. Generally, the Court's inquiry centered on two areas. First, the Court examined the scope of the state's police power. In McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909), the Court articulated its attitude toward state regulation. If the law in controversy has a reasonable relation to the protection of the public health, safety or welfare it is not to be set aside because the judiciary may be of opinion that the act will fail of its purpose, or because it is thought to be an unwise exertion of the authority vested in the legislative branch of the Government. Id. at 547-48. Second, the due process clause served as the strongest barrier against state regulation. The Court invoked the due process clause when a state threatened to take private property. For a discussion of the use of the due process clause, see A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1976); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980). Rate regulation during the turn of the century illustrates the primary importance of the due process clause. If the state levied an unreasonable rate against a company, the Court treated the issue as a deprivation of property without due process. Only secondarily would the Court add that “in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws.” Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. & C., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
however, the equal protection clause began its climb toward becoming a potent constitutional hurdle.\textsuperscript{16} By the end of Chief Justice Warren’s tenure on the Court, equal protection review embodied three tenets. First, the Court deferred to legislative judgments concerning social and economic programs.\textsuperscript{17} Second, the Court examined closely certain suspect classifications.\textsuperscript{18} Third, the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to classifications impinging upon the exercise of a fundamental right.\textsuperscript{19} The Burger Court purportedly follows this triparte model.\textsuperscript{20}

Shortly before Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice, the Court enlarged the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis by retrieving right to travel analysis from the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause in the fourteenth amendment\textsuperscript{21} and bringing it within the ambit of the equal protection clause. The Court has developed three approaches

\textsuperscript{16} See generally R. McCloskey, The Modern Supreme Court 28-126 (1972).
\textsuperscript{17} An early case illustrating judicial deference concerning social and economic regulation is Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In Lindsley, Justice Van Devanter stated the appropriate guidelines for equal protection review.
\textsuperscript{18} The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.
\textsuperscript{19} A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
\textsuperscript{20} See infra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
for evaluating the constitutionality of durational residency requirements under the equal protection clause: (1) does the statute operate as a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel; (2) does the statute operate as an irrebuttable presumption; and (3) does the balance of interests weigh more heavily in favor of the individual than in favor of the state? The Zobel Court departed from these approaches, but a look at the Court's meandering path back to the beginning is warranted.

The Court demonstrated use of the first two approaches in Shapiro v. Thompson.22 In Shapiro, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of three statutes conditioning the receipt of public assistance benefits on a one year residency requirement.23 The challengers of the stat-


utes argued that the denial of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits solely because of a failure to satisfy the one year waiting period deprived bona fide citizens of equal protection of the law.24 In response, the proponents offered four justifications for requirements for public assistance benefits generally relied upon the lack of reasonableness in the statutes. Ramos is illustrative:

By definition, the one-year residence requirement is not a waiting period required of all applicants. Whatever arguments might be legitimately made in favor of a waiting period required of every applicant, regardless of length of residence, they can not reasonably be used to support a provision whereby aids are denied to all needy and otherwise eligible applicants who have resided in the state less than one year and granted to applicants similarly situated with respect to need and eligibility, but who have resided here for more than one year. Ramos, 276 F. Supp. at 477. Additionally, the Ramos court admitted the incidental effect on interstate travel created by the durational residency requirement, but added that "it is significant that the majority [in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), discussed supra note 1] concluded that the state's desire to protect its treasury from applications for aid by recent arrivals, did not justify interference with interstate movement." Id. For residency requirements prior to Shapiro, see Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 567 (1966); LoGatto, Residence Laws—A Step Forward or Backward?, 7 Cath. Law. 101 (1961); Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 Wash. U. L.Q. 355, 1956 Wash. U. L.Q. 21; Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 1080 (1966).

24. 394 U.S. at 627. Justice Brennan described the effect of the classification:

[T]he effect of the waiting-period in each case is to create two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life.

394 U.S. at 627.

The Supreme Court received amicus curia briefs; each brief, however, focused on three issues; 1) the importance of AFDC benefits; 2) empirical studies illustrating the impact on migration, coupled with the constitutional right to travel; and 3) the establishment of an irrebuttable presumption as to why the migrant entered the state. P. Kurland & G. Casper, Landmark Briefs & Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 68 (1975). In oral argument, Solicitor General Archibald Cox tied the major arguments together. First, Mr. Cox emphasized the importance of the AFDC benefits. Second, he stressed that the classification "rested on a prejudice against outsiders." Id. at 387. Third, he argued that the classification lacked a "substantial relation to the accomplishment of any permissible State policy." Id. On the second day of oral argument, Mr. Cox delivered a passionate plea in favor or protecting the right to travel:

[W]e have a situation in which the state has singled out for the purposes of disfavor and hostile treatment those who exercise the fundamental liberty of moving to a new residence in pursuit of better opportunities, better life, or what else they consider to be an advantage. That discrimination, we say, is not merely capri-
the residency requirements: (1) to protect the fiscal integrity of the
governmental unit by discouraging potential recipients from entering
the jurisdiction;\(^\text{25}\) (2) to discourage indigents from entering the jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of receiving aid;\(^\text{26}\) (3) to allocate resources on
the basis of contributions to the community;\(^\text{27}\) and (4) to facilitate
administrative convenience and encourage new residents to look for
jobs.\(^\text{28}\) The Court held the statutes unconstitutional under all of the
asserted objectives.\(^\text{29}\)

Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan responded to each of the
justifications with a separate rationale.\(^\text{30}\) He rejected the initial pur-
pose as having a constitutionally impermissible goal—that of penaliz-
ing the exercise of the right to travel.\(^\text{31}\) The Court had held
consistently that the state could not purposely chill\(^\text{32}\) the exercise of a

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\(^{25}\) Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627-28.

\(^{26}\) Id. at 631.

\(^{27}\) Id. at 632. "Appellants argue . . . that the challenged classification may be
sustained as an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of
the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of taxes." Id.

\(^{28}\) Id. at 633-34.

\(^{29}\) See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.

\(^{30}\) See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.

\(^{31}\) Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.

\(^{32}\) A state cannot chill the exercise of a fundamental right. See, e.g., United
constitutional right. Justice Brennan found the second justification unreasonable in light of the over-inclusive classification; the one-year waiting period created an irrebuttable presumption that all newly arrived indigents entered the jurisdiction to obtain greater benefits. Additionally, the rationale of conditioning benefits based on past contributions to the community posed two problems. First, the "past contribution argument" had no basis in fact. Second, the Court invoked the "parade-of-horribles" argument cautioning that the same justification might allow state apportionment of other benefits and services.

When reviewing the last objective, Justice Brennan heightened the scope of equal protection analysis. If a classification penalized the

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33 In Shapiro, the right to travel served as the constitutional right. 394 U.S. at 629.
34 Id. at 631.
35 Id. at 632. Justice Brennan questioned whether long-term residents did make a greater contribution through taxes than newer residents. Both classes were indigents. Moreover, he noted that in Pennsylvania 40% of those denied benefits "had lengthy prior residence in the State." Id.
36 This type of argument exemplified the Waite and Fuller Court's jurisprudence. Uniformly the Justices on these courts reasoned that if they allowed the state to enforce "T," then the state would follow suit with "X" and "Y" and "Z."
37 394 U.S. at 632-33. Without citation or explanation, Justice Brennan opined that the equal protection clause prohibits the apportionment of benefits and services. Otherwise, states might bar new residents from public facilities, or they might allocate all benefits and services according to a citizen's past tax contributions. Id.
38 See supra notes 27, 35-37 and accompanying text. Shapiro illustrates the Warren Court's expansion of the traditional areas for invoking a strict scrutiny analysis of classifications. See, e.g., Mogk v. Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698, 700 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (declined to apply the "reasonableness" test, concluding that "[i]t appears to us, however, that not only the Supreme Court of the United States but the Congress as well has discarded the 'reasonableness' test in favor of the compelling state interest test"). See generally R. Funston, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 58 (1977) ("Indeed, Shapiro presented some troubling questions to those who remembered their constitutional history. The thought processes and methods of analysis employed by
exercise of the right to travel, the Court demanded that the state prove the classification "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Furthermore, the "necessary" standard required the state to adopt the least drastic means available.

Although criticized, Shapiro provided a mandate for lower courts to review the constitutionality of other durational residency requirements. These requirements inherently penalize those who have re-

the majority in Shapiro were strikingly similar to those which characterized the Court during the heyday of substantive due process.

39. 394 U.S. at 634. The Court did not hold per se infringements on the right to travel unconstitutional; rather, it would declare the end illegitimate when the legislature purposely infringed on the right to travel. Absent that discriminatory purpose, "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id.

40. Id. at 637. For example, when responding to the claim that the requirement safeguarded against fraud, Justice Brennan offered alternate means the two states could have chosen. Id.

41. "Make no mistake about it," wrote one contemporary observer, "Lochner v. New York is alive and well in Shapiro v. Thompson." Winter, supra note 23, at 102. Ten years after Shapiro, Professor Michael Perry criticized the Court for implicating the equal protection clause. Perry asserted that "while the line or classification offended a constitutional norm, the right of interstate migration, it did not offend or even implicate the principle of equal protection." Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023 (1979). See also The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 23, at 122-23.

Dissenting, Justice Harlan argued that the Court expanded its newly developed "doctrine of the compelling state interest test." 394 U.S. at 655. Justice Harlan suggested that in cases like Shapiro, when classifications are based on the exercise of a constitutional right, the Court should employ the due process rather than the equal protection clause. Id. at 658-59. Furthermore, Justice Harlan criticized what he perceived as an expansion of fundamental rights. Id. at 661. He opined that "[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights," and by expanding the realm of rights subject to the compelling state interest test the Court acted like a "super-legislature." Id.

42. Dissenting in Shapiro, Chief Justice Warren feared the Court opened the floodgates:

The Court's decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurking beneath are the multitude of situations in which States have imposed residence requirements including eligibility to vote, to engage in certain professions or occupations or to attend a state-supported university. Although the Court takes pains to avoid acknowledging the ramifications of its decision, its implication cannot be ignored.

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/10
cently exercised their right to travel. 43 Other types of requirements,

394 U.S. at 655.


43 As courts broadened the scope of the right to travel, land control programs and exclusionary zoning practices received greater attention along with residency requirements. While these types of regulations did not involve durational residency requirements, the legal issues raised were a product of Shapiro. See Construction Indus. Ass’n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See generally Lamb & Lustig, The Burger Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Activist-Restraintist Debate, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 169 (1979) (arguing that “right to travel” analysis is not useful in challenging zoning ordinance); Comment, The Right to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 Harv. J. on Legis. 244 (1975); Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 612 (1972); 9 Ga. L. Rev. 260 (1974) (“right to travel” analysis could have a profound impact on zoning and growth control).

Employment preference statutes also conflicted with right to travel analysis. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (privileges and immunities clause forbids discriminatory hiring practices). But cf. White v. Massachusetts, 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983) (Commerce clause not violated by mayor’s executive order “which required that all construction projects funded in whole or in part by city funds . . . should be performed by a work force consisting of at least half bona fide residents of Boston.”) See
therefore, received closer attention—such as bar admission requirements, divorce statutes, residency requirements for public officers, tuition fee differentials for public schools, and residency requirements for public employees. See, e.g., Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (one-year residency requirement for bar admission unconstitutional); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (one-year residency for bar admission unconstitutional); Kennan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. N.C. 1970) (twelve-month residency requirement for taking bar exam unconstitutional). According to one commentator, however:

Most courts have not extended Shapiro to void durational residence requirements for bar admissions. Lower courts have generally found that denying admission to the bar did not penalize the right to travel sufficiently to warrant the application of strict scrutiny.


Subsequent to Shapiro, some courts extended the penalty analysis to include residency requirements for parties seeking a divorce. See Note, Durational Residence Requirements, supra note 44, at 656. Additionally, for the Supreme Court's treatment, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Courts differ over whether such statutes impose a penalty, or whether an important governmental interest is at stake. Compare Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973) and Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971) and State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974) and Monroe v. Monroe, 32 Ohio Misc. 129 (1972) with Makers v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1974) and Caiazza v. Caiazza, 291 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975).

The leading case is Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972). In Green, the court held a two-year residency requirement for a public officer unconstitutional. After finding a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel, the court applied the strict scrutiny test of Shapiro. Id. See, e.g., Headlee v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (three-year residency requirement for mayor unconstitutional); Mogk v. Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (three-year residency requirement for membership to charter revision commission unconstitutional).
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requirements for voter qualification.48

47. Courts usually find a legitimate state interest for imposing a durational residency requirement upon out-of-state students. The legitimate interest apparently negates the necessity for invoking the "compelling state interest" test. See, e.g., Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Weaver v. Kelton, 357 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Arizona Bd. of Regents v. Harper, 108 Ariz. 223, 495 P.2d 453 (1972); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Ca. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970). The Starns court distinguished its case from Shapiro. Unlike in Shapiro, the Starns court rejected the presence of any discriminatory purpose to exclude a class of people. Id. at 237. Moreover, the court noted that "[t]here is no showing here that the one-year waiting period has any dire effects on the nonresident student equivalent to those noted in Shapiro." Id. at 238. Adopting the reasoning in Kirk v. Board of Regents, the Starns court acknowledged the absence of a chilling effect on a fundamental right; thus, the court failed to find a "penalty" requiring the invocation of the compelling state interest test. Id. The court conceded, however, that the classification was discriminatory and created an irrebuttable presumption. Id. at 238-39. Nevertheless, the court attempted to explain that the presumption could be overcome. Id. at 240. The court's logic fails. In short, it assumed away the presumption by asserting that the presumption could be overcome after a year. Id. More importantly, however, the Starns court accepted as a legitimate state interest the goal of cost equalization. Id. But in Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982), the Supreme Court suggested that its summary affirmance of Starns should not be read as an acceptance of cost equalization as a valid state interest. Id. at 2315 n.13. The Zobel Court added that it considered the requirement in Starns a test of bona fide residence. Id.


For the difficulty with drawing a line between the acceptable and unacceptable residency requirement, see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per curiam) (fifty-day voter residency requirement for non-presidential elections constitutional); Burns
The Court's next treatment of a state durational residency requirement came in a challenge to Tennessee's voter registration law.\textsuperscript{49} While \textit{Shapiro} focused on whether the classification penalized the exercise of the right to travel,\textsuperscript{50} this step served as a mere formality when, in \textit{Dunn v. Blumstein},\textsuperscript{51} the Court suggested that all durational residency requirements operated as a penalty.\textsuperscript{52} The \textit{Dunn} Court held that a durational residency requirement for voting,\textsuperscript{53} imposed on an otherwise potentially bona fide resident, penalized the exercise of both the constitutional right to travel\textsuperscript{54} and the constitutional right to equal opportunity to participate in the political process.\textsuperscript{55} Aside from ambiguous dicta in \textit{Shapiro},\textsuperscript{56} the opinions in \textit{Dunn} and \textit{Sha-
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piro mandate that durational residency requirements satisfy the "compelling state interest" test.57

The Court subsequently modified its penalty analysis, reading Shapiro and Dunn for slightly less than the opinions suggested. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,58 the Court applied the strict scrutiny component of equal protection analysis59 and invalidated a waiting period requirement for non-emergency medical care for indigents.60 Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Marshall61 distinguished between migration and travel, deciding that the Constitution protected against penalties imposed only on the right to migrate.62 Justice Marshall noted further that Shapiro did not require an impact on the right to migrate.63 Instead, classifications merely penalizing those recently exercising a constitutional right invoked the "compelling state interest" test.64 He also added that while not all waiting

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57. Shapiro and Dunn suggest that if a classification penalizes the exercise of the right to travel solely on the basis that one of the classes consists of newcomers, then the classification must pass the compelling state interest test. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).


59. Id. at 250, 254, 262.

60. The statute provided that an indigent would not receive non-emergency "hospitalization, medical care or outpatient relief" unless he had resided in the county for a year. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-297A (Supp. 1973-1974).


62. Adopting the reasoning of a federal court, Justice Marshall concluded that "the right to travel was involved in only a limited sense in Shapiro." Id. at 255. He associated travel with mere movement, and interpreted Shapiro as applying only to migration. Id.

63. Justice Marshall incorrectly stated that the Court in Shapiro looked at whether the waiting-period itself deterred migration. Id. at 257. In the portion of the opinion Justice Marshall quotes, the Court discussed one of the proffered purposes of the statutes and remarked that the means operated as an impermissible purpose of discouraging the poor from entering the jurisdiction. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).

64. 415 U.S. at 256-57. In this case, the right to travel served as the requisite constitutional right. Id.
periods constituted penalties, a penalty clearly existed in this case—the denial of a vital benefit and privilege.65

Before Memorial, the Court had appeared ready to phase out its “penalty analysis” and examine classifications as irrebuttable presumptions, an approach discussed in Shapiro.66 In Shapiro, the Court rejected one of the asserted justifications for the residency requirement67 because the classification created an irrebuttable presumption without any factual basis.68 The Dunn Court adopted a similar approach toward irrebuttable presumptions,69 holding that the equal protection clause limits when a state may employ a conclusive presumption to justify a durational residency requirement.70 In Vlandis v. Kline,71 the Court went a step further and declared the conclusive presumption in the University of Connecticut's non-resident tuition system an unconstitutional denial of due process.72 The Vlandis Court held that the irrebuttable presumption arbitrarily denied73 a student an opportunity to make an individualized showing

65. Id. at 259. Here, Justice Marshall refers to governmental entitlements. Perhaps an implicit concern in Memorial is that of protecting government created property interests. See supra note 24.


67. See supra notes 26, 34 and accompanying text.


69. The Court considered Tennessee's argument that the durational residency requirement operated as an "administratively useful conclusive presumption" to test bona fide residence. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349-52 (1972).

70. The Court relied on Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), and found the use of such a presumption too "crude" and "imprecise." Id. at 351.


72. Id. at 442. Connecticut created an irrebuttable presumption of non-residence if the student's "legal address for any period of the one-year period immediately prior to his application for admission" was outside the state. Id.

73. Connecticut offered three objectives for its policy: 1) cost equalization; 2) rewarding for past contributions; and 3) administrative convenience. Id. at 448, 449, 451. Justice Stewart accepted the goal of achieving "cost equalization between bona fide residents and non-residents," but added that "basing the bona fides of residency solely on where a student lived when he applied for admission to the University is using a criterion wholly unrelated to that objective." Id. at 448-49. Considering the second objective, Justice Stewart quoted from Shapiro that apportionment between new and old residents based on past contributions might lead to apportionment of other state services. Id. at 450. Furthermore, Connecticut's interest in administrative convenience lacked sufficient importance, and less drastic means were available. Id. at 451.
of bona fide residence.\textsuperscript{74}

The \textit{Memorial} Court never considered the irrebuttable presumption approach of \textit{Vlandis},\textsuperscript{75} and the Court ultimately abandoned the due process argument.\textsuperscript{76} The penalty analysis developed in \textit{Shapiro} and \textit{Memorial} also proved difficult to use.\textsuperscript{77} Justice Marshall observed in \textit{Memorial} that the "penalty analysis" approach saddled the Court with the task of defining the scope of a penalty.\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, other courts wrestled with the problem, and their decisions lack uniformity.\textsuperscript{79} Not surprisingly, therefore, a year after its decision in \textit{Me-
morial, the Court, in *Sosna v. Iowa*, departed from its path of prior precedent.

In *Sosna*, the Court upheld Iowa’s one-year waiting-period requirement in a divorce action. Without applying explicitly any test from either the equal protection or due process clauses, the Court fore, was whether the requirement penalized persons for having recently exercised their right to migrate. *Id.* at 811.


80. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).

81. *Sosna* is the only time Justice Rehnquist joined the majority in the major durational residency requirement cases.

82. 419 U.S. at 408. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the requirement on two grounds. First, appellant argued that the law established two classes, and discriminated against one class because it targeted “those who have recently exercised their right to travel to Iowa.” *Id.* at 405. Second, appellant raised a due process issue, claiming that the requirement “denies a litigant the opportunity to make an individualized showing of bona fide residence.” *Id.*

83. The Court abandoned the *Vlandis* due process approach, no doubt, for practical reasons. Professor Tushnet explains that the conclusive presumption analysis in *Vlandis* fell prey to doctrinal inconsistency with equal protection analysis and was shortly thereafter discarded.

A fair interpretation of the process is that Justice Stewart mounted a peculiar hobbyhorse in *Vlandis v. Kline* and the liberal justices went along for the ride to the result they favored. Unfortunately for the liberals, the inconsistency between the conclusive presumption and the general equal protection doctrines made it impossible for the former to become an established mode of analysis. Tushnet, *Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies*, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1326 (1979). See also *McKay v. Horn*, 529 F. Supp. 847 (D. N.J. 1981):

In the past, the Supreme Court has struck down legislation under the Due Process clause which denies governmental benefits on the basis of a presumption not universally true without giving the claimant an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sustained the law as a legitimate means of protecting Iowa's interests. The penalty analysis developed in the previous cases never entered into the opinion, while the Vlandis approach succumbed to a quibble over semantics. Instead, the Court employed a balancing approach to test the constitutionality of the statute. Such judicial craftsmanship prompted Justice Marshall, in dissent, to express concern for future treatment of other durational residency requirements.

84. 419 U.S. at 404-09. Justice Rehnquist distinguished between the Shapiro, Dunn, Memorial line of cases and Sosna by incorrectly limiting the states' interest in the former cases to matters of mere administrative and budgetary convenience. Id. at 406. In Sosna, however, he found additional state interests: 1) the state in a divorce proceeding is not merely a grantor, but an interested party; 2) the state sought to insulate itself from constant collateral attack of its divorce decrees; and 3) the state sought to prevent itself from becoming a divorce mill. Id.

85. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.

86. The challengers to the statute averred that they were denied the "opportunity to make an individualized showing of bona fide residence," and cited Vlandis v. Kline, and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) as support. 419 U.S. at 405. Justice Rehnquist responded by drawing a distinction between a "denial" and a "delay." In the former case, a denial existed; here, however, Justice Rehnquist found only a delay because petitioner could always file for divorce after a year. Id. at 409-10. At best, this distinction is tenuous and merits the criticism it instigated. See, e.g., Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 456 (Alaska 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).

87. Justice Rehnquist never stated what test he was applying. Facially, at least, Justice Rehnquist employed some sort of balancing approach. Commentary on the case illustrates the problem with the reasoning in Sosna. One commentator lamented that "[t]he test the Court was applying simply defies definition." Note, supra note 45, at 666. See also McCoy, supra note 9, at 1014 (expressing uncertainty as to whether the Court has found the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopa compelling interest requirement and returned to some standard closer to the usual rational basis requirement); Comment, The Right to Travel: In Search of a Constitutional Source, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 117, 126-27 (1975) (suggesting that the Court deviated from its prior position and adopted—implicitly—a balancing approach); Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1129, 1158 (1975) ("Justice Rehnquist in Sosna refused to announce the applicable standard of review or even the applicable constitutional source."). One author suggests that the test in Sosna resembles the minimal scrutiny test. Comment, The Right to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 Harv. J. on Legis. 244, 268 (1975).

88. 419 U.S. at 419.
Justice Marshall's fears proved unwarranted, as courts shy away from the *Sosna* balancing approach. Indeed, many courts still examine classifications in light of the graduated model for equal protection review. During the interim between *Sosna* and *Zobel*, the Supreme Court did not decide any major durational residency requirement case. *Zobel*, therefore, offered the Court an opportunity

89. See Strong v. Collatos, 593 F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1979). In *Strong*, Appellants averred that *Sosna* proscribed the use of a balancing test instead of the "compelling state interest" test. The court rejected their argument, and distinguished between residency requirements for bringing a divorce action and those "residency requirements that shut off the basic necessities of life, prevented voting, or curtailed hospital and medical services." *Id.* at 423. See generally *In re United States ex rel. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n*, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982) (minimal impact on right to travel); *Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of Dental Examiners*, 673 F.2d 272, 276-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (apparently accepting, though not invoking, the penalty analysis); *City of Akron v. Bell*, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1981) (although not applying any test, court accepts penalty analysis with caveat that not all durational residency requirements impose penalties); *Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities*, 651 F.2d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying penalty analysis, concluding "that the 'deprivation' involved in this case—the failure to provide a berth in a recreational harbor at the same rate as a resident—does not operate as a significant 'penalty' on the right to travel"). But cf. *Joseph v. City of Birmingham*, 510 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (after reviewing two-tier equal protection format, employing an intermediate tier); *Williams v. Zobel*, 619 F.2d 448 (Alaska 1980) (applying a balancing approach), *rev'd*, 102 S. Ct. 2903 (1982).


Where the individual interest affected does not involve a fundamental right and the residency requirement is not a real impediment to interstate travel, then the governmental purpose sought to be gained by the imposition of the residency requirement may be justified under the traditional rational-relation test and need not be so indicated by the showing of a compelling state interest.

Lambrt v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 532 (Me. 1980) (citation omitted). The *Lambert* court's use of the phrase "real impediment" illustrates at least one way a court can implicitly escape the two-tier model. Deciding what constitutes a "real impediment" is the same as deciding what "interest" is sufficiently important in the court's eyes that it may impede interstate travel.

91. Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed its attitude toward state discriminatory tactics against non-residents solely on the basis of non-residency or citizenship. *See, e.g.*, *Cabel v. Chavez-Salido*, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982); *Califano v. Torres*, 435 U.S. 1 (1978);
to clarify its approach toward residency requirements, and equal protection analysis in general.

The *Zobel* Court cast aside the tests developed in prior cases. Instead, the Court applied a facially traditional equal protection analysis to strike down the statute. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger purportedly applied the minimum rationality test of the standard equal protection analysis, notwithstanding the appellant's focus on showing that the statute acted as a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel. First, while examining the asserted objectives of the act, Chief Justice Burger determined that no rational relationship existed between two of the objectives and the classification. Second, he considered the third objective stated in the act—that of allocating benefits according to past contributions to the community—the only justification for retrospective application of the Alaska plan. After designating this third justification impermissible, Chief

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92. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. This type of analysis resembles the approach used during the heyday of substantive due process. See supra note 15.

93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a review of the minimum rationality test. The Chief Justice subjected the statute to the minimal scrutiny without deciding what the applicable standard of review would be if the statute passed this initial stage of the test. Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. at 2309.

94. See generally Brief for Appellants at 14-28, Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309.

95. The Alaska legislature included a statement of objectives with the statute: 1) to provide a mechanism for equitable distribution to the people of Alaska of at least a portion of the state's energy wealth derived from the development and production of the natural resources belonging to them as Alaskans; 2) to encourage persons to maintain their residence in Alaska and to reduce population turnover in the state; and 3) to encourage increased awareness and involvement by the residents of the state in the management and expenditure of the Alaska permanent fund. 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 21, § 1(b), reprinted in 102 S. Ct. at 2313 n.7.

96. Chief Justice Burger held that the second and third justifications in the act address current or future behaviors and could not justify a classification between newer and older residents. Both the recent migrant and the long-term resident are similarly situated with respect to the goal of encouraging persons to remain in Alaska and to encourage increased awareness of the permanent fund expenditures. 102 S. Ct. at 2313. Of course, one might respond by suggesting that long-term residents need more encouragement than recent migrants because long-term residents may have a deep-seated sense of apathy not found in new residents.

97. See supra note 95. Chief Justice Burger buttressed this point by noting that
Justice Burger declared the distribution scheme unconstitutional.98

Concurring, Justice Brennan agreed that the past contribution rationale reached too far.99 More importantly, he would have declared the law unconstitutional solely on the basis that it affected free interstate migration.100 Reading the equal protection clause as mandating equality of citizenship, Justice Brennan criticized the Alaska statute for establishing degrees of citizenship.101

Concurring separately, Justice O'Connor criticized the Court for invoking the equal protection clause, misreading Shapiro and Vlandis, and declaring Alaska's purpose illegitimate.102 Instead, Justice O'Connor concluded that the distribution scheme burdened individuals exercising their right to migrate103 and thus contravened the


Actually, both the Alaska Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court ignored the language in the first objective. Rewarding for past contributions was not an “objective” of the Alaska legislature—at least according to the language it chose. The last two stated purposes were the “objectives,” while the first listed purpose was merely the only viable means for implementing the program. See supra note 7.

98. 102 S. Ct. at 2315.

99. Justice Brennan feared the possible balkanization of states if each state adopted a plan similar to that of Alaska's distribution scheme. Id. at 2316-17. Moreover, Justice Brennan intimated that the “past contribution” rationale may have some importance, but measuring the contribution by a durational residency requirement created a tenuous presumption.

In effect, then, the past-contribution rationale is so far-reaching in its potential application, and the relationship between residence and contribution to the State so vague and insupportable, that it amounts to little more than a restatement of the criterion for discrimination that it purports to justify.

Id. at 2318.

100. Id. at 2317. Justice Brennan emphasized the pervasive discrimination embodied in the plan. Id.

101. Id. at 2317-18. The citizenship clause in the fourteenth amendment “equates citizenship . . . with simple residence.” Id. By distributing benefits unequally to citizens, Alaska, according to Justice Brennan, violated this principle. Id.

102. Id. at 2319 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

103. Practically speaking, one cannot say the Alaska plan “burdened” those who recently exercised the right to travel. No great imposition arises from giving one a smaller slice of a boon. In order to reach the privileges and immunities question, however, Justice O'Connor opined that the statute infringes a fundamental right by burdening nonresidents.

The “burden” imposed on nonresidents is relative to the benefits enjoyed by residents. It is immaterial, for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, that the nonresident may enjoy a benefit in the new state that he lacked com-
article IV privileges and immunities clause.\footnote{104}

Justice Rehnquist dissented, admonishing the Court for abandoning the traditional deferential approach toward economic regulations.\footnote{105} He observed that the Alaska plan did not discourage travel or migration,\footnote{106} and he read the majority opinion as not treating the case as a right to travel issue.\footnote{107} But viewing the case in traditional equal protection terms, he disagreed with the majority's reliance on the illegitimacy of the "past contribution" argument.\footnote{108} The Court, opined Justice Rehnquist, should only question the propriety of the "past contribution" justification in right to travel cases and not in traditional minimum scrutiny analysis.\footnote{109} According to Justice Rehnquist, the deferential aspect of equal protection analysis required only that the classification be rationally based.\footnote{110} Otherwise, the Court might repeat its mistakes made during the substantive due process era.\footnote{111} After finding a rational basis for the Alaska plan, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the majority necessarily read a particular economic and social policy into the fourteenth amendment—
the same charge levelled against the Court during the era of substantive due process. 112

Indeed, Chief Justice Burger employed an ends analysis characteristic of the *Lochner* era rather than a means analysis. 113 Arguably, the plan would have passed constitutional muster under the prior approaches. 114 But instead of examining whether the distribution scheme operated as a penalty on the exercise of the right to migration, as in *Shapiro*, 115 or whether it created an unjustified conclusive presumption, as in *Vlandis*, 116 or even whether it satisfied the balancing approach in *Sosna*, 117 Chief Justice Burger began the discussion in traditional equal protection terms. 118 By declaring the end impermissible, however, he failed to clarify the appropriate standard of equal protection analysis for classifications between recent migrants and long-term residents. 119

In lieu of such analysis, the Court’s holding turned on classifying the “past contribution rationale” as an impermissible end. 120 In the

112. 102 S. Ct. at 2325.
113. See supra note 15. Rather than examining the nexus between the stated objectives and the means employed, Chief Justice Burger held the retrospective application of the plan unconstitutional for lack of a legitimate purpose. 102 S. Ct. at 2315.
114. Applying the penalty analysis the classification passes the test. Because the distribution scheme also treats residents differently according to when they were born, the classification does not distinguish solely on the basis of the exercise of the right to travel. Alternately, the nature of the benefit denied cannot be said to deter travel, either practically or hypothetically. Consequently, the classification does not impose a penalty requiring the Court to invoke the compelling state interest test. For a discussion of the statute’s constitutionality under a balancing approach see Note, supra note 6; Note, supra note 11.
115. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 83-84, 87 and accompanying text.
118. 102 S. Ct. at 2312-13.
119. Through its prior decisions, the Court had created uncertainty as to what test applied to durational residency requirements. *Sosna* suggested the Court would consider a balancing approach. Conversely, the Court never explicitly abandoned its penalty analysis. Summary affirmances suggested that the Court did not hold all durational residency requirements penalties. The crucial question, therefore, centered on when the Court would ask more of a statute than mere rationality. When Chief Justice Burger said that “right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis,” he brought attention to the question. 102 S. Ct. at 2312 n.6. But the Chief Justice never transformed the particular application he spoke of into the appropriate standard of review for durational residency requirements.
120. 102 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
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The tradition of Lewis Carroll, the Court assumed that what it announces three times must be true. Arguably, the prior decisions only rejected the "contributory rationale" when searching for a compelling state interest. Even accepting the Court's reading of Shapiro, Vlandis, and Memorial, its underlying reasoning is intellectually unsatisfying. Here, the Court assumed incorrectly that rewarding for past contributions does not influence present or future behavior.

121. "Just the place for a Snark," the Bellman cried,
As he landed his crew with care
Supporting each man on the top of the tide
By a finger entwined in his hair
"Just the place for a Snark. I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
"Just the place for a Snark. I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true."

L. CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK, FIT THE FIRST.

122. See supra note 121. The Court merely extracted the language from its decisions in Shapiro, Memorial, and Vlandis. 102 S. Ct. at 2314-15. For the initial statement, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 266 (1974) (rejecting contributory rationale); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 450 n.6 (1973) (relying upon Shapiro that apportionment based on past contributions "would give rise to grave problems under the Equal Protection Clause"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (apportionment of state services on basis of past tax contributions prohibited). But cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) ("State's refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is 'protectionist' only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve"); Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 499 (1879) ("whether the State of Connecticut shall measure the contribution which persons resident within its jurisdiction shall make by way of taxes in return for the protection it affords them, by the value of the credits, choses in action, bonds, or stocks which they may own, is a matter which concerns only the people of that state, and with which the Federal government cannot rightly interfere").

123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. The statement in Shapiro, however, is unambiguous: "The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services." 394 U.S. at 633. Instead, a careful appraisal of the contributory rationale reveals a parallel with conclusive presumption analysis. Often, no basis in fact exists for the proposition that those being rewarded actually contributed to the state, and those being denied often do contribute to the state. See supra note 35; Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 273 (1936) (requiring state to show factual basis); Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F. Supp. 102, 106 (D.C. Mass. 1971) (classification arbitrary and presumes contribution). If a state presented the factual basis for distributing benefits, arguably the two classes would not be similarly situated and thus the disadvantaged class could not raise an equal protection challenge.

124. Justice Brennan recognized the "presentist" argument for rewarding individuals for past action:
The past actions of individuals may be relevant in assessing their present needs; past actions may also be relevant in predicting current ability and future per-
More importantly, by labelling the "contributory rationale" as illegitimate, the Court reads a particular economic and social value into the equal protection clause. If the Court really means what it says about classifications according to the length of residency, then statutes such as California's roll-back tax assessment plan, Florida's homestead exemption, or Kentucky and Indiana's durational residency requirements for alcohol sellers pose troublesome questions.

Predicting how the Court might resolve such questions requires understanding the doctrinal conflicts among the justices. The four opinions in Zobel illustrate at least one of these conflicts. For instance, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist rejected the application of the article IV privileges and immunities clause to the Alaska statute. Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, championed the use of the clause as a constitutional source for protecting the right to migrate. Although agreeing that the Alaska scheme might interfere with the right to migrate, Justice Brennan artfully dodged the privileges and immunities clause. Consequently, five justices expressed their intention of protecting the right to migrate, and state legislation facially biased against newcomers might fall at the hands of judicial review.

Not all classifications between newcomers and long-term residents should fall prey to judicial review. Justice Brennan's concurrence foreshadows the Court's future role in assessing residency requirement...
ments in general, and the "past contribution rationale" in particular. In short, a state may establish requirements to test bona fide citizenship.\textsuperscript{132} Beyond that limited goal, a state must demonstrate that its durational residency requirement does not create an irrebuttable presumption without an empirically identifiable basis in fact.\textsuperscript{133}

The result in \textit{Zobel v. Williams}, therefore, does not preclude states from adopting durational residency requirements. In fact, the majority opinion's reliance on equal protection analysis suggests that durational residency requirements might survive judicial scrutiny if a legitimate and demonstratable basis exists for the classification.\textsuperscript{134} Nevertheless, the majority's failure to advance the applicable standard of review leaves open the possibility that the Court might develop yet another test.

\textit{Sam Kalen}

\textsuperscript{132} While simple residency requirements may penalize the exercise of the right to migrate, the state is said to have a compelling interest in testing bona fide citizenship. \textit{See supra} note 3.

In a case decided after \textit{Zobel}, the Supreme Court implicitly established a definitional approach toward residency requirements. In \textit{Martinez v. Bynum}, 51 U.S.L.W. 4524 (U.S. May 3, 1983), the Court explained its prior cases by drawing a distinction between durational residency requirements and bona fide residency requirements. "A bona fide residency requirement," the \textit{Martinez} Court explained, "furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents." \textit{Id.} at 4526. The Court also added that bona fide residency requirements did not involve a "suspect" classification and thus were not governed by strict scrutiny analysis; instead, such requirements had only to pass a rational basis test \textit{Id.} at 4526 n.7.

\textsuperscript{133} In other words, a state must present data illustrating that its classification scheme is grounded "in fact" and not in an arbitrary assumption about the differences between recent migrants and long-term residents. \textit{See supra} notes 122, 123 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{See supra} note 133. Consequently, although five justices in \textit{Zobel} reaffirmed the vitality of "right to migrate" arguments, an even larger number suggested that these arguments could be overcome by an adequate demonstration of "reasonableness" on the part of a state.