The Other Election Controversy of Y2K: Core First Amendment Values and High-Tech Political Coalitions

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THE OTHER ELECTION CONTROVERSY OF Y2K: CORE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND HIGH-TECH POLITICAL COALITIONS

MARC JOHN RANDAZZA, ESQ.*

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ABSTRACT

As the 2000 campaign reached its climax, some renegade supporters of Green Party candidate Ralph Nader countered critics’ charges that they were “handing the election to Bush” by creating websites encouraging vote-swapping. The theory of this practice was: A Nader supporter in a hotly contested state would agree to vote for Al Gore if a Gore supporter in an uncontested state would vote for Ralph Nader. The object was to help deliver five percent of the popular vote to the Green Party (so that the Greens would receive federal matching funds for the 2004 presidential election) while simultaneously working to prevent a George W. Bush presidency.

With the election less than a week away, and the poll margins closer than any election in recent history, several state election officials acted to snuff out the online vote-swapping movement by threatening vote-swap site operators with fines and/or imprisonment. The chilling effect brought about by the letters from state regulators may have tipped the scales in the 2000 campaign, even though no one knew whether prohibiting vote-swapping was constitutional.

This study introduces the reader to the concept and practice of vote-swapping. It examines the chilling effect of the threats of prosecution issued during the 2000 election and these effects’ possible electoral consequences. This study analyzes online vote-swapping under various state laws and state constitutions and extends the analysis to encompass federal election law and federal constitutional law. Finally, this study examines the ethics of vote-swapping and concludes that the practice is legal under most state election laws, protected under most state constitutions, protected by the federal Constitution, and an ethical use of personal voting power.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Issue

The 2000 presidential election will be remembered as one full of irregularities and controversy. In fact, the 2000 presidential election
produced approximately forty lawsuits during the Florida recount alone. Before the election, multiple candidates filed lawsuits in order to gain full access to the political process. Ralph Nader, Pat Buchanan, and John McCain all brought their campaigns into the courtroom in order to participate in American democracy.

The circumstances surrounding the 2000 Florida recount are unlikely to repeat. The Florida vote recount that never was, and the subsequent jurisprudential farce of Bush v. Gore, will remain in memory for many years, but their impact on future elections is likely to be purely mechanical. There was, however, a less-reported controversy during November of 2000 that is likely to re-emerge in the future: online vote-pairing. This was yet another attempt by individuals outside the traditional Democratic and Republican Party structure to gain access to the political process.

Online vote-pairing started when some members of the Texas Democratic Party, resigned to the fact that Texas was firmly in George W.

5. Whatever the motivation of the five justices who selected George W. Bush as president in 2000, it cannot be seriously asserted that it was grounded in proper jurisprudence. Even the majority, made up of justices who traditionally shunned equal protection analysis and embraced strong notions of federalism, but supported the converse logic in the 2000 election decision, knew that the logic in Bush v. Gore was so poorly crafted that no future courts should rely upon its analysis. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities”). See also Laurence Tribe, eroG v hsB and its Disguises, Freeing Bush v. Gore From its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001); Nelson Lund, “Equal Protection My Ass!” Bush v. Gore and Laurence Tribe’s Hall of Mirrors, 19 CONST. COMMENT 543 (2002); Laurence Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 571 (2002); Nelson Lund, Carnival of Mirrors: Laurence Tribe’s “Unbearable Wrongness,” 19 CONST. COMM. 609 (2003).
Bush’s column, proposed trading their votes with Nader supporters in swing states.\textsuperscript{8} As the 2000 campaign raged, many individuals opposed to the specter of a George W. Bush presidency lobbed charges at Green Party voters that their support would “hand Bush a victory.”\textsuperscript{9} Presumably, these critics held the belief that a Nader supporter would rather see Gore in office than Bush.\textsuperscript{10}

To counter these charges, some Nader-Gore supporters used the relatively new medium of the Internet to play an ancient political game.\textsuperscript{11} They launched websites to encourage or facilitate strategic voting, which would take on the cyberspace moniker of “online vote-swapping.”\textsuperscript{12}

It is unfortunate that this phenomenon was so widely referred to as vote “swapping.”\textsuperscript{13} Perhaps the term invoked images of Napster, the file-swapping service that was under siege during the 2000 campaign season.\textsuperscript{14} In fact, some commentators called online vote-swapping “electoral Napster.”\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Molly Ivins, Democratic Steak and Republican Pink Clouds, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Aug. 22, 2000, at B6 [hereinafter Democratic Steak].
\item The assumption that all Nader voters would have voted for Gore was false. Twenty-three percent of Nader supporters said that they would have voted for Bush had Nader not been running. See Peter Dizikes & David Ruppe, Will Nader Fare Well? How Strong Will Green Party Candidate’s Support be on Election Day?, ABCNEWS.COM, Oct. 26, 2000, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/naderthreat_001026.html (last visited Jul. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Dizikes & Ruppe].
\item See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
\end{enumerate}
Writing catchy headlines sometimes necessitates setting aside semantic accuracy, and no headline writer should be criticized for it. This study is more in-depth than a mere headline, and in order to accurately study this strategic voting behavior and attendant political assembly, it is necessary to remove the word “swap” and this word’s attendant baggage from the discussion. “Vote-swapping” is more accurately described as “online coalition building” or “online political assembly.” Nothing actually changed hands and was thus “swapped.” Jamin Raskin, a constitutional law professor at American University, who popularized the term “vote-swapping,” originally referred to the practice as “vote-pairing.” In this study, I revert to Raskin’s less catchy, but more accurate (and baggage-free) rough-draft term.

The online vote-pairing movement seemed to attract primarily Green/Democrat alliance voters. Nevertheless, this strategy could have been beneficial to, for example, Libertarians seeking to increase their party’s power by forming alliances with Republican voters. In fact, one site, Votexchange2000.com, allowed voters to first enter their state before entering their party affiliations. As discussed in Part V, criticism of the practice was almost completely the province of Republican secretaries of state, and praise of the practice was almost completely reserved to Democrats and Greens. Although hypothetical hindsight is blurry at best, perhaps if the practice stood to benefit Bush as much as it stood to benefit Gore, Republican election officials would have been less inclined to attempt to suppress the movement.

Building an online vote-pairing coalition is simple and entirely Internet-dependent. For example, in the 2000 election, a voter who wished to support Ralph Nader might have lived in a hotly contested “swing state”

such as Florida. Assuming that the Nader supporter, faced with Nader’s inevitable defeat, would have preferred to see Al Gore elected over George Bush, the Nader supporter faced a quandary. Should he vote his conscience and actually contribute to his third choice at the expense of his second choice? One alternative was to pair himself with a Gore supporter in a relatively uncontested state such as Massachusetts with the help of an online vote-pairing site. The Nader supporter in Florida and the Gore supporter in Massachusetts would both recognize that Gore would easily carry Massachusetts; accordingly, the two would agree that taking a vote from Gore in a Democratic stronghold would have no impact on Massachusetts’ electoral votes. The Gore supporter in Massachusetts would agree to cast her vote for Ralph Nader, thereby giving the Greens one more vote toward the magic five percent they sought in order to receive federal matching election funds for the 2004 presidential election. In exchange, the Nader supporter in Florida would cast a vote for Gore, giving Gore a much-needed vote in a hotly contested and ultimately pivotal state. One email vote exchange was later regretted by one of the participants, who happened to use his U.S. government email address. The exchange became a matter of public record when the Washington Times published the following text obtained from a vote-pairing participant:

Congratulations! You have been matched with Fred Turner from this state: VA. This person’s first choice candidate is Al Gore, but he/she is planning on voting for your candidate, Ralph Nader,
trust that you will in turn vote for Al Gore according to an honor system that we all support by registering at http://VoteExchange.com.27

James Ridgeway introduced America to the concept of online vote-pairing in The Village Voice in September 2000.28 Ridgeway reported that since the election promised to be so close, Nader supporters feared that their efforts could bring about a conservative victory.29 Many believed that if Nader were not running, Gore would have been more securely in the lead in the late days of the campaign.30 Concerned with spoiling Gore’s chances in what was never more than a two-way race, after the Ridgeway article hit the stands, Nader supporters got to work.31 On October 1, 2000, Steve Yoder, a Washington, D.C. technical writer, launched Voteexchange.org.32

By October 2, 2000 conservative voters were in on the act as well.33 On that day a message board for FreeRepublic.com34 encouraged of Republican, Libertarian, constitutional, and Reform party candidates to vote-swap with Bush voters in Massachusetts, New York, and Washington, D.C.35 Nevertheless, the conservative vote-swappers did not gain the same momentum and media attention as the “Nader-traders.”36

Although there was some media and Internet discussion of the subject, the idea did not truly catch fire until American University constitutional law professor Jamin Raskin promoted the idea in the MSN online

27. Id.
28. Professor James Raskin of the American University College of Law is often credited with introducing the practice of vote-swapping, see Raskin, Litigating, supra note 16, at 699 n.246 (“[Vote-swapping] is a phenomenon I am familiar with because I introduced the idea of vote-trading, which I actually first called ‘vote-pairing,’ to America in Slate Magazine on October 24, 2000, several weeks before election day.”). But see James Ridgeway, Beatification of Ralph, VILLAGE VOICE ONLINE, Sept. 27–Oct. 3, 2000 [hereinafter Beatification], available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0039/ridgeway3.php (last visited July 25, 2003); Democratic Steak, supra note 8, at B6.
30. See, e.g., Dizikes & Ruppe, supra note 10.
31. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
In his article, Raskin explained that the presidential race had narrowed enough that a strong showing by Ralph Nader in ten battleground states had the potential to give George W. Bush the 270 Electoral College votes he needed to win. Upon publication of Raskin’s article, hits to vote-pairing sites increased exponentially. Prior to the SLATE article, VoteExchange.org arranged 500 swaps in one week. After the Raskin article, VoteSwap2000 arranged 500 trades in 24 hours, and in its short life exchanged more than 5,000 votes. Votetrader.org claimed that it arranged 15,000 vote exchanges in several battleground states.

With the election less than a week away, and the poll margins closer than any election in recent history, election officials in Oregon and California struck out against online vote-pairing. Officials in Florida, Arizona, Minnesota, and Wisconsin declared the practice illegal but did not act with the same zeal as their west-coast counterparts.

The California Secretary of State, Bill Jones (R) sent an email to Jim Cody, co-creator of VoteSwap2000, threatening him with prosecution under California’s election code sections 18521 and 18522 as well as criminal conspiracy under Penal Code section 182. Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury (D) said online vote-pairing, “even without the exchange of money, violate[d] state election laws.” Bradbury sent desist

37. See Raskin, supra note 13.
38. See id.
40. Harris, supra note 25.
41. Rutherford B. Hayes won the 1876 presidential race by a single electoral vote. See Abramson et al., supra note 11. See also Bronislaus B. Kush, Every Vote Counts in Fight for the White House, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 2000, at 2 (“The Kennedy/Nixon race of 1960 had a 118,574 popular vote margin, but was a clear electoral college victory for Kennedy. In 1880, James Garfield prevailed over Winfield S. Hancock by a mere 7,018 votes.”).
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part III.
45. See infra notes 211–12.
46. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521(a) (West 2000) (“A person shall not directly or through any other person receive, agree, or contract for, before, during or after an election, any money, gift, loan, or other valuable consideration . . . because he or any other person voted . . . agreed to vote, refrained from voting, or agreed to refrain from voting for any particular person or measure.”).
47. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(a)(2) (West 2000) (“Neither a person nor a controlled committee shall directly or through any other person or controlled committee pay, lend, or contribute, or offer or promise to pay, lend, or contribute, any money or other valuable consideration or to or for any voter to or for any other person to . . . induce any voter to . . . vote or refrain from voting at an election for any particular person or measure.”).
letters to six vote-trading sites—all based outside Oregon—which stated
that the sites would be subject to civil penalties in Oregon if they facil itated the trading of Oregonians’ votes.\textsuperscript{50} However, Bradbury, the only Democrat to take a swipe at vote-swappers quickly reversed himself.\textsuperscript{51}

Prior to her involvement in the Florida recount debacle, Katherine Harris (R) declared vote-pairing “illegal.”\textsuperscript{52} Arizona’s state election director publicly stated that vote-pairing violated state law.\textsuperscript{53} Wisconsin officials personally met with one vote-pairing site operator.\textsuperscript{54} Because the law Wisconsin officials relied upon contained penalties of a $10,000 fine and three years in prison,\textsuperscript{55} the website operator modified his website to include disclaimers which stated that the practice of vote-swapping is illegal; Wisconsin officials took no further action.\textsuperscript{56} Minnesota’s Secretary of State made her position clear when she stated, “Vote-swapping undercuts the fundamental tenets that hold our country together.”\textsuperscript{57}

On the other hand, Maine and Nebraska officials came to a different conclusion than those in Florida, Arizona, and Wisconsin. Maine Secretary of State Dan Gwadosky (D) said that online vote trading was “perfectly legal.”\textsuperscript{58} In fact Gwadosky not only dispelled any notion of its illegality but also endorsed the practice. “It’s a provocative way to use a new medium,” he said.\textsuperscript{59} He continued to praise the practice as likely to increase voter turnout even in Maine, a state with historically one of the best turnout rates in the United States.\textsuperscript{60}

Nebraska Secretary of State Scott Moore (R) seemed to accept the legality of the practice. He stated, “Obviously, if money was changing hands or threats or intimidation was occurring, then I would have a

\textsuperscript{50.} See Scott Harris, ACLU Takes Up Vote-Swapping Fight, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 2, 2000, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,19890,00.html (now defunct) (on file with author).
\textsuperscript{52.} Telephone Interview with Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State (Nov. 1, 2000).
\textsuperscript{54.} Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A.
\textsuperscript{55.} WISC. STAT. ANN. § 12.11 (West 2002).
\textsuperscript{56.} Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A.
\textsuperscript{57.} See Press Release, Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer Asks Vote-Swap Web Sites to “Cease and Desist” in MN (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/office/voteswap%2011-1-00.doc (last visited July 7, 2003).
\textsuperscript{58.} David Connerty-Marin, Nader-Gore Vote-swapping is Deemed Legal in Maine, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 1, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter Connerty-Marin].
\textsuperscript{59.} Id.
\textsuperscript{60.} Id.
B. Research Questions

If the First Amendment means anything, it means that Americans have the right to speak freely in a public forum on matters of political importance. With the rise of the Internet as a powerful medium of mass communication and a new public forum, anyone with a dial-up account “can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.” The fact that the medium is new does not justify a change in our established core values regarding freedom of expression and association. However, online vote-pairing needs to be studied in the context of how technology and law interact with strategic voting behavior. Accordingly, the following questions will be answered by this study:

What was the reaction of state election officials toward this behavior? How did different states confront the issue? Which state election officials acted within the confines of their proper authority, and which officials, if any, exceeded their mandate, or shirked their responsibility?

What was the reaction of the Federal Elections Commission toward online vote-pairing? Did this behavior run afoul of any federal laws?

What are the constitutional considerations of online vote-pairing? Does the federal Constitution demand that it be permitted, even in states which may properly suppress it under their state laws and constitution?

Finally, this study will address the ethics of online vote-pairing. If the practice is not prohibited, should it be?

This study explores one of the effects the Internet had, and will continue to have, on presidential politics. There have been studies on the effect of Internet communication on voting behavior but only by looking at the Internet as a more evolved medium of mass communication.

62. Id.
63. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948) [hereinafter Meiklejohn]. See also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 23 (1971) [hereinafter Bork] (“[E]ven without a first amendment . . . representative democracy . . . would be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment.”).
64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (striking down the Communications Decency Act and stating that restrictions on website content are afforded the same protection as traditional print).
65. See id.
66. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Politicking on the Internet, FORTUNE, Mar. 6, 2000 at 84; Torsten
Online vote-pairing takes the interaction of voting behavior and the Internet to a higher level, where political coalitions and movements are actually created in cyberspace. An assessment of the legal questions raised by vote-pairing facilitates understanding how this practice is, will, and should be governed. Evolution in Internet technology will likely move more traditional political activity into cyberspace. Therefore, a study of online vote-pairing is a study of the genesis of the next level of political action and activism in cyberspace.

C. Research Methodology

The majority of this study will rely on federal and state election codes, case law, attorney general opinions, and official statements. Oregon and California are the only states that took punitive action against online vote-pairing operations. However, since Arizona, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Nebraska officials weighed in on the issue with some degree of credibility, this study will include an analysis of the vote-pairing phenomena in the context of these states’ laws and constitutions as well.

There were other states whose officials publicly voiced opposition to online vote-swapping. Kansas’ Secretary of State Ron Thornburgh was quoted as saying, “I will do everything I can to vigorously prosecute vote-swapping.” However, Thornburgh admitted a lack of knowledge as to whether it was illegal. Given that Thornburgh spoke with what some could characterize as questionable credibility, his comments will not warrant an exploration of Kansas law. Additionally, unnamed Missouri and Texas officials allegedly spoke against the practice but took no action and were not named in the news source that reported their comments. Accordingly, although the article noting these comments has significant indicia of reliability, none of these states presents a novel enough legal issue to warrant analysis based on unnamed sources.


67. See infra Part III.
69. See id.
71. See id.
D. Part Outline

Part I contains the research questions, the literature review, and the research methodology.

Part II is divided into four sections: a study of strategic voting behavior; a study of political action in cyberspace before the 2000 presidential election; an introduction to the re-electoral college; and a study of the chilling effect.

Part III looks at online vote-pairing through the prism of state law. California, Oregon, Minnesota, Florida, Wisconsin, Maine, Nebraska, and Arizona are included due to the fact that these states acted, directly or indirectly, on the issue. Each state’s election law is presented and studied, with attendant constitutional analysis where the state’s jurisprudence deviates from, or offers more instruction than, federal constitutional jurisprudence.

Part IV analyzes federal law. The Federal Election Law—42 United States Code § 1973i(C)—begins Part IV, and federal constitutional concerns follow. I theorize that strict scrutiny is applicable to state action against online vote-pairing. Thereafter, the study works through each prong of the strict-scrutiny test.

Part V adds an ethical dimension to the study by looking at the practice of online vote-pairing beyond the question of whether it is legally permissible and answering the question whether it is ethical.

Part VI gives the reader the author’s legal and ethical conclusions on the matter of online vote-pairing.

E. Literature Review

Soon after vote-pairing became a legal controversy, three commentators jumped into the fray with scholarly articles examining the legality of the practice. To date, my research has identified six scholarly works that examine the issue of online vote-pairing in the 2000 presidential race. The author of this Article, an associate at Becker &

72. The lack of case law on this subject at the time of this writing requires a certain amount of theorizing.
Poliakoff, wrote two of the six. An associate at Covington and Burling authored a newsletter article, and an associate at Sidley & Austin authored a law review article. Third-year law students at the University of North Carolina and the University of California, Hastings College of Law, wrote the remaining two law review articles as student notes.

My article in the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review examines the online vote-pairing phenomenon in the context of other Internet-based political activity. The article examines the actions of state regulators in California and Oregon against a backdrop consisting of their respective state election laws, state constitutions, the federal election laws, and finally the federal Constitution. After a discussion of the constitutionality of online vote-pairing, I concluded that the practice of online vote-pairing was permissible under both California and Oregon election law, protected by the California and Oregon Constitutions, and fully-protected under the federal Constitution.

Deborah Matties published a short piece about the vote-pairing controversy in the Communications Lawyer, a newsletter. In this piece, Matties reported on the issue of online vote-trading and foreshadowed a later appellate decision on the issue by questioning Judge Kelleher’s decision to reject the vote-pairing site operators’ petition for an injunction against the California Secretary of State that would have prohibited the Secretary from threatening vote-pairing site operators.
Brad Worley’s article, *Nader’s Traders vs. State Regulators*\(^8^7\) recognizes that the model of vote-pairing can affect its legality, and he categorizes the vote-pairing sites as falling into the “encouragement model,” “bulletin board model,” or “the automatic brokering model.”\(^8^8\)

Worley calls sites that offer “little practical assistance” in facilitating a vote-pairing action, but merely opine on the subject, the “encouragement model.”\(^8^9\) Worley’s “bulletin board model” describes chatboards designed to facilitate person-to-person contact among potential vote-swappers; however, these sites provide nothing more than an electronic bulletin board for one’s contact information.\(^9^0\) The “automatic brokering model” is the model that actually links users together to facilitate a private agreement to vote-swap\(^9^1\) and is the only model that constitutes online vote-pairing.

After describing his three models of online vote-pairing, Worley’s legal analysis focuses on state election statutes and the concept of “valuable consideration.”\(^9^2\) Worley’s article rests on the premise that the issue of the legality of online vote-pairing will be resolved by (1) whether a vote is a thing of value;\(^9^3\) and (2) whether the individual state examining the practice has case law which draws analogies to online vote-pairing in its analysis of its election law.\(^9^4\) Worley examines neither the constitutional implications nor the federal law implications of online vote-pairing. In all reality, Worley has a point. As discussed in Part III of this study, from a tactical standpoint, it would have been better to fight for vote-pairing sites on the “valuable consideration” front. Regardless, the issue contains questions of such constitutional gravity that Worley’s article is handicapped by a lack of any constitutional or federal analysis. A constitutional analysis is important because any regulation of online vote-pairing (at the very least) implicates free speech and free assembly concerns.

In *Breaking Duverger’s Law Is Not Illegal*,\(^9^5\) I expanded the scholarship on this issue by examining online vote-pairing against a backdrop of political science research pertaining to strategic or tactical

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88. Worley, *supra* note 73, at 60.
89. *Id.* at 60–61.
90. *Id.* at 61–62.
91. *Id.* at 62–64.
92. *Id.* at 64.
93. *Id.* at 64–65.
94. *Id.* at 52–60.
95. Randazza I, *supra* note 73.
voting. This article substantially consists of my first article, *The Constitutionality of Online Vote-Swapping,* with a few improvements, updates, and an added-on section discussing strategic voting theory. While this is an important issue to consider when looking at online vote-pairing, I would be overly egotistical if I claimed that *Breaking Duverger’s Law Is Not Illegal* contributed a great amount to legal scholarship on this issue.

Jessie Sisgold authored an article on the subject in the *Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal.* Sisgold’s study covers a lot of the same ground covered by *The Constitutionality of Online Vote Swapping.* Sisgold, like Worley, devotes a great amount of analysis to a consideration of what the term “valuable consideration” means in the context of California election law. Sisgold most notably delves into a discussion of legislative logrolling and campaign contributions as legally similar to the practice of online vote-pairing and alludes to the possible slippery slope of outlawing vote-pairing, which could lead to absurd legal and political conclusions.

Sisgold analyzes the possible rationales for prohibiting the brokering of votes, essentially running online vote-trading through Richard Hasen’s vote-buying analysis. Sisgold adopts Hasen’s analysis of vote-alienation on political equality and political efficiency rationales and concludes that neither justifies a prohibition of vote-pairing. Sisgold’s eventual conclusion states, “This is good for democracy” without studying the ethical implications of online vote-pairing.

Sisgold adds to the existing scholarship by applying Hasen’s logic and describes the rationales behind vote-bribery statutes as protective of equality, efficiency, or merely a proper use of state power to determine that a vote is not property to be bought or sold. Sisgold states that as a result of the technology gap between rich and poor, the equality rationale may be somewhat applicable to efforts to stifle vote-pairing since the poor will have less computer access and Internet access than the wealthy.

96. *See supra* note 73.
98. *See supra* note 73.
100. *Id.* at 160–61.
101. *Id.* at 163.
102. *Id.* at 164–67.
104. *Id.* at 161.
105. *Id.* at 167.
106. *Id.* at 164–67.
107. *Id.* at 165.
The efficiency rationale for prohibiting vote-pairing stems from the fact that online vote-swaps are inherently unpoliceable, and therefore, it is inefficient to permit the practice. Sisgold suggests that this is an inadequate argument to require state anti-fraud laws to come to bear against online vote-swappers. Sisgold finally offers an alternative rationale for prohibiting vote-swapping: “that votes belong to the community as a whole and thus should not be alienable by individual voters.” However, he states that, “this is a thin branch on which to rest an argument against an encroachment of core First Amendment protection—political speech.” Sisgold gives no analysis of online vote-pairing against a backdrop of political science theory and omits a study of most states that weighed in on the issue.

John Rushing’s article in the Texas Forum on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights covers the same ground as Sisgold’s, with a brief discussion of the electoral college. Rushing provides a well-written but limited analysis of the issue with little added scholarship regarding state concerns, political theory, or ethics.

In conducting my research on this issue for this study, it came as a surprise that only six scholarly works existed, even more than three years after the events of 2000 unfolded. To be certain that no additional works had been written, I returned to the University of Florida, all of its databases and journals, the Internet, Westlaw, and Lexis. I searched for any term that might possibly describe online vote-pairing and even looked through every scholarly article that mentioned the word “Nader.” I conducted an exhaustive search of the literature (popular as well as academic) available at the University of Florida, in print and electronically under multiple searches. On a weekly basis, from

108. Id. at 166.
109. Id. at 166.
110. Id. at 166.
111. Id. at 167.
112. Rushing, supra note 75.
113. I searched to the following publications until July 21, 2003: Academy of Management Journal; Administrative Science Quarterly; African Historical Studies; American Historical Review; American Journal of International Law; American Journal of Sociology; American Political Science Review; American Quarterly; American Sociological Review; Asian Survey; Annals of the Association of American Geographers; British Journal of Political Science; British Journal of Sociology; Comparative Politics; Comparative Studies in Society and History; Economic Geography; Economic History Review; Eighteenth-Century Studies; English Historical Review; Ethnohistory; Family Coordinator; French Historical Studies; Hispanic American Historical Review; Historical Journal; History and Theory; History of Education Quarterly; History Teacher; Industrial and Labor Relations Review; International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs); International Journal of Middle East Studies; International Organization, International Studies Quarterly; Journal of African
January 8, 2003 until July 22, 2003, I conducted repeated Lexis, Westlaw, and Internet searches (primarily using Google) with redundant search terms with multiple combinations of “vote,” “trade,” “swap” “strategic,” and “Nader.” After all of these exhaustive searches, only the original six law journal articles revealed any kind of research on this subject. This study also reflects the most serious comments in the news media and newsletters as well, even though almost all of what was written did not involve academic research or an otherwise helpful discussion of the issues.

I cannot testify as to why so little was written about this topic, but my theory is that given the fact that the recount of 2000 was such a media frenzy, this narrower issue was subsumed in the tidal wave of commentary and observation surrounding the recount, Katharine Harris, Bush v. Gore, and dimpled chads. In any event, those issues are behind us, but online vote-pairing lies ahead.
II. DUVERGER’S LAW, POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE CHILLING EFFECT

A. Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law

Ostensibly, the purpose of a democratic election is to poll the electorate to measure its preference concerning an issue or a candidate. However, the simple-majority and single-ballot (SMSB) system, such as that in the United States, has an inherent flaw in gauging the actual preferences of the electorate. The SMSB system directs voting behavior in a manner that prefers a two-party system, regardless of the actual preference of the electorate. As a result, “the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system.” (In the 1950’s Maurice Duverger wrote on this topic so successfully that this concept has taken on his name—Duverger’s Law.)

In SMSB systems as we have in the United States, some voters who would prefer the leadership of a third-party do not vote for their preferred candidate. Instead, voters frequently abandon their preferred candidate in favor of another because of contextual factors (such as a candidate’s chance to ultimately win) that surround the election. Usually this occurs when the voter’s most preferred candidate is a less viable candidate than the two front-runners in an election. To reduce the chances of his or her least-preferred candidate winning, the voter selects a lesser choice among the two front-runners. Traditional political science and logic tells us that the net effect is the reduction of the number of viable political parties.

116. See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (Barbara & Robert North trans., 1954) [hereinafter DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES].

117. See id. See also Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques 247 (3d ed. 1958) (“le scrutin majoritaire à un seul tour tend au dualisme des parties”).

118. See, e.g., DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 116, at 217; Gary Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems 13 (1997) [hereinafter MAKING VOTES COUNT].


120. This is what Duverger referred to as the “psychological effect” of the simple plurality system. See DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 116, at 207–35 (discussing the coalescence of two main parties); MAKING VOTES COUNT, supra note 118, at 13 (discussing Duverger’s propositions); Cox, supra note 11, at 611, 616; John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh et al., Strategic Voting in the 1994 Taipei City Mayoral Election, 16 ELECTION STUD. 153, 154 (1997) [hereinafter Hsieh et al.] (discussing the meaning of “strategic voting”).

121. This is commonly referred to as “Duverger’s Law.” See DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 116, at 217. See also Cox, supra note 11; William Riker, The Two Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 753, 757 (1982) [hereinafter Riker] (showing support for Duverger’s Law while demonstrating that writing on the law...
In the 1990s, Gary Cox followed up on Duverger’s research and published multiple works describing what he called the Duvergerian and non-Duvergerian equilibria. Cox wrote that in an SMSB election, the electorate may reach an equilibrium under which only the two dominant candidates survive, and third parties are marginalized to the point of non-importance. This, the current dominant condition of American politics, is known as the Duvergerian equilibrium. Alternatively, a non-Duvergerian equilibrium exists when there is a clear front-runner, but the two candidates fighting for second place are of sufficient parity that neither candidate’s backers are willing to forego their support. This is rare in U.S. politics but occurred in the Chilean National Election in 1978 and in the Taipei mayoral race in 1994.

Arthur Holcombe recognized Duverger’s Law (before it took on that moniker) in 1910, when Holcombe wrote, “the tendency under the system of plurality elections toward the establishment of the two-party system is almost irresistible.” Even Holcombe was not the first to write about the shortcomings of the SMSB system. In 1869, Henry Droop, an English barrister, posited that each voter in an SMSB system has a choice between the two front-runners, suggesting that voting for a trailing candidate is essentially throwing the vote away.

James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock examined the legislative equivalent of vote-pairing by looking at “vote trading” or “logrolling” in legislative bodies. Buchanan and Tullock described how the practice predates Duverger; A.N. Holcombe, Direct Primaries and the Second Ballot, 5 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 532, 540 (1911) [hereinafter Holcombe] (the tendency of plurality elections to create a two-party system is “irresistible”).

122. Cox, supra note 11.
123. Id.
125. Roger Myerson and Robert Weber, A Theory of Voting Equilibria, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 102 (1993) [hereinafter Myerson & Weber]; Cox, supra note 11; ARTURO VALENZUELA, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CHILE (1978) [hereinafter VALENZUELA] (discussing the 1958 Chilean presidential election in which the right wing candidate won the election with 31.2% of the vote, the leftist candidate gathered 28.5%, and the centrist received 20.5%. Although the left and center were more likely to ally against the right and could have easily changed the results had there been strategic voting, the relative strength of both non-right candidates dampened any incentive to enter into strategic voting); Hsieh, supra note 120, at 160 (demonstrating the non-Duvergerian equilibrium in the 1994 Taipei City election).
126. VALENZUELA, supra note 125.
127. Hsieh et al., supra note 120, at 154.
130. JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) [hereinafter
permits legislators to add levels of preference to simple yea or nay votes.\textsuperscript{131} For example, a legislator engaging in logrolling may improve his position by voting for a measure that he does not strongly support in exchange for receiving support on a matter he advocates strongly.\textsuperscript{132} Steven Brams and William Riker elaborated on this phenomenon in \textit{The Paradox of Vote Trading}.\textsuperscript{133} In this work, Riker and Brams studied legislative bodies and wrote that although logrolling improves the relative position of legislative vote-traders, it also creates external costs for the non-traders.\textsuperscript{134} For example, a failure to engage in vote-trades with legislative colleagues could encourage retributive action by a legislator who might otherwise have supported another’s bill but refuses to do so out of a desire to encourage the other legislator to “play ball.”\textsuperscript{135} Accordingly, Riker and Brams theorized that although the sum of a vote-swap may be good for the traders, in the end, the trade may disadvantage everyone involved, including the traders themselves.\textsuperscript{136} However, this theory is based on the likelihood that vote-trading in legislative bodies will inevitably repeat, with trades continuing ad infinitum.\textsuperscript{137} While this possibility is understandable in the legislative context, it is unlikely that citizen voters will have enough regular interaction surrounding votes to create a pattern of compromise and mutual reliance.\textsuperscript{138}

A slew of authors have discussed the principles Duverger articulated. Gary Cox,\textsuperscript{139} T.R. Palfrey,\textsuperscript{140} and Roger Myerson and Robert Weber\textsuperscript{141} all used mathematical models to demonstrate that multi-candidate elections

\textbf{Buchanan & Tullock}, But see COLO. CONST. art V., § 40 (prohibiting legislative vote-trading by constitutional mandate in Colorado); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.05 (West 2003) (prohibiting legislative vote-trading by statute); Roberts v. Millikin, 93 P. 2d 393 (Wash. 1939) (equating vote-trading with “malfeasance in office”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.010 (West 2003) (“‘Misfeasance’ or ‘malfeasance’ in office means any wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts, or interferes with the performance of official duty”), amended by 2003 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 111 (S.S.B. 5221) (West 2003).

131. \textit{Buchanan & Tullock}, supra note 130, at 145.
132. \textit{Id}.
133. \textit{Id}.
134. \textit{Id}.
135. \textit{Id}.
136. \textit{Id}.
137. \textit{Id}.
138. Legislators are colleagues who work together on a regular basis, while the electorate is called together to vote only periodically.
139. Cox, \textit{supra} note 11.
140. T.R. Palfrey, \textit{A Mathematical Proof of Duverger’s Law, in Models of Strategic Choice in Politics} (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989). However, Palfrey recognizes that the law may not hold up in some unusual situations. \textit{Id}.
under the plurality rule will tend to result in only two candidates receiving a significant number of votes. 142

There is great political scientific evidence that many voters in a SMSB election do not vote for their preference, as they would be expected to. 143 Instead, they tend to vote for the “lesser of two evils” or they vote on other strategic grounds (e.g., against one candidate by voting for the next strongest candidate). 144 Therefore, the idea that voters would vote for someone other than their first choice is not alien to the practice of democracy. However, online vote-pairing placed a new twist in Duverger’s law by allowing electors to upset the Duvergian equilibrium and promote their true preferences in an election without the constraints that inhere in the SMSB election.

B. Political Movements and the Internet

The Internet, as a ganglion of online networks, has created a rapid global communication system that permits new forms of social and political organization and coordination. 145 Vincent Casaregola and Robert Cropf wrote that the Internet provides citizens with “the opportunity to engage in an unprecedented communal process of sharing information and creating new knowledge.” 146

It did not take long for political candidates, parties, and political action committees to recognize the Internet’s potential as “a powerful campaign tool with the potential to significantly influence the outcome of [elections].” 147 The vast communicative power of the Internet makes it a super-broadcasting tool that allows nearly anyone to jump into the political fray, regardless of economic means. 148

142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 11; Holcombe, supra note 121.
144. Id.
146. Id.
148. Id.
1. First-Level Online Political Organization

In July of 1989, an organization of Chinese students living in the U.S. organized a lobbying campaign to persuade Congress to protect them from Communist Chinese threats of reprisal for their support of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrators.\[149\] The lobbying committee used email and Internet newsgroups to organize 43,000 students at 160 colleges and universities and gain widespread media attention with only four days notice.\[150\] The bill passed, largely as a result of the students’ use of telecommunications to coordinate the disparate parts within their coalition.\[151\]

Also in 1989, a group of twenty activists in Santa Monica, California, organized the SHWASHLOCK (showers, washers, and lockers) movement online.\[152\] “They eventually overcame neighborhood and City Council resistance, obtaining a $150,000 line item in the budget and approval for converting an old bath house to a facility for the homeless.”\[153\] The group also created a job bank co-op for the homeless and a campaign to include Santa Monica schools in an international program to educate school children about electronic communication.\[154\] A follow-up survey of the activists revealed that “it was the online process that enabled the group to plan and execute these various efforts.”\[155\]

As another example of first-level online political organization, The Christian Coalition used its website on July 7, 1994 to urge its allies to contact Congress and demand an end to federal support for the National Endowment for the Arts.\[156\] Three days later, a group of freshman Republican Congressmen called for an end to federal support for the

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\[150\] See Bonchek, supra note 147, at § 5.2.

\[151\] Id.

\[152\] Id.

\[153\] Id.

\[154\] Id.


\[156\] Id.
NEA. Analysts credited the Congressmen's actions to the online coalition building power of the Internet.

These actions could theoretically have been accomplished without the Internet. Had the Chinese students or the Christian Coalition owned a TV network, or possessed enough funds to buy sufficient airtime to make their cause heard nationwide, the result may have been the same. In these examples of first-level online organization, the Internet brought a powerful voice to people who otherwise might not have an impact, but their actions were not unique to cyberspace. The Internet acted as a tool of democratization, but the conduct was not entirely Internet-dependent. The Internet, in these circumstances, acted as a super-leafleting tool or a cheap means of advertising to a mass audience.

2. Second-Level Online Political Organization

The next level of using the Internet as a political action tool is the actual use of cyberspace as a “place” for the creation of online coalitions. In 1998, Bart-Jan Flos of the Politeia Network for Citizenship and Democracy in Europe suggested the use of the Internet to form coalitions led by already elected politicians. Mark Bonchek and Edward Schwartz demonstrated the strength of the Internet as a replacement for capital in the organization of grassroots political movements.

Dave D’Alessio studied the impact of the world wide web on the 1996 presidential election. He found that the potential for the Internet to compensate for a lack of campaign funds was great, but that this was not the true value of Internet campaigning. D’Alessio wrote that the true value of the Internet in political campaigns would be socializing voters to

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Philip Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (suggesting that the Internet is not just a means of communication, but a “place”); Linda M. Harasim, Networks as Social Space, in GLOBAL NETWORKS 15–34 (Linda M. Harasim ed., 1993) (same).
163. Id. at 492.
seek out political information on the web. Furthermore, D’Alessio found that web hits to political sites hovered at an unremarkable level until approximately 60 days before the election, when hit counts jumped substantially and continued on a rising trend until the week before the election. In the day before the election, hits increased precipitously from the previous day, and on the day of the election, hits spiked even more.

The idea of the Internet as a tool of political organization evolved into its next form in November of 2000. At that time, the Internet became more than an alternative to phone banks and expensive advertising. Instead, users harnessed the Internet to create a vote-pairing, coalition-building movement unique to cyberspace with the potential for massive political repercussions.

C. The Electoral College

Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the existence of the Electoral College, establishing a mechanism whereby each state has a number of electors equal to the number of senators and representatives it sends to Congress. These electors are then entrusted to vote for the President and Vice-President of the United States. Each state must appoint its electors by the Tuesday following the first Monday in November, and no Senator, Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States may serve as an elector. Aside from these requirements, there are no constitutional or federal constraints

164. Id.
165. Id. at 495.
166. Id.
167. Although the construction and function of the Electoral College in the United States might be common knowledge to some readers, a perfunctory review of the mechanics of the Electoral College is nonetheless valuable.
168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1–2 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”). This is further codified by 3 U.S.C. § 3 (2000):

The number of electors shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the several States are by law entitled at the time when the President and Vice President to be chosen come into office; except, that where no apportionment of Representatives has been made after any enumeration, at the time of choosing electors, the number of electors shall be according to the then existing apportionment of Senators and Representatives.

For the purposes of the Electoral College, the District of Columbia is a “State.” 3 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
169. Id.
on the states’ selection of electors, provided that the individual electors are constitutionally fit to serve.  

In forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, the electoral votes for each state are awarded by state-wide popular election, with the majority winner taking all the electoral votes for that state. Yet almost half of the states impose no restrictions upon elector conduct. Once appointed, the electors may cast their vote for whomever they please regardless of the result of the popular vote in these states. Most remaining states’ electors are bound to vote for the candidate determined by the popular vote in their states. Only Maine and Nebraska apportion their electors proportionally based on how the state vote is split. Each congressional district in these states is polled to apportion its electoral vote, and the winner overall in the state takes the two senatorial electoral votes.

To understand online vote-pairing, the operative fact regarding the Electoral College is that whether a candidate for president wins a state by a single vote or a landslide, the electoral votes are apportioned to the winner. Even in Maine and Nebraska, it is a “winner take all” apportionment of congressional districts: electoral votes.

D. The Chilling Effect

1. What is the Chilling Effect?

The secretaries of state who sought to stamp out online vote-pairing certainly achieved their goal. Although nobody was certain whether prohibiting vote-pairing was constitutional, the effect brought about by state action in California, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin was immediate.

171. The author notes that the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits anyone from serving as an elector if the person engaged in insurrection, rebellion, or gave comfort to an enemy of the United States, after previously taking an oath not to do so. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.


173. The states with restrictions are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.

174. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (West 2003) (“One Presidential elector shall be chosen from each congressional district and 2 at large”); NEB. REV. STAT. 32-710 (1999) (“One presidential elector shall be chosen from each congressional district, and two presidential electors shall be chosen at large”).

175. See Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 492–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that California’s
The statements made by secretaries of state of Arizona, Florida, and Minnesota, while threatening no prosecutorial action (or in the case of Minnesota, threatening prosecution after the sites had already shut down) certainly contributed to the existing detrimental effect.

The Supreme Court defines the “chilling effect” as the “collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the more reluctant to exercise it.” This effect is recognized as affecting free association rights as well as free speech rights. A chilling effect exists when citizens are apprehensive to exercise their rights to free expression or free association due to the threat of the expense and inconvenience of criminal prosecution. This effect may exist when there is direct prosecution or restraint or when the state action is merely a comment by an official perceived to have the requisite power to prosecute. The landmark case of Near v. Minnesota explains that when citizens are apprehensive about exercising their rights to free expression or free association due to the threat of criminal prosecution, constitutionally protected rights can be chilled.

Nonetheless, the Court hinted that it might allow restraint on the lawful “publication of the sailing dates of [military] transports or the number and location of troops.” Courts engage in a balancing test to determine actions taken against vote-pairing sites constituted a chilling effect and stating that plaintiffs alleged a “colorable prior restraint claim.”

177. See Christine Cupaiuolo, When a Personal Vote Isn’t Personal, at http://www.poppolitics.com/articles/2000-11-02_nadergorelegal.shtml (now defunct) (“Minnesota Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer e-mailed VoteSwap2000.com on Monday, asking them to ‘cease and desist’ vote-swapping activities in the state of Minnesota. (They already had.”).
178. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (holding ordinance that prohibited the possession of “obscene” or “indecent” material in a bookstore to be unconstitutional due to its tendency to inhibit not only unprotected expression but also protected expression).
179. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 493–94 (1965) (holding statute that defined “subversive organization” was unconstitutional due to potential “chilling effect” on defendant’s associational rights).
182. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (holding Minnesota statute that authorized prior restraints on publication of defamatory materials unconstitutional).
183. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716. See also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726–27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that when national security information is implicated, the
whether the detrimental effect is sufficiently counterbalanced by valid governmental interests, but the government must meet a heavy burden to convince a court to sustain state action that chills constitutionally protected activity. Therefore, a chilling effect is not per se unconstitutional, but since its existence can stifle “the flow of democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources,” state actions that chill free expression are held up to heightened scrutiny.

2. Was There a Chilling Effect?

The statements and actions of the secretaries of state, in their quest to shut-down the vote-pairing sites, sent shivers through cyberspace that affected website operators nationwide. For example, the day after California contacted VoteSwap2000, the website posted the following message: “We are not lawyers . . . Our advice is to err on the side of caution, and if you can’t determine for sure that you are not in violation of any laws, you should not participate in vote-swapping.”

Despite site operators’ support of Ralph Nader, and the questionable constitutionality of the actions of the secretaries of state, none of the site operators were willing to risk prison or fines. At least three vote-pairing sites, citing threats of litigation, closed down immediately after California Secretary of State Jones’s letter to VoteSwap2000 became public. One Florida-based site, PresidentGore.com was designed to specifically exclude Californians because its operator was uncertain of California’s jurisdiction over its operator. Without determining whether the secretaries of states’ actions were permissible or unconstitutional, it is not far-fetched to theorize that the secretaries of state may have had a profound effect on the outcome of the 2000 presidential election by government has the burden of proving that disclosure would have severe consequences for national security).

187. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256.
188. See Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A.
192. When the user filled out the vote-swap form, if the user entered “California” in the “state” field, he received the following message: “As at least one other site has had issues with CALIFORNIA law not permitting the swap of their votes, we have disallowed submissions from California. I’m sorry for this, but I don’t want to get in trouble over this.” http://www.presidentgore.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2000) (now defunct).
creating a nationwide “chilling effect” on the publication and use of vote-pairing websites.193

3. What Were the Electoral Consequences of the Chilling Effect?

Had the 2000 election been decided by a large margin, the vote-pairing debate would still be of constitutional importance because political speech and association was crushed by the mere threat of prosecution.194 However, because the entire election was resolved by a razor-thin margin, it is easy to speculate that the vote-pairing movement could have had a profound effect upon the outcome of the election. As late as November 17, 2000, pundits claimed “Nader Traders” could have tipped Florida toward Al Gore.195

The effect of online vote-pairing upon the 2000 election is not based on hindsight alone. In its waning days, the 2000 presidential campaign was a cliffhanger between Al Gore and George W. Bush. With less than a week to go, no pundits could definitively say who was actually in the lead. With a total of 538 electoral votes up for grabs and 270 needed to win the presidency, as of October 30, 2000, Bush securely held 202 electoral votes to Gore’s 190, and 146 electoral votes were too close to call.196 On November 3, CNN.com reported 224 electoral votes for Bush, 181 for Gore, and 133 that were too close for CNN.com to call.197 Meanwhile, Reuters reported that Bush had 217 electoral votes, Gore had 200, and 121 electoral votes were too close to call.198

The candidacy of Ralph Nader, the Green Party’s nominee for President, added to the unpredictability of the 2000 race. The Greens, previously notable only for their insignificance in American politics, promised to have resounding influence in the presidential election. The Florida polls as of November 3, 2000, showed Gore with 46% of the vote, Bush with 42% of the vote, and Nader with 6% of the vote.199 With a

193. See Harris, supra note 25.
194. See supra note 179.
195. Harris, supra note 25.
199. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll, conducted from October 31 to November 2, 2000, for Reuters/MSNBC, which surveyed 659 likely Florida voters with a margin of error of plus or minus 4% (released, 11/2/00). This tracking poll was a rolling sample of 200 likely voters each 24-
margin of error of +/- 4%, Florida’s all-important twenty-five electoral votes remained unclaimed. Pennsylvania’s twenty-three electoral votes were similarly precarious with 45% supporting Gore, 41% supporting Bush, and 8% supporting Nader. Washington, formerly narrowly in the Gore column, went to a dead toss-up on November 3 with 44% supporting both Gore and Bush and 6% supporting Nader. Nationally speaking, as of October 27, 2000, 56% of Nader supporters said that if Nader were not running, they would have voted for Gore, while 23% favored Bush, and 21% would not have voted at all. Given these numbers, had Nader not been in the race, Gore would have appeared to have had a firm lead in Florida, Pennsylvania, and Washington a week before the election.

As the wind blew out of California and chilled vote-pairing operations nationwide, the national race for electoral votes was tight, with Bush holding 217 likely votes, Gore holding 200, and 121 too close to call. With the race as close as it was, even New Hampshire’s four electoral votes, traditionally forgotten about the day after its primary race, were still influential enough that neither campaign had abandoned the state (Bush 45%, Gore 40%, Nader 5%).

Voteexchange2000.org arranged 257 exchanges for Florida voters between October 26, 2000 and October 30, 2000, when it shut down due to a 24-hour period, with the three most recent 24-hour surveys added together for a likely voter sample of 600. For an additional poll compilation, see http://www.electyou.com/electoralmap.htm (last visited July 25, 2003).

200. Id.
201. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll, conducted from October 31 to November 2, 2000 for the TOLEDO BLADE and the PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE that surveyed 603 likely Pennsylvania voters with a margin of error of plus or minus 4% (released, 11/2/00). This tracking poll was a rolling sample of 200 likely voters for each 24-hour period, with the three most recent 24-hour surveys added together for likely voter sample of 600. For an additional poll compilation, see http://www.electyou.com/electoralmap.htm (last visited July 25, 2003).
203. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll conducted October 31 to November 2, 2000, for REUTERS and MSNBC. The poll surveyed 508 likely Washington voters with a margin of error of plus or minus 4.5% (released, 11/2/00). This tracking poll was a rolling sample of 200 likely voters for each 24-hour period, with the three most recent 24-hour surveys added together for a likely voter sample of 600. For an additional poll compilation, see http://www.electyou.com/electoralmap.htm (last visited July 25, 2003).
204. See Dizikes & Ruppe, supra note 10.
205. Inside Politics (CNN TV Broadcast Nov. 6, 2000) (Transcript # 00110600V15).
207. An American Research Group poll that was conducted from October 31 to November 1, 2000, surveyed 600 likely New Hampshire voters with a margin of error of +/- 4% (release, 11/2/00) (source on file with author).
to fear of prosecution from California’s and Oregon’s Secretaries of State. Given that the buzz surrounding the vote-pairing phenomenon had just begun, it is likely that the rate of votes being swapped would have increased until Election Day. However, had the rate of vote-pairing remained constant, 2056 votes could have been exchanged by this one site in Florida alone. That many more votes for Al Gore in Florida would have given twenty-five more electoral votes to Gore nationally, which thus would have changed the outcome of the 2000 presidential race. Had the sites continued to run, the circus following the election may never have occurred. Alternatively, had the sites been shut down immediately, the race may not have been decided by such a close margin, and George W. Bush may have been able to claim victory on Tuesday, November 7 instead of waiting until December and the resolution of Bush v. Gore.

Given the razor-thin margin of the election during the first days of November 2000, the secretaries of state should have foreseen the potential effect of their actions upon the election. Did they act correctly? Had they not acted, could it have changed the outcome of the election? Were other secretaries of state delinquent in not acting similarly? Although any effect upon the results of the election is mere speculation, at the time that the secretaries of state acted (or refrained from acting), such an effect was certainly foreseeable. The resolution of the debate over the propriety of their conduct could have great implications for future elections and the concept of democracy in a new-media society.

III. VOTE-PAIRING AND STATE LAW

While federal constitutional concerns may ultimately govern the legal status of online vote-pairing, it is important to study this new method of political organization under state election law. In most circumstances, it appears that the secretaries of state who sought to prohibit the practice relied upon a misapplication of their state’s respective electoral laws. This part of the study will analyze the state election law of each state where officials took some kind of action or issued a statement on the legality of vote-pairing. Where appropriate, it will also discuss state constitutional protections.

209. See D’Alessio, supra note 162, at 494–95 (demonstrating that during the 1996 campaign, hits to election oriented websites increased rapidly as election day approached, with 1996’s election day attracting “more than twice as many [hits] than on any other day.”)
A. Procedural History and Kelleher’s Abstention

California’s secretary of state Bill Jones (R) fired the first volley in the battle over vote-pairing by threatening to imprison the operators of VoteSwap2000.org. 211 “You can’t trade a dollar for a vote, a job for a vote, or a vote for a vote,” said Jones spokesman Alfie Charles. Justifying Jones’ crackdown on vote-pairing, Charles said, “[I]t’s the Secretary of State’s job to protect the integrity of the election process.” 212

Soon thereafter, the California ACLU fired back and filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction to prevent Jones from acting against vote-pairing sites due to the First Amendment implications of Jones’ actions. 213 As of Monday, November 6, 2000 (the day before the 2000 election), the ACLU’s federal court motion for a temporary restraining order against Jones languished in U.S. District Court Judge Kelleher’s chambers. 214 Eventually, Kelleher ruled that the vote-pairing sites were not entitled to a restraining order preventing Jones from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute their operators or participants. 215 Kelleher’s reasoning for denying the motion is unknown because his ruling was a simple one-line denial of the motion. 216 Months later, Kelleher declined to rule on the underlying First Amendment question. Kelleher relied on the Pullman doctrine 217 and abstained from making a decision. 218

211. California’s Secretary of State Jones said that VoteSwap2000.org:

[S]pecifically offers to broker the exchange of votes throughout the United States of America. This activity is corruption of the voting process in violation of Elections Code sections 18521 and 18522 as well as Penal Code section 182, criminal conspiracy . . . any person or entity that tries to exchange votes or broker the exchange of votes will be pursued with utmost vigor.

Email from California Secretary of State to operator of Vote-Swap 2000, forwarded on Nov. 1, 2000).


214. Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700). Although the temporary restraining order was applied from Nov. 3, 2000, a week prior to the election, Kelleher did not rule until Nov. 7, and the denial was not transmitted to the parties until Nov. 8, which was the day before the election. See Brief of Plaintiff, at 4, at http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/Porter_v_Jones/PorterOpeningAppealBrief.pdf.


218. See Porter v. Jones, 314 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003); Porter v. Jones, 393 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003).
Railroad Commission v. Pullman stands for the proposition that a federal district court may decline to adjudicate a controversy that is properly before it when such a controversy may be resolved in state courts. The doctrine is designed to avoid conflicts between state legislatures and federal courts by permitting federal courts to abstain from deciding sensitive federal constitutional questions when state law may decide the question or render it moot.

A federal court may only properly invoke the Pullman doctrine if:

1. the case touches on a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open,
2. constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definite ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy, and
3. the proper resolution of the possible determinative issue of state law is uncertain.

The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the first prong of the Pullman test was absent in Porter v. Jones. In fact, the appeals court observed that in First Amendment cases, the first Pullman factor “will almost never be present because the guarantee of free expression is always an area of particular federal concern.” Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that Kelleher’s ruling was an abuse of discretion because “constitutional challenges based on the first amendment or free expression are the kind of cases that the federal courts are particularly well-suited to hear. That is why abstention is generally inappropriate when first amendment rights are at stake.”

Although some of America’s greatest legal minds including Alan Dershowitz and Laurence Tribe fought on behalf of the ACLU, the legal giants appear to have made a tactical error in bringing their action in federal court. Although bringing suit in federal court was jurisdictionally proper, from a strategic standpoint, it might have been superior to fight the vote-pairing legal battle in each applicable state court. The ACLU

220. See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 1998).
221. Porter, 319 F.3d at 492.
222. 393 F.3d at 492.
223. Id. at 492 (quoting Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1989)).
224. Id. (quoting J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 487 (9th Cir. 1984)).
225. Id.
226. See Porter, 319 F.3d at 483.
could have sought an interpretation of each state’s election law from each individual state’s courts. The state courts could have ducked the constitutional issue and would likely have based their rulings on simple interpretations of state election laws. Generally, courts will avoid constitutional questions when statutes may be interpreted on other grounds.227 However, given that (with the exception of Arizona) anti-vote-pairing secretaries of state appeared to have stretched the intent of their respective states’ laws, vote-pairing cases could have turned on these grounds. The constitutional question might have then remained unsettled, but at least the websites would have had a chance of survival at the crucial moment when they came into play.

B. California

1. California Procedure

The proper forum for the initial resolution of Porter v. Jones (the California vote-pairing case) was a California state court. While the ruling would have made less press and would have had less persuasive precedential value than a federal court decision, the rights of the voters could have been better served had the ACLU team sought injunctive relief against the Secretary of State in a California state court through a writ of mandate (the California equivalent of a restraining order).228 This remedy is appropriate where denial of relief permits an immediate infringement on First Amendment rights.229

2. California Constitutional Law

California courts follow the rule that when a prosecution creates an “ominous, chilling effect on the free exercise of political speech . . . [a]
The petition for writ of mandate is appropriate. The California Constitution affords greater protection to free speech and association than the federal Constitution. As long as federal rights are protected, California legal principles will prevail in California state courts. Given this fact, an independent survey of California constitutional law is unnecessary, but an analysis of the California election law is crucial.

3. California Election Law

The California Secretary of State threatened to prosecute the operators of VoteSwap2000 for violations of California Elections Code sections 18521(a) and 18522(a)(2). These provisions prohibit citizens from giving or receiving payment or other “valuable consideration” to induce any voter to vote for a particular person or measure. Jones believed that the exchange of promises to vote for certain candidates fit the definition of “valuable consideration.” California law defines “valuable consideration” as follows:

Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully

234. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521(a) (West 2000) (“A person shall not directly or through any other person receive, agree, or contract for, before, during or after an election, any money, gift, loan, or other valuable consideration . . . because he or any other person voted, agreed to vote, refrained from voting, or agreed to refrain from voting for any particular person or measure.”).
235. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(a)(2) (West 2000) (“Neither a person nor a controlled committee shall directly or through any other person or controlled committee pay, lend, or contribute, or offer or promise to pay, lend, or contribute, any money or other valuable consideration to or for any voter to or for any other person to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting at an election for any particular person or measure.”).
236. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(2)(2) (West 2000).
Therefore, absent the elements of valuable consideration” that make it truly valuable, the consideration is merely gratuitous.248

The right to vote is a right that both parties might otherwise exercise, as is the right to refrain from voting, or the right to vote for whomever one pleases. The promises made in the arrangement of an online vote-swap did not change these rights. When voters agreed to swap their votes, they retained all of their rights to vote or refrain from voting, or to vote for whichever candidate they chose. Their pledge was unenforceable, and they were free to withdraw at any time without detriment. Therefore, at best, the agreements could be deemed gratuitous consideration. Gratuitous consideration is consideration that “is not founded upon any such loss, injury, or inconvenience to the party to whom it moves as to make it valid in law.”249 As such, the acts of vote-swappers were no more than exchanges of mere gratuitous consideration, and the website operators were working outside the scope of the statute.

C. Oregon

On November 2, 2000, Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury said online vote-pairing, even without the exchange of money, violated his state’s voting corruption law.250 Bradbury acted swiftly and sent desist letters to six vote-trading sites that were based outside Oregon.251 Although Oregon initially also targeted sites that merely advocated vote-pairing, by November 2 the Oregon Elections Board softened its position only to prohibit entering into a contract to trade votes or facilitate such activity.252

248. Id. at 1550–51.
249. Id.
251. Oregon Warns, supra note 49, at A26. This raises interesting questions as to whether he would even have been able to assert jurisdiction over the operators. This issue is beyond the scope of this study, but there have been many excellent studies of this question. See, e.g., Brian E. Daughdrill, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Waiting For The Other Shoe To Drop On First Amendment Concerns, 51 MERCER L. REV. 919 (2000); Kevin R. Lyn, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Is A Home Page Enough To Satisfy Minimum Contacts?, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 341 (2000); Todd D. Leitstein, Comment, A Solution For Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565 (1999).
1. Oregon Election Law

Oregon’s voting corruption law states that “[n]o person, acting either alone or with or through any other person, shall directly or indirectly subject any person to undue influence with the intent to induce any person to register or vote in any particular manner.” 253 The statute defines “undue influence” as including the “giving or promising to give money, employment or other thing of value.” 254

Oregon’s Secretary of State interpreted “thing of value” to include the exchange of a co-equal vote. Therefore, according to the State Election Division, any individual pair of voters engaging in an arrangement to swap votes was in violation of Oregon law, 255 as was any website operator who facilitated such an arrangement.

Analysis of whether online vote-pairing is illegal under Oregon law hinges on the question: Is a vote a “thing of value that would be used to induce a person to vote?” There is only one reported case in Oregon interpreting Oregon Revised Statute section 260.665 (“section 260.665”). Although this decision offers a nearly perfect roadmap for analysis of this issue under Oregon law, due to a procedural technicality, it offers little in the way of precedent upon which a court, the Secretary of State, or citizens can rely.

Oregon Republican Party v. State 256 dealt with a plan by the Oregon Republican Party to mail applications for absentee ballots with the voter’s name pre-printed on them. 257 The application was to include a letter urging the voter to apply for an absentee ballot, if the voter was unsure of being able to vote on Election Day, and a postage-paid envelope in which the voter could send the application to Republican Party headquarters. 258 The Party would then have the applications forwarded to the county clerk, who would have the ballots sent to the individual voters. 259 The Republican Party sought a declaration that the mailing would not violate the election

254. Id. § 260.665(1).
255. See Telephone Interview with Jennifer Hertel, Program Representative, Oregon State Election Division (Nov. 6, 2000) (confirmed by email from Norma Buckno, Oregon State Election Division, to Marc J. Randazza (Mar. 28, 2001) (on file with author)). Hertel stated that the individual voters would be in violation of Oregon Revised Statute section 260.665 but acknowledged that there would be no practical way to prosecute individual voters due to the impossibility of verifying exactly how each voter cast his or her ballot. See id.
256. 717 P.2d 1206 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) [hereinafter Oregon Republican I].
257. Id. at 1207.
258. See Oregon Republican I, 717 P.2d at 1207.
259. See id.
statute, but the Circuit Court of Marion County, Oregon, held that it would violate the statute due to the fact that the stamped envelope was a “thing of value.”

The Oregon Republican Party appealed to the Court of Appeals of Oregon, which reversed the finding of the circuit court, and agreed that such a mailing would not violate section 260.665. The court wrote that when considering whether a “postage paid envelope is a thing of value that would be used to induce a person to vote,” the parties in the case had incorrectly focused on the first part of the question. The decisive factor was not whether the stamped envelope was valuable consideration, but rather whether there existed improper intent to induce persons to register or vote. Since inducement requires a promise of an advantage as a result of performing the desired act, for an act to be held as inducement, there must be persuasion coupled with a benefit or the absence of a threatened detriment. Therefore, in order for inducement to exist, there must be a benefit greater than what is involved in the act of voting. The law requires something with value independent of the right of suffrage. The court held that the envelope was a “thing of value” but that it did not reward the act of voting.

This decision would appear to quell the vote-swap controversy, at least in the State of Oregon. However, the Oregon Supreme Court rendered Oregon Republican I moot upon appeal because the election was over.

While not accepting that the doctrine of “capable of repetition, yet evading review” existed in Oregon, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated that if it did, it would not be applicable to this case. Because the Republican

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260. *Id.* (trial court opinion unpublished, but trial court reasoning derived from published court of appeals decision).
261. See *id.* at 1208.
262. See *id.*
263. See *id.*
264. See *id.*
265. *Id.*
266. *Id.*
267. *Id.*
268. See Or. Republican Party v. State, 722 P.2d 1237 (Or. 1986) [hereinafter Oregon Republican II]. See also Brumnett v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 848 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Or. 1993) (“Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court’s decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties . . . [are] moot.”).
269. See Oregon Republican II, 722 P.2d at 1237. See also Brumnett, 848 P.2d at 1196 (“Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court’s decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties . . . [are] moot.”); Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 895 P.2d 765, 774–75 (Or. 1995) (“[C]apable of repetition, yet evading review” has been rejected by the Oregon Supreme Court); Pham v. Thompson, 965 P.2d 482, 485 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (“Oregon does not recognize the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review doctrine.’”); Safeway, Inc. v. Or. Pub. Employees Union,
Party did not allege that it intended to utilize the same plan in the future, the issue evaded review. Therefore, the decision of the court of appeals in *Oregon Republican I* was reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. The court of appeals obediently followed the Oregon Supreme Court’s instructions and wrote, in a *per curiam* opinion, “Dismissed as moot.” The majority did not write a single additional word. However, in a scathing concurrence, Judge Van Hoomissen foresaw the vote-swap controversy when he wrote:

> The Supreme Court could have decided the issue on its merits and should have done so. Meanwhile, political parties, campaign committees, candidates and public officials responsible for enforcement of the election laws are left guessing about the legality of the conduct proposed here. More litigation, more expense and more delay are the only results of the Supreme Court’s directive to this court.

2. *Oregon Constitutional Analysis*

Van Hoomissen not only foresaw the constitutional issue presented by online vote-pairing but also offered guidance to the resolution of the issue on free speech grounds in his concurrence in *Oregon Republican I*. Van Hoomissen, in examining the legislative intent behind section 260.665, wrote: “[a]n election offense does not exist unless the act tends to produce the types of evils that the statute was designed to avoid.” Judge Van Hoomissen’s concurrence states that it is consistent with his interpretation of the statute to say that the giving of a thing of value does not include giving an item or service that does no more than facilitate the act of deliberative voting.

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270. See *Oregon Republican II*, 722 P.2d at 1238. *But see, e.g.*, Whipple v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 629 P.2d 384, 421 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (“Matters of public interest should sometimes be resolved by the courts even in the face of apparent mootness of the particular case at hand.”).
273. *Id.*
274. *Id.* (Van Hoomissen, J., concurring).
276. *Id.* at 1210.
Van Hoomissen noted that the court did not address the constitutional aspects of the case that he believed were present, but his opinion suggests that Bradbury’s application of section 260.665 violated Article I, Section 8 (freedom of speech)277 and Article I, Section 26 (freedom of assembly)278 of the Oregon Constitution.279 Van Hoomissen’s analysis also suggests that Bradbury’s move was likely violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.280 Since Oregon’s Constitution usually provides greater protection to freedom of speech and assembly than the federal Constitution,281 there is no necessity for federal analysis when there is a violation of the state constitution.282

Bradbury’s application of section 260.665 impacted First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly. The websites expressed political opinion and facilitated the assembly of citizens to achieve a common political goal. As such, the application of the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the Constitution.283 Under this level of scrutiny, suppression of online vote-pairing is impermissible.

Initially, Bradbury’s actions implicated Article 1, Section 8 and Article I, Section 26 of the Oregon Constitution. However, given his re-statement of position on November 2, 2000, only Section 26, the Oregon Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of association, was implicated.284 This provision states, in pertinent part, “No law shall be passed restraining any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner to consult for their common good . . . .”285

Therefore, the constitutional question becomes whether, under Oregon law, a constitutional prohibition against laws suppressing freedom of association can be overridden by the actions of a secretary of state that

277. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.”).
278. OR. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“No law shall be passed restraining any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their Representatives; nor from applying to the Legislature for redress of grievances.”).
279. Oregon Republican I, 717 P.2d at 1210.
280. Id.
282. See id. at 549.
directly restrain freedom of association. This is a proposition that the Supreme Court of Oregon has already rejected. If the Secretary of State threatened citizens with prosecution that resulted in a restraint of Oregonians from assembling together to consult for their own common good, a balancing test is neither necessary nor proper. Bradbury violated the constitutional rights of Oregonians.

D. Florida

Before Katharine Harris gained fame (or infamy) for her involvement in the 2000 vote recount debacle, she weighed in on the issue of online vote-pairing. On November 2, 2000, the author of this study called the then Secretary of State and questioned her as to her opinion on the issue. Harris stated that the practice was “absolutely illegal” under Florida law. When pressed as to what statutes the practice violated, Harris stated that the practice was certainly illegal because “a vote is to be voted, not traded or swapped.” Despite this position, Harris never took public action against the online vote-pairing sites and never issued any official releases on the matter.

Based on her statements, one could argue that the current Secretary of State lacks Harris’ conviction on the subject. Representatives of the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, seemed confused as to how to apply Florida election law to vote-pairing. When questioned, Sharon Larson, Assistant General Counsel to the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections stated her expert opinion that online vote-pairing “could possibly” be a violation of the law. Regardless, Larson suggested that any such violations were beyond the concern of the Division of Elections. “The Department of State does not have prosecutorial authority,” she said.

Searching for a more definite answer, I pressed the Secretary of State’s office for an answer more definite than “maybe.” The General Counsel’s office deferred the inquiry to the judgment of the secretary’s public relations professionals. Bill Spann, Communications Director for the Florida Department of State, finally issued this official statement:

286. See Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541, 544 (Or. 1975).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 545–46 n.6.
289. Telephone Interview with Katharine Harris, Secretary of State, Florida, Nov. 2, 2000.
290. Id.
291. See Email from Sharon Larson, Assistant General Counsel to the Florida Department of State Division of Election, to Marc J. Randazza (July 18, 2003) (on file with the author).
Vote-swapping may, in fact, constitute voter fraud, and all Florida citizens should be aware of that. Specifically, the process of vote-swapping may violate Florida Statute sections 104.045 and 104.061. The Florida Department of State considers any allegation of voter fraud to be a very serious matter and would immediately inform the proper investigative authority.292

Given that Florida was the most closely divided state in 2000, it is foreseeable that vote-pairing could have an effect in Florida in 2004.293 As one of the top prizes in the Electoral College, vote-pairing demands analysis under Florida law. This is especially true in light of the fact that the Secretary of State’s General Counsel’s office is so unsure as to whether the practice is illegal.

As Spann mentioned above, Florida has two statutes that “may” be implicated by the practice of online vote-pairing: Florida Statute section 104.045,294 the Florida “vote selling” statute, and Florida Statute section 104.061,295 the Florida statute prohibiting the corrupt influence on the practice of voting. The Florida vote selling statute provides:

104.045. Vote selling: Any person who:

(1) Corruptly offers to vote for or against, or to refrain from voting for or against, any candidate in any election in return for pecuniary or other benefit; or

(2) Accepts a pecuniary or other benefit in exchange for a promise to vote for or against, or to refrain from voting for or against, any candidate in any election, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

As discussed in Part IV, the federal vote-buying statute296 is limited to instruments of corruption that are pecuniary in nature. Section 104.045 dispenses with this limitation and specifically includes pecuniary benefits and “other” benefits.

292. See Email from Bill Spann, Communications Director for the Florida Department of State, to Marc J. Randazza (July 21, 2003) (on file with the author).

293. See American University News Press Release, Jan. 1, 2001, or http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/0/fab356d21d699441a852569d10077aa8d?OpenDocument (last visited July 13, 2003) (Jamin Raskin was quoted in the release as saying, “If Republican state officials had not shut down the vote-trading movement in Florida, it is very possible that Al Gore would have won that state.”).


Related Florida laws such as Florida Statute section 104.012, the Florida election law governing the giving of consideration for voter registration, prohibits the giving of “anything of value that is redeemable in cash to any person in consideration for his becoming a registered voter . . . .”297 By expressly prohibiting the exchange of pecuniary or monetary benefits for a voter’s registration, the Florida Legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude other types of benefits from the statute’s prohibition.298 The Legislature did not include such a limitation in section 104.045, and therefore, one cannot be read into it.

The Florida vote selling statute has expansive language that provides that any person who corruptly offers to vote for or against a candidate in exchange for not only a pecuniary but also any other benefit, or accepts a pecuniary or other benefit in exchange for a promise to vote for or against a candidate is guilty of a third degree felony.299 The language of this statute suggests that the Florida vote selling statute is intended to encompass behavior that might include online vote-pairing. However, the Florida Division of Elections interpreted this statute as permitting the transfer of something of value, pecuniary or otherwise, as long as the consideration given is not bestowed with the intent to “buy” or “corruptly influence” another’s vote.300

Unless online vote-pairing is held to be an act of a nature that is tantamount to “corruption,” then it is clear that online vote-pairing would not be punishable under section 104.045. However, what “corrupt intent” means is certainly open to interpretation.

It is difficult to argue that “corruption” includes conduct that is regularly blessed in other political arenas.301 Perhaps this political consideration is why Larson was reluctant to take a firm legal position on the issue. However, the term “corruption” has a degree of vagueness to it that makes judicial predictions uncertain. Appellate decisions interpreting this term are not very illuminating, but they shed enough light on the subject to suggest that online vote-pairing does fit within the boundaries of this law.302 Most cases define “corruption” in the context of the Florida Corrupt Voting Practices Act, Florida Statute section 104.061, which provides:

297. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.012 (West 2002) (emphasis added).
299. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.045 (West 2002).
301. See Part V, Ethical Analysis.
Fla. Stat. § 104.061 Corruptly Influencing Voting

(1) Whoever by bribery, menace, threat, or other corruption whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, attempts to influence, deceive, or deter any elector in voting or interferes with him or her in the free exercise of the elector’s right to vote at any election commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 for the first conviction, and a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 for any subsequent conviction.

(2) No person shall directly or indirectly give or promise anything of value to another intending thereby to buy that person’s or another’s vote or to corruptly influence that person or another in casting his or her vote. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. However, this subsection shall not apply to the serving of food to be consumed at a political rally or meeting or to any item of nominal value which is used as a political advertisement, including a campaign message designed to be worn by a person.

Florida decisions interpreting this law have held that section 104.061 is intended to prohibit conduct that is “nonprotected” and “clearly criminal.”303 Although the definition of key terms in the statute, such as “anything of value,” “other corruption,” and “corruptly” will vary in the minds of reasonable observers, Florida appellate decisions uniformly hold that the statute and its key terms are not unconstitutionally vague.304

The benchmark in Florida for unconstitutional vagueness is whether a statute gives fair notice to a person of ordinary or “common intelligence” of what constitutes forbidden conduct.305 Any doubt as to what is prohibited is resolved in favor of the accused and against the prosecution.306

Given that the statute is limited to what is “clearly criminal conduct,”307 theoretically there should be little need for extensive analysis beyond this

303. See Shiver v. Apalachee Publ’g Co., 425 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
304. See Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1983); Russ v. State, 832 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
305. Russ, 832 So. 2d at 906; Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 1995); State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980).
306. Russ, 832 So. 2d at 906–07; State v. Wershaw, 343 So. 2d 605, 608 (Fla. 1977).
307. Shiver, 425 So. 2d at 1175.
point. As even the General Counsel’s Office of the Secretary of State could not definitively figure out if online vote-pairing violated Florida law, a person of “common intelligence” should not reasonably be expected to divine the answer. However, it does not take more than a citizen of average intelligence to determine that (despite the best intentions of the Florida appellate courts) greater analysis is not only warranted but also necessary.

In *Trushin v. State* the defendant, an attorney, circulated a letter throughout a Miami Beach apartment complex promising to prepare a will, free of charge, to all residents who pledged to vote for a particular slate of candidates in a runoff election. Trushin was charged with promising something of value with the intent to buy votes and corruptly influence voting under section 104.061(2). On appeal, Trushin claimed that the terms “anything of value” and “corruptly” were unconstitutionally vague. However, the Florida Supreme Court considered only the “anything of value” language because Trushin failed to raise the vagueness of the term “corruptly” at the district court level.

The Florida Supreme Court held that the term “anything of value” was not unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that any person of “ordinary mental capacity” was capable of understanding that section 104.061 prohibited the giving of any item of any value whatsoever so long as the unlawful intent prohibited by the statute was present. The law prohibits only the giving of something, or the mere promise to do so, “only when the defendant intends thereby to buy [a] vote or to corruptly influence casting a vote.” The statute’s intent is to prohibit an individual from conditioning his or her vote upon the receipt of a “personal benefit.”

Trushin’s last stand was an argument that the preparation of a will was not “a thing of value.” The Florida Supreme Court abstained from this determination and held that this is a decision for the trial court, which should only be overturned if the decision was clearly erroneous.

308. 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1983).
309. *See id.* at 1127.
310. *Id.* at 1127–28.
311. *Id.*
312. *Id.*
313. *Id.*
314. *Id.*
315. *Id.* at 1131 (internal quotation marks omitted).
316. *See id.*
317. *Id.* at 1132.
318. *Id.*
The question as to whether “other corruption” was unconstitutionally vague would wait nineteen years for an answer, until Russ v. State\textsuperscript{319} came before Florida’s First District Court of Appeals. In ruling on this issue, the appellate court again relied on the “person of ordinary or common intelligence” test and determined that the term “corruption” neither had a technical nor specialized definition and that the words were understandable in common parlance.\textsuperscript{320}

Given the fact that Russ engaged in clear threats and menacing behavior, there is little room to criticize the First District Court of Appeals for ducking the question and holding that Mr. Russ’s behavior might have fallen inside the clearly marked outline of the term “corruption.” However, the court left only an implied definition of “corruption” for us if we wish to look at the novel question of online vote-pairing.

Because the issue is so novel and uncontrolled by the statute, it is fair to assume with some degree of confidence that a court would be hard-pressed to hold whether two electors discussing mutual preferences and coordinating their votes falls either within the purview of an exchange of “things of value” or the catchall “other corruption.” Since any doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant,\textsuperscript{321} the great doubt that even the state election board harbors must be resolved in favor of the protected nature of online vote-pairing.

Even if one of Florida’s lower courts were presented with the question, the application of section 104.061 to encompass a prohibition against online vote-pairing should likely fail before a challenge of unconstitutional overbreadth as applied. In Florida, the overbreadth doctrine applies to statutes, or the application thereof, that are “susceptible of application” to constitutionally protected conduct such as political speech.\textsuperscript{322}

A successful overbreadth challenge must establish that the application of the statute reaches a “substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.”\textsuperscript{323} Given that the most sacrosanct of constitutionally protected rights, freedom of assembly and speech in a political context, are implicated by any prosecution of persons engaged in online vote-pairing, and that their definitions provided by the statutes were written before the phenomenon even existed, any such prosecution would most likely fail, even before being subjected to federal constitutional scrutiny.

\textsuperscript{319} 832 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
\textsuperscript{320} Id. at 906–07.
\textsuperscript{321} See State v. Wershaw, 343 So. 2d 605, 608 ( Fla. 1977).
\textsuperscript{322} Russ, 832 So. 2d at 907 (citing Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 1980)).
\textsuperscript{323} See id. (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
E. Minnesota

1. Minnesota Election Law

On November 1, 2000, Minnesota Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer issued what could have been the most melodramatic statement of the 2000 election:

[Vote-pairing] seriously undermine[s] the integrity of the Minnesota electoral process and the high confidence that Minnesotans place on election results . . . . Minnesotans participate in political parties, nominate candidates, and work in campaigns with a high degree of expectation that their votes will have a significant and above-board impact on the election. . . . Vote-swapping is the ultimate in voter fraud. It proposes to change the outcome of the election through an underhanded scheme. . . . Fair and honest elections are the core foundation of our democracy. Vote-swapping undercuts the fundamental tenets that hold our country together. Vote-swapping cannot be permitted and will not be allowed in the State of Minnesota.324

Kiffmeyer’s prediction that online vote-pairing would bring about electoral Armageddon was derived from her arguably mistaken interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 211B.13,325 the section of the Minnesota election law governing bribery, treating, and solicitation:326

211B.13 Bribery, treating, and solicitation.

Subdivision 1. Bribery, advancing money, and treating prohibited. A person who willfully, directly or indirectly, advances, pays, gives, promises, or lends any money, food, liquor, clothing, entertainment, or other thing of monetary value, or who offers, promises, or endeavors to obtain any money, position, appointment, employment, or other valuable consideration, to or for a person, in order to induce a voter to refrain from voting, or to vote in a particular way, at an election, is guilty of a felony. This section does not prevent a candidate from stating publicly preference for or support of another candidate to be voted for at the same primary or

325. Id.
326. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.13 (West 2003).
bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration for a promise.\textsuperscript{238}

California courts have never interpreted the California Election Code to prohibit the type of behavior in which vote-swappers engaged. The general rule in California is that the gravamen of a charge of election corruption is an improper promise, usually of a pecuniary nature.\textsuperscript{239} For a promise made by a candidate to be “improper,” it must offer or imply a service or benefit, conferrable directly upon the voter, that “does not involve the proper administration of the office sought.”\textsuperscript{240} For example, in one case, a promise by a campaign worker to help free a voter’s brother from jail in exchange for an absentee ballot vote did not relate to the proper duties of the candidate (city councilman) and was therefore both “improper” and unlawful.\textsuperscript{241}

Generally speaking, under California law, the term “valuable consideration” is not necessarily money or a material benefit.\textsuperscript{242} Consideration exists if the person to whom the promise is made loses any right he could have otherwise exercised or the person making the promise receives any benefit he would otherwise not have had.\textsuperscript{243} Both need not exist in order for there to be consideration, but if neither condition is met, there is no consideration.\textsuperscript{244}

If the promise leaves a party able to perform or withdraw at will without detriment, there is no consideration, and the contract is void.\textsuperscript{245} If even one of the promises given in an agreement leaves a party with the option to perform or withdraw at will, then the promise is illusory and provides no consideration.\textsuperscript{246}

In comparison to “valuable consideration,” “gratuitous consideration” is defined as consideration “which is not founded upon any such loss, injury, or inconvenience to the party to whom it moves as to make it valid

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{238} CAL. CIV. CODE § 1605 (West 1982).
\item \textsuperscript{240} Id. at 667. See also Bush v. Head, 97 P. 512, 515 (Cal. 1908).
\item \textsuperscript{241} See Stebbins, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
\item \textsuperscript{242} See Estate of Bishop, 25 Cal. Rptr. 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
\item \textsuperscript{243} See Southern Cal. Enter., Inc. v. Walter & Co., 178 P.2d 785, 790–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Chrisman v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 256 P.2d 618, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (stating that if the promisor is not otherwise lawfully entitled to the benefit, the benefit is sufficient to claim valuable consideration).
\item \textsuperscript{244} See Jordan v. Scott, 177 P. 504, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1918).
\item \textsuperscript{246} See Pease v. Brown, 8 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
\end{itemize}
election. Refreshments of food or nonalcoholic beverages of nominal value consumed on the premises at a private gathering or public meeting are not prohibited under this section.

Subdivision. 2. Certain solicitations prohibited. A person may not knowingly solicit, receive, or accept any money, property, or other thing of monetary value, or a promise or pledge of these that is a disbursement prohibited by this section or section 211B.15.327

Although the plain language of the Minnesota Election Bribery Law offers little clue as to where Kiffmeyer found her definition of “fraud,” for the purposes of this study, it must be assumed that she derived her interpretation somewhere beyond her personal politics.328 However, Kiffmeyer’s very own Minnesota Campaign Manual appears to suggest a very different conclusion.329 The Manual explains section 211B.13 as follows:

Bribery. As stated previously, there is a prohibition against giving any thing of monetary value to any person for the purpose of influencing that person’s vote.330

The logical fulcrum on which online vote-pairing balances under section 211B.13 is the question as to whether the coordination of an online vote-swap is a “thing of monetary value” or “valuable consideration.” Given its textual clarity, section 211B.13 has been rarely interpreted in the courts. However, there are a few Minnesota Attorney General opinions interpreting the statute and its predecessor.

The most recent (1995) Attorney General opinion interpreting the Minnesota Election Bribery Law considered a situation involving a Minnesota town’s offer to provide money, land, roads, and utilities for a courthouse and related buildings if an initiative passed to move the county seat to that town.331 The Minnesota Attorney General concluded that this “offer” of significant real property and services was arguably a violation of section 211B.13.332 However, “the weight of authority tip[ped] against such a determination.”

327. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.13 (West 2003).
328. See Ethics discussed at Part V of this study.
330. Id. (emphasis added).
332. Id. at 7.
333. See id. at 7.
In arriving at this determination, the Minnesota Attorney General distinguished the town’s offer from offers by candidates for office to serve without pay or at reduced pay. Such had been determined in an attorney general’s opinion from 1932 to have the potential to reduce electoral contests to a “race to the bottom,” with candidates willing to serve for the least pay having an undue advantage. Meanwhile coordinated civic action carried no such risk.

A 1954 Attorney General Opinion (referenced in the 1995 Opinion) dealt with circumstances similar to the 1995 opinion, wherein a town made an offer of a gift of land and money to help finance courthouse construction if a referendum to move the county seat succeeded. The Attorney General wrote that such an offer was not a violation of the Corrupt Practices Act (a predecessor of section 211B.13) due to the public nature of the offer and benefit to be derived therefrom. Basing his analysis on a survey of court decisions in other states, the Attorney General wrote that since the party to be influenced was an entire electorate and the thing offered was of a public nature and not of a nature intended to benefit any individuals, “the elements requisite to constitute a bribery or a corrupt and unlawful influence within the meaning of bribery and corrupt practice statutes [was] lacking.”

As mentioned above, judicial interpretations of section 211B.13 are few. However, the Minnesota courts have considered analogous circumstances that are of instructive value when reading section 211B.13. For example, Minnesota Statute section 210A.34 prohibited corporations from making a contribution of any money, property, free services, or other thing of value to any political party, nomination, election, or appointment to any political office. In response, corporations formed political action committees (“PACs”). In examining PACs, the Minnesota Supreme Court held:

A conduit PAC merely aids the political process by stimulating and facilitating the involvement of a larger number of citizens. So long

334. Id.
335. See id.
338. See id.
339. See id.
as the sponsoring entity exerts no influence on the member to contribute to a particular candidate, group of candidates, or type of candidate, the member is merely exercising his personal right to contribute to candidates of his choice. There may well be circumstances under which some subtle pressures are placed on conduit PAC members to support specific candidates, but this could be guarded against by protecting the anonymity of the individual contributor’s choice. For the same basic reasons, except for the further lack of the statutorily required “thing of value,” independent PAC’s [sic] are not violative of the legislative intent.342

The Minnesota Supreme Court additionally analyzed the statute to determine which specific mischief was to be remedied by the statute. Finding that it was “the disproportionate influence on the political process by corporate interests,”343 the Court held that PACs were outside of that disproportionate influence, and thus their incidental expenditures that benefited candidates were not violative of the law.344

By these same principles, although there is no authority that appears to support Kiffmeyer’s position, there is support for the opposite position. Minnesota election laws uniformly have been interpreted to find a “thing of value” to include “things which have a value measurable in money.”345 Even if that “thing of value” is of negligible worth, it must be something that has some palpable monetary value.

The specific mischief that section 211B.13 seeks to cure is that of bribery, not of the assembly and communication of Minnesota citizens to trade ideas leading to a decision as to how to vote. However, even if there were a colorable argument to support Kiffmeyer’s threat against vote-pairing operators and users, any such interpretation would be violative of the Minnesota Constitution (discussed immediately below) and the U.S. Constitution (discussed further below).

342. Minnesota Ass’n of Commerce and Indus. v. Foley, 316 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. 1982).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. LaBelle v. Hennepin County Bar Ass’n, 288 N.W. 788, 792 (Minn. 1939).
346. See, e.g., Miller v. Maier, 161 N.W. 513 (Minn. 1917) (providing cocktails to voters while soliciting their support is prohibited); Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 627f-1 (Mar. 20, 1917) (candidate giving cigars to voters in the election room while polls were still open was in violation of Corrupt Practices Act); Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 627f-1 (June 3, 1930) (distribution of free tickets to a county fair violated Corrupt Practices Act).
2. Minnesota Constitutional Law

Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution provides:

The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on all subjects being responsible for the abuse of such rights.

Kiffmeyer’s cease and desist demand of November 1, 2000 was a prior restraint of expression and, as such, would bear a heavy presumption against its validity under the Minnesota (and U.S.) Constitution. It is most likely that a Minnesota court would consider Kiffmeyer’s interpretation of section 211B.13 (or any other state action which prohibited online political discussion) as running afoul of either the Minnesota or U.S. Constitutions. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that (in most cases) Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota constitution extends protections to free speech identical to those embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That being said, Minnesota court decisions interpreting Article I, Section 3 primarily rely on United States Supreme Court First Amendment decisions. Therefore, a discussion of Minnesota constitutional law may be deferred, and the reader may refer to Part IV for the federal constitutional analysis.

F. Arizona

The Arizona State Election Director, Jessica Funkhouse (R), told the press that Arizona law prohibited the practice of online vote-pairing. Funkhouse said, “It’s illegal in Arizona to give anything of value to vote in a certain way.” According to Funkhouse, “anything of value” includes another person’s vote.

348. See, e.g., State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (free speech protection is not broader under the state constitution than under the federal); State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 738 n.6 (Minn. 1981) (same). Cf. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992) (the state constitution may give broader protection than the federal).
349. Id.
350. See Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A.
351. Id.
352. Id.
1. Arizona Election Law

In making her assessment, Funkho use relied upon Arizona’s election corruption law, Arizona Revised Statute section 16-1014, which provides, in relevant part:

§ 16-1014. Corruption of electors; classification

A. It is unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, by himself or through any other person knowingly:

(1) To treat, give, pay, loan, contribute, offer or promise money or other valuable consideration, or to give, offer or promise an office, place or employment, or to promise or to procure or endeavor to procure an office, place or employment, to or for a voter, or to or for any other person, to induce the voter to vote or refrain from voting at an election for any particular person or measure, or to induce the voter to go to the polls, or remain away from the polls at an election, or on account of the voter having voted or refrained from voting for any particular person or measure, or having gone to the polls or remained away from the polls at an election.

Section 16-1014 has received little appellate review in Arizona. The sole reported case mentioning the law offers no discussion of it but did recognize an obvious application of it—that a promise of a pay raise to school employees in exchange for their support of a budget-override initiative was a violation of the law.

Given that there is so little instruction from the Arizona courts as to how to apply the Arizona election corruption law creatively, a broader survey of Arizona decisions is needed to determine whether an online vote-pairing participant’s promise to vote fits within the term “other valuable consideration,” and, if so, whether such an interpretation fits within the intent of section 16-1014.

There is some support in Arizona law for Funkhouse’s position that a vote could be considered to be “valuable consideration.” In State v. Steiger, a defendant (Steiger) was a supporter of the then executive director of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. Steiger threatened

353. Id.
354. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-1014 (1980).
357. Id. at 618.
Johnson, a member of the Board, who was leaning toward voting to remove the director of the Board. Steiger threatened that he would “see to it that you [Johnson] no longer serve as a Justice of the Peace, and I will further take every step necessary to have you removed from the Board.” As a result of this attempt to influence Johnson’s vote, Steiger was charged with a violation of section 13-1804, theft by extortion.

The prosecutor’s use of a theft statute in this circumstance was a creative interpretation of the law, and Steiger argued to the Arizona Court of Appeals that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not clearly indicate that a “vote” was within the definition of “property” as used in the extortion statute. The appeals court rejected Steiger’s argument and recognized that Arizona law defines “property” as “anything of value, tangible or intangible.” The court then continued to discuss that Johnson’s vote was no less “valuable” than his right to vote free from outside pressure and held: “Because a vote is an intangible and something of value, it is included within the definition of property in A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(8) [extortion].”

It does not automatically follow that Arizona courts would hold similarly when confronted with a gratuitous promise to vote a certain way, arranged between voters, free of pressure. However, given the Court of Appeals’ words in State v. Steiger, it is certain that Funkhouse’s interpretation of “anything of value” was not completely without support in the law. On the other hand, the Steiger court’s opinion falls with some logic within the intent of a statute intended to prohibit extortion, but the same might not be said for the election corruption law. The intent of the election corruption law is to prevent commerce in items of value in exchange for influence over an elector’s voting decision. In the online vote-pairing context, the participant wants to vote for the candidate for whom he or she votes, in stark contrast to Johnson who was under threat of losing her job.

Regardless of the legislative intent, it appears that the balance of the law tips in favor of Funkhouse’s definition of “thing of value,” and given

358. *Id.*
360. *Id.* at 617.
361. *Id.* at 620.
362. *Id.* (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-105(29) (1995)).
363. *Id.*
364. *Id.*
366. See *id.*
the *Steiger* opinion, a vote should be considered to be “valuable consideration” under Arizona law.

2. Arizona Constitutional Law

Although Funkhouse’s interpretation of the terms of art contained in section 16-1014 appears to be sound, the application of the law to prevent online vote-pairing might run afoul of the Arizona Constitution and its protection of free expression. Article 11, Section 6 of the state constitution provides: “Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” Arizona courts give great deference to free speech concerns.\(^{367}\) Such rights “go[] to the heart of the natural rights of citizens to impart and acquire information which is necessary for the well being of a free society.”\(^{368}\) The scope of protected activity under the Arizona Constitution is greater than that protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.\(^{369}\)

When we look at a theoretical state action to prohibit online vote-pairing in Arizona, the threshold question is not whether section 16-1014 is constitutional on its face. Statutes are presumptively constitutional in Arizona, and the text of the law does not appear to suffer from facial vagueness or overbreadth.\(^{370}\) The fact is that the issue of the election corruption law’s applicability is due to the novel nature of online vote-pairing and not to any weaknesses in the drafting of the statute.\(^{371}\) Aside from the context of online vote-pairing, there is little doubt as to what section 16-1014 prohibits, and the text of the law is clear and understandable by citizens of ordinary intelligence, thus giving notice of the conduct it prohibits.\(^{372}\)


\(^{368}\) Id. at 173.


\(^{370}\) See *New Times, Inc.*, 519 P.2d at 173 (statutes come to the court clothed with a presumption of constitutionality); Potorman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (Arizona courts resolve all uncertainties in favor of a statute’s constitutional firmness).

\(^{371}\) See *State v. McLamb*, 932 P.2d 266, 274 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (the fact that a statute could have constitutionally impermissible applications does not render it constitutionally void on overbreadth grounds) (citing *Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent*, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)).

Because the election corruption law is firm and specific, there is little inherent danger of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.373 It is therefore not the law that needs to be subjected to constitutional analysis but rather an application thereof that might implicate constitutionally protected speech.374

In deciding whether conduct holds sufficient communicative power to bring notions of free speech into play, courts will ask whether there was an intent to convey a particularized message and whether there was a likelihood that those who received it would understand the message.375 Online vote-pairing sites certainly had an intent to communicate a particularized message, and the fact that the sites facilitated reasoned agreements is persuasive evidence that the message was understood by its recipient. As such, there is little doubt that Arizona courts could justifiably see this issue in any light other than that cast by the free expression provision of the Arizona Constitution (and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).

Given the fact that vote-swapping involves constitutional rights protected by the free expression provision of the Arizona Constitution, any test of such an application of section 16-1014 should be conducted under the rule of strict scrutiny.376 This highest level of constitutional scrutiny is engaged with a more exacting eye by Arizona courts than by federal courts.377 When presented with the possibility that constitutionally protected rights might be tread upon, Arizona courts will avoid, when possible, “attempts to erode [those] rights by balancing them against regulations serving governmental interests.”378

While the government has the constitutional power to prohibit corruption in elections, it does not have the power to restrict protected political speech.379 Political speech is entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection.380 Because any restraint of online vote-pairing sites would throw a roadblock between members of the electorate seeking to engage in political debate and caucus, but only on a particular subject,

373. See id.
374. See id.
375. See id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
377. See id.
378. See id.
there is the presumption that this is a content-based restriction on free expression.381 Even if it were given the benefit of doubt and considered content-neutral, the government would need to prove that it was restricting no more speech than necessary to serve the governmental interest of prohibiting corrupt elections.382 To enjoin this conduct would be to enjoin conduct beyond the scope of the legislative intent of the statute. Disrupting an online vote-pairing site prohibits progressive (and theoretically, in the future, tech-savvy conservatives) political elements from being placed in contact with one another, after which the topic of debate is up to them. Such a prohibition is equivalent to shutting down an online dating service because some users made arrangements for prostitution over the network, while others use it for legal reasons.

3. Arizona Conclusion

Against this strict backdrop of scrutiny and the heavy burden required to suppress speech, an interpretation of section 16-1014 that prohibited online vote-pairing would likely be found to run afoul of Article 11, Section 6 of the State Constitution. However, until an appellate court rules on the issue, this conclusion is uncertain.

What is certain is that Funkhouse did not attach a novel definition to “valuable consideration” under her state’s election laws. Her application of the statute appears reasoned and not entirely improper. However, if subjected to constitutional scrutiny, the balance of the analysis seems to indicate that online vote-pairing would be protected under the Arizona Constitution.

G. Wisconsin

The operator of NaderTrade.org, Jeff Cardille, found himself in the unenviable position of being called in for a personal interview with the Wisconsin Attorney General.383 At this meeting, the Wisconsin officials told Cardille that vote-pairing was illegal under Wisconsin law and punishable by three years in prison and a $10,000 fine.384 Once NaderTrade.org agreed to cease its operations and post disclaimers on the

381. Id.
382. See Lafaro, 56 P.3d at 61.
383. See Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A.
384. Id.
site informing all visitors that the practice was illegal, the Wisconsin Attorney General backed off on his threats to prosecute.385

Wisconsin is one of the few states that prohibit vote-pairing on a legislative level. Wisconsin Statute Annotated section 13.05 makes it a felony for legislators to engage in vote-swapping, which the law calls “logrolling”:

13.05. Logrolling prohibited. Any member of the legislature who gives, offers or promises to give his or her vote or influence in favor of or against any measure or proposition pending or proposed to be introduced in the legislature in consideration or upon condition that any other person elected to the same legislature will give or will promise or agree to give his or her vote or influence in favor of or against any other measure or proposition pending or proposed to be introduced in such legislature, or who gives, offers or promises to give his or her vote or influence for or against any measure on condition that any other member will give his or her vote or influence in favor of any change in any other bill pending or proposed to be introduced in the legislature, is guilty of a Class I felony.386

Perhaps with this statute in mind, the Wisconsin Attorney General chose to threaten Mr. Cardille. However, this statute is specifically tailored to limit the actions of legislators, not voters. The Wisconsin election bribery statute is found at section 12.11, and it, like most state election laws, relies on the term “anything of value.”387 The Wisconsin law prohibits anyone from offering, giving, or lending anything of value, or any job, privilege, or immunity to any person in order to induce the person to vote, refrain from voting, or voting for a certain candidate.388

This catchall term, “valuable consideration,” would normally require a perusal of case law to determine exactly how the state interprets this term. However, in Wisconsin, the legislature has done this work for us. Section 12.11(1) specifically defines “valuable consideration” under the state election bribery law to include:

[A]ny amount of money, or any object which has utility independent of any political message it contains and the value of

385. See id.
386. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.05 (West 2003).
387. Id. § 12.11.
388. Id. § 12.11.
which exceeds $1. The prohibitions of this section apply to the
distribution of material printed at public expense and available for
free distribution if such materials are accompanied by a political
message.389

A vote-swap promise clearly falls within the exception carved out by
the Wisconsin legislature and outside the statute’s prohibition. A vote-
swap does not involve money, nor is it an object. A vote-swap pledge has
no utility independent of the political message it contains. The Wisconsin
Attorney General clearly misapplied Wisconsin law when he threatened
NaderTrade.org.

H. States That Explicitly Permitted Online Vote-Pairing

Maine’s Secretary of State, Dan Gwadosky, joined Nebraska’s
Secretary of State, Scott Moore, in sanctioning the legality of online vote-
pairing. The only two states that permit an apportionment of their electoral
college votes on a basis other than winner-take-all, Maine and Nebraska,
also stand out as the only two states from where official statements did not
threaten vote-pairing operators or participants.

1. Maine

In contrast to his counterparts in California, Oregon, Arizona,
Wisconsin, and Minnesota, Maine Secretary of State Dan Gwadowsky
neither threatened to prosecute online vote-swappers, nor did he give an
official statement that the practice was punishable under Maine law. In
fact, Gwadowsky stood out as the only state official to condone the
practice both in law and in practice. Gwadowsky said, “It’s a provocative
way to use a new medium.”390

While Gwadowsky’s enthusiasm for vote-pairing is beyond the scope
of this study, his decision to endorse it should be studied against a
backdrop of Maine law. To begin, Maine’s prohibition against bribery in
political matters is enshrined in the State’s Constitution.391 The relevant
article of the Maine Constitution provides:

The Legislature may enact laws excluding from the right of
suffrage, for a term not exceeding ten years, all persons convicted of

389. Id. § 12.11(1).
391. See ME: CONST. art. 9, § 13.
bribery at any election, or of voting at any election, under the influence of a bribe.\textsuperscript{392}

The Maine Legislature followed this mandate and enacted the state’s law prohibiting bribery in official and political matters, Maine Revised Statute section 602.\textsuperscript{393} This law provides, in relevant part:

§ 602. Bribery in official and political matters
1. A person is guilty of bribery in official and political matters if:

A. He promises, offers, or gives any pecuniary benefit to another with the intention of influencing the other’s action, decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, nomination or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party official or voter;

B. Being a public servant, party official, candidate for electoral office or voter, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit from another knowing or believing the other’s purpose to be as described in paragraph A, or fails to report to a law enforcement officer that he has been offered or promised a pecuniary benefit in violation of paragraph A.

2. As used in this section and other sections of this part, the following definitions apply.

C. “Pecuniary benefit” means any advantage in the form of money, property, commercial interest or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic gain; it does not include economic advantage applicable to the public generally, such as tax reduction or increased prosperity generally. “Pecuniary benefit” does not include the following:

(1) A meal, if the meal is provided by industry or special interest organizations as part of an informational program presented to a group of public servants;

(2) A meal, if the meal is a prayer breakfast or a meal served during a meeting to establish a prayer breakfast; or

\textsuperscript{392} ME. CONST. art. 9, § 13.
\textsuperscript{393} ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3602 (West 2003).
(3) A subscription to a newspaper, news magazine or other news publication.\footnote{Id.}

Given that the Maine statute limits its applicability to benefits in the form of an economic gain, little additional analysis is necessary in order to determine that Gwadowsky had it right. Online vote-pairing is permissible under Maine law.

2. \textit{Nebraska}

Nebraska’s secretary of state, Scott Moore, did not share his Maine counterpart’s enthusiasm for online vote-pairing. In fact, in a news interview, he seemed to disapprove on a moral level but kept this judgment separate from his interpretation of state law.\footnote{Associated Press, “\textit{Nader Traders}” \textit{Shut Down Their Web Site Under Pressure}, \textit{WASH. TIMES}, Nov. 1, 2000, at A12.} Nebraska’s election bribery law provides:

\begin{verbatim}
§ 32-1536. Bribery; prohibited acts; penalty.
(1) Any person who accepts or receives any valuable thing as a consideration for his or her vote for any person to be voted for at any election shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.
(2) Any person who, by bribery, attempts to influence any voter of this state in voting, uses any threat to procure any voter to vote contrary to the inclination of such voter, or deters any voter from voting shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.\footnote{\textit{NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.} § 32-1536 (West 2003).}
\end{verbatim}

Nebraska’s use of the term “valuable thing” seems to imply an object and not a vote, but there is a degree of ambiguity inherent in the term. There are no appellate court decisions interpreting the bribery statute, and the statute is equally without mention in the archives of the opinions of the Nebraska Attorney General. There is, however, instruction available in the Nebraska Constitution. Article XV, Section 1 provides for the oath of office for Nebraska elected officials, and the oath provides, in pertinent part:

\begin{quote}
I have not improperly influenced in any way the vote of any elector, and have not accepted, nor will I accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing from any corporation,
\end{quote}
company or person, or any promise of office, for any official act or influence for any vote I may give or withhold on any bill, resolution, or appropriation.\(^\text{397}\)

It only follows that if a vote is a “valuable thing” then any candidate for office in Nebraska who promises anything in exchange for a vote would be in violation of his or her oath of office, and by extension, the Nebraska Constitution. Logically, Moore’s conclusion is sound. Online vote-pairing is not illegal under any rational interpretation of Nebraska law.

I. General State Conclusions

At this point, it is instructive to note that during the 2000 presidential election, there were individuals who used the Internet to attempt to “sell” their votes.\(^\text{398}\) It should be apparent by this point in this study, that these sites are not considered to be within the purview of the above analysis. Every state election statute prohibits selling or offering to sell a vote for pecuniary gain, and the Supreme Court has held that despite any constitutional concerns, such solicitation falls outside of the protections offered by the First Amendment.\(^\text{399}\)

The secretaries of state who moved against online vote-pairing sites regarded this online networking as the application of undue influence in the voting process and made a leap: that discussion equals money.\(^\text{400}\) With the exception of Arizona, this was in direct contradiction to their respective states’ laws.\(^\text{401}\) However, most secretaries of state posited that

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\(^\text{397. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).}\)


\(^\text{400. However, the Supreme Court has made the converse statement: money equals speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).}\)

\(^\text{401. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665 (1999); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521(a) (2000); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(a) (2000).}\)
sites merely discussing online vote-pairing were permissible under their offending states’ laws. For example, consider California and Oregon. It was the conduct of “brokering” votes that was explicitly prohibited under California law and the application of “undue influence” that ran afoul of Oregon law.

When vote-swap participants agreed to pair their votes, they engaged in speech and association related to a campaign for political office. Each voter agreed with another to coordinate his or her vote in order to achieve a common political goal. There was no exchange of money or goods, and there was no enforceable binding arrangement. For the most part, this lack of a pecuniary exchange weakened the claims of the secretaries of state who believed that there was an illegal contract inherent in an online vote-swap. Jessica Funkhouse of Arizona appears to be the only election official who spoke out against online vote-pairing, but she did not speak completely out of turn.

IV. FEDERAL ANALYSIS

A. Federal Election Law

1. Matching Funds Law

The online vote-pairing movement had its roots in some of the more bizarre nuances of U.S. election law. The electoral college has had the effect of creating a duopoly in American politics, and the federal matching funds law smothers infant political movements in their cradle. This state

404. OR. REV. STAT § 260.665(1) (1999) (“As used in this section, ‘undue influence’ means force, violence, restraint or the threat of it, inflicting injury, damage, harm, loss of employment or other loss or the threat of it, fraud or giving, or promising to give money, employment or other thing of value.”). For elaboration, see also Oregon Republican Party v. State, 717 P.2d 1206, 1207, rev’d on other grounds, 726 P.2d 412 (1986) (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he promise of an advantage as a result of performing the desired act; it is persuasion coupled with a benefit or the absence of a threatened detriment.”).
407. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 341 [hereinafter Duopoly] (noting that the Republicans and Democrats use “campaign
of affairs gave rise to the bottleneck in democracy that forced the left-leaning coalition of Green/Democrat supporters into action.

The purpose of most online vote-pairing sites was to circumvent the mechanisms that protect the duopoly and, for the most part, to help Ralph Nader’s Green party achieve a sufficient percentage of the popular vote in the 2000 presidential race so that the Greens would qualify for funding in 2004, while simultaneously helping (or at least not harming) Al Gore’s chance for victory in the electoral college. It is crucial for the reader to note that not all vote-pairing participants were Gore/Nader allies. Also, despite the fact that online vote-pairing was primarily a Green/Democrat alliance movement in 2000, it is just as likely that a Reform/Republican, Libertarian/Republican, or any other manner of cyber-coalition could rise up in future elections.408

Even in 2000, votexchange2000.com provided a far more complex algorithm than the typical Green/Democrat alliance.409 Votexchange2000.com allowed the visitor to select his or her state, the candidate the visitor preferred to win the election (among Bush and Gore) and then allowed the visitor to select which alternative candidate he or she wished to support.410 After filling in the fields, the visitor was asked for his or her email address, and the site connected the visitor with a similarly minded voter in another state.411

Federal law provides for the voluntary public financing of candidates for presidential office.412 The law differentiates between the “major” political parties and “minor” or “new” parties.413 The eligible presidential candidates from each major party are entitled to equal payments limited by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.414 Candidates of minor parties are eligible only for funding if their party received a threshold number of votes in the previous election equal to five percent or more of the total number of votes cast.415 Once a party meets this threshold, it is entitled to

\[\text{finance laws, policies regulating access to public television, patronage practices, partisan gerrymandering, and potentially a wide variety of other measures" to lock third parties out of the political process).}

408. See supra Part II.
410. Id.
411. See Appendix B for a screen shot of votexchange.com.
413. Id. § 9002 (1976).
415. Id. § 9004(a)(3).
a proportional amount of funds pegged to the percentage of votes the party received in the previous election. 416


Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution establishes congressional authority to regulate presidential elections. 417 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as granting Congress “very broad authority” to enact legislation to prevent corruption in presidential elections. 418 Given the fact that Congress has substantive legislative jurisdiction over the right to prevent corruption in presidential elections, its authority in this area is extremely broad 419 as long as the exercise of this authority does not trample any other constitutionally protected right. 420

Congress has long recognized the damage to our democracy that would result if federal elections were tainted by bribery, vote buying, or manipulation. Using its plenary power, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) “as the means to overcome this public evil in those instances wherein it does, or could, infect a federal election.” 421 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973i(c) criminalizes fraudulent voting or registration in every election where national candidates appear on the ballot. 422 The law prohibits payment, offers of payment, or acceptance of payment, in exchange for a vote. 423

The threshold question in the online vote-pairing context, in light of appellate court decisions construing § 1973i(c), is whether a vote is a “payment” or other applicable type of benefit bestowed upon an elector, when the elector swaps votes. Amidst a backdrop of action by state officials, the U.S. Department of Justice failed to move against any of the vote-pairing website operators. A spokesperson at the Department was quoted as saying, “[T]here is no pecuniary exchange, and [vote-pairing] is

416. Id. § 9004.
417. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.”).
419. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
420. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132.
423. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (2001) (prohibiting conspiracy “with another individual for the purpose of encouraging his false registration to vote or illegal voting, or pays or offers to pay or accepts payment either for registration to vote or voting.”).
an agreement amongst private parties." Additionally, the spokesperson stated there is no violation in terms of voter fraud. To successfully prosecute a defendant under § 1973i(c), there is no requirement that the government show specific intent to affect the outcome of a federal election. The congressional intent in passing the statute was to protect the integrity of the right to vote by protecting the integrity of the vote. \[\text{\footnotesize \cite{427}}\] 

\text{\footnotesize \textquoteleft\textquoteleft[T\textquoteleft\textquoteright]he payment itself, \textit{not} the purpose for which it is made, is the harm and the gist of the offense.\textquoteright\textquoteright} 

The federal vote-buying statute proscribes all activities with the potential to damage the integrity of a federal election. The Fourth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals has held, similar to the Fifth Circuit, that whether the violator intends to expose the federal election to corruption or the possibility of corruption is of no legal effect. All that need be shown to establish a violation of § 1973i(c) is that the defendant bought or offered to buy a vote and that this activity exposed a federal election to the mere possibility of corruption. There is no requirement that actual corruption take place, nor is there a requirement that the defendant have the specific intent to expose the election to corruption.

The courts have not spoken on the issue of whether Congress would have the right to regulate a purely statewide election. However, the Fifth Circuit held that it is proper to apply § 1973i(c) to any election in which state and federal candidates for office appear on the ballot. The rationale being that even if corruption were directed solely at the state candidates, the potential for corruption of a federal race makes the conduct proper for Congress to regulate.

In \textit{United States v. Cole}, the defendants were convicted of corruption in an election in which all the candidates for federal office were running unopposed. The defendants argued that since the federal aspect of the

\text{\footnotesize 425. Id.}}
\text{\footnotesize 426. \textit{Bowman}, 636 F.2d at 1011.}}
\text{\footnotesize 427. \textit{See id.}}
\text{\footnotesize 428. Id. at 1012.}}
\text{\footnotesize 429. \textit{See id.}}
\text{\footnotesize 431. \textit{See id. at 908.}}
\text{\footnotesize 432. Id.}}
\text{\footnotesize 433. \textit{Bowman}, 636 F.2d at 1012 (specifically declining to consider this issue).}}
\text{\footnotesize 434. Id.}}
\text{\footnotesize 435. Id.}}
\text{\footnotesize 436. \textit{United States v. Cole}, 41 F.3d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1994).}
election could not possibly be impacted by the corruption, the federal law would be inapplicable. The defendants conceded that § 1973i(c) would apply to the election if the race were opposed but argued that absent an opposition, no corrupt influence could exist. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this argument and construed § 1973i(c) to apply in any mixed federal/state election, regardless of whether the candidates for federal office faced opposition.

The amount of money used to bribe a voter is of no consequence. *United States v. Campbell* involved a payment of $50. *United States v. Saenz* involved a $45 welfare voucher and a six-pack of beer. *United States v. Daugherty* involved a mere $3, and *United States v. Lewin* involved a payment of a single dollar. The law is equally unforgiving, no matter how insignificant the compensation. However, benefits must be individual in nature. The assistance of a civic group to prospective voters, or even a continuance of employees’ fringe benefits, are not prohibited by the statute.

Whether the actual corruption takes place, or whether the participants in the scheme intended that it take place, is irrelevant. However, for “corruption” to exist under the statute, there must be at least an offer of pecuniary gain to the voter. This pecuniary gain need not be in the form of cash.

The definition of “payment” in §1973i(c) is not necessarily limited to the transfer of money or its equivalent. The legislative history of the Act makes it clear that Congress contemplated an exchange of a benefit beyond actual cash. *The Congressional Record* shows that a non-

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437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. See United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 782, 787 (8th Cir. 1988).
441. See United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 935 (5th Cir. 1984).
442. See United States v. Daugherty, 952 F.2d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 1991).
443. See United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1972).
444. See id.
445. See id. at 1136.
447. See United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99, 101–02 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that Congress’ intent was to prohibit the offering or giving of items of pecuniary value to an individual voter in exchange for his vote).
448. Id. (“We therefore find that Congress did not intend to restrict the term payment . . . to offers of money . . . . Payment . . . includes the offer of redeemable, cash-equivalent, food vouchers.”).
449. See id. at 101.
450. Id. (quoting 111 CONG. REC. S4245 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1965) (statement of Sen. Williams) (“Third, the amendment would provide a penalty for anyone offering or accepting money or something of value in exchange for registering or voting.”) (emphasis added)).
monetary payment would qualify as a “payment.” However, the Fifth Circuit held that this definition is limited to benefits of a truly pecuniary nature.

In *United States v. Garcia*, the defendants were indicted under the federal vote-buying statute. Garcia was the county welfare director and was responsible for distributing vouchers for food, clothing, prescriptions, and medical services to indigent citizens. The defendants were accused of offering food vouchers to voters in exchange for their pledges to vote for certain candidates in the primary election. The defendants challenged § 1973i(c) as unconstitutionally vague. The gravamen of their vagueness argument was that if food vouchers could be included as “payment” under § 1973i(c), then no citizen could be certain of what was proscribed and what was permitted. The court rejected this analysis of § 1973i(c), relying on the legislative history to support the conclusion that § 1973i(c) was never intended to be limited to cash payments.

In *United States v. Garcia*, voters received a government benefit—welfare vouchers. The voters stated that they believed that receipt of the vouchers depended upon how they agreed to vote and not upon their eligibility. Therefore, a federal prosecutor could foreseeably expand this analysis and claim that the exchange of votes is the exchange of a government benefit—the right to vote—for another vote. This is somewhat of a nonsensical stretch, but multiple state election officials made similar stretches. If this issue arises again, and the party in power does not stand to benefit, as it did in 2000, federal conduct may be entirely different.

The defendants in *Garcia* further argued that unless the government showed that the recipients of the vouchers would have been otherwise ineligible to receive them, nothing was truly “paid” to them. The Fifth

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451. Id. (quoting 111 CONG. REC. S8986 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1965) (statement of Sen. Javits) (“I wish to make it as clear as is possible to make it that it is intended solely to prohibit the practice of offering or accepting money or a fifth of liquor, or something—some payment of some kind—for voting or registering.”)).

452. See, e.g., *Garcia*, 719 F.2d at 100. See also United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1972).

453. *Garcia*, 719 F.2d at 100.

454. Id.

455. Id.

456. Id. at 101.

457. Id.

458. Id.

459. Id.

460. Id. at 100.

461. Id. at 103.
Circuit found that although the recipients were already eligible for this government benefit, and thus were not receiving anything to which they were not otherwise entitled, the receipt of the vouchers still amounted to a pecuniary benefit since the vouchers came in specific dollar denominations and could be directly exchanged for goods as if they were cash. In light of the above analysis, it appears that the Justice Department’s statement, that there is no voter fraud in online vote-pairing, was correct. However, this statement and analysis only controls the federal Voting Fraud Act. What if Arizona’s election officials, properly interpreting their own state law, attempted to prosecute an online vote-pairing site operator or participant? No matter where the small skirmishes over this issue are fought, eventually the matter will come down to an analysis under the First Amendment.

B. Federal Constitutional Law

The acts of the individual secretaries of state touch upon the core of constitutionally protected necessities for democracy—the trinity of speech, assembly, and association. Online assembly, association, and speech intended to further public political goals are at the core of First Amendment values.

Freedom of speech is essential to a self-governing society. The constitutional guarantee that speech shall remain unencumbered by governmental intervention exists to ensure the free exchange of ideas for the promotion of political and social change. When speech involves political issues, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized it as the core of First Amendment values. Even jurists who would protect only a narrow sliver of what is now untouchable agree that political speech must be protected.

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462. Id. at 101.
464. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 63, at 26–27.
466. See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 318 (protecting political speech outside foreign embassies). Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (explaining that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, federal courts will not normally protect his speech).
467. Bork, supra note 63, at 23 (“[E]ven without a first amendment . . . representative democracy
Restraint of websites promoting online vote-pairing implicates both the specifically enumerated First Amendment protection for freedom of speech and the closely related and entwined freedom of association.\textsuperscript{468} Like the right to free speech, the right to assemble in furtherance of a common political goal is fundamental to our system of government and law.\textsuperscript{469}

1. Content-Based Speech Regulation

It is presumptively unconstitutional for the state to burden speech based on its content.\textsuperscript{470} Political speech is zealously guarded as the core value protected by the First Amendment,\textsuperscript{471} “[f]or speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”\textsuperscript{472} At the very pinnacle of this core value is the notion that

\ldots would be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment.”.\textsuperscript{468} See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (explaining that the right to associate in order to express one’s views is “inseparable” from the right to speak freely).

\textsuperscript{469} See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 577 (2000) (holding that members of a political party have the right to select their nominees for higher office); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995) (quoting J. Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927), that the right of assembly is a fundamental right).


\textsuperscript{471} See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966). The majority wrote:

Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.

\textit{Id. See also} N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment demands unfettered and uninhibited robust political debate); Bork, supra note 63, at 23 (“Even without a first amendment . . . representative democracy . . . would be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment.”). See also Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Free Speech Now}, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 305–06 (1992) (“[A]n insistence that government’s burden is greatest when political speech is at issue responds well to the fact that here government is most likely to be biased. The presumption of distrust of government is strongest when politics are at issue.”).

\textsuperscript{472} Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis wrote in his concurring opinion:
speech related to a campaign for political office is worthy of the “fullest and most urgent application” of First Amendment protection.\textsuperscript{473} In \textit{Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley},\textsuperscript{474} the city of Chicago passed an ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.\textsuperscript{475} The Supreme Court held that the ordinance discriminated on the basis of viewpoint because it distinguished between peaceful picketing to further a labor cause and other forms of peaceful picketing.\textsuperscript{476} Under this ordinance, the message on the picket sign would determine whether the picketer was engaged in protected speech or guilty of disorderly conduct.\textsuperscript{477} This is clearly impermissible, as “above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”\textsuperscript{478} “To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”\textsuperscript{479}

Regulations are content-based when they distinguish permissible speech from impermissible speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.\textsuperscript{480} Courts presume that government actions are invalid when

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{474} Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
\item \textsuperscript{475} Id. at 93. In \textit{Mosley}, Chicago’s Municipal Code, § 193-1(i) provided that a person commits the crime of disorderly conduct when he “[p]ickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building . . . provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute . . .”
\item \textsuperscript{476} Id. at 95–96.
\item \textsuperscript{477} Id. at 95.
\item \textsuperscript{478} Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
\item \textsuperscript{479} Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
\item \textsuperscript{480} See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (“Whether individuals may exercise their free-speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign.”).
\end{itemize}
they suppress speech on the basis of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content.481 In fact, “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.” 482 This is because the government attacks the very heart of the First Amendment when it restricts speech due to the message it conveys.488 Restrictions based on the message conveyed impede society’s search for truth,484 impair the individual’s right to meaningful self-fulfillment,485 and obstruct the ability of citizens to fully participate in a system of deliberative self-government.486

Laws that impair speech with a blind eye toward the ideas and views expressed are content-neutral and often permissible.487 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that government may restrict all speech emanating from a sound-amplification truck regardless of the message broadcasted.488 Billboards may be prohibited to minimize visual clutter and enhance aesthetics.489 Also, the Court upheld a National Park Service anti-camping rule that prohibits people from sleeping on the National Mall as part of a coordinated political statement because it was equally applicable to traditional campers.490 Each of these regulations impacted


483. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 803 (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”).

484. For a complete discussion of content-neutral analysis, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46 (1987).


486. See id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).

487. See id. (“[I]n a self-governing nation, the people, not the government, ‘are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.’”) (quoting First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978)).


speech, potentially even political speech, but none was created for the purpose of impairing speech based on its message.491

Even the most fundamental of constitutional rights may be curtailed if the infringement passes a strict scrutiny test.492 Speech, assembly, and associational rights may be infringed only by regulations that are designed to serve a compelling governmental interest,493 are unrelated to the suppression of ideas; and are means that are narrowly tailored to achieve the stated interest—they must be the least restrictive and least drastic means available to achieve the stated purpose.494

The application of strict scrutiny hinges on whether the restriction severely burdens rights of speech495 or association.496 If a restriction severely burdens these rights, then this elevated standard applies.497 However, most cases eliminate this step; without examining the degree of burden a restriction creates, they simply state that if political speech or association is at issue, then strict scrutiny applies.498 In *NAACP v.

491. Facialy even-handed regulations on speech are not always content-neutral. See, e.g., *NAACP v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 423, 428–29 (1963) (Virginia law prohibiting attorneys from accepting business from anyone who was not a party to a suit or that had no pecuniary interest in the case held to impermissibly prevent NAACP’s political action).


494. *Id*.


496. See *Roberts v. United States Jaycees*, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward these ends were not also guaranteed.”). See also *NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).


498. *Buckley*, 525 U.S. at 207 (“When core political speech is at issue, we have ordinarily applied strict scrutiny without first determining that the State’s law severely burdens speech.”); *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n*, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (same).
Alabama ex rel Patterson, the Supreme Court stated, “[I]t is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.\textsuperscript{500}

Strict scrutiny has been applied to situations involving solicitation of voters and distribution of literature within 100 feet of a polling place entrance,\textsuperscript{501} regulation of campaign promises,\textsuperscript{502} and a law prohibiting businesses from making expenditures to influence the outcome of referenda.\textsuperscript{503} Unquestionably, if a political group’s associational rights are implicated, strict scrutiny must apply.\textsuperscript{504}

2. Freedom of Association

Political speech, which is protected by the First Amendment, “is undeniably enhanced by group association.”\textsuperscript{505} The Constitution not only protects the freedom of citizens to join together to discuss and further their common political beliefs,\textsuperscript{506} but affirmatively demands it.\textsuperscript{507} Moreover, the right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs is “an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”\textsuperscript{508}

However, even the fundamental constitutional right of association may be infringed if the state’s action passes the test of strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{509} If the
government seeks to regulate associational rights, it must demonstrate that it is doing so to further a compelling state interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved by any less restrictive means.510

In *Roberts v. United States Jaycees*, the Supreme Court held that while the freedom to associate presupposes a freedom from compelled association, the government was nevertheless justified in forcing the Jaycees to admit women.511 The Court was persuaded that the state of Minnesota had a compelling state interest in ending discrimination against women, and requiring the Jaycees to open their membership to women was a valid step toward this goal.512 Despite the fact that forcing the Jaycees to admit women adversely impacted the associational freedoms of the Jaycees, this regulation passed strict scrutiny.513

In a similar case with the opposite result, *Boy Scouts of America v. Dale*,514 the Court held that a state anti-discrimination law could not properly bar the Boy Scouts from prohibiting an openly gay assistant scoutmaster from serving.515 The Court held that since one of the sincerely held beliefs of the Boy Scouts is that homosexuality is immoral,516 forcing them to include a homosexual scoutmaster would significantly burden their associational right to disfavor homosexuality.517

In *Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee*,518 the Court held that in the context of the Socialist Workers’ Party (“SWP”), an Ohio statute that mandated the disclosure of campaign contributors and fund recipients would unconstitutionally burden associational rights.519 The Court held that given the historical public hostility toward the SWP, such public disclosures would subject contributors and recipients to harassment distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the polls is permissible); *United States v. O’Brien*, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (the compelling governmental interest in maintaining an armed forces in time of war justifies the suppression of the speech element of the expressive political conduct of burning a draft card); *Cf.*, *Mills v. Alabama*, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (law prohibiting the publication of political editorials on an election day is an “obvious and flagrant” violation of the principles of the First Amendment).

511. *Id.*
512. *Id.*
513. *Id.*
515. *Id.* at 659.
516. *Id.* at 656.
517. *Id.* at 659.
519. *Id.* at 101–02.
and reprisals, effectively discouraging them from acts of protected political association.\textsuperscript{520}

One could argue that the framers of the Constitution intended to extend freedom of expression and association only to technologies existing in the 1700s.\textsuperscript{521} However, even strict constructionists argue that courts must apply constitutional values to new circumstances, especially when those circumstances arise due to changes in technology.\textsuperscript{522} Cyberspace is entitled to the same degree of protection as other more traditional public forums and media.\textsuperscript{523}

Under strict scrutiny, a regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.\textsuperscript{524} Although the First Amendment may be considered to encompass the most sacrosanct of rights, on rare occasions there are competing governmental interests to which the First Amendment rights of speech must yield.\textsuperscript{525} For example, fair trial rights have been held to trump the First Amendment in specific circumstances.\textsuperscript{526} The government’s interests in order, safety, and traffic outside abortion clinics, as well as its interests in safeguarding property rights and women’s freedom to pursue reproductive health services, are sufficient to allow the use of fixed buffer zone limits on abortion protesters.\textsuperscript{527} And in circumstances most analogous to the issue at hand, in order to assure “fair and honest” elections, the right to freedom of speech is frequently trumped\textsuperscript{528} because the right to cast a ballot in an uncorrupt election is just as important as the right to discuss that election.\textsuperscript{529}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{520} See also Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63.
\item \textsuperscript{522} Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) (Bork, J., concurring) (holding that the First Amendment must be interpreted “to encompass the electronic media.”).
\item \textsuperscript{523} Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“We agree with its conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”).
\item \textsuperscript{524} See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
\item \textsuperscript{525} See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
\item \textsuperscript{526} See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that First Amendment yields to fair trial rights).
\item \textsuperscript{527} Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 382 (1997).
\item \textsuperscript{528} See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (holding campaign contributions, although protected, yield to the maintenance of the appearance of uncorrupt elections); Burson, 504 U.S. 191 (maintaining a polling environment free from intimidation trumps free speech); Brown, 456 U.S. 45 (holding that integrity of electoral process trumps free speech); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 (campaign contribution limits are justified to prevent appearance of corruption).
\item \textsuperscript{529} See Burson, 504 U.S. 191; Brown, 456 U.S. 45 (stating that the state has a legitimate interest
There would be little value in open debate prior to an election in which the democratic process itself was subverted by intimidation and fraud. Accordingly, “states have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral process.” The prevention of corruption, or even the appearance of corruption, in government has been held to be a compelling governmental interest validating the restriction of constitutionally protected speech.

If the compelling governmental interest is the integrity of the polling process, the state may infringe upon free speech rights to achieve this interest. However, even the most compelling governmental interest may not be promoted by overbroad means that suppress otherwise protected expression. Because of the danger of governmental censorship of politically disfavored ideas, content-based restrictions can be employed only when absolutely necessary to achieve the compelling interest asserted.

C. Federal Constitutional Conclusions

1. Regulation of Vote-Swap Sites Requires Strict Scrutiny

The secretaries of states’ actions and statements against the vote-pairing website operators’ rights to disseminate information of a political nature, issued on the eve of a pending election, implicate core First Amendment values to such an extent that strict scrutiny must apply. Those secretaries that acted less dramatically nevertheless contributed to a dangerous chilling effect of constitutionally protected conduct. The impact in protecting the integrity of the electoral process, but when it seeks to do so by restricting speech, strict scrutiny is triggered).

530. Brown, 456 U.S. at 52 (explaining that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process, but when it seeks to do so by restricting speech, strict scrutiny is triggered).

531. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 (restriction of campaign contributions is justified by the need to prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption in the electoral process).

532. See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 45.


535. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986) (explaining that the burdens of the associational rights of a political party must be subjected to strict scrutiny); see also Buckley, 525 U.S. at 212; Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992) (burdening association by limiting new parties’ access to the ballot is subject to strict scrutiny); Eu, 489 U.S. at 224–25 (noting that laws that restrict a political party’s right to endorse candidates are subject to strict scrutiny); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728–29 (1974) (holding that restrictions that limit a candidate’s right to political association are subject to strict scrutiny).
upon the rights of association of these sites’ users and potential users should independently trigger strict scrutiny. 536 Given the fact that both groups’ rights were implicated, only strict scrutiny would be logical.

2. Actions by the Offending Secretaries of State Were Not Content-Neutral

The secretaries of state regulated (or attempted to regulate) protected political speech and association in a public forum. 537 In many cases, these actions were enough to trigger strict scrutiny. 538 However, to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny applicable to their actions, it is first necessary to determine whether the secretaries of states’ actions were content-based or content-neutral. 539

According to one website operator’s counsel, the threat of prosecution turned on the particular message the sites carried: the “user’s willingness to participate in an exchange of unenforceable pledges as a methodology for communicating a political viewpoint.” 540 Websites containing any other content were not subject to threats of reprisal by the government. 541

While the vote-pairing battle raged, the Republican National Committee had a website that permitted users to enter their names, addresses, email addresses, and other personal information so that they could “Get involved with the Republican Party!” 542 The Democratic National Committee had a similar website inviting visitors to sign up and “Take Action!” 543 The Libertarians, 544 Natural Law Party, 545 and the Yahoo! personals 546 each had web forms permitting users to enter their names in a database in order to communicate with other individuals with common political or social goals. The secretaries of state considered illegitimate the simultaneous goals of electing Al Gore as President and

536. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 199.
537. See supra Part III.
541. Id.
helping the Green Party acquire five percent of the popular vote. As such, this does not appear to be a content-neutral regulation, but one that specifically targets the political goals of the so-called “Nader traders.” In as much as they restricted websites that urged people to vote in a particular manner in a publicly held election, their actions were unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.

3. Compelling Governmental Interests


The interest alleged by the secretaries of state was the elimination of “undue influence” or “corruption” from the voting process in their respective states. These interests are certainly compelling state interests. Given this fact, the secretaries would have had little difficulty arguing they were motivated to act by a desire to further a compelling state interest by restricting the speech and associational rights of the website operators and users. However, it does not appear that their actions bore a reasonable relationship to the compelling governmental interest.

If a vote-swap is an actual situation of “bartering” votes, it could be construed as conduct that the state can legitimately prohibit. However, as demonstrated above, nothing in this arrangement was truly bartered. Voters entered into a discussion and convinced one another to vote a certain way based on common political goals. The Court has drawn a distinction between entering into an exchange of this type and an illegal exchange by distinguishing between voting based on a promise of public political action and voting based on an illegal exchange for “private profit.”

There can be no determination, or even serious assertion, that anyone entered into a vote-swap arrangement for private profit or any other form of enrichment. Perhaps if the “vote-swap” sites been more correctly named “vote consensus” sites, or “vote strategically” sites, they would have

547. See supra Part III.
549. Letter from Bill Bradbury to website operators (Nov. 2, 2000) (on file with author).
550. Email from California Secretary of State to operator of Vote-swap 2000 (forwarded Nov. 1, 2000) (on file with author).
551. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (restriction of campaign contributions is justified by the need to prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption in the electoral process).
552. Id.
553. Brown, 456 U.S. at 55 (soliciting an agreement to vote for pecuniary gain is an illegal exchange due to its relationship to private profit).
passed by unnoticed. “Barter” only exists in this situation as a matter of semantic misfortune. The trades are unenforceable, confer no private benefit, and do not transfer anyone’s voting authority.\(^{554}\) To the contrary, these websites and their users engaged in political speech and association, which is protected by the First Amendment.\(^{555}\)

b. Compelling Interest? Protecting the Duopoly

In \textit{Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party},\(^{556}\) the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law banning “fusion parties.”\(^{557}\) Fusion is “the nomination by more than one political party of the same candidate for the same office in the same general election.”\(^{558}\) In \textit{Timmons}, a minor political party, the “New Party,” sought to nominate Andy Dawkins as its candidate for state representative, but he was already on the ballot as a candidate under the banner of another party.\(^{559}\) Minnesota election officials refused to accept the nomination because of a Minnesota statute which stated: “No individual shall be named on any ballot as the candidate of more than one major political party.”\(^{560}\)

The New Party filed suit, claiming that the Minnesota ban unconstitutionally infringed on its members’ right to free association.\(^{561}\) The Court held that while the Minnesota ban did affect the New Party’s members’ right to free association, it did so in service of compelling governmental interests of “ballot integrity” and “political stability.”\(^{562}\)

Some of the Court’s reasoning is inapplicable to the online vote-pairing model. For example, the Court considered the Minnesota arguments that fusion tickets could exploit the ballot in misleading ways:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(554\) Brief for Plaintiffs at 5, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (quoting Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1338–48 (2000)).
  \item \(555\) Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 660–61 (“[The Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
  \item [W]ithout free speech and assembly[,] discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. \textit{Id}.
  \item \(556\) 520 U.S. 351 (1997). For an excellent criticism of \textit{Timmons}, see \textit{Duopoly}, supra note 407.
  \item \(557\) \textit{Id}. at 369–70.
  \item \(558\) Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197–98 (8th Cir. 1996).
  \item \(559\) \textit{Timmons}, 520 U.S. at 354.
  \item \(560\) \textit{Id}.; \textit{MINN. STAT.} § 204B.04 (1991).
  \item \(561\) \textit{Timmons}, 520 U.S. at 355.
  \item \(562\) \textit{Id}. at 370.
\end{itemize}
Petitioners contend that [a] candidate or party could easily exploit fusion as a way of associating his or its name with popular slogans and catchphrases. For example, members of a major party could decide that a powerful way of “sending a message” via the ballot would be for various factions of that party to nominate the major party’s candidate as the candidate for the newly-formed “No New Taxes,” “Conserve Our Environment,” and “Stop Crime Now” parties.563

The Court also considered Minnesota’s argument that fusion parties might allow new minor parties artificially to gain popularity by affiliating themselves with a popular candidate and bootstrapping that candidate’s appeal onto their own group.564

Neither of these arguments applies to online vote-pairing because vote-pairing does not affect nominations or the ballot. Nonetheless, the Court’s determination that states possess a “strong interest in the stability of their political systems” is problematic and could be a constitutional sticking point should online vote-pairing come before the Court.565 Specifically, the Court determined that “[t]he Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party system.”566

The Court concluded that the Minnesota statute did not create a severe burden and accordingly did not apply strict scrutiny.567 Instead, the Court applied a lesser standard which merely required that “the asserted regulating interests are sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation on the party’s rights.”568 The Court concluded that “the burdens Minnesota’s fusion ban imposes on the New Party’s associational rights are justified by

563. Id. at 365.
564. Id. at 366.
565. Id. at 367.
566. Id.
567. The fact that the Supreme Court relied on dicta to create new law with potentially expression-stifling consequences is better discussed by Richard Hasen in Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1997). Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364. Id. at 307 (citing and quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The stabilizing effects of [a two-party] system are obvious.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144–45 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government.”); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 532 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Broad-based political parties supply an essential coherence and flexibility to the American political scene.”).)
568. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted).
correspondingly weighty valid state interests in ballot integrity and political stability."

The implication of *Timmons* for online vote-pairing is obvious. Online vote-pairing and Minnesota fusion parties are quite factually distinct. But, if a state regulator switched gears and relied on the interest of political stability instead of relying on the justification that their actions were taken to protect the electoral process from corruption, then this *could* be a constitutional sticking point for a challenger of such a prohibition.

4. *The Offending Secretaries of States’ Actions Were Not the Least Restrictive Method of Serving the Governmental Interest*

Prohibiting vote-pairing websites in order to prevent corruption in the political process is misguided. The secretaries relied upon statutory provisions against the exertion of undue influence upon a voter or the voting process. Were these agreements in some manner enforceable, then the voters who entered into them would enter the polls subject to the external influence of an enforceable contract preventing them from voting according to their own political beliefs. Even content-based restrictions on political speech in a public forum would be permissible if this were the case.

However, the agreements were in no manner binding or enforceable. Upon entry into the voting booth, voters were motivated only by their conscience and self-interest. There can be no valid determination that any vote-swapper entered the voting booth compelled to vote by any motivation other than the desire to achieve his or her own personal political goals.

Not only did the threats of prosecution place an unnecessary burden on providers of protected content but such threats did not effectively address the harm they sought to prevent. The government bears the burden of demonstrating that the regulation will in fact address the problem of corruption of the electoral process. Since all the sites were only putting individuals in contact with one another by email, an allegation of coercion

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569. *Id.* at 369–70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
570. Although this theory has not been tested, it is the author’s opinion that this sticking point would be forced to yield to the contrarian view due to the great factual distinctions between fusion parties and online vote-pairing coalitions.
572. *See* *Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (government bears the burden of demonstrating that its restrictions will prevent the alleged harms in a direct and material way).
is fanciful at best. Had the contact taken place in close proximity to the polling place, the analysis might be different, but absent this kind of direct coercion and considering the voluntary nature of participation in the program, governmental regulation of vote solicitation was an impermissible burden on speech.

V. ETHICAL ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

The majority of this study is devoted to the question of whether online vote-pairing is legal and constitutionally protected. However, to end the inquiry with a legal conclusion leaves the study incomplete. There are an ample number of practices that involve legal behavior that is not necessarily ethical. For example, an attorney who leaves no stone unturned when representing a client, who follows a research thread to an absurd extent, and who is motivated more by a desire to pad his timesheet than by a desire to provide the client with zealous representation is not breaking the law. Absent fraud, no criminal or civil sanctions await the attorney, although the state bar may elect to take professional disciplinary action.

Despite the legal ramifications or constitutionality of online vote-pairing, no discussion of this phenomenon is complete without an examination of the ethics of bringing together cyberspace, the Electoral College, and the building of a political party.


B. The Issue is Rampant With Bias 577

Like the Bush v. Gore Supreme Court decision, the divergent opinions over the ethics of vote-pairing are determined almost solely on the basis of the political sympathy of the official giving the opinion. The chart on the following page displays each election official responsible for comments or action regarding vote-pairing sites, his or her party affiliation (if known), his or her position on vote-pairing, whether action was taken against vote-pairing sites, and whether the official correctly applied the state’s election law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Position on Vote-pairing</th>
<th>Action on Vote-pairing</th>
<th>Correct Application of Election Law?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>No 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Not Analyzed</td>
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<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Not Analyzed</td>
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<td>OR</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Threat/Aborted</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

577. In the interest of full disclosure, the author will reveal his political biases. The author’s parents are two of five registered republicans in their voting district in Massachusetts. The author’s father calls refers to the author as “that goddamned liberal.” Despite this fact, the author is a registered Republican and served as a volunteer for the 2000 McCain presidential campaign. The author supported Bill Weld (R), Paul Celucci (R), and Mitt Romney (R) for Governor of Massachusetts. The author wrote himself in for President in 1992 and 1996 in unsuccessful bids for the White House. Therefore, the author considers himself to have been unbiased as far as a preference for or against either major party in the 2000 presidential election. He was equally disgusted by both.

578. Although Kansas law is not analyzed in this study, the Secretary of State himself admitted no knowledge of an applicable law. Another Lost Cause, TOPEKA CAP. J., Nov. 6, 2000, at A11; Vote Trading Lambasted, at http://www.kansas.com/arch/2000fall/11_02_00/news/votetradecom (now defunct) (on file with author).
Although far from scientific, the above chart shows that party affiliation was the greatest indicator of whether a state election official would move against online vote-pairing. Maine’s Democratic Secretary of State commented that online vote-pairing was a “provocative use” of new media;\(^\text{579}\) meanwhile, Minnesota’s Republican Secretary of State melodramatically stated, “Vote-swapping undercuts the fundamental tenets that hold our country together.”\(^\text{580}\)

This is not to suggest that the Republican Party engaged in an anti-First Amendment conspiracy. The author predicts that had the tables been reversed and a Libertarian-Republican coalition formed on the Internet, Democratic secretaries of state would have been just as vigorous in their opposition to online vote-pairing.

As the above chart indicates, several state election officials expressed the opinion that vote-pairing was illegal or unethical. In sharp contrast, the popular media had very few commentators who spoke ill of the new practice. The critics included a student at the University of West Virginia who wrote an editorial in the school newspaper which stated that “[s]ociety has gone way too far this time. By encouraging this type of behavior, how will this [2000] election’s outcome be one of truth?”\(^\text{581}\) Ken Layne wrote in the \textit{USC Annenberg Online Journalism Review}, “[vote-pairing is] a terrific plan, equally useful for a Buchanan fan who lives in a battleground state where Dubya needs all the votes he can muster.”\(^\text{582}\)

Nebraska’s Republican Secretary of State, Scott Moore, who refrained from trying to subdue the vote-pairing practice, added “I’m not saying it’s


\(^{580}\) See Press Release, Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer Asks Vote Swap Web Sites to “Cease and Desist” in Minnesota, Minnesota Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/office/voteswap%2011-1-00.doc (last visited July 7, 2003).


right, I’m just not saying there is any illegal activity in this one.”

The only author to date, with the exception of the author of this work, who has commented in any way on the ethical implications of this practice in a scholarly journal is Jesse Sisgold of the University of California at Hastings. Sisgold wrote: “Vote-swapping gives citizens a chance to say more precisely what they think about the country’s politics. This is good for democracy.” However, Sisgold did not elaborate.

C. Vote-Pairing in Other Contexts

As online vote-pairing is a new phenomenon, there are few commentaries on the ethics of the practice. To evaluate the ethical implications of the practice, this study analyzes analogous behavior.

The words “vote-swapping” conjure up images of Franco-Russo collusion in the 2002 Winter Olympics; therefore, this Part will discuss this subject and its ethical implications. This Part will follow up with a discussion of vote-pairing among appellate judges and politicians, studying the ethical implications of vote-trading in each specific context. The eventual goal is to draw some kind of parallel to high-tech political vote-pairing.

1. Vote-Pairing Among Olympic Judges

After the 2002 Winter Olympics, the very term “vote-swapping” conjures images of wrongdoing. In the 2002 Winter Olympics, French figure-skating judge Marie-Reine Le Gougne voted for a Russian pairs team over a Canadian couple, despite what many believed to be the clear superiority of the Canadian pair. Following the public outcry, Alimzan Tokhtakhounov was arrested in Italy on U.S. charges, after being accused of being behind the scheme to get Gougne to vote for the Russian pairs team, in exchange for a Russian judge’s vote for the French ice-dancing team. The controversy resulted in two gold medals being awarded for

584. Sisgold, supra note 73, at 167.
585. Id.
588. See id.
the same event—one to the Russian pair and the other to the Canadian pair. The International Skating Union quickly proposed reforms to reduce the possibility of vote-pairing from figure skating.

There is little debate as to the ethical implications of the Franco-Russian collusion in the Olympic games. The proper objective of a figure skating judge is to evaluate the ability of the skater to the best of his or her ability and judge the performance in a fair and unbiased manner. Any collusion or vote-pairing in this context is improper and unethical.

2. Vote-Pairing and the Judiciary

The mere suggestion that appellate judges might engage in vote-pairing draws criticism from some of the highest echelons of legal punditry. Richard Posner strongly condemned any suggestion of the practice. Einer Elhauge wrote, “[u]nder prevailing ethical norms judges cannot engage in the sort of logrolling that legislators commonly employ.”

Despite some minority views to the contrary, the dominant belief is that appellate judges will vote on legal principle and “not trade votes as though they were so many horses at a swap meet.” Although no judge will likely admit it, Evan Caminker believes that on multi-member courts,

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589. See id.
591. See, e.g., Amy Shipley, Skating Dances Around Judges’ Choices, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 12, 2002 at D1 (reporting that national bias among skating judges has “drawn accusations ranging from cheating to poor sportsmanship.”); Vicki Michaelis, New Judging For Skating Still Leaves Room For Political Bias, USA TODAY, June 10, 2002, at 7C.
592. See, e.g., Chris Broussard, Shaky Calls Breed Talk of Conspiracies, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at D1 (discussing officiating in the NBA, “[T]he officials’ motives should not be in question,” said Stu Jackson, the N.B.A.’s senior vice president of basketball operations, “Their motives are very simple and very clear, and that is to administer the game safely and fairly with an eye on getting calls correct. That is their only motive.”).
595. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1826 n.164 (1992) [hereinafter Stout] (arguing that vote trading on multi-member courts helps to gauge the preferences of the justices and promotes stability of appellate voting and its accuracy in measuring group preferences, but acknowledging that the judicial appointment process may mean that not all subgroups of society are adequately represented.).
judges and justices routinely trade votes implicitly. This practice is completely unregulable by the legislature. The legislative branch only has the power to establish some rules of procedure.

Caminker wrote an exhaustive study of this phenomenon, which I will not endeavor to fully recap in this study. However, suffice it to say that Caminker’s conclusion was that vote-pairing in the judiciary is unethical. Professor Caminker feared that widely accepted vote-trading among judges might cause this to become the dominant means of deciding cases. Instead of using persuasion to lobby colleagues, judges would be in a constant state of barter for opinions. Caminker additionally feared that vote-trading on multi-member courts could create a “continual imbalance of judicial influence over discrete realms.” For example, if one group of justices had strong convictions about free speech issues but weak convictions about antitrust issues and another group of justices held opposite priorities, vote-swapping would allow the first group to dictate free speech doctrine and the second could dictate antitrust doctrine. This would create a departure from the appellate court’s equilibrium position with respect to these particular issues.

The proposition that judicial vote-pairing is improper and unethical is difficult to refute. Judicial opinions should reflect reasoned and learned judicial thought, borne of the maturation of their legal theory and collective decision-making by the judicial body. They should not reflect a mere measurement of the justices’ ability to cooperate. While debate and compromise are a normal exercise in any deliberative body, when a judge strays from application of the law in favor of expediency or collegiality, the judge strays from a proper judicial role.

598. See Michael S. Paulsen, Lawson’s Awesome, 18 Const. Commentary 231, 232 (2001) [hereinafter Paulsen] (“Congress simply has no power to pass any laws that affect the process of judicial case-deciding . . . ”).
599. Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297, 2380 (1999) (“While vote trading and other strategic maneuvers can plausibly be viewed as furthering legitimate judicial objectives, I have sketched a number of objections suggesting that vote trading nevertheless constitutes improper judicial behavior.”).
600. See id at 2373–74.
601. See id.
602. Id. at 2378.
603. See id.
604. See id.
605. See id.
606. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 596, at 139.
607. Id.
Despite Lynn Stout’s opinion to the contrary, the need for appellate judges to engage in vote-trading in order to help gauge judicial preferences is unnecessary. The ability of judges to render dissenting and concurring opinions assists not only the preference-gauging function, but allows the preferences of a minority justice to morph over time into the prevailing law. Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes brought more influence to the evolution of American jurisprudence than many justices brought in their entire careers. Where would American jurisprudence be had Holmes traded his vote in *Olmstead v. United States*? The case itself would have come out the same way, but the foundation of the law surrounding wiretapping would never have been built, and *Katz v. United States* might never have even been granted certiorari.

Closer to home in the vote-pairing context, Holmes and Brandeis both offered dissenting and concurring opinions, with no effect upon the outcome of the cases, in *Abrahms v. United States* (Holmes) and *Whitney v. California* (Brandeis joined by Holmes). These two pieces of uncontrolling dicta later became the foundations of First Amendment jurisprudence. Prior to Holmes’ dissent in *Abrahms*, John Stuart Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” theory had no place in jurisprudence. Now, the marketplace of ideas is firmly entrenched in the conscience of the American judiciary.

It is unlikely that any citizen would prefer to have his or her rights decided on the basis of a vote-trade rather than a reasoned examination of the actual merits of his or her case, especially when the outcome of the case could be incarceration, the death penalty, or a strong impact on civil rights. “[L]egislative-style ‘logrolling’ and negotiating would be reprehensible conduct in a judge and would violate the core principles governing the judicial role.” In fact, if there were a widespread

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608. Stout, supra note 595, at 1826 n.164.
610. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
612. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
613. 274 U.S. at 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
perception that appellate courts engaged in logrolling, the very legitimacy and effectiveness of the courts would be threatened. “[T]he Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”617 Would it be plausible to the nation to hear that First Amendment rights were rolled back because Justice Scalia owed Justice O’Connor a vote from a previous decision on maritime jurisdiction? It is most likely that the court would lose its air of legitimacy if it came with a perception that its decisions were made in any manner other than as a product of law.618

With regard to the judiciary, the rights of society, or at least the parties before the court, hang in the balance of the decision. In criminal cases, the defendant has a right to counsel and a right to an impartial jury.619 These values were established to safeguard the goal that the merits of the case should prevail on any given day.620 Given the potential for impact upon the rights of litigants and citizens alike, a judge should not depart from standard judicial procedure in the name of expediency or intra-court politics.

3. Vote-Pairing in the Political Arena

The framers of the Constitution would have recognized the practice of online vote-pairing as a modern equivalent of a procedure they affirmatively embraced at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.621 At the Convention, The Committee on Standing Rules and Orders originally held that delegates’ votes would be recorded and entered in the minutes of each meeting.622 However, at the urging of Rufus King and George Mason, this measure was revoked because of a fear that delegates would thereby be bound to their past statements, thus stifling persuasive caucus and vote-pairing.623

617. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992); see also Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L. J. 703, 783 (1994) (adherence to established law provides the court with its legitimacy).
619. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
622. See id. at 301–02.
623. See id.
More than 200 years later, legislative vote-trading is part of the normal business of the United States Congress. In fact, both the federal and state legislative bodies are prime soil for cultivation of vote-trades. Legislative voting is public, thus easily-monitored, and retaliation for unreciprocated vote trades is simple and inexpensive. Of course, whether legislative vote-trading occurs is not the most relevant question. The question is: Is it ethical?

The Supreme Court of Mississippi has held that legislative vote-pairing is a normal, proper part of the legislative process. “Compromises are reached. Votes are traded; you vote for my bill and I’ll vote for yours.” Many judges and scholars agree that the very nature of the legislative process requires compromise, and in some cases, trading of votes. There are some political scientists who theorize that vote-trading actually creates value, allowing individuals to exchange sets of preferences for another, thus making all voters better off and none worse off.

There is no debate that a legislator or other public officeholder trading votes for personal gain is both illegal and unethical. However, even traditional compromise-based vote-pairing among politicians is not universally accepted. For example, Wisconsin and Washington have enacted statutes prohibiting lawmakers from agreeing to vote for their colleagues’ legislation in exchange for support on other initiatives.

627. Id.
629. See Baker, supra note 625, at 721.
630. See, e.g., Young v. Edwards, 207 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Mich. 1973) (vote trading impermissible where a legislator engages in it to gain a pay raise or a position); Raynovich v. Romanus, 299 A.2d 301, 308 (Penn. 1973) (Eagen, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Clapps, 512 A.2d 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (politicians charged with conspiracy, bribery, and ethics violations for trading votes for jobs); Wright v. State, 202 S.W. 236 (Ark. 1918) (trading votes for a promise to use political influence to bring about supporters’ nominations to public service positions).
Colorado goes one step further and prohibits legislative vote-trading under the State Constitution.633

Regardless of the jurisdiction’s legal posture toward legislative vote-trading, scholars and judges alike recognize that bargaining is a necessary component of the political process.634 However, the ethical line begins to blur when legislators are seen as supporting a bill out of a desire to serve themselves (perhaps supporting a colleague’s bill in exchange for that colleague’s support in gaining a committee seat). The ethical yardstick, when examining legislative behavior, is to decide whether the vote-trade was done for a corrupt reason. Of course, this then begs the question, what does “corrupt” mean?

“Attempts to cabin the definition of ‘corruptly’ within a single rule have proven unsatisfactory.”635 Judge Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit brings the reader through a minefield of definitions in his dissent in United States v. Dorri.636 Kozinski presents a collection of definitions from “done with the intent to secure an unlawful benefit either for oneself or for another,”637 to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word, referring to a wrongful design to acquire an advantage, pecuniary or otherwise.638 Finally, Kozinski settles on the premise that “corruptly” can only be defined on a case-by-case basis.639 Kozinski’s final thesis sounds a lot like the “I know it when I see it”640 test that Potter Stewart laid down in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio.641 Kozinski’s case-by-case basis conclusion raises some grave doubts. The jury instruction at issue in U.S. v. Dorri instructed the jurors that: “An act is ‘corruptly’ done if it is done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method with a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to one’s self or to another.”642

633. See COL. CONST. art. V, § 40 (prohibiting legislative vote-trading by constitutional mandate in Colorado).
635. See United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
636. Id.
637. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991)).
638. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (6th ed. 1990)).
639. Id.
641. Id.
642. Dorri, 15 F.3d at 890.
Under this instruction, unethical behavior would be punished, while unorthodox behavior done for an uncorrupt reason would not. The Colorado constitutional and Washington and Wisconsin statutory prohibitions against legislative vote-trading take all discretion over one method of compromise out of the hands of each legislator. 643 This is too harsh. If a legislator obeys the law but looks pragmatically beyond the result of an individual vote, seeking greater consensus-building and perhaps some other proper benefit to his constituents in the future, it cannot be considered to be "corrupt" and should likely not be considered "unethical." If a legislator exchanged a vote for a personal gain, pecuniary or otherwise, then the exchange would be corrupt and thus unethical. Absent corrupt intent or effect, therefore, a legislator building consensus should not be considered to be unethical.

D. Ethical Conclusion

The full ethical conclusion with regard to online vote-pairing is discussed in Part VI of this study, in conjunction with a legal conclusion on the issue. However, in the above examples, the overriding logic suggests that whether a vote-trade ventures into the realm of the unethical turns on whether the trade negatively impacts the rights of others, or whether it is somehow "corrupt."

VI. CONCLUSIONS

There are two questions that this study endeavors to answer. The first is whether vote-pairing is legal. To some extent, the individual state studies in Part III, supra, answer this question. However, the constitutional legal parachute must be opened and checked for holes. This Part begins by doing so. This Part then picks up where Part V ends and reconciles the ethical conclusion.

643. See supra Part III.
A. Legal Conclusion

The online vote-pairing phenomenon involved thousands of people nationwide gathering in the new town square to associate for the furtherance of a common political goal. California Secretary of State Bill Jones should have been aware of this fact, given the decision that he had just lost in California Democratic Party v. Jones. In that case, the United States Supreme Court gave Jones a civics lesson in interference with the right to political association:

Representative democracy in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views. . . . Consistent with this tradition, the Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects “the freedom to join together in furtherance of common political beliefs.”

Had thirty thousand people met in a convention hall to form a political coalition, few would question the meeting’s legality. In a less extreme example, had a husband and wife discussed their presidential preferences, discovered that they had opposite views, and thus decided to both refrain from voting, a prosecutor would certainly have had no place bringing the couple to court.

Nevertheless, the secretaries of state of California, Oregon, Florida, Arizona, and Wisconsin reacted to new technology by imperiling a fundamental constitutional right. However, the Constitution demands that government regulations that burden political speech and assembly rights must withstand some degree of scrutiny. The positions taken by the then secretaries of state would likely fail such scrutiny.

644. According to a study conducted by http://votetrader.org/results/ (last visited July 13, 2003), www.nadergore.com facilitated the pairing of 221 participants and had 314 individual visitors, www.nadergore.org had 300 participants and 1791 visitors, www.tradevotes.com had 310 participants and 1851 visitors, www.votexchange.com had 9698 participants and 58509 visitors, www.voteexchange.org had 692 participants and 88524 visitors, www.votewwap2000.com had 2500 participants and 29850 visitors, www.votewwap2000.net had 6325 participants and 37760 visitors, www.votetrader.org had 228 participants and 1486 visitors, www.votexchange2000.com had 3000 participants and 17910 visitors, and www.winwincampaign.org had 10251 participants and 60460 visitors. From this data, votetrader.org estimated that there were 36,025 participants. It is not far-fetched to theorize that some of the individual visitors also participated in vote-exchanges with other individuals without use of these websites as coordination engines.


646. Id. (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986)).

647. See supra Part III.
A citizen pledging to swap votes followed her conscience, un-polic ed and unobserved in the voting booth.\textsuperscript{648} Even Oregon officials admitted that there was no way to ascertain how another person voted.\textsuperscript{649} A citizen using a website to pledge a vote could have changed her mind, or may not even have been a citizen or a registered voter.\textsuperscript{650} Website users could have used fictitious or multiple email addresses or identities because information on the website and information concerning the entire arrangement is not verifiable.\textsuperscript{651} Even if the agreement could be verified, the end result is a vote cast to achieve a preferred political goal, albeit in a non-traditional manner. Before being threatened with prosecution, the websites that facilitated vote-swapping facilitated political association and speech.\textsuperscript{652} They asked a user a series of questions about her political goals and geographic location and then used that information to match her with another user who had complimentary political goals. Once so matched, the two voters could arrange coordinated political action.\textsuperscript{653}

Ultimately, what controls this issue is that vote-pairing is protected by the federal Constitution. Voting to achieve a political goal is the essence of democracy.\textsuperscript{654} The vote-pairing websites took the consensus-building aspect of the political meeting and political speech from the town hall and transferred it into cyberspace. That the political meeting and discussion took place in the digital world as opposed to a meeting room does not change the level of constitutional protection that should be afforded.\textsuperscript{655} While this phenomenon may have broken Duverger’s law\textsuperscript{656} and inverted his theories of strategic voting, no American law was broken. Online vote-pairing is legal and subject to the highest level of constitutional protection.

It is certain that no individual component of vote-pairing was illegal. When the user visited a vote-pairing site, the site would ask the voter his or her state of residence. Nothing illegal there. The next step was to ask

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{648} Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (on file with author).
\item \textsuperscript{649} Telephone interview with Jennifer Hertel, Program Representative, Oregon State Election Division (Nov. 6, 2000) (Hertel stated that the individual voters would be in violation of OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665 but acknowledged that there would be no practical way to prosecute individual voters due to the impossibility of verifying exactly how each voter cast his or her ballot).
\item \textsuperscript{650} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{651} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{652} Brief for Plaintiffs at 11, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (on file with author).
\item \textsuperscript{653} Id. at 7.
\item \textsuperscript{654} Cf. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988) (the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change is afforded the highest level of First Amendment protection).
\item \textsuperscript{655} See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (website content is afforded the same First Amendment protection as traditional print).
\item \textsuperscript{656} See supra Part II.
\end{itemize}
the voter about his or her preferences in the presidential race. Again, nothing illegal there. The next step was for the site to find someone with an analogous preference and match the two users up. At this point, the activity the users arranged was out of the site-operator’s hands. Each user in the pair would be sent the other’s email address, and if they were able to reach a level of trust and agreement, then they would agree to vote-pair. Conceivably, the two might not be able to agree, might not trust each other, or might decide that they preferred to discuss how to manufacture illegal drugs, engage in prostitution, or hatch a murder-for-hire plot. The sites had no control over what the two voters discussed. If they conspired to violate drug laws, then the paired voters committed a crime. But, no vote-pairing participant was accused of this. Vote-pairing participants were, after the sites put them in contact with each other, engaged in a private conversation, ostensibly about their support for a certain political ideology. To call this “illegal” is to toss aside any notion of freedom of association and freedom of speech.

If there were evidence that these sites were used primarily for illegal activity, or that they were intended to do so, the conclusion would be different. As discussed in Part III, individuals did attempt to sell their votes online during the 2000 election, although most examples were found to be hoaxes or practical jokes. It is clear that the above analysis does not apply to this kind of behavior. Every state election statute prohibits selling or offering to sell a vote for financial gain, and such an arrangement would be beyond the protections of the First Amendment.

B. Ethical Conclusion

Despite its clear legality, online vote-pairing was not without its detractors. In fact, Ralph Nader himself was an outspoken opponent of the practice. Nader said, “I like people to vote their conscience and vote for who they’d really like to be elected.” Other Greens echoed his sentiment. David Silva, a staunch Green Party member in Santa Cruz,

657. See, e.g., Stenger, Ebay, supra note 398 (quoting Maryland officials stating that offering to sell a vote was punishable by fines and imprisonment in Maryland); Stenger, Vote, supra note 398; Derfner, supra note 398 (reporting on voteauction.com); Abramson, supra note 398; Weber, supra note 398, at 14; Bechtold, supra note 398 (discussing the shutdown of voteauction.com).
658. See Brown, 456 U.S. at 55.
660. Id.
California called the practice “silly,” and “probably illegal . . . or it should be.”

However, aside from Nader, Silva, Oregon’s Democratic Secretary of State Bill Bradbury, a handful of Republican secretaries of state, an undergraduate student at West Virginia University, and the editorial board of The Grand Rapids Press, there were no published commentaries citing specific criticism of the movement.

The Grand Rapids Press ran the most articulate criticism of the practice in an editorial on November 4, 2000, stating: “The online dealmaking diminishes the American electoral process. Citizens should vote their convictions when they enter the voting booth, not close the deal on a brokered interstate agreement. Mr. Nader has said that specifically in urging his supporters to reject the temptation.”

Nader’s ire was understandable, in that Nader frequently was quoted as supporting neither Gore nor Bush, seeing no difference between them. Neither, the Grand Rapids Press, the undergraduate student, nor any one of the secretaries of state seemed to understand the practice and appeared to rely on the baggage-laden term “vote-swapping” as the ground upon which they rested their unsupported conclusions. The secretaries of state merely stated that the practice was “illegal” because it ran afoul of their states’ laws, but never elaborated.

Voting to achieve a political goal is the essence of democracy, and democracy is meaningless without the ability of citizens to assemble to promote their political views. The author questions whether such assembly approached unethical behavior, and if it does, questions what this means as far as an ethical analysis of all political organizations. In the Olympic vote-trading scandal, the skaters expected to be judged fairly, and the spectators expected to view a fairly judged competition. Without some

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662. A thorough search of online sources revealed no additional published commentaries criticizing the ethics of online vote-pairing.
663. Voting Your Conscience: Presidential Election Should not be Treated as a Swap Meet, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 4, 2000, at A12.
665. To the extent that they did, their statements are fully reported in Part III of this study, supra.
666. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421 (the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change is afforded the highest level of First Amendment protection).
fundamental level of impartiality and fairness, the entire process of judging the event becomes nonsensical.

With regard to the judiciary, again, the impact is upon the rights of the individual standing before the court and the rights of the citizenry bound by the case law the court can establish. Federal judges are appointed, ostensibly, for their legal expertise and their ability to judge the law and the facts fairly. Furthermore, a multi-judge court is established for the purpose of diluting each individual judge’s voice and to force the judges to debate and come up with the legally correct answer. Judges are fallible, but the belief is that, in the end, the adversarial process will create good law. Vote-pairing on judicial panels is clearly ethically corrupt because it reduces decisions impacting the rights of citizens to be judged impartially to a horse-trade which has the potential to send someone to prison (or roll back the rights of all citizens in the jurisdiction) based on factors extrinsic to the facts and the law of the case at bar.

The ethical analysis of vote-trading changes when it enters the political arena, both when it comes to a politician and an individual voter. Politicians and individual voters alike organize themselves politically on the basis of consensus. Politicians form coalitions and blocs while individuals organize themselves into political parties. Forming a coalition, political party, or voting bloc by necessity requires cooperation; however, the element of corruption, seeking improper gain in exchange for support, is different than establishing a political consensus.

Corruption would exist in a vote-trading arrangement if a politician traded his or her vote for a pecuniary gain or if a voter traded a vote for the same. This element is absent in the context of online vote-pairing as it appeared in the 2000 presidential election. The participants in the 2000 vote-swaps formed an online caucus to promote a Progressive-Democrat coalition that could be properly described as the first political coalition to exist solely in cyberspace.

The mere fact that a practice is legal or constitutionally protected does not always answer the question as to whether it is ethical. Both threads of logic run with each other in online vote-pairing. Online vote-pairing is
void of corrupt intent or outcome and is a perfectly ethical use of an individual’s personal political power.

C. Conclusion

With the sole exception of Jessica Funkhouse, State Election Director for Arizona, every state regulator who attempted to smother the online vote-pairing movement did so under an erroneous application of his or her state’s election law.  Although Funkhouse appears to have properly interpreted her state’s law, even her analysis fails to pass constitutional muster. High-tech strategic voting in the form of online vote-pairing was the world’s first online political coalition, and any attempt to stifle it runs afoul of the First Amendment.

Often First Amendment advocates find themselves with strange bedfellows. Nazis,673 Klansmen,674 and child pornographers675 are usually at the forefront of First Amendment debate. Online vote-pairing is not a case in which a First Amendment advocate must suspend ethical beliefs in order to support the greater good of free expression. Online vote-pairing is legal, ethical, and constitutionally protected.

The fact remains that online vote-pairing could have a significant impact on future elections. This study has examined the ramifications of the practice under state law, federal law, and under an ethical lens. However, questions remain for future study.

One frequent question raised in discussions about the topic is the subject of the faithless vote-pairing participant. Given that the process of online vote-pairing has no mechanism for enforcement of a promise, all participants trust other participants to live up to their promise. This speaks to the issue of should a voter participate in vote-pairing? This question is clearly beyond the scope of this study. This study is intended to analyze online vote-pairing under state election laws, constitutional analysis, and an ethical lens. Any suggestion that the practice should be outlawed because someone might participate dishonestly is laughable, and such an

672. See supra Part III.
675. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2001) (holding that a ban on “virtual child pornography” was unconstitutionally overbroad because it abridged the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech).
argument asserted by a state regulator would invite an amicus brief from Ebay’s general counsel.676 Stifling a means of communication because someone might use it to lie is as ludicrous as outlawing the telephone because people arrange illicit marital affairs over the phone lines.

This brings us to a follow-up question of is online vote-pairing a good idea? Again, this is a philosophical question that is beyond an examination of whether it is legal and ethical. Whether it is a good idea seems to turn on one’s personal views toward democracy. A Republican or a Democratic activist is unlikely to approve of a process that opens the political process to increased competition. Staunch Green Party supporters spoke out against the process, even as it stood to benefit their movement. However, the author’s instinct is that anything that brings another cart into the marketplace of ideas is good for democracy.

Off the philosophical bent and into the mechanical is the question: How does an online vote-pairing site affect a candidate’s disclosure requirements under state and federal campaign financing laws? Jeff Cardille, creator of one of the more popular vote-pairing sites, is reported to have spent $200 to post his site.677 Should either Al Gore or Ralph Nader have reported this as a campaign contribution?

Additional study should also be focused on online vote-pairing and its exacerbation of the technology gap. Does this practice, which requires access to a computer and Internet access, marginalize the poor? When online coalition politics requires an “entry fee” that many underprivileged voters cannot afford, is its goal of broadening participation in democracy frustrated by its very instrumentalities?

Another angle of study for this practice is its effect or use by minorities. Is online vote-pairing subject to abuse by racists? It is imaginable that (for example) racist voters on both sides of the Democrat-Republican divide could ally themselves against a minority candidate. On the other hand, minority voters on either side of the divide could bring themselves together in a coalition to increase minority participation in politics far beyond the hopes of Lani Guinier, without racial gerrymandering by state legislatures.678

676. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Fraud on EBay Lands Culprit in Jail, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 2 1999, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,7375,00.html (now defunct) (on file with author) (although the fraud culprit was prosecuted and incarcerated, not a single commentator suggested that Ebay should be shut down because users committed fraud on its system).
677. See Meg Kissinger, UW’s Student’s Web Site Promotes Vote Trading to Aid Nader, Gore, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 2000, at 1B, available at 2000 WL 26093361.
Of course, the very issue of online vote-pairing will (now that the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals has remanded the issue to a federal trial court) be the subject of continued litigation.\footnote{Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2003).} Where will that case end? Is a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in the future for high-tech coalition politics? If so, will the Supreme Court follow precedent and protect the right to political association on the Internet or will it create novel interpretations of federalism and equal protection as it did in \textit{Bush v. Gore}?\footnote{531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (majority’s position was clearly counter to notions of federalism, and the majority valued expediency over accuracy in tabulating votes).} Will a center-right coalition take advantage of the technology and turn the tables on Maine’s Democratic Secretary of State’s statement that this was a “provocative use of a new medium” to defeat a Democratic candidate?


As the 2004 election season dawns, and \textit{Porter v. Jones} winds its way through the courts,\footnote{See Porter v. Jones, 00-CV-11700 (On Dec. 12, 2003 Judge Kelleher entered a case management order that all law and motion matters, except for motions in limine, must be heard by May 17, 2004).} it is apparent that the other election controversy of Y2K is far from resolved. These questions can only be answered by the 2004 election, the eventual outcome of \textit{Porter v. Jones}, and further study of the issue.